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`RALSTON BROWN - AUGUST 14, 2025
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`MOTION TO STRIKE THE AFFIDAVIT ELIZABETH CORRAL
`+Pursuant to Practice Book Sec. 10-39. (or applicable rule No.) the defendant, (here and after
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`Brown) hereby respectfully moves to strike the Affidavit of Elizabeth Corral. Please refer to the
`Exhibit filed in support of memorandum in support of motion and cross motion for summary
`judgment for this motion. The affidavit contains hearsay that is not permissible under the rules of
`evidence. Elizabeth Corral affidavit is hearsay, does not contain personal knowledge of the facts
`in Brown’s servicing records, ahd contradict a previous affidavit submitted by Carrington. The
`affidavit is submitted to mislead the court, by concealing Carrington’s fraudulent and unlawful
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`conduct pertaining to Brown mortgage account.
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`Elizabeth Corral submitted the affidavit on improper foundation. Her affidavit relies on fraud
`and hearsay statement in Carrington’s éewicing records to make the affidavit. Elizabeth Corral
`failed to establish her qualifications and reliability of the information provided. Elizabeth Cor.ral
`affidavit does not testify to have personal knowledge of Brown’s servicing records, or knowledge
`on how the business records were generated, or testified she is familiar with and trained on the
`manner and method by which Carrington created and maintained its business records
`pertaining to Brown’s account, which is a statutory requirement of the business records
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`exception to the hearsay rule.
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`Elizabeth Corral is not competent to testify to the facts alleged. Elizabeth Corral does not
`have the personal knowledge of the facts to make affidavit on Carrington’s Servicing Records,
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`including the financial data and transactions with respect to Brown’s Loan.
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`This Motion is brought under Practice Book § 23-18 (a, which permits the court to strike
`any portions of an affidavit that are not based on the affiant's personal knowledge, contain
`hearsay, or are otherwise inadmissible under the rules of evidence. Brown argues that Practice
`Book § 23-18 (a) does not apply here becéuse Brown challenged the amount of the debt claimed
`by Carrington. He identifies his answer to the complaint as sufficiently denying the amount of the
`debt to render § 23-18 (a) inapplicable. Specifically, he asserts that this was achieved by denying
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`that the debt was in default.
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`BACKGROUND
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`On or around December 22, 2017, Brown requested a home equity loan from
`Carrington. The term for the loan state Brown would have a fixed rate of 4.875% interest. On
`April 1, 2018, Carrington significantly increased Brown’s monthly mortgage payment. Carrington
`stated Brown insurance premium went up so it increases Brown mortgage payment. Brown
`contacted his insurance agent and discover the insurance premium did not go up as Carrington
`stated. ,
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`In several phone conversation, Brown informed Carrington, that Carrington was
`overcharging his mortgage account. Carrington ignored Brown and continue to add incidental
`amount to Bréwn’s mortgage account, meanwhile insisting that Brown make the overcharged
`payments. |
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`On or around April 1, 2020 Carrington on its own, approved 90 days COVID-19
`Pandemic Forbearance Plan as assistant to Brown. Carrington COVID-19 assistant stated:
`Brown will not be required to make regular monthly mortgage payment for three consecutive
`months. '
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`Despite of Carrington’s assurancé to Brown, that Brown will not be required to make
`regular monthly mortgage payment for three consecutive months, Carrington applied late fees
`and used the months it voluntarily places Brown on COVID-19 Pandemic Forbearance Plan to
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`start the foreclosure process against Brown.
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`On November 2020 Carrington stop accepting Brown’s mortgage payment. On December
`12020 Carrington resume accepting Brown’s mortgage payfnents. On September 2021,
`Carrington again stoppe.d accepting Brown’s mortgage payments. On November 10, 2021
`Brown filed a complaint against Carrington. That case is caption in short Brown v. Carrington
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`FBT. CV 21 5047334-S
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`Brown alleged Carrington breach the contract between the parties, made negligent
`misrepresentation, and was negligehce in with its Conducts‘. All amount to a CUTPA violation.
