Case 3:21-cv-01152-KAD Document 70 Filed 09/30/22 Page 1 of 13
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`DEL RIO, et al.,
`Plaintiffs,
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`v.
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`AMAZON.COM SERVICES, LLC, et al.,
`Defendants.
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
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`MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE: DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS (ECF
`NO. 37) & PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND (ECF NO. 63)
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`3:21-CV-01152 (KAD)
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`SEPTEMBER 30, 2022
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`Kari A. Dooley, United States District Judge:
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`Plaintiffs, Javier Del Rio, Colin Meunier, and Aaron Delaroche, bring this putative class
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`action against Defendants, Amazon.com Services, LLC, Amazon.com.dedc, LLC, and
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`Amazon.com, Inc. on behalf of themselves and similarly situated warehouse workers employed
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`by Defendants. Plaintiffs assert by way of an Amended Complaint two causes of action against
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`Defendants: (1) a failure to pay straight time wages in violation of Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 31-72; 31-
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`71b et seq. and Conn Agencies Regs. § 31-60-11; and (2) a failure to pay overtime wages in
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`violation of Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 31-68; 31-76b(2)(A) et seq. The gravamen of Plaintiffs’ Amended
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`Complaint is that Defendants required Plaintiffs to go through a mandatory security screening
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`process prior to leaving Defendants’ Connecticut facilities but failed to pay Plaintiffs their hourly
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`wage for the time it took to do so. Defendants moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint pursuant
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`to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), which Plaintiffs oppose. While the motion to dismiss was pending,
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`Plaintiffs moved for leave to file a Second Amended Complaint, which Defendants oppose. For
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`the reasons set forth below, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED in part. (ECF No. 37)
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`Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to amend is DENIED. (ECF No. 63)
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`Standard of Review
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`1
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`Case 3:21-cv-01152-KAD Document 70 Filed 09/30/22 Page 2 of 13
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`When deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court “must accept as true the
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`factual allegations in the complaint and draw all inferences in the plaintiff's favor.” Kinsey v. New
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`York Times Co., 991 F.3d 171, 174 (2d Cir. 2021) (quotation marks, alterations, and citation
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`omitted). To survive a motion to dismiss filed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the “complaint must ‘state
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`a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,’” setting forth “factual content that allows the court to
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`draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Kolbasyuk
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`v. Capital Mgmt. Servs., LP, 918 F.3d 236, 239 (2d Cir. 2019) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
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`550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). “The assessment of
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`whether a complaint's factual allegations plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief ‘does not
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`impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage; it simply calls for enough fact to raise a
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`reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of illegal’ conduct.” Lynch v. City of
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`New York, 952 F.3d 67, 75 (2d Cir. 2020) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). At this stage “the
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`court's task is to assess the legal feasibility of the complaint; it is not to assess the weight of the
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`evidence that might be offered on either side.” Id.
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`In general, the Court's review on a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) “is limited
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`to the facts as asserted within the four corners of the complaint. . . .” McCarthy v. Dun &
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`Bradstreet Corp., 482 F.3d 184, 191 (2d Cir. 2007); Peter F. Gaito Architecture, LLC v. Simone
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`Dev. Corp., 602 F.3d 57, 64 (2d Cir. 2010). “[I]f . . . matters outside the pleading are presented to
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`and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and
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`disposed of as provided in [Fed. R. Civ. P.] 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity
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`to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.” Glob. Network Commc'ns,
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`Inc. v. New York, 458 F.3d 150, 154–55 (2d Cir. 2006); Carter v. Stanton, 405 U.S. 669, 671
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`(1972) (per curiam); Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). “Federal courts have complete discretion to determine
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`2
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`Case 3:21-cv-01152-KAD Document 70 Filed 09/30/22 Page 3 of 13
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`whether or not to accept the submission of any material beyond the pleadings offered in
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`conjunction with a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. . . .” HB v. Monroe Woodbury Cent. Sch. Dist., No. 11-
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`CV-5881 CS, 2012 WL 4477552, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); Ware v. Associated Milk Producers, Inc.,
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`614 F.2d 413, 415 (5th Cir. 1980); Nutt v. Norwich Roman Cath. Diocese, 921 F. Supp. 66, 68 n.
