Case 3:24-cv-00050-VAB Document 22 Filed 04/25/25 Page 1 of 14
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
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`WILLIAM SCALES,
`Plaintiff,
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`WEBSTER BANK, N.A.,
`Defendant.
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`v.
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`No. 3:24-cv-50 (VAB)
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`RULING AND ORDER ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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`William Scales (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se, has sued Webster Bank, N.A. (“Webster
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`Bank” or “Defendant”) for breach of contract, negligence, and spoliation of documents based on
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`Webster Bank’s denial of his business loan application. Compl., ECF No. 1 at 2, 7 (Aug. 25, 2023)
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`(“Compl.”)
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`Webster Bank has moved for summary judgment. Mot. for Summ. J., ECF No. 20-5 (Feb.
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`19, 2025) (“Mot. for Summ. J.”)
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`For the following reasons, Webster Bank’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.
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`I.
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`FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
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`A. Factual Background1
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`On or around December 10, 2021, Taskem Corporation, a company Mr. Scales owns,
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`applied for an SBA Express Line of Credit loan application of up to $250,000 from Webster Bank.
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`1 The factual allegations are taken from the Defendant’s Local Rule 56(a)1 Statement and supporting
`exhibits. Local Rule 56(a)2 requires the party opposing summary judgment to submit a Local Rule 56(a)2
`Statement which contains separately numbered paragraphs corresponding to the Local Rule 56(a)1
`Statement and indicating whether the opposing party admits or denies the facts set forth by the moving
`party. Each denial must include a specific citation to an affidavit or other admissible evidence. D. Conn. L.
`Civ. R. 56(a)3.
`Although the Defendant informed Mr. Scales of his obligation to respond to the motion for
`summary judgment and the contents of a proper response, see Def.’s Notice to Pro Se Litigant Opposing
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`Case 3:24-cv-00050-VAB Document 22 Filed 04/25/25 Page 2 of 14
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`Webster Bank’s Statement of Material Undisputed Facts, ECF No. 20-4 ¶¶ 2, 3 (“Def SMF”);
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`Almonte Aff., Ex. A, ECF No. 20-3 at 7 (“Loan Application”). Mr. Scales was listed as the
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`guarantor on the application. Loan Application, ECF No. 20-3 at 10. The Loan Application
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`included several fields regarding information about Taskem Corporation, such as the date it was
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`established, and its projected business growth in the next year, as well as the purpose of the loan.
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`Id. at 7. The Loan Application also indicated that additional documents would be required for the
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`loan, such as two years of business tax returns for Taskem Corporation and two years of personal
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`tax returns for Mr. Scales. Id. at 14.
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`Webster Bank’s underwriting department reviewed the application and determined that
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`Taskem Corporation lacked credit worthiness. Almonte Aff., ECF No. 20-3 ¶ 8 (“Almonte Aff.”).
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`In addition, Webster Bank claims that the loan Taskem Corporation applied for required Small
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`Business Association (“SBA”) approval, and the SBA did not approve the application. Almonte
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`Aff. ¶ 7, 9.
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`On or around January 5, 2022, Webster Bank denied Taskem Corporation’s application
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`and sent Taskem Corporation a denial letter. Def SMF ¶¶ 4–5; Almonte Aff., Ex. B, ECF No. 20-
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`3 at 17 (“Denial Letter”). The Denial Letter attached a “Statement of Credit Denial” which
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`explained that the loan request was denied because of “[r]eliance on projections with no secondary
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`Motion for Summary Judgment Filing, ECF No. 20-1, Mr. Scales has not filed a Local Rule 56(a)2
`Statement with his opposition papers.
`Even though Mr. Scales is unrepresented, he is not excused from complying with the Court’s
`procedural and substantive rules. See Evans v. Kirkpatrick, No. 08-CV-6358T, 2013 WL 638735, at *1
`(W.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 2013) (citing Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 477 (2d Cir. 2006);
`see also Jackson v. Onondaga Cnty., 549 F. Supp. 2d 204, 214 (N.D.N.Y. 2008) (“[W]hen a plaintiff is
`proceeding pro se, all normal rules of pleading are not absolutely suspended” (citation and internal
`quotation marks omitted)). Thus, the Defendant’s facts, when supported by the evidence in the record, are
`deemed admitted. See D. Conn. L. Civ. R. 56(a)3 (“Failure to provide specific citations to evidence in the
`record as required by this Local Rule may result in the Court deeming admitted certain facts that are
`supported by the evidence in accordance with Local Rule 56(a)1, or in the Court imposing sanctions. . . .”).
