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`NO. HHB-CV24-6090030 : SUPERIOR COURT TATIANA GALLARDO : NEW BRITAIN JD V. : CASH 4 KEYS NY, LLC ET AL : JULY 18, 2025 MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT PRECISION PROPERTY MANAGEMENT, LLC’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (COUNT TWO) I. INTRODUCTION Plaintiff Tatiana Gallardo hereby objects to Defendant Precision Property Management, LLC’s (hereinafter “Precision”) Motion for Summary Judgment as to Count Two of the Revised Complaint. Count Two alleges that Precision, as property manager of the premises at 424 West Street, Bristol, owed a duty to maintain the common area outdoor stairway where Ms. Gallardo slipped on untreated ice and fell, and that Precision’s negligence in failing to inspect, treat, or warn of the icy condition caused her injuries. Precision’s motion argues it owed no duty to Ms. Gallardo because the landlord allegedly retained exclusive responsibility for snow removal under the lease. This objection demonstrates that genuine issues of material fact exist as to Precision’s control over the common stairway and its duty to keep that area safe. Given the evidence of Precision’s management responsibilities and actual control of property maintenance, summary judgment is inappropriate. The Court should deny Precision’s motion so that a jury may resolve the factual questions regarding Precision’s duty and negligence. II. FACTS IN DISPUTE 1. The Parties and Premises: Plaintiff Gallardo was a tenant residing on the third floor of 424 West Street, Bristol on March 2, 2023. Co-Defendant Cash 4 Keys NY, LLC (“Cash 4 Keys”) owned the premises, which consist of a
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`multi-unit residential building with common areas including an exterior stairway. Cash 4 Keys contracted Precision as its property manager for the premises prior to the date of the accident. Precision was the acting property manager on the date of the accident. 2. The Fall on the Icy Stairway: On the morning of March 2, 2023, Ms. Gallardo left her third-floor apartment and headed down the northeast exterior back stairway, which was a common means of egress for the building. She slipped on the first step, which was coated in an accumulation of ice that had not been treated or cleared, and fell to the ground, suffering serious injuries. The Revised Complaint alleges that the icy condition had existed for some time (over the course of several days) and had not been remedied, creating a dangerous hazard. As a result, Count Two of the Complaint asserts that Precision, as the property manager in control of the premises, was negligent in failing to remove or mitigate the ice, failing to inspect the stairway, and failing to warn tenants of the danger. Specifically, paragraph 11 of Count Two lists several negligent acts or omissions by Precision, including that Precision “[f]ailed to remove, or adequately remove accumulated snow and/or ice from the stairway,” “[f]ailed to inspect or adequately inspect said stairway… to ensure its safety,” and “[h]ad a duty to maintain the stairway in an orderly manner yet failed to do so.”. 3. Precision’s Property Management Agreement: Precision’s duties were governed by a written Professional Management Agreement between Cash 4 Keys (the owner) and Precision (the agent). Exhibit A. Under that agreement, Precision agreed to “use its best efforts and perform all measures necessary for the orderly renting, leasing, operation, maintenance,
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`and management of the PROPERTY on the terms and conditions set forth herein, using the same degree of care that an ordinarily prudent person would use in the management of properties owned by such person.” Id. at 3. Furthermore, the Management agreement holds that Precision shall be responsible for repairs of the property: “at the expense of the Owner, Agent shall cause the property to be maintained in good order and condition,” and “shall cause to be made, at the expense of Owner, all repairs, replacements and alterations therein and thereto,” purchasing any supplies or equipment “necessary or desirable for the proper operation and maintenance of the property.” Id. at 5-6. Precision was obligated to “inspect... repairs, meet with contractors for repairs, and coordinate and assist with routine repairs and maintenance.” Id. At 7.
`The agreement further provided that Precision “shall use its best efforts to provide for the property maintenance which will include regularly scheduled inspections [and] supervision of maintenance activities,” including responding to tenant maintenance requests. Significantly, Precision was empowered to take emergency action without prior owner approval: “Agent may perform work or purchase supplies… in circumstances which Agent in good faith believes constitute an emergency requiring immediate action for the protection of any portion of the property or any occupants thereof… If Owner cannot be notified before the required emergency action must be taken, Agent shall notify Owner as soon as possible after such emergency action.” Id. at 6.
