Case 3:24-cv-01675-KAD Document 9 Filed 11/25/24 Page 1 of 10
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
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` Civil No. 3:24-cv-01675 (KAD)
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` November 25, 2024
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`Anna Sullivan,
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` Plaintiff,
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`v.
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`Hartford Hospital, et al.,
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` Defendants.
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`I.
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`RECOMMENDED RULING ON MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED IN FORMA
`PAUPERIS AND INITIAL REVIEW UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 1915
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`INTRODUCTION
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`This is a lawsuit filed by the plaintiff, Anna Sullivan, proceeding pro se, against Hartford
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`Hospital and fifty-three others, including other hospitals, government entities, corporations,
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`celebrities, politicians, and business leaders. (Compl., ECF No. 1.) Ms. Sullivan evidently
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`believes that these fifty-four entities are responsible for a “parasite” or “wormhole” in her head.
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`(Exs. to Compl., ECF No. 1-1, at 3.) She seeks permission from the court to begin her lawsuit in
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`forma pauperis, or “IFP.” (ECF No. 2.)
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`When a plaintiff wishes to proceed IFP – that is, without paying the filing fee – the court
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`ordinarily conducts two inquiries. First, it reviews the plaintiff’s financial affidavit and determines
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`whether she is unable to pay the fee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). Second, to ensure that the plaintiff is
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`not abusing the privilege of filing a free lawsuit, the court examines her complaint to determine
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`whether, among other things, it “is frivolous” or “fails to state a claim on which relief may be
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`granted.” 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(ii). And in all cases – not just those that involve indigent
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`pro se plaintiffs – the court must determine whether it has jurisdiction over the subject matter. If
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`Case 3:24-cv-01675-KAD Document 9 Filed 11/25/24 Page 2 of 10
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`the complaint is “frivolous” or “fails to state a claim,” or if it fails to show that the court has
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`jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the case. Id.
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`United States District Judge Kari A. Dooley referred this case to me – United States
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`Magistrate Judge Thomas O. Farrish – to conduct these two inquiries. (ECF No. 4.) I have
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`thoroughly reviewed the complaint, the IFP motion, and the accompanying financial affidavit. In
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`the first step of the analysis, I recommend that Judge Dooley deny the IFP motion because Ms.
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`Sullivan has not shown an inability to pay the filing fee. In the second step, I recommend that
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`Judge Dooley dismiss the complaint because Ms. Sullivan has not invoked the court’s
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`jurisdiction, or, in the alternative, because Ms. Sullivan’s complaint is frivolous. I further
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`recommend that the dismissal be with prejudice to an amended complaint.
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`II.
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`BACKGROUND
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`Ms. Sullivan’s lawsuit arises out of her belief that fifty-four politicians, celebrities, and
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`prominent corporations are responsible for a “parasite” or “wormhole” in her head. (Exs. to
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`Compl., ECF No. 1-1, at 3, 11.) Her precise claims are difficult to discern; although she used the
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`complaint form that the District of Connecticut provides to pro se litigants, she left nearly all of
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`the form’s spaces blank and instead attached a seemingly random assortment of documents and
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`pictures. (Compl., ECF No. 1, at 3–4.) These include an “after visit summary” of an apparent
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`visit to urgent care; eight photos of what appears to be a wounded scalp labeled with her name;
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`and three pages of what the Court construes as a list of additional defendants. (Doc. No. 1-1.) The
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`closest that her submission comes to attempting a claim is in some handwritten notes affixed to
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`these documents. In the notes accompanying two of the photos, Ms. Sullivan appears to describe
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`how some of the defendants use a “parasite” or “wormhole” in her head to spy on other people and
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`how the government is hiding the truth about tumors, cysts, and other growths. (Id. at 3–4.) Within
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`the list of names, Ms. Sullivan states that the defendants have teamed up to traffic humans but also
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`that she is owed money for the celebrity services that she provides. (Id. at 11–12.) She further
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`states that the defendants “did not help [her] and did not accept [her] with this wormhole in [her]
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`head,” that there is a fake hospital system run by Ned Lamont, Kamala Harris, and Nancy Pelosi,
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`and that the FBI “denied and rejected [her] when they know about this.” (Id. at 13.)