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`2
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`Case 3:24-cv-00050-VAB Document 22 Filed 04/25/25 Page 3 of 14
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`source of repayment. Business plan and projections lack sufficient detail to support the requested
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`loan. No owner's equity; limited personal financial means.” Def SMF ¶ 4; Denial Letter, ECF No.
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`20-3 at 18. The Denial Letter also stated that Mr. Scales could contact his underwriter if he “ha[d]
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`any more information that [he] feel[s] would be helpful in the decision process” and that he should
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`contact the named Credit Bureau if he felt there was an error in his Credit Report. Denial Letter,
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`ECF No. 20-3 at 17. Webster Bank did not receive an updated credit report. Def SMF ¶ 10.
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`There is “no account or other relationship between” Mr. Scales and Webster Bank. Def
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`SMF ¶ 14. Webster Bank claims that it cannot, based upon regulatory guidelines, make loans based
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`upon an oral agreement. Almonte Aff. ¶ 14.2
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`B. Procedural History
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`On August 25, 2023, Mr. Scales filed his Complaint in the Southern District of New York.
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`Scales v. Webster Bank, Case No. 1:23-cv-07607-LTS, ECF No. 1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug, 25, 2023).
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`On January 9, 2024, Judge Laura Taylor Swain sua sponte transferred jurisdiction to the
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`District of Connecticut. Transfer Order, ECF No. 7.
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`2 As mentioned above, Mr. Scales did not submit a Statement of Material Facts. The Complaint includes the following
`factual allegations:
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`The Defendant is being sued for Negligence, spoliation of documents, and breach of contract. The defendant
`stated my corporation was approved a business loan and without adequate reason terminated the verbal
`contract. The Defendant's personnel also created false reasoning and my corporation polished the highlighted
`reasons for the delay of t he [sic] business loan and the defendant refused to proceed with the process of the
`business loan. The defendant's reassurance of the business loan approval seem to have only been committed
`to retrieve additional information of my company's future business plans. The defendant was made aware all
`the highlighted areas of concern was polished and explained in further detail and simply stated it didn't matter
`it was a waste of time and they wouldn't approve the business loan already stated approved and only waiting
`for SBA approval. The defendant's promise of a business loan delayed seeking other options of seeking a
`business loan for months.
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`The defendant also refused to communicate the reason for the breach of contract over email and stated they
`didn't have to provide a reason. The defendant was made aware the letter of denial was requested for a lawsuit
`against a web developer for missing track revenue and no form of repayment being the final statement made
`by webster bank and they changed their reason on the denial letter, possibly deliberately to not assist my
`corporation in any way shape or form.
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`Compl. at 5.
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`3
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`Case 3:24-cv-00050-VAB Document 22 Filed 04/25/25 Page 4 of 14
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`On March 13, 2024, Webster Bank filed its Answer. Answer, ECF No. 15.
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`On May 10, 2024, Webster Bank filed its first motion for summary judgment. Mot. for
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`Summ. J., ECF No. 18.
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`On February 18, 2025, the Court denied Webster Bank’s first motion for summary
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`judgment without prejudice to renewal for failure to file proof of service of the required notice to
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`Mr. Scales, and sua sponte extended the time to refile motions for summary judgment until March
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`7, 2025. Order, ECF No. 19.
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`On February 19, 2025, Webster Bank filed a second motion for summary judgment. Mot.
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`for Summ J.
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`II.
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`STANDARD OF REVIEW
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`A court will grant a motion for summary judgment if the record shows no genuine issue as
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`to any material fact, and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P.
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`56(a). The moving party bears the initial burden of establishing the absence of a genuine dispute
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`of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The non-moving party may
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`defeat the motion by producing sufficient evidence to establish that there is a genuine issue of
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`material fact for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). “[T]he mere
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`existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly
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`supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of
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`material fact.” Id. at 247–48 (emphasis in original).
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`“[T]he substantive law will identify which facts are material.” Id. at 248. “Only disputes
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`over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude
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`the entry of summary judgment.” Id.; see Graham v. Henderson, 89 F.3d 75, 79 (2d Cir. 1996)
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`4
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`(“[M]ateriality runs to whether the dispute matters, i.e., whether it concerns facts that can affect
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`the outcome under the applicable substantive law.” (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248)).