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`1 (D. Conn. 1995); Galvin v. Lloyd, 663 F. Supp. 1572, 1575 (D. Conn. 1987).
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`Allegations
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`The Court accepts as true the allegations in Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint, which are
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`summarized as follows.
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`Defendant Amazon.com Services, LLC is a limited liability company organized and
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`existing under the laws of the state of Delaware, headquartered in Seattle, Washington. (Amended
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`Complaint, ECF No. 25 at ¶ 4) It is registered as a business with the Connecticut Secretary of State.
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`(Id.) Defendant Amazon.com.dedc, LLC is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of
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`the state of Delaware, headquartered in Seattle, Washington. (Id. at ¶ 5) Defendant Amazon.com,
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`Inc. is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the state of Delaware, headquartered
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`in Seattle, Washington. (Id. at ¶ 6) Defendants collectively own and operate approximately ten
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`facilities in Connecticut, to include “fulfillment centers,” “delivery stations,” and “sorting centers.”
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`(Id. at ¶ 7) Defendants employ warehouse workers at their Connecticut facilities, like Plaintiffs
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`Del Rio, Meunier, and Delaroche, who are not exempt from mandatory security screening protocol.
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`(Id. at ¶ 22)
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`Plaintiff Del Rio is an individual residing in New Haven, Connecticut. (Id. at ¶ 8) Del Rio
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`was employed by Defendants as a Packer at their North Haven, Connecticut facility from
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`November of 2020 to April of 2021. (Id.) Plaintiff Meunier is an individual residing in Royal Oak,
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`Michigan. (Id. at ¶ 9) Meunier was employed by Defendants as a Stower and Picker Packer at their
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`3
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`Windsor, Connecticut facility from May 29, 2018 until July 10, 2019. (Id.) Plaintiff Delaroche is
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`an individual residing in Granby, Connecticut. (Id. at ¶ 10) Delaroche was employed by
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`Defendants as a Stower, Packer, Line Straightener, and Induct at their Windsor, Connecticut
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`facility from November of 2019 until April of 2021. (Id.)
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`In conjunction with their employment, Defendants required Plaintiffs and similarly situated
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`non-exempt warehouse workers at their Connecticut facilities to go through a mandatory security
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`screening process prior to leaving the facilities at the end of their shift, or for their meal break. (Id.
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`at ¶ 24) As part of this screening process, Defendants required Plaintiffs to wait in lines leading
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`up to a security screening area and to proceed through a metal detector. (Id. at ¶¶ 25; 27) If the
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`metal detector’s alarm sounds, Defendants subjected Plaintiffs to individual searches conducted
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`by a security guard. (Id. at ¶ 28) Defendants also required all bags and personal items carried by
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`Plaintiffs to be individually searched by security guards. (Id. at ¶ 26) Defendants prohibited
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`Plaintiffs from leaving the facility until they have successfully completed the security screening
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`process, which routinely took between ten and twenty minutes.1 (Id. at ¶¶ 28–29) Moreover,
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`Plaintiffs allege that Defendants’ mandatory security screening process resulted in an automatic
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`thirty-minute deduction from their unpaid meal break.2 (Id. at ¶¶ 31–37)
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`Plaintiffs allege that Defendants agreed to compensate them and similarly situated non-
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`exempt warehouse workers at their Connecticut facilities based on an hourly rate for their time at
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`work. (Id. at ¶ 38) Notwithstanding, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants have not paid them for the
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`time elapsed between the conclusion of their shifts and the conclusion of the mandatory security
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`1 Plaintiff alleges that, with delays, the mandatory security screening process “could take over [twenty] minutes.” (Id.