`On December, 2021 Carrington resume accepting Brown's mortgage payments. On April 28,
`2022, Carrington again stop accepting Browns mortgage payment. |
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`On July 8, 2022 in affidavit testimony to the Bridgeport Superior Court, Elizabeth A.
`Ostermann, Carrington’s Vice President of Lien Release made the following statement.
`Carrington utilizes an insurance vendor SWBC which manages and oversees the relationship
`and information between a loan borrower’s insurance policy and the loan servicer, Carrington. ‘
`Carrington’s insurance vendor, SWBC will access EDU and retrieve data relative to the
`insurance policy. Carrington ‘has no discretion or input into the insurance premiums.
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`On or around April 19, 2024 Brown visited SWBC headquarter in New Jersey, and
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`discovers SWBC did not service Brown's loan, or retrieved or provided insurance data to
`Carrington. Brown also contacted the City of Bridgeport Tax Collector office and discover the
`property tax did not increase. On Jénuary 12, 24 the State Court accepted Carrington’s false
`representation and granted motion for summary judgment on Browns CUTPA claim.
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`On September 5, 2024 Carrington filed this foreclosure action, in an attempt to
`circumvents Brown State Courts action. By preemptively énd prematurely filing foreclosure
`against Brown, Carrington is attempting to ciréumvents any decision in Brown’s State Courts
`action. On January 10, 2025 Brown filed a complaint in Federal Court against Carrington,
`alleging two counts of fraud and violation of FDCPA. Carrington foreclosure action is an attempf
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`to use the court to commit fraud to circumvents Brown Stafe Courts action. On June 18, 2025
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`Brown filed motion to dismiss the current foreclosure action. On July 10 2025, Carrington filed
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`motion for summary judgment.
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`L ARGUMENTS
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`(1) Affidavit Made on Improper Foundation
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`Paragraph two (2) of Elizabeth A. Ostermann Affidavit States: she is over the age of
`eighteen years, and she is authorized to make the Affidavit on behalf of Carrington. As a witness
`I can competently testify to the matters stated herein. | make this affidavit based on my personal
`knowledge of the facts contained herein. In the regular performance of my job functions at
`Carrington, | am familiar with the business records maintained by Carrington for the purpose of
`servicing mortgage Loans. collecting payments and pursuing any delinquencies (the "Servicing
`Records"). Carrington's Servicing Records typically include transaction histories, other
`electronic data compilations and imaged documents pertaining to the Loans that Carrington
`services. See Exhibit 10 (Defendant Aff.)
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`Paragraph six (6) of Elizabeth A. Ostermann Affidavit States: The Servicing Records
`also include all of the financial data and transactions with respect to a Loan, including
`payments, credits, tax disbursements, insurance payments, modifications, interest charges, late
`fees and servicing notes. | am personally familiar with the Servicing Records as | routinely
`review them to determine a Loan's payment history and date of default, which are reflected in
`the Loan's transaction history, as well as a Loan's note possession history, which is reflected in
`comment log notes entered by Carrington employees with a business duty to do so. See
`Exhibit 10 (Defendant Aff.)
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`Paragraph seven (7) of Elizabeth A. Ostermann Affidavit States: | received extensive
`training in the use of Carrington's computer databases in order to be able to access records to
`perform my job on a daily basis. Based on my training and personal knowledge of the processes
`by which Carrington's Servicing Records are created and maintained, Carrington's Servicing
`Records are made at or near the time by, or from information provided by, persons with
`knowledge of the activity and transactions reflected in such records, and are kept in the ordinary .
`course of the business activity regularly conducted by Carrington. It is the regular practice of
`Carrington's mortgage servicing business to make and update its Servicing Records on a
`regular basis. See Exhibit 10 (Defendant Aff.)
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`Paragraph eight (8) of Elizabeth A. Ostermann Affidavit States: | make this affidavit
`based on my personal knowledge of the facts contained herein, my personal knowledge of the
`business and recordkeeping practices of Carrington and my own personal review of the
`Servicing Records for the Loan. | have reviewed the attached exhibits and have confirmed that
`they are true and correct copies of the originals based on my review of the Servicing Records.