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`“The inquiry performed is the threshold inquiry of determining whether there is the need
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`for a trial—whether, in other words, there are any genuine factual issues that properly can be
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`resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.”
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`Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250. When a motion for summary judgment is supported by documentary
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`evidence and sworn affidavits and “demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact,”
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`the non-moving party must do more than vaguely assert the existence of some unspecified disputed
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`material facts or “rely on conclusory allegations or unsubstantiated speculation.” Robinson v.
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`Concentra Health Servs., Inc., 781 F.3d 42, 44 (2d Cir. 2015) (internal citation and quotation marks
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`omitted).
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`The party opposing the motion for summary judgment “must come forward with specific
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`evidence demonstrating the existence of a genuine dispute of material fact.” Id. (internal citation
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`and quotation marks omitted). “If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly
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`probative, summary judgment may be granted.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250 (citations omitted).
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`When deciding a motion for summary judgment, a court may review the entire record,
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`including the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, affidavits, and any
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`other evidence on file to determine whether there is any genuine issue of material fact. See Fed. R.
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`Civ. P. 56(c); Pelletier v. Armstrong, No. 3:99-cv-01559 (HBF), 2007 WL 685181, at *7 (D. Conn.
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`Mar. 2, 2007). In reviewing the record, a court must “construe the evidence in the light most
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`favorable to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable inferences in its favor.” Gary Friedrich
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`Enters., LLC v. Marvel Characters, Inc., 716 F.3d 302, 312 (2d Cir. 2013); see also Dufort v. City
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`of New York, 874 F.3d 338, 343, 347 (2d Cir. 2017) (“On a motion for summary judgment, the
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`court must ‘resolve all ambiguities and draw all permissible factual inferences in favor of the party
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`against whom summary judgment is sought.’” (quoting Estate of Gustafson ex rel. Reginella v.
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`Target Corp., 819 F.3d 673, 675 (2d Cir. 2016))). A court will not draw an inference of a genuine
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`dispute of material fact from conclusory allegations or denials, see Brown v. Eli Lilly & Co., 654
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`F.3d 347, 358 (2d Cir. 2011), and will grant summary judgment only “if, under the governing law,
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`there can be but one reasonable conclusion as to the verdict,” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250.
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`Complaints filed by pro se plaintiffs “must be construed liberally and interpreted to raise
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`the strongest arguments that they suggest.” Sykes v. Bank of Am., 723 F.3d 399, 403 (2d Cir. 2013)
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`(quoting Triestman, 470 F. 3d at 474) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Tracy v.
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`Freshwater, 623 F. 3d 90, 101–02 (2d Cir. 2010) (discussing the “special solicitude” courts afford
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`pro se litigants).
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`III. DISCUSSION
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`Mr. Scales brings suit for breach of contract, spoliation of documents, and negligence.
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`The Court will first address the continuing viability, following Webster Bank’s motion for
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`summary judgment, of his breach of contract claim, and then will address his remaining claims.3
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`A. The Breach of Contract Claim
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`To state a claim for breach of contract under New York law, “the complaint must allege:
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`(i) the formation of a contract between the parties; (ii) performance by the plaintiff; (iii) failure of
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`defendant to perform; and (iv) damages.” Johnson v. Nextel Commc'ns, Inc., 660 F.3d 131, 142
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`3 “A federal trial court sitting in diversity jurisdiction must apply the law of the forum state to determine the choice-
`of-law.” Fieger v. Pitney Bowes Credit Corp., 251 F.3d 386, 393 (2d Cir. 2001). Under Connecticut law, “the
`validity and construction of a contract generally are determined by the law of the state of execution or by the law of
`the state in which the contract is to be performed.” Brandewiede v. Emery Worldwide, 815 F. Supp. 60, 63 (D. Conn.
`1992). Here, because Mr. Scales is domiciled in New York and his alleged contract with Webster Bank related to a
`loan for a New York business, New York law applies to Mr. Scales’s state law claims.
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`(2d Cir. 2011). “Under New York law, whether a binding agreement exists is a legal issue, not a
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`factual one.” Vacold LLC v. Cerami, 545 F.3d 114, 123 (2d Cir. 2008) (citations omitted).
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`A contract, whether express or implied, “requires such elements as consideration, mutual
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`assent, legal capacity and legal subject matter.” Maas v. Cornell Univ., 721 N.E.2d 966, 970 (N.Y.