`at ¶ 29)
`2 Plaintiff alleges that the mandatory security screening process during the unpaid meal break period routinely took
`seven to ten minutes to complete, and sometimes took over ten minutes with delays. (Id. at ¶ 36) Plaintiffs were not
`able to eat their meals during the mandatory security screening process. (Id. at ¶ 37)
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`4
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`screening process, or the time elapsed between the commencement of their unpaid meal period
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`and the conclusion of the mandatory security screening process. (Id. at ¶¶ 30; 38) Plaintiffs further
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`allege that, for some putative class members, a portion of the time spent in Defendants’ mandatory
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`security screening process qualified as overtime.3 (Id. at ¶ 39)
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`Plaintiffs bring this class action on behalf of themselves and all other putative class
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`members, which Plaintiffs define as follows: “All current and former employees of Defendants
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`who were employed as hourly, non-exempt warehouse workers in Connecticut at any time from
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`April 16, 2018 through the date of final judgment in this matter.” (Id. at ¶ 43) Plaintiffs allege that
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`the putative class members consist of “over 10,000 warehouse workers” employed by Defendants
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`at their Connecticut facilities. (Id. at ¶ 22).
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`Additional relevant facts shall be set forth below as necessary.
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`Discussion
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`Plaintiffs assert two causes of actions against Defendants based on their alleged failure to
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`pay earned wages. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege in support of both Counts that Defendants violated
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`Connecticut’s Minimum Wage Act by failing to compensate Plaintiffs and putative class members
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`for time spent undergoing mandatory security screening during their meal breaks and at the end of
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`their shifts. (ECF No. 25 at ¶¶ 50, 52) Defendants have moved to dismiss Count One in its entirety
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`and Count Two with respect to Plaintiffs Del Rio and Meunier. The Court addresses each argument
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`in turn.
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`Count One
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`In Count One of the Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs claim that Defendants failed to pay
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`their straight time wages “in violation of Connecticut’s Minimum Wage Act,” Conn. Gen. Stat. §§
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`3 For example, Plaintiffs Meunier and Delaroche allege that some time they spent waiting in Defendants’ mandatory
`security screening process qualifies as overtime. (Id. at ¶¶ 40–41)
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`5
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`31-72; 31-71b et seq. and Conn Agencies Regs. § 31-60-11. (Emphasis added) Defendants argue
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`that Count One must be dismissed in its entirety because it is premised on a right to straight time
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`pay “that does not exist under Connecticut’s Minimum Wage Act and because the Connecticut
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`Supreme Court has held that § 31-72 is a mechanism to enforce existing wage obligations,” and
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`“does not create a substantive right to wages.”4 (ECF No. 37-1 at 1, 5) The crux of Defendants’
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`argument is that “Plaintiffs failed to allege . . . an agreement [setting forth wage obligations] and
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`breach of that agreement.” (ECF No. 41 at 1) In other words, although Defendants concede that §
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`31-72 “exists to enforce wage agreements,” (ECF No. 37-1 at 4), Defendants argue that Plaintiffs
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`have not sufficiently alleged any wage agreement that was breached which would entitled them to
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`straight time pay for non-overtime hours. Instead, Defendants note that Plaintiffs’ allegations in
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`Count One specifically allege that they “violated [Connecticut’s Minimum Wage Act] by failing to
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`compensate Plaintiffs.” (ECF No. 25 at ¶ 50) Defendants particularly “[u]nderscore[] that
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`Plaintiffs’ § 31-72 claim is based on [Connecticut’s Minimum Wage Act], rather than an
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`agreement to pay wages.” (ECF No. 41 at 1)
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`In response, Plaintiffs identify the allegations set forth in their Amended Complaint which
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`state that Defendants “agreed to pay Plaintiffs an hourly rate for the hours they work.” (ECF No.