`As a result, | know the facts set forth in this affidavit based on my own personal knowledge and,
`if called and sworn as a witness, could competently testify thereto. See Exhibit 10 (Defendant
`Aff.) '
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`Paragraph ten (10) of Elizabeth A. Ostermann Affidavit States: Defendant utilizes an
`insurance vendor, SWBC, which manages and oversees the relationship and information
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`between a loan borrower's insurance policy and the loan servicer, Carrington. Carrington utilizes
`a system, Electronic Data Interchange ("EDI"), that allows companies to exchange data
`electronically to eliminate paperwork and facilitate information between companies. Many
`companies use EDI, including Plaintiff's insurance company, Farmers Insurance. Farmers
`Insurance enters information in EDI, including the premium amounts. Carrington's insurance
`vendor, SWBC, will access EDI and retrieve data related to the insurance policy. Carrington has
`no discretion or input into the insurance premiums. Farmers Insurance bills for the full premium
`and then applies credits and discounts after receipt of the full premium. Carrington does not use
`discretion or have any input on insurance premiums. These are exclusively determined by the
`insurance company. See Exhibit 10 (Defendant Aff.)
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`Paragraph eleven (11) of Elizabeth A. Ostermann Affidavit States: According to information
`received from SWBC that | located in Carrington's Servicing Records, on February 15, 2018,
`Carrington received an invoice for Plaintiff's insurance renewal premium in the amount of
`$3,326.77. True and correct copies of the invoices contained in the Servicing Records are
`annexed hereto as Exhibit "B." See Exhibit B1.. True and correct copies of the escrow analysis
`are annexed hereto as Exhibit "C." See Exhibit C1 True and correct copies of Plaintiff's payment
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`histories | took from the Servicing Records are collectively annexed hereto as Exhibit "D." See
`Exhibit D1. See Exhibit 10 (Defendant Aff.)
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`On February 16, 2018 Carrington send $3,326.77 as payment to renew Brown'’s insurance
`premium, when Farmers Insurance only requested $3,044.91,
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`At the heights of overpaid insurance premium, Carrington overpaid the insurance premium
`by $793.66 in 2019. In 2019 Carrington send $3,508.44 as payment to renew the insurance
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`premium, when Farmers Insurance only requested $2,755.61
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`In 2020 Carrington send $3,747.35 as payment to renew the insurance premium, when
`Farmers Insurance only requested $3,424.08. See Exhibit D
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`_Carrington argued it did not overpay Browns insurance premium; it receives insurance
`data from insurance vender SWBC who collect insurance related information from Farmers
`Insurance, Browns insurance company. Specifically, Elizabeth A. Ostermann stated, Carrington
`utilizes an insurance vendor SWBC which manages and oversees the relationship and
`information between a loan borrower’s insurance policy and the loan servicer, Carrington.
`Carrington’s insurance vendor, SWBC will access EDU and retrieve data relative to the
`insurance policy. Carrington.has; no discretion or input into the insurance premiums. See
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`Exhibit 10 (Defendant Aff. p. 3, pp. 10-11)
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`Naturally, Brown investigated Carrington’s claims, He visited SWBC headquarter in New .
`Jersey and discovers SWBC did not service Browns loan or provided insurance data to
`Carrington. See Exhibit 14
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`On May 1, 2018 Carrington increased Browns monthly mortgage payment from $2,231.21 to
`$2,341.83. See Exhibit C 5/1/2018 p.3-4, Exhibit B No. 6, and Exhibit 10 Defendant Aff. p. 3,
`pp.11 Carrington claimed, Browns insurance premium went up from $216.88 to $277.23 so it
`increased Brown’s’ mortgage payment.
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`Elizabeth A. Ostermann affidavit testifies, due to the increase in the insurance premium,
`according to the escrow analysis dated March 16, 2018, this caused a shortage of $603.39 in
`the escrow account. To make up for the shortage, an additional $50.28 was charged .each
`month for the length of 12 months. See Exhibit B No. 26 and See Exhibit 10 Defendant Aff p.