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`1999). “It is well settled under New York law that although there is no written contract between
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`two parties, ‘a contract may be implied in fact where inferences may be drawn from the facts and
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`circumstances of the case and the intention of the parties as indicated by their conduct.’” Ellis v.
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`Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 3 F. Supp. 2d 399, 409 (S.D.N.Y. 1998), aff'd sub nom. Ellis
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`v. Provident Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 172 F.3d 37 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting In the Matter of Boice, 640
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`N.Y.S.2d 681, 682 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996)). “A contract cannot be implied in fact[, however,]
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`where the facts are inconsistent with its existence, or against the declaration of the party to be
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`charged, . . ., or against the intention or understanding of the parties; or where an express promise
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`would be contrary to law. The assent of the person to be charged is necessary, and, unless he has
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`conducted himself in such a manner that his assent may fairly be inferred, he has not contracted.”
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`Ellis, 3 F. Supp. 2d at 409 (quoting Miller v. Schloss, 113 N.E. 337, 339 (N.Y. 1916)).
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`In his Complaint, Mr. Scales alleges that his “corporation was approved a business loan
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`and without adequate reason [Webster Bank] terminated the verbal contract.” Compl. at 5.
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`Webster Bank, however, argues “there was no loan or agreement for a loan approved by
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`the Defendant to the Plaintiff.” 4 Mot. for Summ J. at. 7. It claims that “[t]here is no business or
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`4 To the extent that Webster Bank argues that because Taskem Corporation, not Mr. Scales, was the party who applied
`for a loan, and thus his breach of contract claim must fail, see Almonte Aff. ¶ 4 (“Plaintiff purportedly seeks damages
`as a result of the Bank’s rejection of a business loan application submitted, not by the Plaintiff, but by his company,
`non-party Taskem Corporation . . .There is, therefore, no basis for the claim against the Defendant.”), the fact that Mr.
`Scales is named as Plaintiff rather than Taskem Corporation is not dispositive. “It is well established that a plaintiff
`in a breach of contract action ‘may not assert a cause of action to recover damages for breach of contract against a
`party with whom it is not in privity.’” Yucyco, Ltd. v. Republic of Slovenia, 984 F. Supp. 209, 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)
`(quotation omitted). Interpreting the facts in the light most favorable to Mr. Scales, however, the Loan Application
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`account relationship between the Defendant and the Plaintiff[,] and [t]here was no oral agreement
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`for a loan.” Id.
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`The Court agrees.
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`Mr. Scales has not alleged the existence of a written contract, but rather he argues that the
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`parties reached a “verbal contract.” Compl. at 5. Yet, there are no facts in the record supporting
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`the existence of a verbal contract apart from Mr. Scales’s allegations in the Complaint. See
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`Cifarelli v. Vill. of Babylon, 93 F.3d 47, 51 (2d Cir. 1996) (“[M]ere conclusory allegations,
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`speculation or conjecture will not avail a party resisting summary judgment.”). Moreover, Webster
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`Bank has asserted, and Mr. Scales does not dispute, that Webster Bank “does not (nor can it based
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`upon regulatory guidelines) make loans based upon an ‘oral agreement.’” Almonte Aff. ¶ 14; see
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`also Ellis, 3 F. Supp. 2d at 409 (“A contract cannot be implied in fact . . . where an express promise
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`would be contrary to law.” (citation omitted)); Caires v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, 745 F. Supp. 2d
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`40, 51, 53 (D. Conn. 2010) (“The D'Oench, Duhme doctrine based on the 1942 United States
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`Supreme Court case and subsequent judicial interpretation and legislative codification, invalidates
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`certain agreements made between a bank's representatives and borrowers . . . unless the agreement
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`meets certain requirements, including being reduced to writing. . . Defendant is entitled to the
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`protections of the D'Oench, Duhme doctrine and 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) as an assignee of the FDIC”);
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`12 U.S.C. § 1823(e)(1) (“No agreement which tends to diminish or defeat the interest of the [FDIC]
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`suggests that he is the owner of Taskem Corporation, and thus he is in privity of contract with Taskem Corporation
`and may sue for breach of contract on behalf of the corporation. See Emerson Elec. Co. v. Holmes, No.