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`III. THE FIRST INQUIRY – ENTITLEMENT TO IFP STATUS
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`Typically, when a plaintiff files a case in federal court, she must pay filing and
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`administrative fees totaling $405.00. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914. A court may nonetheless “authorize
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`the commencement . . . of any suit . . . without prepayment of fees . . . by a person who submits an
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`affidavit that includes a statement of all assets such [person] possesses that the person is unable to
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`pay such fees[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1); see also Coleman v. Tollefson, 575 U.S. 532, 534 (2015)
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`(stating that litigants who qualify for IFP status “may commence a civil action without prepaying
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`fees”).
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`To qualify as “unable to pay,” the plaintiff does not have to demonstrate absolute
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`destitution, see Potnick v. E. State Hosp., 701 F.2d 243, 244 (2d Cir. 1983) (per curiam), but she
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`does need to show that “paying such fees would constitute a serious hardship[.]” Fiebelkorn v.
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`U.S., 77 Fed. Cl. 59, 62 (2007). The United States Supreme Court has said that a plaintiff makes
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`a “sufficient” showing of inability to pay when her application demonstrates that she “cannot
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`because of [her] poverty pay or give security for the costs and still be able to provide [herself] and
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`[her] dependents with the necessities of life.” Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S.
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`331, 339 (1948).
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`In determining whether a plaintiff’s financial circumstances meet these standards, courts
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`may consider the financial resources of anyone who supports the plaintiff. See, e.g., Fridman v.
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`City of N.Y., 195 F. Supp. 2d 534, 537 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (“In assessing an application to proceed
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`in forma pauperis, a court may consider the resources that the applicant has or can get from those
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`who ordinarily provide the applicant with the necessities of life, such as from a spouse, parent,
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`adult sibling or other next friend.”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); Monti v.
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`McKeon, 600 F. Supp. 112, 114 (D. Conn. 1984), aff'd, 788 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1985) (table decision).
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`In other words, “[w]here a litigant is supported or assisted by another person, the [c]ourt may
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`consider that person's ability to pay the filing fee.” Pierre v. City of Rochester, No. 6:16-cv-06428
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`(CJS), 2018 WL 10072449, at *1 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 13, 2018).
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`In her IFP affidavit, Ms. Sullivan appears to claim that she has no income and no cash on
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`hand or in a bank account. (ECF No. 2, at 4.) She further claims that she has monthly obligations
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`of $5,700, but that her bills are paid by Nathanael Sullivan at this time. (Id. at 3, 5.) Ms. Sullivan
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`also states that she has one dependent, whose expenses are covered by family members. (Id. at 6.)
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`Because Ms. Sullivan states that she is supported financially by Nathanael Sullivan and
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`other family members, the Court may consider their resources as well as hers in determining her
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`ability to pay the filing fee. See Fridman, 195 F. Supp. 2d at 537. Ms. Sullivan’s application,
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`however, does not provide information about the financial resources of Nathanael Sullivan or any
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`other person who may support her. Without that information, the Court cannot determine whether
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`Ms. Sullivan is entitled to IFP status.
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`Because Ms. Sullivan’s application does not provide information about the financial
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`resources of the persons that support her, the Court cannot determine whether she is able to pay
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`the filing fee.1 See, e.g., Rajkarnikar v. Stanley Black & Decker, No. 3:21-cv-01356 (AWT), 2021
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`The Court also notes that Ms. Sullivan left most of the spaces on the IFP form blank,
`including the space that asks about any previous cases that she has filed in federal court. (Id. at 5–
`6.) This omission leads the Court to be concerned that Ms. Sullivan has not completed her
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`Case 3:24-cv-01675-KAD Document 9 Filed 11/25/24 Page 5 of 10
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`WL 5039011, at *2 (D. Conn. Oct. 30, 2021) (citing Bank of New York v. Consiglio, No. 3:17-cv-
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`01408 (CSH) (SALM), 2017 WL 9480197, at *2 (D. Conn. Oct. 2, 2017)), report and
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`recommendation adopted, 2017 WL 4948069 (D. Conn. Nov. 1, 2017)). For these reasons, I
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`recommend that Judge Dooley deny Ms. Sullivan’s motion for leave to proceed IFP.