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`Additionally, the Agreement empowered Precision to hire employees to assist with the management and maintenance of the property. “Agent shall have the right to hire, negotiate, supervise, and discharge all employees used in the management of the Property. Agent shall designate such duties and pay such compensation as deemed necessary by Agent and approved by the Owner. Agent shall have the exclusive right to manage the personnel on the basis of budgets and job standards approved by the Owner. It is agreed that all such employees are employees of the Agent or private employee leasing agency.” Id. at 8.
`Thus, by contract, Precision had broad responsibility and authority to maintain the premises (including common areas) in a safe condition, to conduct inspections, and to address dangerous conditions to protect occupants, and to hire employees in furtherance of accomplishing those duites.
`4. Lease Provisions: The plaintiff’s lease with Cash 4 Keys (the landlord) also sheds light on duties. Exhibit B. In the lease, Cash 4 Keys agreed that “we will maintain the grounds and remove snow from walks and driveways.” (The lease defines “we” and “our” as the Landlord, Cash 4 Keys.). Id. at 1. The lease also identified Precision as the “Manager” authorized to manage the property and “to receive on [the landlord’s] behalf all notices, demands and service of process”. Apart from designating Precision in this managerial role, the lease is otherwise silent as to the duties of Precision, including the removal of snow or ice. In other words, the lease confirms the landlord’s general responsibility for common-area maintenance (consistent with Conn.
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`Gen. Stat. § 47a-7(a)(3)) and positions Precision as the landlord’s agent, but it does not disclaim or negate Precision’s involvement in maintenance. It certainly does not forbid the landlord from delegating maintenance tasks to its agent; indeed, that delegation is exactly what the separate Management Agreement accomplished. 5. Precision’s Claims of No Duty: In moving for summary judgment, Precision does not dispute that Ms. Gallardo fell on an icy common stairway or that she was injured; instead, Precision denies that it had any duty or control over that area. Precision’s motion argues “there is no genuine issue of material fact that the defendant did not breach any duty owed to the plaintiff”, because (according to Precision) it owed no such duty in the first place. In support, Precision points to the lease language placing snow removal responsibility on the landlord, and to an affidavit from its owner asserting that Precision “was not requested or directed to perform ice or snow removal from the premises,” that it “did not perform” any snow removal there, and that it “did not receive any compensation for” snow removal services. Precision’s position is that under the lease and the management contract, it “did not have control or possession of the stairway where Gallardo slipped and fell for snow or ice removal, and had no legal duty … to inspect, warn about, clean, shovel, sand, or perform any ice or snow removal on the stairway.” This assertion of non-control and no-duty is squarely contradicted by the terms of Precision’s management agreement and by the factual circumstances, as discussed below, creating a classic factual dispute inappropriate for summary judgment.
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`III. STANDARD OF REVIEW “In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Provencher v. Enfield, 284 Conn. 772, 790-91 (2007). “[S]ummary judgment is appropriate only if a fair and reasonable person could conclude only one way … [A] summary disposition … should be on evidence which a jury would not be at liberty to disbelieve and which would require a directed verdict for the moving party.” Dugan v. Mobile Medical Testing Services, Inc., 265 Conn. 791, 815 (2003). The moving party “has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue as to all the material facts, which, under applicable principles of substantive law, entitle him to a judgment as a matter of law … [t]he courts hold the movant to a strict standard … to satisfy his burden the movant must make a showing that it is quite clear what the truth is, and that excludes any real doubt as to the existence of any genuine issues of material fact.” Zielinski v. Kostoris, 279 Conn. 312, 318 (2006). “When documents submitted in support of a motion for summary judgment fail to establish that there is no genuine issue of material fact, the nonmoving party has no obligation to submit documents establishing the existence of such an issue.” Id. at 318-19. “Issues of negligence are ordinarily not susceptible of summary adjudication but should be resolved by trial in the ordinary manner … Summary judgment is particularly ill-adapted to negligence cases, where … the ultimate issue in contention involves a mixed question of fact and law, and requires the trier of fact to determine whether the standard of care was met in a specific circumstance.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Busque v. Oakwood Farms Sports Center, Inc., 80 Conn. App. 603, 607 (2003), cert. denied, 267 Conn. 919 (2004). “So extreme a remedy as summary judgment should not be used as a substitute for trial or as a device intended