`3 par.11
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`If the Court subtract the old mortgage payment $2,231.21 from the new mortgage
`payment $2,341.83 the difference is $110.62. Carrington testified that it only added $50.28 to
`the mortgage payment. See Exhibit B No.26, and Exhibit 10 Defendant Aff p. 3 par.11
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`-The calculation shows Carrington added an additional $60.34 per month ($724.08 a
`year) more than what it testified it added to Brown’s mortgage payment. $110.62 - $50.28
`=$60.34 a month x 12 = ($724.08 a year) |
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`The mortgage statement shows, supported by what Elizabeth A. Ostermann affidavit
`testified, Carrington deducts $1 10.62 from Brown’s monthly mortgage payments each month to
`supplement the fraudulent amount it added to the mortgage payment. See Exhibit C p.4
`5/1/2018 See also Exhibit 10 Defendant Aff p. 3, par. 12 '
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`On November 2, 2022 after hearing Carrington oral argument for motion for summary
`judgement the Court, (Judge Moses) denied Carrington’s motion for Summary Judgments
`because, the court recognized Carrington’s unfair or deceptive practices. Specifically, the Court
`stated Carrington’s summary judgment was being denied because there exist material issues of
`disputed fact whether (1) Carrington’s loan accounting and loan servicing practices are unfair or
`deceptive, (2) Carrington negligently misrepresented information to Brown regarding his loan,
`(3) Carrington breached the terms of the mortgage contract. See Exhibit 4.11/2/22 Court
`decision _
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`At Carrington summary judgment re-argument hearing, the court recognized that Carrington
`affidavit did not account for the additional $60.34 a month that was added to Brown's mortgage
`payment. Carrington then fraudulently misied the court into believing the additional $60.34 a
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`month added to Browns principal obligation was due to the Ciiy of Bridgeport property tax
`increase. Brown contacted the City of Bridgeport Tax Collectors office, and discovered; the
`property tax did not increase as Carrington fraudulently misled the court. See Exhibit A
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`The court requested that Carrington show anywhere in the affidavit where Carrington
`accounted for the additional $60.34. Carrington affidavit could not show, nor did Carrington
`show where it accounted for thee additional $60.34 a month added to Brown’s mortgage
`payment. See Exhibit 3 Court. Transcript from 10:26 am to 11:02 am and Exhibit 10
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`There was no legal need for Elizabeth Corral, someone with no knowledge of Brown’s
`Servicing Records, to submit another affidavit on behalf of Carrington. The new affidavit is a
`sham, and is submitted solely to mislead this court. Elizabeth A. Ostermann, Carrington Vice
`President of Lien Releas_e already submitted an affidavit in support of motion for summary
`judgment. Elizabeth A. Ostermann already testified to be an individual with personal knowledge
`of the facts contained herein. In the regular performance of her job functions at Carrington, she
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`is familiar with the business records maintained by Carrington for the purpose of servicing
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`mortgage Loans. See Exhibit 10 (Defendant Aff.)
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`Elizabeth A. Ostermann already sat’isfy tiie statutory requirements out line in Practice
`Book § 23-18 of the business records hearsay exception. She testified that she received
`extensive training in'tiie use of Carrington's computer databases in order to be able to access
`records to perform her job on a daily i)aeis. She already satisfies the statutory requirements
`based on her training and personal knowledge of the processes by which Carrington's Servicing
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`Records are created and maintained. See Exhibit 10 Paragraph 1-7
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`We have stated that "the necessity requirement is met when, unless the hearsay
`statement is admitted, the facts it contains may be lost, either because the declarant is dead or
`otherwise unavailable, or because the assertion is of such a nature that evidence of the same
`value cannot be obtained from the same or other sources.™ State v. Oquendo, supra, 665; see
`also State v.. Frye, 182 Conn. 476, 480, 438 A.2d 735 (1980) ("necessity factor ... is reflected in
`the prerequisite that the declarant be unavailable"). "The moving party has the burden of
`proving the declarant's unavailability."
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`Carrington has not stated Elizabeth A. Ostermann is unavailable to submit an affidavit by
`Elizabeth Corral. Elizabeth Corral affidavit does not testify to having the same personal
`knowledge pertaining to the Servicing Record of Brown’s loan, nor does her affidavit testify to
`have extensive training in the use of Carrington's computer databases, in order to be able to
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`access records to make the affidavit.