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`IV. THE SECOND INQUIRY – 1915©(2)(B) REVIEW
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`Although Ms. Sullivan’s IFP motion fails the first inquiry, I will nevertheless proceed to
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`the second inquiry in the interest of judicial efficiency. See, e.g., Franklin v. Chenango Cnty. Pub.
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`Def. Office, No. 3:18-cv-00865 (BKS) (DEP), 2018 WL 4288620, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2018)
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`(conducting 28 U.S.C. § 1915© analysis even though IFP motion denied).
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`A.
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`General Principles of Review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915
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`The same statute that authorizes courts to allow a qualifying plaintiff to begin her lawsuit
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`without paying the fee also directs courts to review that plaintiff’s complaint to ensure she is not
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`abusing the privilege of filing a free lawsuit. As noted above, that review asks whether the
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`plaintiff’s complaint, among other things, “is frivolous.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915©(2)(B).
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`A complaint is “frivolous” when it is entirely without a factual or legal basis. As the Court
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`of Appeals has explained, an “action is ‘frivolous’ for § 1915© purposes if it has no arguable basis
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`in law or fact, as is the case if it is based on an ‘indisputably meritless legal theory.’” Montero v.
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`application with the “particularity, definiteness, and certainty” that the law requires. Andrea P. v.
`Kijakazi, No. 3:22-cv-00354 (SRU) (TOF), 2022 WL 1050326, at *1 (D. Conn. Mar. 14, 2022)
`(quoting DiRubba v. DiRubba, No. 3:22-cv-00181 (AVC) (TOF), slip op. at 7 (D. Conn. Mar. 8,
`2022) and Escobedo v. Applebees, 787 F.3d 1226, 1234 (9th Cir. 2015)). The Court is aware of at
`least three cases that Ms. Sullivan filed in this District prior to filing this one. See Sullivan v.
`Lamont, No. 3:24-cv-01003 (OAW) (filed July 22, 2024); Sullivan v. Bezos, No. 3:24-cv-01390
`(KAD) (filed Aug. 29, 2024); Sullivan v. Harris, No. 3:24-cv-01578 (KAD) (filed Oct. 1, 2024).
`If Ms. Sullivan wishes to file lawsuits and IFP motions in this Court in the future, she is respectfully
`advised that she must fill out the IFP form completely and carefully, and that all of her statements
`must be true.
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`Travis, 171 F.3d 757, 759 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325, 327
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`(1989)). “Frivolous” complaints include those where the facts alleged are “clearly baseless—that
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`is . . . they are fanciful, fantastic or delusional.” Gallop v. Cheney, 642 F.3d 364, 368 (2d Cir.
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`2011) (quoting Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32–33 (1992)). When an IFP complaint is
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`“frivolous,” it is subject to dismissal. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915©(2)(B)(i); Gallop, 642 F.3d at 368.
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`These and other pleading rules are applied liberally in favor of pro se plaintiffs like Ms.
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`Sullivan. “Since most pro se plaintiffs lack familiarity with the formalities of pleading
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`requirements,” courts must “construe pro se complaints liberally, applying a more flexible
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`standard to evaluate their sufficiency than we would when reviewing a complaint submitted by
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`counsel.” Lerman v. Bd. Of Elections, 232 F.3d 135, 139–40 (2d Cir. 2000). In other words, courts
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`interpret pro se complaints “to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest.” Pabon v. Wright,
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`459 F.3d 241, 248 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). Because pro se litigants
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`“cannot be expected to know all of the legal theories on which they might ultimately recover,” a
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`reviewing court’s “imagination should be limited only by [the] factual allegations” when
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`determining what legal claims the complaint suggests. Phillips v. Girdich, 408 F.3d 124, 130 (2d
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`Cir. 2005).
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`This liberality has limits, however – and one limit is that the court may not fill the gaps in
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`a pro se plaintiff’s complaint by imagining facts that she did not plead. Although courts “are
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`obligated to draw the most favorable inferences that [a pro se plaintiff’s] complaint supports,” they
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`“cannot invent factual allegations that [she] has not pled.” Chavis v. Chappius, 618 F.3d 162, 170
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`(2d Cir. 2010).