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`to impose a difficult burden on the non-moving party to save his or her day in court unless it is clear that no genuine issue of material fact remains to be tried … A judge’s function when considering summary judgment motion is not to cull out the weak cases from the herd of lawsuits waiting to be tried; rather, only if the case is dead on arrival, should the court take the drastic step of administering the last rites by granting summary judgment.” (Internal citation and quotation marks omitted.) Mott v. Wal-Mart Stores East, LP, 139 Conn. App. 618, 631 (2012). “The essential elements of a cause of action in negligence are well established: duty, breach of that duty; causation; and actual injury … Duty is a legal conclusion about relationships between individuals, made after the fact, and [is] imperative to a negligence cause of action.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Doe v. Saint Francis Hospital & Medical Center, 309 Conn. 146, 174 (2013). Under the theory of premises liability, “[t]he law is clear that [a] possessor of land has a duty to an invitee to reasonably inspect and maintain the premises in order to render them reasonably safe … In addition, the possessor of land must warn an invitee of dangers that the invitee could not reasonably be expected to discover.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gargano v. Azpiri, 110 Conn. App. 502, 508 (2008). “Liability for injuries caused by defective premises … does not depend on who holds legal title, but rather on who has possession and control of the property.” LaFlamme v. Dallessio, 261 Conn. 247, 251 (2002). The person or entity in possession and control of the “do[es] not breach their duty to invitees by failing to remedy a danger unless they had actual or constructive notice of that danger.” DiPietro v. Farmington Sports Arena, LLC, 133 Conn. App. 630, 650 (2012). “Under Connecticut law, the existence of both actual and constructive notice is a question of fact.” Vendrella v. Astriab Family Ltd. Partnership, 133 Conn. App. 630, 659
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`(2012), aff’d, 311 Conn. 301 (2014). “The defendant can be charged with having constructive notice of a defect when it is of such a nature and duration that a reasonable inspection would have disclosed the risk.” (Emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Ormsby v. Frankel, 54 Conn. App. 98, 110-11 (1999), aff’d, 255 Conn. 670 (2001). “What constitutes a reasonable length of time is largely a question of fact to be determined in light of the particular circumstances of a case.” (Internal quotations omitted.) Considine v. Waterbury, 279 Conn. 830, 870 (2006). That question “is a question of fact for the jury and unless the period of time is such that but one conclusion could be found, its determination should be left to the trier.” Baker v. Ives, 162 Conn. 295, 307 (1972). “A plaintiff can prove the elements of negligence using either direct or circumstantial evidence … Circumstantial evidence is evidence of facts from which the trier is asked to infer the existence of, and, so, to find proven, another fact or set of facts …Circumstantial evidence need not be so conclusive as to exclude every other hypothesis … Rather, circumstantial evidence must only produce in the mind of the trier a reasonable belief in the probability of the existence of the material fact.” (Citation omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Rawls v. Progressive Northern Ins. Co., 310 Conn. 768, 777-78 (2013). “It is settled that circumstantial evidence can establish constructive notice.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Kurti v. Becker, 54 Conn. App. 335, 339, cert. denied, 251 Conn. 909 (1999). Summary judgment is a drastic remedy and is appropriate only when “the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Practice Book § 17-44; Scrapchansky v. Plainfield, 450 (1993). The movant bears the burden of
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`showing the absence of any genuine factual dispute, and the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party (id.; Connell v. Colwell, 214 Conn. 242, 246 (1990)). A “material” fact is one that will make a difference in the case outcome. Hammer v. Lumberman’s Mut. Cas. Co., 214 Conn. 573, 578 (1990). Once the movant meets its burden, the opposing party must substantiate its adverse claim by showing evidence of a genuine issue for trial. Importantly, “the issue of whether a defendant owes a duty of care is an appropriate matter for summary judgment because the question is one of law” (Mozeleski v. Thomas, 76 Conn. App. 287, 290 (2003)). However, if that legal question turns on disputed historical facts (such as the extent of control over premises), summary judgment should be denied so that the factfinder can resolve those underlying facts. See Fiorelli v. Gorsky, 120 Conn. App. 298, 309, (2010) (noting that although questions of fact are generally for the jury, if control is definitively expressed in a lease it may become a question of law – but if not definitive, control is a factual issue for trial). IV. ARGUMENT A. Precision’s Control Over the Common Area Stairway Gave Rise to a Duty of Care Connecticut law presumes that a landlord retains control of common areas and thus owes a duty to maintain them safely, absent an explicit transfer of control to another. LaFlamme v. Dallessio, 261 Conn. 247, 256–57 (2002) (landlord owes duty of reasonable care as to parts of property over which it retained control); State v. LoSacco, 12 Conn. App. 172, 177 (1987) (landlord is responsible for maintenance of common areas, as no tenant has exclusive control over them). Here, it is undisputed that the stairway where Ms. Gallardo fell was a common area serving multiple tenants. Under the lease and Conn. Gen. Stat. § 47a-7(a)(3), Cash 4 Keys (the landlord) clearly had a