`16CV1390PKCSIL, 2020 WL 4592808, at *17 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 11, 2020) (“A corporate officer and sole owner of a
`corporation is in privity with the corporation.”). Alternatively, even if Mr. Scales were not in privity to the alleged
`contract, if his breach of contract claim did not suffer from the defects discussed herein, dismissal of this case without
`granting an opportunity to amend to substitute Taskem Corporation as Plaintiff in this case would be improper. See
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(a)(3) (“The court may not dismiss an action for failure to prosecute in the name of the real party in
`interest until, after an objection, a reasonable time has been allowed for the real party in interest to ratify, join, or be
`substituted into the action.”); see also Tracy, 623 F. 3d at 101–02 (discussing the “special solicitude” courts afford
`pro se litigants).
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`in any asset acquired by it . . . shall be valid against the [FDIC] unless such agreement—(A) is in
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`writing,); see also Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”), Webster Bank, National
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`Association, FDIC Cert No. 18221, https://banks.data.fdic.gov/bankfind-suite/bankfind/details/
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`18221 (last visited April 23, 2025).5
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`To the extent that Mr. Scales argues that the Loan Application constituted an implied
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`contract, “[a] loan application and discussions with a lender about the requirements necessary to
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`obtain that loan, . . . , are insufficient to give rise to a valid and binding contract, express or
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`implied.” Seren Fashion Art & Interiors, LLC v. B.S.D. Cap., Inc., No. 23-CV-2349 (JGLC), 2023
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`WL 7529768, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 13, 2023), appeal dismissed, No. 23-7837, 2024 WL 4866898
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`(2d Cir. May 28, 2024); see also Kilgore v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, 89 F. Supp. 3d 526, 533
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`(E.D.N.Y. 2015) (“Despite plaintiff's allegations to the contrary, submitting an application to
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`Ocwen's loan modification program does not create a binding agreement. Under New York law,
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`defendant was under no obligation to modify the terms of plaintiff’s mortgage.”) (citations
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`omitted). The Loan Application does not offer any guarantees that Taskem Corporation will
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`receive a business loan. Rather, the information regarding the loan is included under a heading
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`titled, “Loan Request Information,” see ECF No. 20-3 at 10, and the application notes that
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`additional documentation is required, see id. at 14. In addition, the Denial Letter informs Mr.
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`Scales that Webster is “unable to grant [his] request.” Id. at 17. Even considering these facts in the
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`light most favorable to Mr. Scales, there is no genuine dispute of material fact that suggests that
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`5 The Court may take judicial notice of the fact that Webster Bank is an FDIC insured institution. See United States
`v. Sliker, 751 F.2d 477, 485 (2d Cir. 1984) (“As said in Cook v. United States, [320 F.2d 258, 259–60 (5th Cir.
`1963)] while the principle permitting inference of a prior from a subsequent condition ‘is to be used with caution,’
`‘[t]his seems ... to be an appropriate place for its application’ in light of ‘the common knowledge of the nearly
`universal prevalence of the banks of the United States having their deposits insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance
`Corporation[.]’” (citing United States v. Phillips, 427 F.2d 1035, 1037 (9th Cir.1970) (noting “[c]ourts may take
`judicial notice of any fact ‘capable of immediate and accurate determination by resort to easily accessible sources of
`indisputable accuracy’” and taking judicial notice of fact that bank was FDIC insured)).
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`the parties had mutually assented to enter into a contract. Nor is there anything in this record to
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`support the existence of consideration.6 As a result, there is no evidence supporting the formation
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`of a contract between Webster Bank and Mr. Scales, or Taskem Corporation, for a business loan.
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`Accordingly, Webster Bank’s motion for summary judgment on Mr. Scales’s breach of
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`contract claim will be granted.
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`B. The Remaining Claims
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`1. The Negligence Claim
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`“Under New York law, the elements of a negligence claim are: (i) a duty owed to the
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`plaintiff by the defendant; (ii) breach of that duty; and (iii) injury substantially caused by that
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`breach.” Lombard v. Booz-Allen & Hamilton, Inc., 280 F.3d 209, 215 (2d Cir. 2002). “In the
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`absence of a duty, as a matter of law, there can be no liability.” Pasternack v. Lab'y Corp. of Am.
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`Holdings, 59 N.E.3d 485, 490 (N.Y. 2016) (citations omitted). “The definition and scope of an
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`alleged tortfeasor's duty owed to a plaintiff is a question of law.” Id. (citations omitted).