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`25 at ¶ 38) Plaintiffs argue that this allegation reasonably supports the inference that Defendants
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`breached a wage agreement which entitles them to straight time pay for non-overtime hours. While
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`the Court agrees with Defendants that § 31-72 is a mechanism by which to enforce wage
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`agreements, the Court agrees with Plaintiffs that the allegations plausibly allege such an agreement
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`and a breach of the agreement by Defendants. In addition to the allegation that Defendants agreed
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`4 See also (ECF No. 37-1 at 6) (“[T]here is no actionable claim for straight time pay for non-overtime hours . . . under
`[Connecticut’s] Minimum Wage Act. . . . [Section 21-72 contains] no mention of a duty to pay employees straight
`time wages for non-overtime hours.”).
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`6
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`Case 3:21-cv-01152-KAD Document 70 Filed 09/30/22 Page 7 of 13
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`to pay Plaintiffs an hourly wage for the hours worked, the Amended Complaint alleges that
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`“Defendants did not pay Plaintiffs . . . [the] compensable work time” involved in the mandatory
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`security screening process. (Id. at ¶ 2) Defendants’ narrow focus on the failure to allege an
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`agreement to compensate Plaintiffs for the time spent complying with the mandatory security
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`screenings misses the point. Plaintiffs allege that insofar as the process was mandatory, it falls
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`within the agreement to pay Plaintiffs their hourly wage for however long the process took.
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`Accordingly, drawing all reasonable inferences in Plaintiffs’ favor as the Court must,
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`Kinsey, 991 F.3d at 174, and all reasonable inferences that Defendants are liable for the misconduct
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`alleged, Kolbasyuk, 918 F.3d at 239, the Court finds that the Amended Complaint reasonably
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`supports the inference that Defendants violated § 31-72 on the basis of their breach of the
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`agreement to pay hourly compensation to Plaintiffs for the hours they worked. Accordingly,
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`Defendants’ motion to dismiss Count One for failure to state a claim is denied.
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`Counts One and Two—Plaintiff Meunier
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`Alternatively, Defendants assert an affirmative defense to Counts One and Two with
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`respect to Plaintiff Meunier, specifically, that “Plaintiff Meunier’s claims are barred by a general
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`release he signed over seven months after the conclusion of his employment, while represented by
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`counsel in this case.” (ECF No. 37 at 1) Plaintiff Meunier previously sued Defendant Amazon.com
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`Services, LLC for disability discrimination. In resolving the litigation, Plaintiff Meunier signed
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`the general release now relied upon in Defendants’ affirmative defense. In support of this
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`argument, Defendants attach two documents to their 12(b)(6) motion: (1) a September 2, 2021
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`declaration of Defendants’ Human Resources Manager, Emily Kidder; and (2) a 2020 settlement
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`agreement and general release between Plaintiff Meunier, Defendant Amazon.com Services, LLC,
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`and “each of its divisions, affiliates, parents, subsidiaries and operating companies” (“Release”).