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`duty to keep that stairway in a safe condition for tenants and invitees. Precision seizes on this fact to argue that only the landlord’s duty is implicated. However, Precision ignores that the landlord’s duty can be, and was, fulfilled through its agent, Precision, which had actual control over the means and manner of property maintenance. The law does not hold that an owner’s duty magically immunizes a property manager from liability; rather, both the landlord and its agent may be held accountable to an injured tenant if the agent undertook the duty of care and performed it negligently. In other words, the landlord’s retaining of legal duty for common areas does not preclude the finding of a concurrent duty running from a property manager to third parties in the zone of risk. Indeed, the Connecticut Supreme Court has expressly recognized that a property maintenance contractor or agent can owe a direct duty of care to persons injured by a hazard on the property – even when the contractor does not hold title or exclusive possession of the premises. In Gazo v. City of Stamford, 255 Conn. 245 (2001), a bank’s snow removal contractor argued (like Precision does) that only the property owner had the “nondelegable” duty to keep the premises safe, and thus the contractor owed no duty to a patron who fell on an icy sidewalk. The Supreme Court rejected that argument and held the contractor did owe a duty to the injured plaintiff. The Court emphasized that “[a] duty to use care may arise from a contract, from a statute, or from circumstances under which a reasonable person, knowing what he knew or should have known, would anticipate that harm of the general nature of that suffered was likely to result from his act or failure to act.” Id. at 251 (quoting Coburn v. Lenox Homes, Inc., 186 Conn. 370, 375 (1982)). In Gazo, it was entirely foreseeable to the contractor that failing to perform snow removal with reasonable care could result in someone slipping and getting hurt – and public policy favored holding the contractor to that duty of care.
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`As the Supreme Court noted, the contractor had agreed by contract to do the very task necessary for safety, and “[i]t is not an unreasonable extension of that duty to go beyond [the owner] to include those members of the public, like the plaintiff, who are injured by the breach.” Gazo, 255 Conn. at 251. In sum, Connecticut law does not require that a defendant have title to or exclusive control of premises to owe a duty of care regarding those premises – if the defendant has assumed responsibility for property maintenance or otherwise taken control of the situation, the law will impose a duty to act with reasonable care for the safety of lawful entrants. See id. at 260–62; see also Hoffmeister v. Westbury Condo. Ass’n, No. CV 980586164, 2001 WL 1468788, at 3 (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 1, 2001) (contractor hired to remove snow owes an independent duty to any person foreseeably injured by negligent snow removal, per Gazo). “Where the evidence on the question as to who had control of the area or instrumentality causing the injury is such that the mind of a fair and reasonable [person] could reach but one conclusion as to the identity of the person exercising control, the question is one for the court, but, if honest and reasonable [persons] could fairly reach different conclusions on the question, the issue should properly go to the jury....” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Pelletier v. Sordoni/Skanska Construction Co., 286 Conn. 563, 599 (2008). Medina v. Transfer Trailer Servs., Inc., No. KNL-CV-20-6045942-S, 2025 WL 1565398, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. May 30, 2025)
`Applying these principles to the case at bar, a jury could readily find that Precision assumed control over keeping the common areas safe, and thus owed a duty to Ms. Gallardo. Precision was not a passive or occasional contractor with a limited role; it was the exclusive property manager, tasked with comprehensive oversight of
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`the premises. Precision’s Professional Management Agreement demonstrates the extent of control Precision wielded over maintenance of the property. Precision was contractually obligated to “cause the property to be maintained in good order and condition” and to handle “all repairs, replacements and [maintenance]… necessary or desirable for the proper operation and maintenance of the property.” It had authority to hire and supervise maintenance staff or contractors, to purchase supplies, and generally to deal with all upkeep on the Owner’s behalf. Precision also had the right (and duty) to conduct regular inspections of the premises. If a dangerous condition arose that threatened occupants’ safety, exactly like an icy stairway, Precision had not only the power but the contractual mandate to address it. The management agreement’s emergency clause gave Precision affirmative authority to take immediate action to protect occupants or property in an emergency, even if the owner could not be reached first. A reasonable jury could view an exterior stairway coated in ice (days after a storm, presumably) as precisely the kind of dangerous condition demanding “immediate action for the protection of… occupants” that Precision was empowered to take without prior approval. In other words, Precision had both the control over the means of remedying the hazard and the responsibility to do so promptly in the interest of tenant safety.