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`Elizabeth Corral submitted her affidavit on improper foundation. She testified she relied
`on the hearsay and fraud in Carrington’s servicing records to make her affidavit. See Exhibit 17
`Elizabeth A. Ostermann, the individual with personal knowledge of Brown’s servicing records
`already testify Carrington utilizes an insurance vendor, SWBC, which manages and oversees
`the relationship and information between a loan borrower's insurance policy and the loan
`servicer, Carrington. Carrington utilizes a system, Electronic Data Interchange ("EDI"), that
`allows companies to exchange data electronically to eliminate papenmbrk and facilitate
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`information between companies. See Exhibit 10 (Defendant Aff p. 3, par. 10)
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`Brown'’s evidence has established that this testimony is hearsay and a sham all in one.
`Brown already visited SWBC headquarter in New Jersey and discovers SWBC did not service
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`Browns loan or provided insurance data to Carrington. See Exhibit 14 Brown'’s evidence also
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`- established he contacted the City of Bridgeport Tax Collector office and discover the property
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`tax did not increase. See Exhibit A Brown_filed motion to strike the affidavit of Elizabeth A.
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`Ostermann.. See FBT. CV 21 5047334-S Dkt. No. 125
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`Here, If Elizabeth Corral relies on Carrington servicing records to make the affidavit, she
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`relied on hearsay and false statement in Carrington’s servicing record to make the affidavit.
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`Notwithstanding, Elizabeth Corral affidavit falsely testified, Brown (the borrower) failed to make
`monthly mortgage payments for the month of April 1, 2021, and for each and every month
`thereafter. See Exhibit 15 (Elizabeth Corral Aff. Par. 7)
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`The court, in somewhat comparable circumstances, have found a similar need for
`explanation. They have held with virtual unanimity that a party cannot create a genuine
`issue of fact sufficient to survive summary judgment simply by contradicting his or her own
`previous sworn statement (by, say, filing a later affidavit that flatly contradicts that party's .
`earlier sworn deposition) without explaining the contradiction or attempting to resolve the
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`disparity. See, e. g., Colantuoni v. Alfred Calcagni & Sons, Inc., 44 F. 3d 1, 5 (CA1
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`1994); Rule v. Brine, Inc., 85 F. 3d 1002, 1011 (CA2 1996); Hackman v. Valley Fair, 932 F.
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`2d 239, 241 (CA3 1991);
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`Elizabeth A. Ostermann affidavit testified, Carrington received Brown’s mortgage
` payment up to December 28, 2021. See Exhibit 10 par. 16 Therefore, Elizabeth Corral affidavit
`contradicts Elizabeth A. Ostermann earlier affidavit testimony to the court. Brown’s evidence |
`proves he was currant with his mortgage payments, he made mortgage payments, even when
`Carrington returned the rfiortgage payments. See Exhibit C 2021, Exhibit M and Exhibit N
`Elizabeth Corral is not only statutorily unqualified to access Carrington’s computer data base to
`submit information about Brown’s servicing records, she submits false and misleading
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`information in her affidavit to the court.
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`Despite the facts that Elizabeth A. Ostermann relied on hearsay and fraudulent
`information’s in Carrington’s servicing records to submit her affidavit, she statutorily testified to
`her qualification to submit the false information pertaining to the Servicing Record of Brown’s
`loan on behalf of Carrington’s course of business activities.
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`(2) Sham Affidavit Do Not Fall Under Any of the Hearsay Exception
`As previously stated, on July 10, 2025 Carrington Mortgage Services, LLC submitted
`another affidavit from Elizabeth Corral in support of motion for summary judgment. This affidavit
`is filed as Exhibit 17. The affidavit of Elizabeth Corral contains statements that constitute hearsay
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`and sham which are not admissible under the rules of evidence.