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`(ECF No. 37-2) In response, Plaintiffs contest the legal and factual applicability of the Release to
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`the claims asserted in the Amended Complaint. As a factual matter, Plaintiff Meunier submits that
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`it was not the parties’ intention to release any wage claims at the time he settled his disability
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`discrimination claim. (ECF No. 39 at 9–10) In support of this argument, Plaintiffs submit an
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`October 22, 2021 declaration of Plaintiff Meunier’s former attorney who represented him in the
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`disability discrimination claim, Thomas J. Durkin. (ECF No. 39-1) As a legal matter, Plaintiff
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`Meunier argues that Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-72 renders the release unenforceable as to his wage
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`claims. (ECF No. 39 at 10–18)
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`Defendants’ argument with respect to Plaintiff Meunier relies on extraneous documents
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`outside the pleadings—the release itself and the affidavit of Ms. Kidder. As discussed, “[f]ederal
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`courts have complete discretion to determine whether or not to accept the submission of any
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`material beyond the pleadings offered in conjunction with a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. . . .” Monroe
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`Woodbury Cent. Sch. Dist., 2012 WL 4477552, at *4; Ware, 614 F.2d at 415. Here, the parties
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`offer competing factual narratives regarding the scope of the Release and its applicability to
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`Plaintiff Meunier’s unpaid wage claims. On this record, the Court elects not to accept these
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`extraneous documents and affidavits, thus converting the motion to one for summary judgment
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`Galvin v. Lloyd, 663 F. Supp. 1572, 1575 (D. Conn. 1987). These issues are better addressed after
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`discovery has been completed and the facts fully developed. Accordingly, limiting its analysis to
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`the four corners of the Amended Complaint and for the reasons articulated above, the motion to
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`dismiss Plaintiff Meunier’s unpaid wage claims in Counts One and Two is denied.
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`Count Two—Plaintiff Del Rio
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`In Count Two of the Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs claim that Defendants failed to pay
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`their overtime wages in violation of Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 31-68; 31-76b(2)(A) et seq. Defendants
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`Case 3:21-cv-01152-KAD Document 70 Filed 09/30/22 Page 9 of 13
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`argue that Count Two must be dismissed with respect to Plaintiff Del Rio because he “fails to
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`identify any workweek during which he worked over [forty] hours and passed through security
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`while exiting [Defendants’] facility to support his claim for overtime wages.” (ECF No. 37 at 1)
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`In response, Plaintiffs clarify that “Plaintiff Del Rio does not assert that he is owed overtime
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`wages.” (ECF No. 39 at 9) Any claim for unpaid overtime wages set forth in Court Two by Plaintiff
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`Del Rio is dismissed.
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`Motion for Leave to Amend
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`On August 26, 2022, Plaintiffs moved for leave to file a Second Amended Complaint
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`pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). Defendants oppose Plaintiffs’ motion.
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`“[A] party may amend its pleading only with the opposing party's written consent or the
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`court's leave. The court should freely give leave when justice so requires.” Metzler Inv. Gmbh v.
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`Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc., 970 F.3d 133, 142 (2d Cir. 2020) (citing Rule 15(a)(2)). “‘In the
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`absence of any apparent or declared reason,’ including ‘undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive
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`on the part of the movant, . . . the leave sought should, as the rules require, be freely given.’”
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`Hannah v. Walmart Stores, Inc., 803 F. App'x 417, 422 (2d Cir. 2020) (citing Foman v. Davis, 371
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`U.S. 178, 182 (1962)). “[I]t is within the sound discretion of the district court to grant or deny
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`leave to amend.” WGH Commc'ns, Inc. v. Penachio Malara LLP, No. 21-570-CV, 2022 WL
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`569665, at *1 (2d Cir. Feb. 25, 2022). However, “[w]here a scheduling order has been entered, the
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`lenient standard under Rule 15(a) . . . must be balanced against the requirement under Rule 16(b)
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`that the Court’s scheduling order ‘shall not be modified except upon a showing of good cause.’”
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`Grochowski v. Phoenix Constr., 318 F.3d 80, 86 (2d. Cir. 2003).
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`“Leave may be denied for good reason, including futility, bad faith, undue delay, or undue
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`prejudice to the opposing party.” TechnoMarine SA v. Giftports, Inc., 758 F.3d 493, 505 (2d Cir.