`Depostion testimony taken from Tiana Ramalanjaona, one of the owners of Cash 4 Keys, provided strong evidence that Precision did exercise control over the snow maintenance of the property, and to that end employed and oversaw a contractor named Luis Changaqui to do just that. See Exhibit C – July 2, 2025 Deposition of Tiana Ramalanjaona, pg. 11-12. Ramalanjaona testified that tenants at the 424 West Street apartment building had access to an online portal to make complaints, repair
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`and maintenance requests. This portal would then interface with a software that Precision had access to, called “Buildium” where they could see the tenant requests and complaints and act on them. Critically, Ramalanjaona testified that at the time of the incident he did not have access to the Buildium online portal. At the time of the incident Precision operated and had access to the tenant communication portal. Id. at 12-14. Tennants with complaints about snow removal were also able to communicate directly with Luis. Tennants with complaints about the work done by Luis would communicate directly with Precision, through the online portal or via email. Id. at 15.
`Ramalanjaona testified to the following:
`7/2/25 Deposition of Tiana Ramalanjaona, Pg. 18-20.
`Q: Okay. Did you have a contract, a written contract with Luis, or how was that -- how were things arranged with him? A: I don't have a written contract with him. It was basically when it snows, he would go and do the snow removal. You know, snow removal/icing, clear the sidewalks, whatever needed to be done to the property. Q: Okay, thank you. I just want to draw your attention to this paragraph here. I know you're on a small phone. Can you see that, sir, where it says Management Standards? A: Yep. Q: Okay. And it says, the agent hereby accepts said employment on the terms and conditions hereinafter set forth, and shall use its best efforts to perform all measures necessary for the orderly renting, leasing, operation, maintenance, and management of the property on the terms and conditions set forth herein,
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`using the same degree of care that an ordinarily prudent person would use in the management of properties owned by such persons. Do you agree that that says that right there? A: Yes. Q: Okay. And the agent here is obviously - that's Precision; correct? A: Yes. Q: Okay. And maintenance and management of the properties would include snow removal; correct? A: Yes. Q: Okay, so while they may not be doing it themselves, they were in charge of maintaining that snow removal to a degree that an ordinarily prudent person would. Is that correct? A: Yes.
`Exhibit C: July 2, 2025 Deposition of Tiana Ramalanjaona Pg. 18-20.
`Precision’s argument that the lease did not require Precision to perform snow removal misses the point. It is true that Section 5 of the lease says the landlord will remove snow from walks and driveways, and the lease does not explicitly assign that duty to Precision. But the absence of the words “Precision shall shovel snow” in the lease is not dispositive of the tort duty question before this Court. By the lease’s own terms, Precision is identified as the landlord’s managing agent, and nothing in the lease prohibits the landlord from using an agent to carry out its maintenance obligations. To the contrary, the landlord did exactly that by hiring Precision, and Precision did exactly that by hiring and supervising Luis Changaqui. Thus, the lease language simply means the ultimate responsibility vis-à-vis the tenant remained with
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`the landlord (consistent with general law) – it does not mean Precision had no role to play. Indeed, Precision was in the best position to remedy snow and ice issues, because they were exclusively in control of the online portal where tenants were instructed to report these problems. Whether Precision’s role rose to the level of control and assumption of duty is a factual matter.
`Tiana Ramalanjaona provided testimony that directly address the delegation of Cash 4 Keys snow removal duties under the Lease Agreement:
`Q: … One moment, please. Okay, sir, you're familiar with the Rental Agreements you used at that property? A: Yes. Q: Okay. And are you familiar with the section of the Rental Agreement that - there's a checkbox, and it says you or we will handle the snow removal. And it says you, meaning the renter, or we will handle the grass cutting and things like that. Are you familiar with that section of your contract? A: I am familiar with it. I don't have one in front of me now, but I am familiar that we do have something in there that says that. Q: Okay, so when it says we, if it's checked off, we will handle the snow removal, that means Cash 4 Keys; right? A: Yes. Q: Okay. And Cash 4 Keys is then delegating that responsibility to Precision; correct? A: Yes. Q: And then Precision's then delegating that responsibility, based on your testimony, to Luis?
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`A: Yes.
`Exhibit C: July 2, 2025 Deposition of Tiana Ramalanjaona Pg. 19-21.
`Mr. Ramalanjaona’s admission that the snow removal duties were delegated to Precision, which Precision then delegated to Luis is clear evidence that precision exercised control over the premises where Ms. Gallardo fell and thus owed her a duty of care. This testimony directly refutes the self serving affidavit of Precision owner William Dziedzic, and a minimum shows that there are genuine issues of material fact present that require that Count 2 be presented to a jury.