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`B.
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`Subject Matter Jurisdiction
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`Before applying those principles to the complaint, the Court must first determine whether
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`it has jurisdiction over Ms. Sullivan’s claims. Federal courts are courts of “limited jurisdiction,”
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`meaning that they cannot hear just any case. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S.
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`375, 377 (1994). Leaving aside some others that are not relevant here, a federal court can typically
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`adjudicate only three types of claims: (1) those that “aris[e] under the Constitution, laws, or treaties
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`of the United States” – so-called “federal question” jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331; (2)
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`disputes between citizens of different states, where the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000 –
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`“diversity jurisdiction” under 28 U.S.C. § 1332; and, under certain circumstances, (3) other claims
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`that are “so related” to an “original jurisdiction” claim that they “form part of the same case or
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`controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution” – “supplemental jurisdiction”
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`under 28 U.S.C. 1367(a). If subject matter jurisdiction is lacking, the complaint must be dismissed,
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`even if it was drafted by a pro se plaintiff. See, e.g., Rene v. Citibank N.A., 32 F. Supp. 2d 539,
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`541 (E.D.N.Y. 1999); cf. Makarova v. U.S., 201 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2000) (placing the burden
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`of proving subject matter jurisdiction on the pro se plaintiff).
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`Even when viewed liberally, Ms. Sullivan’s complaint does not describe a claim within the
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`jurisdiction of this court. Ms. Sullivan alleges that she is a citizen of Connecticut, and that
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`Defendant Hartford Hospital is also a citizen of Connecticut. (Compl., ECF No. 1, at 1.) The
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`complaint also does not contain a demand for relief. Because (1) Ms. Sullivan and at least one of
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`the defendants are citizens of Connecticut; and (2) Ms. Sullivan does not allege that the amount in
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`controversy exceeds $75,000, she has not invoked the court’s diversity jurisdiction.
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`Moreover, Ms. Sullivan’s complaint does not describe a claim arising “under the
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`Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” Indeed, Ms. Sullivan’s complaint makes no
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`mention of the Constitution or any federal law and, even construing it liberally, the Court does not
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`read the complaint to even suggest a legal claim. See Phillips, 408 F.3d at 130. It therefore fails
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`to support “federal question” jurisdiction. And when neither federal question nor diversity
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`jurisdiction has been shown to exist, there is no basis for the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction.
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`See 28 U.S.C. § 1367; United Mine Workers of Am. V. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966).
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`Because Ms. Sullivan’s complaint does not invoke the court’s diversity, federal question,
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`or supplemental jurisdiction, I recommend that Judge Dooley dismiss the complaint for lack of
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`subject matter jurisdiction.
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`C.
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`Review of the Complaint for Frivolousness
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`Although I recommend that Judge Dooley dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter
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`jurisdiction, I will nevertheless consider whether Ms. Sullivan’s complaint is frivolous. See
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`Ishutkina v. Biden, No. 3:20-cv-01656 (CSH), 2021 WL 6841431, at *5 (D. Conn. Mar. 1, 2021)
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`(analyzing whether a complaint was frivolous after determining that the complaint must be
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`dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction).
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`Ms. Sullivan’s complaint appears to be premised on her belief that she has a “wormhole”
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`in her head and that the various defendants are either at fault for it or refuse to do anything about
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`it. (Doc. No. 1-1, at 3–4, 11–13.) But a “[p]laintiff’s beliefs – however strongly [she] may hold
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`them – are not facts.” Morren v. New York Univ., No. 1:20-cv-10802 (JPO) (OTW), 2022 WL
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`1666918, at *18 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 29, 2022) (citation omitted), report and recommendation adopted,
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`2022 WL 1665013 (S.D.N.Y. May 25, 2022). As discussed, a court may dismiss a claim as
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`factually frivolous if the facts alleged are “clearly baseless—that is . . . they are fanciful, fantastic
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`or delusional.” Gallop, 642 F.3d at 368 (quoting Denton, 504 U.S. at 32–33). “As those words
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`suggest, a finding of factual frivolousness is appropriate when the facts alleged rise to the level of
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`the irrational or the wholly incredible.” Denton, 504 U.S. at 33. Other courts in this circuit have
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`dismissed claims with substantially similar allegations as factually frivolous. See, e.g., Richards
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`v. Eddinger, No. 3:23-cv-00158 (KAD), 2023 WL 11897990, at *2 (D. Conn. Mar. 13, 2023)
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`(dismissing claims that defendants put a chip in plaintiff’s brain and “traffick[ed] humans for their
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`brain abilities”); Currytto v. Perez, No. 3:17-cv-02110 (MPS), 2018 WL 11462246, at *2 (D.