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`Specifically, Paragraph 2 of Elizabeth Corral affidavit States: | am a/a Default Fulfillment
`Manager of Carrington Mortgage Services, LLC (the "Plaintiff"). In the regular performance of
`my job functions, | am familiar with business records maintained by Carrington to service
`mortgage loans. These records, which include data compilations, electronically imaged
`documents, and others, were created at or near the time by, or from information provided by,
`persons with knowledge of the activity and transactions reflected in such records, and are
`maintained in the course. of business activities conducted regularly by Carrington. It is the
`regular practice of Carrington’s mortgage servicing business to make these records. In
`connection with making This statement of review, | have personally examined these business
`records reflecting the data and information used in this affidavit. See Exhibit 17
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`Paragraph 7 of Elizabeth Corral affidavit States: The borrower failed to make monthly
`mortgage payments for the month of April 1, 2021, and for each and every month thereafter.
`See Exhibit 17 Par. 7
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`Here, Elizabeth Corral affidavit does not testify to have personal knowledge of Brown's |
`servicing records, or knowledge on how the business records were generated, or testified she is
`familiar with and trained on the manner and method by which Carrianon created and
`maintained its business records pertaining to Brown'’s account, which is a statutory requirement
`of the business records exception to the hearsay rule. Elizabeth Corral affidavit does not
`establish that the basic elements of Carrington computer system is reliable. Elizabeth Corral
`submitted false affidavit testimony about Brown’s Servicing' records, that Brown failed to make
`monthly mortgage ;)Jayments for the month of April 1, 2021, and for each and every month
`thereafter. |
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`Pursuant to § 300 of the Practice Book, affidavits filed in connection with a motion for
`summary judgment must be made on personal knowledge, must set forth facts which would
`be admissible in evidence, and must show that the affiant is competent to testify to all
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`matters stated in the affidavit." Dorazio v. M. B. Foster Electric Co., 157 Conn. 226, 228,
`253 A.2d 22;
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`Elizabeth Corral affidavit did not suggest that she understood how Carrington
`transmitted the "electronically stored business records” or how Carrington processed the
`electronic records to create computer generated business records that resided with her
`employer, Carrington Mortgage Services LLC. In short, Elizabeth Corral affidavit did not
`establish that Carrington’s computer systems were reliable. Accordingly, Carrington failed to
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`meet the court's "strict standard" of "showing that it is quite clear what the truth is, and that
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`excludes any real doubt as to the existence of any genuine issue of material fact." (internal
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`quotation marks omitted) See American Express Centurion Bank v. Head, supra, 115 Conn.App.
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`at 15, 971 A.2d 90
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`We conclude that Elizabeth Corral affidavit did not sati‘sfy the second part of the two part
`test as presented in Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Carabetta, supra, 55 Conn.App. at 376, 739
`A.2d 301. The affidavit did not "establish that the basic elements of the computer system [were]
`reliable.” Heeding our Supreme Court's caveat that "[clJomputers may ... makKe errors that arise
`out of defects in the “software,’ the input procedures, the data base, and the processing
`program;" American Oil Co. v. Valenti, supra, 179 Conn. at 359, 426 A.2d 305; we conclude that
`it was incumbent on the plaintiff to produce an affidavit from "a person who is familiar with
`computerized records not only as a user but also as someone with some working acquaintance
`with the methods by which such records are made;" id., at 361, 426 A.2d 305; to establish the
`reliability of Carrington's computer system.
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`In view of the complex nature of the operation of computers and general lay unfamiliarity
`with their operation, courts have been cautioned to take special care to be certain that the
`foundation is sufficient to warrant a finding of trustworthiness and that the opposing party has
`full opportunity to inquire into the process by which information is fed into the computer.”
`(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) See Connecticut Light & Power Co. v.