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`In addition, “[u]nder New York law, a breach of contract will not give rise to a tort claim
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`unless a legal duty independent of the contract itself has been violated. Such a ‘legal duty must
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`spring from circumstances extraneous to, and not constituting elements of, the contract, although
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`it may be connected with and dependent on the contract.’” Bayerische Landesbank, New York
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`Branch v. Aladdin Cap. Mgmt. LLC, 692 F.3d 42, 58 (2d Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). As a result,
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`“[w]here an independent tort duty is present, a plaintiff may maintain both tort and contract claims
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`arising out of the same allegedly wrongful conduct. . . however, [where] the basis of a party’s
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`claim is a breach of solely contractual obligations, such that the plaintiff is merely seeking to
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`6 “Under New York law, ‘[c]onsideration is defined as either a bargained for gain or advantage to the promisee or a
`bargained for legal detriment or disadvantage to the promisor.’” Seren Fashion Art & Interiors, 2023 WL 7529768,
`at *5 (quoting Greenberg v. Greenberg, 646 F. App'x 31, 32 (2d Cir. 2016) (summary order)) (alteration in original).
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`obtain the benefit of the contractual bargain through an action in tort, the claim is precluded as
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`duplicative.” Id. at 58.
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`Mr. Scales brings a negligence claim, presumably based on allegations that Webster Bank
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`“refused to communicate the reason for the breach of contract over email and stated they didn't
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`have to provide a reason.” See Compl. at 5. This claim, however, is predicated solely on Mr.
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`Scales’s failure “to obtain the benefit of the contractual bargain,” and thus fails, given that the
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`Court has dismissed his breach of contract claim. See Bayerische Landesbank, 692 F.3d at 58; see
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`also Beck v. Metro. Bank Holding Corp., 747 F. Supp. 3d 442, 465 (E.D.N.Y. 2024) (dismissing
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`Plaintiff’s negligence claim where it “is duplicative of her breach of contract claim because the
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`negligence claim does not arise out of any legal duty independent of the contract and it does not
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`allege any separate injuries” and Plaintiff “has failed to point to any duty of care that [Defendant]
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`owed her separate and apart from its obligations under the Agreements.”).
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`In addition, even if Mr. Scales intended to bring a negligence claim for conduct unrelated
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`to his breach of contract claim, he fails to demonstrate that Webster Bank owed him a duty of care.
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`Mr. Scales has not provided the Court with any precedent—nor has the Court identified any
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`precedent—supporting the proposition that a bank owes a duty of care towards a loan applicant,
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`and “[c]ase law instead supports the proposition that a lender does not have a duty of care toward
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`a loan applicant.” Seren Fashion Art & Interiors, 2023 WL 7529768, at *6 (citing Lombard, 280
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`F.3d at 217 (“GDB had no obligation even to consider Lombard's loan application, much less to
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`grant it, and BAH was not hired to communicate anything to Lombard, much less to induce
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`detrimental reliance.”); Genna v. Sallie Mae, Inc., No. 11-CV-7371 (LBS), 2012 WL 1339482, at
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`*4 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 17, 2012) (“[C]ase law is sufficiently clear and consistent that in New York ‘an
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`arm's length borrower-lender relationship ... does not support a cause of action for negligent
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`Case 3:24-cv-00050-VAB Document 22 Filed 04/25/25 Page 12 of 14
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`misrepresentation[.]” (citation omitted)); and Dobroshi v. Bank of Am., N.A., 886 N.Y.S.2d 106,
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`109 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009) (“This court has repeatedly held that an arm's length borrower-lender
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`relationship is not of a confidential or fiduciary nature and therefore does not support a cause of
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`action for negligent misrepresentation.”)). Nor is there anything in this record of any other
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`relationship between the parties that would create a dispute of material fact about the existence of
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`a legal duty. In the Loan Application, Mr. Scales indicated that Taskem Corporation is not an
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`existing customer of Webster Bank, see Loan Application, ECF No. 20-3 at 7 (”Existing
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`Customer? N”) and Webster Bank has indicated, and Mr. Scales does not refute, that “[t]here is no
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`account or other relationship” between the bank and Mr. Scales. Def SMF ¶ 14.
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`Accordingly, summary judgment for Webster Bank as to Mr. Scales’s negligence claim
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`will be granted.
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`2. The Spoliation Claim
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`“Spoliation is the destruction or significant alteration of evidence, or the failure to preserve
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`property for another's use as evidence in pending or reasonably foreseeable litigation.” West v.