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`Case 3:21-cv-01152-KAD Document 70 Filed 09/30/22 Page 10 of 13
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`2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). Regarding undue delay, “[t]he party seeking leave to
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`amend [] has the burden to explain the delay and show why an amendment is warranted.” Boudreau
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`v. Gonzalez, No. 3:04CV1471 (PCD), 2006 WL 8446804, at *2 (D. Conn. Oct. 24, 2006). “[T]he
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`longer the period of an unexplained delay, the less will be required of the nonmoving party in
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`terms of a showing of prejudice.” Messier v. Southbury Training Sch., No. 3:94-CV-1706 (EBB),
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`1999 WL 20907, at *3 (D. Conn. Jan. 5, 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted). “In determining
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`what constitutes prejudice, we generally consider whether the assertion of the new claim or defense
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`would (i) require the opponent to expend significant additional resources to conduct discovery and
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`prepare for trial; (ii) significantly delay the resolution of the dispute; or (iii) prevent the plaintiff
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`from bringing a timely action in another jurisdiction.” Monahan v. New York City Dep't of Corr.,
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`214 F.3d 275, 284 (2d Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). Importantly, though, “[m]ere
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`delay . . . absent a showing of bad faith or undue prejudice, does not provide a basis for a district
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`court to deny the right to amend.” State Teachers Ret. Bd. v. Fluor Corp., 654 F.2d 843, 856 (2d
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`Cir. 1981).
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`Here, Plaintiffs seek to further amend their Amended Complaint to, inter alia, “clarify that
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`their lawsuit seeks back wages for “all” time the class was required to remain on the premises from
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`clock out to swipe out (i.e., exit) to undergo security screening procedures.”5 (ECF No. 63 at 2)
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`Specifically, Plaintiffs’ proposed amendment seeks to expand the mandatory screening process for
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`which Plaintiffs seek compensation to “[t]he time spent walking to the screening area, going
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`through the screening process, going to lockers to retrieve personal belongings and exiting the
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`5 Plaintiffs also seek to further amend their Amended Complaint “to limit the class to just the hourly workers at
`Defendants’ BDL2 and BDL3 facilities, limit their claim for unpaid time from 10–20 minutes per shift to 2–6 minutes
`per shift, . . . limit the class period to March 15, 2020 when Defendants altered their security screening procedures in
`response to the COVID-19 Pandemic, . . . clarify that Defendants’ ‘agreement’ to pay them for all their work is not in
`writing, and to plead more specifically which workweeks Plaintiffs Meunier and Delaroche worked overtime.” (Id. at
`1–2)
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`building.” (ECF No. 63-2 ¶¶ 2, 28, 47, 49) Plaintiffs aver that the proposed amendments do not
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`add additional facts and will not require additional discovery or delays to the proceedings. (ECF
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`No. 63 at 2) To the contrary, Defendants decry Plaintiffs’ untimely amendment as an attempt to
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`significantly alter the nature and scope of the relief sought. (ECF No. 67 at 4–5) Specifically,
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`Defendants assert that Plaintiffs have belatedly sought to include not only the time spent clearing
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`the mandatory security screening process, but also the time spent walking to the security screening
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`area; walking to the lockers or break room to collect personal belongings and walking to the exit
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`of the facility at which point the employees “swipe out” of the facility. (Id.) Defendants argue that
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`the information needed to assert such claims was in Plaintiffs’ possession before the filing of the
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`original Complaint and/or shortly thereafter, and that it is only after discovery has demonstrated
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`the weakness of their claims that Plaintiffs seek to expand their claims.6 (Id.) Finally, Defendants
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`assert that it will suffer prejudice if Plaintiffs are permitted to amend the Complaint at this late—
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`post discovery—juncture. (Id.) The Plaintiffs filed a reply to the Defendants’ opposition in which
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`they contest any assertion that the Defendants will be prejudiced by the amendment and reiterate
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`that the clarification is not an effort to expand the Plaintiffs’ claims. (ECF No. 69)
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`The Court agrees with Defendants that the motion should be denied because Plaintiffs have
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`not offered any sound reason for the delay in asserting this expanded wage claim and to allow the
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`amendment would be unduly prejudicial to Defendants. See Foman, 371 U.S. at 182. The deadline
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`for Plaintiff to move to amend the pleadings was November 30, 2021. The motion to amend is
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`clearly untimely. Further, the parties agreed in the Rule 26(f) Report that motions filed after
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`November 30, 2021 “will require, in addition to any other requirements under the applicable rules;
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`6 Defendants also assert that Plaintiffs attempt to alter the legal theory under which they proceed by making explicit
`that the agreement to pay hourly wages was not in writing. (Id.) As the Court has already denied the motion to amend
`the wage claims, the Court does not address this alternative basis upon which to deny the motion to amend.
