DOCKET NO.: HHD-CV24-6185873-S
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`LOUIS EGBUNA
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`V.
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`ELARIOW SEVILLE
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`SUPERIOR COURT
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`J.D. OF HARTFORD
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`AT HARTFORD
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`APRIL 14, 2025
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`OBJECTION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO
`RESPOND TO PLAINTIFF’S OFFERS OF COMPROMISE
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`Plaintiff, Louis Egbuna, hereby objects to Defendant’s, Elariow Seville, Motion for
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`Extension of Time to Respond to Plaintiff’s Offers of Compromise filed on April 9, 2025. (Ent. No.
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`125.00). Defendant’s requested extension is unwarranted as he has all the information
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`necessary to respond to Plaintiff’s Offer of Compromise. Moreover, the majority view holds that
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`the 30-day period to respond to Offers of Compromise is mandatory and not subject to extension.
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`For the reasons stated below, Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court sustain his Objection.
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`I.
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`Background and Procedural History
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`On June 3, 2020 Plaintiff brought a Complaint sounding in negligence against Defendant.
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`(See, Complaint). Plaintiffs allege that on November 20, 2023, Plaintiff Egbuna was operating a
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`vehicle traveling east on New Britain Avenue in Hartford, Connecticut. (Complaint, First Count ¶
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`1). At the same time and place, Defendant was the operator of a motor vehicle traveling east on
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`New Britain Avenue and was approaching the vehicle occupied by the plaintiff.
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`Id. at ¶ 2.
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`Suddenly and without warning Defendant collided with a vehicle behind the Plaintiff and caused a
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`chain reaction that ultimately caused a collision with the vehicle occupied by the Plaintiff. Id. at ¶ 3.
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`As a result of the collision, the Plaintiff suffered serious personal injuries, including a knee injury
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`requiring surgical repair. (Complaint, First Count ¶ 7). The Plaintiff alleges that the collision was
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`caused by the negligence of Defendant. (Complaint, First Count ¶ 6).
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`On July 16, 2024, Defendant served Notices of Discovery on Plaintiffs. (Ent. No. 102.00).
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`Thereafter, on October 15, 2024 Plaintiff filed a Notice of Compliance with Defendant’s standard
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`discovery requests.
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`(Ent. No. 110.00). Plaintiff has continued and will continue to request and
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`disclose relevant medical records as they become available in accordance with his ongoing
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`obligation to do so.
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`On March 10, 2025, Plaintiff filed an Offer of Compromise for $1,000,000.00.
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`(Ent. No.
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`122.00). Defendant then filed a Motion for Extension of Time to respond to Plaintiff’s Offer of
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`Compromise on April 9, 2025, seeking an additional thirty (30) days to respond to Plaintiff’s Offer
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`of Compromise (Ent. No. 125.00). As discussed in greater detail below, Defendant’s request is
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`nothing more than a stall tactic to delay compensating Plaintiff for his injuries in a fair and
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`just manner.
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`II.
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`Argument
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`This action has been pending since June 3, 2024. The plaintiff has waited the required one
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`hundred and eighty (180) days prior to the filing of his Offer of Compromise. With the required one
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`hundred and eighty (180) day waiting period passed, Plaintiff filed his Offer of Compromise on
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`March 10, 2025, as he was legally entitled to do.
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`Defendant is well-aware of the allegations in this case, and has been for over ten (10)
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`months. Defendant has had more than enough time to evaluate this case, and is fully capable of
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`responding to Plaintiff’s Offers of Compromise at this time. For these reasons, Defendant has not
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`provided good cause for an extension in which to respond to Plaintiff’s Offers of Compromise.
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`Furthermore, pursuant to Connecticut General Statute § 52-192a, discussed at greater length
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`below, granting an extension of time to respond to Plaintiff’s Offer of Compromise would, in fact,
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`lead to an unjust and inequitable result. Connecticut General Statute § 52-192a reads, in pertinent
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`part, as follows:
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`.seeking the
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`.after commencement of any civil action.
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`(a).
`recovery of money damages, whether or not other relief is sought,
`the plaintiff may, not earlier than one hundred eighty days after
`service of process is made upon the defendant in such action but
`not later than thirty days before trial, file with the clerk of the court
`a written offer of compromise. . .directed to the defendant or the
`defendant’s attorney, offering to settle the claim underlying the
`action for a sum certain. . .Within thirty days after being notified of
`the filing of the offer of compromise and prior to the rendering of a
`verdict by the jury or an award by the court, the defendant or the
`defendant’s attorney may file with the clerk of the court a written
`acceptance of the offer of compromise agreeing to settle the claim
`underlying the action for the sum certain specified in the plaintiff’s
`.If the offer of compromise is not
`offer of compromise.
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`accepted within thirty days and prior to the rendering of a
`verdict by the jury or an award by the court, the offer of
`compromise shall be considered rejected and not subject to
`acceptance unless refiled.
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`The Appellate Court has defined Connecticut General Statute § 52-192a as follows:
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`An offer of judgment is an offer to settle the entire case, including
`claims both known and unknown, and both certain and
`uncertain. Obviously, if injuries worsen as time passes, damages
`will increase, and, if injuries mend, damages will decrease. These are
`the vagaries of offers of settlement . . . There is only one claim
`underlying the plaintiff's action, although its value may change
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`Lutynski v. B.B.&J. Trucking, Inc., 31 Conn. App 806, 813-14 (1994) (internal citations omitted).