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`Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 167 F.3d 776, 779 (2d Cir. 1999). “Claims of evidence spoliation
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`can arise in two circumstances. First, a party may seek a sanction for alleged spoliation.” Thaqi v.
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`Wal-Mart Stores E., LP, No. 09-CV-755 JMA, 2014 WL 1330925, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2014)
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`(citing Mali v. Fed. Ins. Co., 720 F.3d 387, 392–93 (2d Cir. 2013)); see also Fed. R. Civ. P.
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`37(b)(2) (“If a party . . .fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery, including an order
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`under Rule 26(f), 35, or 37(a), the court where the action is pending may issue further just orders.”).
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`“Even without a discovery order, a district court may impose sanctions for spoliation, exercising
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`its inherent power to control litigation.” West, 167 F.3d at 779.
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`Case 3:24-cv-00050-VAB Document 22 Filed 04/25/25 Page 13 of 14
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`“Second, even if an aggrieved party does not seek sanctions for spoliation, the party may
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`still be entitled to an adverse inference on summary judgment (or a permissible adverse inference
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`instruction at trial) if the record warrants such an inference.” Thaqi, 2014 WL 1330925, at *7
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`(citing Mali, 720 F.3d at 392–93). “The record can warrant an adverse inference concerning
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`spoliation where the moving party establishes that: (1) the evidence at issue existed; (2) the
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`evidence was in the exclusive possession of the non-moving party; and (3) ‘the non-production of
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`the [evidence] has not been satisfactorily explained.’” Id. (citing Mali, 720 F.3d at 393) (alteration
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`in original).
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`“While a party to an action may bring a motion for sanctions for spoliation against another
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`party in that action, there is no independent federal cause of action for spoliation.” Andrews v. City
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`of New York, No. 23-CV-2411 (LTS), 2023 WL 3724978, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. May 30, 2023) (citing
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`Sterbenz v. Attine, 205 F. Supp. 2d 65, 74 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (“Plaintiff provides no supporting
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`authority for her assumption that a court's inherent power to impose sanctions for spoliation
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`extends to situations where, as here, the failure to preserve evidence occurred prior to the initiation
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`of any lawsuit and allegedly impeded an action other than the one in which the sanctions are being
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`sought. . . . Whatever else it may mean, the ‘inherent power’ doctrine does not effectively afford a
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`federal cause of action for spoliation where a state law claim does not exist.”); see also Ortega v.
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`City of New York, 876 N.E.2d 1189, 1197 (N.Y 2007) (“For all of these reasons, we join the
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`majority of jurisdictions to consider the issue . . . and decline to recognize spoliation of evidence
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`as an independent tort claim.”).
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`Mr. Scales asserts a claim for spoliation of documents that seemingly arises from
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`allegations that Webster Bank falsified the reason for the denial of his loan application in response
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`to potential litigation.7 See Compl. at 5 (“The Defendant's personnel also created false reasoning .
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`. . they changed their reason on the denial letter, possibly deliberately to not assist my corporation
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`in any way shape or form”).
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`As discussed above, Mr. Scales has not provided any genuine dispute of material fact
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`regarding the existence of an oral agreement to provide services or the existence of a legal duty
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`that Webster Bank owed him. As a result, his spoliation claim is not viable, as there are no factual
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`allegations supporting Mr. Scales’s state claims for breach of contract and negligence, and “New
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`York does not recognize spoliation of evidence as an independent tort.”8 Lalima v. Consol. Edison
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`Co. of New York, 58 N.Y.S.3d 66, 68 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017) (citing Ortega, 876 N.E.2d at 1197).
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`Accordingly, summary judgment against Mr. Scales’s spoliation claim will be granted.
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`IV. CONCLUSION
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`For the foregoing reasons, Webster Bank’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.
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`The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to enter judgment for Webster Bank, and to
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`close this case.
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`SO ORDERED at New Haven, Connecticut, this 25th day of April, 2025.
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`
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`/s/ Victor A. Bolden
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`VICTOR A. BOLDEN
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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`
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`7 Mr. Scales also alleges that Webster Bank made assurances “of [his] business loan approval . . . only . . .to retrieve
`additional information of [his] company's future business plans.” Compl. at 5. As discussed above, however, there is
`nothing in this record, much less enough to create a genuine issue of material fact, to support the proposition that
`Webster Bank agreed to provide Mr. Scales or his company with a business loan, and Webster Bank’s solicitation of
`information required to process his loan application is insuf