`Critically, Precision’s contractual obligations (in the Management Agreement) go well beyond what the lease’s checkbox indicates. Precision attempts to analogize this case to situations where a landlord reserved only a narrow right to “make repairs,” which courts found insufficient to impose a snow removal duty. See Def.’s Mem. at 7–9 (citing cases like Waller v. W.E.F. Associates, LLC, No. CV-04-5000118, 2006 WL 1230003 (Conn. Super. Ct. May 2, 2006), and Rivera v. TH Real Estate Holdings, No. CV-03-0400816, 2005 WL 1089925 (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 1, 2005)). Those cases held that a limited “right to repair” clause in a lease (typically allowing a landlord entry to make structural repairs) did not automatically encompass a duty to perform routine snow removal, absent express language. Waller, 2006 WL 1230003, at 2–3 (reasoning that “snow removal cannot reasonably be construed as a repair” in the context of a reserved right to repair). But the scenario here is entirely different. Precision was not a landlord with a narrow contractual right; it was an active managing agent with an expansive contractual obligation to handle all aspects of property maintenance. The Management Agreement explicitly required maintaining the property in good
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`condition and supervising all routine repairs and maintenance. This necessarily would include typical maintenance tasks like keeping common stairs safe and free of hazards. Unlike the “right to repair” clauses in Waller or Rivera, Precision’s duties were affirmative and comprehensive. If snow/ice removal was needed to keep the property safe (a desirable action for proper operation and maintenance), Precision had both the authority to procure that service and the oversight responsibility to ensure it was done. Notably, Precision’s contract allowed it to “negotiate and execute contracts on behalf of the Owner” for services such as trash removal “and all other services of such kind” necessary for the property. Snow removal services fall squarely within “services of such kind” related to property upkeep. Precision even had discretion to spend money (up to a certain limit) without prior owner approval for maintenance needs, and to seek approval for larger expenditures. In short, Precision was the eyes, ears, and hands of the landlord on site. If the common area was unsafe, Precision was the entity expected to notice and to act. A trier of fact could therefore conclude that Precision exercised control over the stairway area by virtue of its contractual duties and its actual management activities, giving rise to a duty of care to the plaintiff.
`B. Genuine Issues of Material Fact Preclude Summary Judgment on Precision’s Negligence When the existence of a duty depends on underlying facts (such as who had control of the area in question), summary judgment is inappropriate if those facts are disputed or if reasonable inferences could be drawn in favor of the non-movant. See Fiorelli v. Gorsky, 120 Conn. App. 298 (2010) (reversing summary judgment where lease language did not conclusively resolve who controlled the area, making it a jury question). Here, at a minimum, there is a factual dispute over Precision’s role in and control of the common stairway maintenance. Precision asserts it “did not have control
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`or possession” of the stairs for snow removal purposes, but Plaintiff has put forth contrary evidence and allegations that Precision was functionally in control. The evidence of the Management Agreement, and Precision’s own actions or inaction, and Tiana Ramalanjaona’s deposition testimony allow an inference that Precision had assumed control of the day-to-day safety of common areas. For instance, was Precision conducting the “regularly scheduled inspections” of the premises that it promised? If so, did those inspections occur around the time of Ms. Gallardo’s fall, and would a reasonable inspection have discovered the icy condition? These questions are for the factfinder. Precision’s affidavit says it wasn’t “requested or directed” by the owner to do snow removal—but a jury could find that Precision didn’t need a specific request because it already had a standing directive (via contract) to manage all maintenance, and an obvious hazard like a known ice storm aftermath should have triggered action. Only a factfinder weighing credibility can determine whether Precision effectively abandoned the common area maintenance it was hired to do, or whether it truly had no involvement.
`It bears noting that even the lease’s snow clause leaves ambiguity about the stairway. The lease mentions “walks and driveways”, but not explicitly stairs or porches. A factfinder could interpret that the exterior back stair was part of the “grounds” or was akin to a “walk,” and thus the landlord (through Precision) should have kept it clear. Alternatively, if Precision believed the lease somehow exempted stairs from the landlord’s snow duty, that would contradict common understanding and the landlord’s overarching statutory duty to keep all common means of ingress and egress safe. This, too, demonstrates that reasonable minds could differ on the extent of Precision’s responsibility, precluding summary judgment.
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`Additionally, Precision’s ro