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`Regardless of whether or not the value of a plaintiff’s case changes during the pendency of a civil
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`action, the statutory time period for which to respond to an offer of compromise does not. The
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`Supreme Court of Connecticut in Blakeslee Arpaia Chapman, Inc. v. EI Constructors, takes this
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`interpretation even further by stating:
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`The imposition of interest as a result of finding that the plaintiff was
`entitled to an award of damages in excess of the offer of judgment is
`mandatory. Our courts have consistently held that prejudgment
`interest is to be awarded by the trial court when a valid offer of
`judgment
`is filed by the plaintiff,
`the offer is rejected by the
`defendant, and the plaintiff ultimately recovers an amount greater
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`than the offer of judgment after trial . . . Moreover, an award of
`interest under § 52-192a is mandatory, and the application of § 52-
`192a does not depend on an analysis of the underlying circumstances
`of the case or a determination of the facts .
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`. The statute is
`admittedly punitive in nature . . . It is the punitive aspect of the
`statute that effectuates the underlying purpose of the statute and
`provides the impetus to settle cases.
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`Blakeslee Arpaia Chapman, Inc. v. EI Constructors, 239 Conn. 708, 752 (1997) (internal citations
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`omitted; internal quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court of Connecticut makes clear that not
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`only is the statutory timeline mandatory, it is “admittedly punitive in nature.” Id. The purpose of the
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`statute is to encourage parties to “settle cases.” Id. The defendant should not receive more time
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`because it “would open the door for a defendant in another case to be insulated from liability for
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`interest as a result of delay due to congested dockets. That, however, would defeat the entire
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`purpose of § 52-192a.” Id. at 753, footnote 54.
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`As noted above, this action has been pending for almost a year. Defendant served discovery
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`on Plaintiffs and Plaintiff responded to Defendant’s discovery requests. Plaintiff’s compliance
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`included over hundreds of pages of medical bills (totaling $84,396.70) and records.
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`This is a motor vehicle accident without any complicated facts. Plaintiffs have provided
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`more than ample documentation for Defendant to fully evaluate their claims. Plaintiff has
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`medical bills in excess of $80,000. Liability is clear here, and it is clear Plaintiff’s injuries were
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`caused by Defendant’s negligence. As such, Defendants can easily respond to Plaintiff’s Offer of
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`Compromise. Therefore, no good cause exists to grant an extension to respond.
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`Defendant’s purported reason for requesting an extension to respond to Plaintiff’s Offer of
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`Compromise is that they do not possess prior treatment records from Nichols College. However,
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`the plaintiff has provided Defendant with correspondence from Nichols College stating there are no
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`treatment records for the plaintiff. Ent. No. 126.00.
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`What Defendant is asking the Court to do runs afoul of the very purpose of § 52-192a. The
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`purpose of Connecticut General Statute § 52-192a is to give defendants a specific amount of time
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`for which to evaluate a case “including present and future damages arising from injuries known
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`and unknown as of that date.” Lutynski v. B.B.&J. Trucking, Inc., 31 Conn. App 806, 814 (1994).
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`Moreover, the Offer of Compromise cannot be filed any earlier than 180 days after service of
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`process is made. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-192a(a). During the time period prior to the filing of
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`Plaintiffs’ Offers of Compromise, Defendant has had more than enough time to review Plaintiff’s
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`allegations and evaluate the merits of the case. Indeed, Defendant has had over ten months to
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`review Plaintiff’s medical records provided in discovery.
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`Additionally, Defendant’s request of an extension of 30 days beyond the statutory
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`deadline is not permissible under the majority view. See, Baker v. Babb, Superior Court, Judicial
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`district of Ansonia-Milford at Milford, Docket No. CV20-6040047-S (May 5, 2021 Pierson, J.)
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`See also, Guarda V. Warren, Superior Court, Judicial district of New Britain at New Britain,
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`Docket No. CV24-6085888-S.
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`In short, Defendants are essentially asking for the Court to remove them from being
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`subject to § 52-192a. However, as Blakeslee Arpaia Chapman, Inc. makes clear, “the application
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`of § 52-192a does not depend on an analysis of the underlying circumstances of the case or a
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`determination of the facts . . . The statute is admittedly punitive in nature.” Blakeslee Arpaia
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`Chapman, Inc. at 752. As such, no extension is warranted here.
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`III.
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`Conclusion
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`There is no basis to grant the relief the Defendant is seeking. As such, Defendant’s
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`Motion for Extension of Time (Ent. Nos. 125.00) should be denied, and Plaintiff’s Objection
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`should be sustained.
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`WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully requests this Court to deny Defendant’s Motion.
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`THE PLAINTIFF,
`LOUIS EGBUNA
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`440951              
`Michael Albaugh, Esq.
`The Flood Law Firm, LLC
`190 Washington Street
`Middletown, CT 06457
`Phone: 860-346-2695
`Juris #: 433718
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`CERTIFICATION
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`I certify that a copy of this document was or will immediately be mailed or delivered
`electronically or non-electronically on April 14, 2025 to all attorneys and self-represented parties
`of record and to all parties who have not appeared in this matter and that written consent for
`electronic delivery was received from all attorneys and self-represented parties receiving
`electronic delivery.
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`Dexter Largent
`Law Offices of Dennis J. Rinaldi
`55 Capital Boulevard, Suite 202
`Rocky Hill, CT 06067
`CTlegal@allstate.com
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`Michael Albaugh                  
`Commissioner of the Superior Court
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