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`Conn. Jan. 18, 2018) (dismissing claim that defendants inserted eavesdropping wire into plaintiff’s
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`heart); Harris v. Sessions, No. 1:18-cv-05245 (CM), 2018 WL 9596844, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 3,
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`2018) (dismissing claim that doctor implanted FBI tracking device in plaintiff’s leg).
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`Accordingly, even when reading Ms. Sullivan’s complaint with the required liberality, the
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`Court concludes that the complaint should be dismissed as frivolous. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Lamont,
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`3:24-cv-01003 (VAB), ECF No. 10 (D. Conn. July 10, 2024) (dismissing as frivolous substantially
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`similar claims brought by Ms. Sullivan); Sullivan v. Bezos, 3:24-cv-01390 (KAD), ECF No. 12
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`(D. Conn. Nov. 1, 2024) (accepting and adopting the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation that the
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`claims be dismissed for frivolousness).
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`D.
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`Denial of Leave to Amend
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`Although a court typically permits pro se plaintiffs “leave to amend at least once,” if
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`repleading a claim would be futile, the court should not grant leave to amend. Cuoco v. Moritsugu,
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`222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000). “Leave to amend may be futile where the factual allegations are
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`clearly frivolous.” Richards, 2023 WL 11897990, at *2. Because nothing in the complaint, even
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`when construed liberally, “suggests that the plaintiff has a claim that she has inadequately or
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`inartfully pleaded,” Cuoco, 222 F.3d at 112, I conclude that repleading would be futile. Other
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`courts considering similar claims have denied leave to amend as futile. See, e.g., Harris, 2018 WL
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`9596844, at *2 (concluding that “irrational” claims alleging implantation of FBI tracking device
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`in plaintiff’s leg could not be cured by amendment); Currytto, 2018 WL 11462246, at *2
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`(dismissing device-implantation claims without leave to amend). Accordingly, I recommend that
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`the complaint be dismissed without leave to amend.
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`V.
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`CONCLUSION
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`For the foregoing reasons, I recommend that Judge Dooley deny Ms. Sullivan’s IFP motion
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`and dismiss her complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction or, in the alternative, because the
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`complaint is frivolous. I further recommend that the complaint be dismissed with prejudice.
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`This is a recommended ruling by a magistrate judge. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(1); D. Conn. L.
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`Civ. R. 72.1(C). If the Plaintiff wishes to object to my recommendation, she must file that
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`objection with the Clerk of the Court by December 16, 2024. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2)
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`(stating that objections to magistrate judge recommendations shall be filed within fourteen days);
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`D. Conn. L. Civ. R. 72.2(a) (allowing five additional days for persons who, like Ms. Sullivan, will
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`receive the recommendation from the Clerk of the Court via mail); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a)(1)(C)
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`(stating that, if a due date falls on a weekend, the date is extended to “the end of the next day that
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`is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday”). If she fails to file a timely objection, her failure
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`“operates as a waiver of any further judicial review[.]” Small v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs.,
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`892 F.2d 15, 16 (2d Cir. 1989). In particular, failure to file a timely objection operates as a waiver
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`of the right to seek appellate review in the Court of Appeals. Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1);
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`Fed. R. Civ. P. 72; Fed. R. Civ. P. 6; see also Impala v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 670 F. App’x 32 (2d
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`Cir. 2016) (summary order).
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`10
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`/s/ Thomas O. Farrish
`Hon. Thomas O. Farrish
`United States Magistrate Judge
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