`Gilmore, 289 Conn. 88, 116-18, 956 A.2d 1145 (2008):
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`A trial court's decision to admit evidence, if premised on a correct view of the law ... calls
`for the abuse of discretion standard of review.... In other words, only after a trial court has made
`the legal determination that a particular statement... is subject to a hearsay exception, is it [then]
`vested with the discretion to admit or to bar the evidence based upon relevancy, prejudice, or
`other legally appropriate grounds related to the rule of evidence under which admission is being
`sought." (Citations omitted; emphasis altered; internal quotation marks omitted.) Midland
`Funding, LLC v. Mitchell-James, supra, 163 Conn.App. at 653, 137 A.3d 1
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`Elizabeth Corral affidavit does not fall under any of the hearsay exceptions outlined in
`Practice Book § 23-18. Elizabeth Corral affidavit does not testify to having personal knowledge
`pertaining to the Se'rvicing Record of Brown'’s Ioah. As a statutory requirement out line in
`Practice Book § 23-18, she does not testify to have extensive training and personal knowledge
`or Any knowledge, on how Carrington’s business records were generated, or the manner and
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`method by which Carrington created and maintained its business records pertaining to Brown’s
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`account. As a statutory requirement out line in Practice Book § 23-18 the affidavit has not
`established that the basic elements of Carrington’s computer system are reliable.
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`As such, Elizabeth Corral affidavit should not be considered by the court in its
`determination of motion for summary judgment. Brown challenged the amount of Carrington’s
`debt; therefore, the hearsay exception does not apply. Elizabeth Corral hearsay affidavit is
`prohibited by statue. The affidavit is hearsay and deemed legally insufficient, irrelevant,
`improper and not competent, reliable or trustworthy evidence to support motion for summary
`judgment. The affidavit does not come close to satisfying the statutory requirements of the
`business records exceptibn to the hearsay rule. The record submitted in‘the affidavit does not
`satisfies each of the three conditions set forth in General Statutes § 52-180.
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`The motiofi to strike the hearsay statements is supported by established legal precedent.
`Case law such as Webster Bank v. Flanagan, 51 Conn.App. 733, 749, 725 A.2d 975 (1999) and
`Burritt Mutual Savings Bank of New Britain v. Tucker, 183 Conn. 369, 375, 439 A.2d 396 (1987)
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`including Practice Book § 23-18 provide clear guidance and authority for the exclusion of
`hearsay evidence in this matter.
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`It is axiomatic that such a defense may be raised by pleading a special defense
`attacking the amount of the debt claimed, but it may also be raised by objection, supported with
`evidence and arguments challenging the amount of the debt, upon the attempted introduction of
`the affidavit in court. See, e.q., Suffield Bank v. Berman, 25 Conn.App. 369, 372-74, 594 A.2d
`493
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`Our review of the record convinces us that the defendant's claim seeking to establish the
`chronology and specific nature of the payments was well articulated and is therefore readily
`distinguishable from a vague claim of insufficient knowledge. Because the defendant challenged
`the amount of the debt, the use of Practice Book § 23-18 to "introduce the affidavit is prohibited,
`and the hearsay rules apply." Webster Bank v. Flanagan, 51 Conn.App. 733, 749, 725 A.2d 975
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`(1999). ‘
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`- Without question, an affidavit of debt is hearsay evidence because it is an out-of-court
`statement, by an absent witness, that is offered to prove the truth of the amount of the debt
`averred in the affidavit. See Midland Funding, LLC v. Mitchell-James, 163 Conn.App. 648, 655,
`137 A.3d 1 (2016) ("Hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of the
`matter asserted.... Unless subject to an exception, hearsay is inadmissible." [Citation
`omitted.]); National City Mortgage Co. v. Stoecker, 92 Conn.App. 787, 798-99, 888 A.2d 95
`(2006) See also Burrift Mutual Savings Bank of New Biritain v. Tucker, 183 Conn. 369, 375, 439
`A.2d 396 (1987).
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`V. CONCLUSION
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`WHEREFORE, for reasons set forth herein, the defendant respectfully requests the court
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`grant motion to strike the affidavit of Elizabeth Corral.
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`THE DEFENDENT, Ralston Brown
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`Ralston Brown
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`102 Harral Ave
`Bridgeport, CT 06604
`(475) 210-8166 '
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`CERTIFICATION
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`This is to certify that on AUGUST 14, 2025 a copy of the foregoing was mailed, to the plaintiff
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`Attorney For The Plaintiff
`Benjamin T. Staskiewicz
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`McCalla Raymer Leibert Pierce LLC
`280 Trumbull Street, 23 rd Floor
`Halford, CT 06103
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`Phone No. 860 808-0606
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`Juris No. 101589
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`e
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`Ralston Brown
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`13
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