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`a showing of good cause for the delay.” (ECF No. 38 at 5) If, as Plaintiffs asserted, the proposed
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`amendment narrowed the issues and “clarified” Plaintiffs’ claims, the prejudice to Defendants
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`would be de minimus or nonexistent and the delay would be of no moment. But this proposed
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`amended complaint marks a significant shift in the nature and scope of the litigation; is based upon
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`information which Plaintiffs themselves would have had based on their work experience or which
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`they received early on in the discovery process; and Plaintiffs offer no satisfactory explanation as
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`to why the amendment was not timely sought.
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`Plaintiffs assert that they only recently discovered that Defendants understood their claims
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`to be premised solely on unpaid time spent undergoing the security screening process and
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`summarily asserts that the Amended Complaint has always included “clock out” to “swipe out”
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`time. In other words, Plaintiffs assert there was no delay in bringing the claim because the claim
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`was already included in the Amended Complaint and the proposed Second Amended Complaint
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`simply clarifies as much. The Court rejects this assertion and disagrees that the Amended
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`Complaint can fairly be read to include a claim for unpaid time following completion of the
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`screening process. It repeatedly references only the time spent undergoing the mandatory screening
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`process; it makes no reference to any post-screening time spent collecting personal belongings or
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`exiting the facility thereafter. Indeed, the proposed Second Amended Complaint redefines the
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`mandatory security screening process to include walking to the security area,7 waiting in lines
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`leading up to the screening area, going to a locker room to retrieve personal belongings, and exiting
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`the facility. As this claim was not previously asserted, the proposed amendment is untimely, and
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`significantly so.
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`7 The Court agrees with Plaintiffs that to the extent Plaintiffs clocked out prior to undergoing the screening process,
`the time needed to travel from the place where they clocked out to the security screening area is fairly contained within
`the claims in the Amended Complaint.
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`Case 3:21-cv-01152-KAD Document 70 Filed 09/30/22 Page 13 of 13
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`Further, Defendants’ have demonstrated prejudice if the amendment were to be granted.
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`Discovery as to liability and individual damages of the named Plaintiffs will close on November
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`1, 2022. The deadline for filing motions for summary judgment is looming. The proposed
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`amendment, as discussed above marks a significant shift in the scope of the Plaintiffs’ wage claims
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`and it is unclear whether further inquiry regarding post-screening activities by Plaintiffs or putative
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`class members through additional discovery would be required. Moreover, by expanding the
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`claims to include unpaid time following completion of the screening process, the proposed
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`amendment potentially expands the size of the putative class seeking compensation for unpaid
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`overtime in Count Two. On balance, the Court concludes that it would be unfairly prejudicial to
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`permit the proposed Second Amended Complaint and Plaintiffs have not established good cause
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`for the same. See Werking v. Andrews, 526 Fed. Appx. 94, 96 (2d Cir. 2013); Grochowski, 318
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`F.3d at 86.8
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`Conclusion
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`For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED in part. Plaintiffs’
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`motion for leave to amend is DENIED.
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`SO ORDERED at Bridgeport, Connecticut, this 30th day of September 2022.
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` /s/ Kari A. Dooley
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`KARI A. DOOLEY
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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`8 To the extent Plaintiffs intend to redefine the class—drop Del Rio as a Plaintiff; or limit the scope of the claims in
`the Amended Complaint—these goals can be achieved either during summary judgment or class certification briefing.
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`13
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`