throbber
DOCKET NO. NNH CV24 6144856 S
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`REGORY GRAY JR.
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`VS.
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`LISA LOWE
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`: SUPERIOR COURT
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`:
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`J.D. OF NEW HAVEN
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`AT NEW HAVEN
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`APRIL 10, 2025
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`MEMORANDUM OF LAW
`IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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`PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
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`I.
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` The plaintiff, Gregory Gray, brings this action against the defendant, Lisa Lowe,
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`in New Haven Superior Court with a return date of July 16, 2024. The plaintiff alleges
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`that on February 1, 2024 he was doing electrical work at the defendant's home
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`located at 10 Fernridge Road in West Hartford, Connecticut. He further alleges that
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`as he was descending a flight of wooden stairs to the basement the entire stairway
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`collapsed, causing him to fall to a concrete floor in the basement. He alleges that the
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`defendant allowed the stairway to be used with insufficient nails or insufficient holding
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`power to remain attached and that the defendant failed to replace wood which was
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`inadequate to support the weight of the stairs. He alleges that the defendant owned
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`and controlled the area and that the defendant was negligent for failing to remedy,
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`inspect, and warn of the condition of the stairs. The undersigned defendant, Lisa
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`Lowe, hereby moves for summary judgment as to the plaintiff’s complaint. The
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`plaintiff’s complaint sounds in premises liability negligence against the defendant.
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`P. O. Box 2903, Hartford, Connecticut 06104-2903 • (203) 407-6000• FAX: (855-424-4385)
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`Law Offices of Cynthia M. Garraty
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`The claim fails as to the defendant because the alleged harm was not reasonably
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`foreseeable. The claim also fails as to the defendant since she did not have actual or
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`constructive notice of the condition that allegedly caused the plaintiff’s injuries.
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`Therefore, summary judgment should be granted as to the plaintiff’s complaint. The
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`following is submitted in support of the motion: This Memorandum of Law, the
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`affidavit of Lisa Lowe (Exhibit A), certified excerpts from the plaintiff’s deposition
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`transcript (Exhibit B), and a true and accurate copy of an inspection report from CT
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`Complete Home Inspections, dated August 11, 2022 (Exhibit C).
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`II.
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`LEGAL ARGUMENT
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`A. STANDARDS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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` The party seeking summary judgment has the burden of showing the
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`absence of any genuine issue of material facts which under applicable principles of
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`substantive law, entitle him or her to a judgment as a matter of law, and the party
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`opposing such a motion must provide an evidentiary foundation to demonstrate the
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`existence of a genuine issue of material fact. Doe v.Town of West Hartford, 328
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`Conn. 172, 191 (2018); Practice Book section 17-44. Although the burden of showing
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`the non-existence of any material fact is on the movant, it is incumbent on the party
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`opposing the summary judgment to provide an evidentiary foundation from which it
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`can be determined that a genuine issue of material fact exists. Rivera v. Double A.
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`P. O. Box 2903, Hartford, Connecticut 06104-2903 • (203) 407-6000• FAX: (855-424-4385)
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`Law Offices of Cynthia M. Garraty
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`Transportation, Inc., 248 Conn. 21, 24 (1999). Mere assertions of fact contained in a
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`complaint or in a brief are insufficient to establish the existence of a material fact, and
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`accordingly, cannot refute evidence properly presented to the court. Kakadelis v.
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`DeFabritis, 191 Conn. 276, 281 (1983). A party seeking to resist summary judgment
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`may not rely on underlying pleadings containing only general denials or upon the
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`pleading of someone not a party to the motion to demonstrate the existence of a
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`material fact. Citizens National Bank v. Hubney, 182 Conn. 310, 312 (1980). When a
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`motion for summary judgment is supported by affidavits or other documents, an
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`adverse party, by affidavit or other documents, must set forth facts showing that there
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`is a genuine issue for trial, for if he does not, the court is entitled to rely upon the
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`facts stated in the movant’s affidavit. Bartha v. Waterbury House Wrecking Co., 190
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`Conn. 8, 11-12 (1983).
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` The standard in awarding a summary judgment is similar to that employed in
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`granting a directed verdict: the motion should be denied unless the evidence is such
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`that no room for disbelief could exist in the minds of the jury. Yanow v. Teal
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`Industries, Inc., 178 Conn. 263, 268 (1979).
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` “A motion for summary judgment shall be supported by such documents as may
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`be appropriate, including but not limited to affidavits, certified transcripts of testimony
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`under oath, disclosures, written admissions and the like.” Practice Book section 17-
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`45.
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`P. O. Box 2903, Hartford, Connecticut 06104-2903 • (203) 407-6000• FAX: (855-424-4385)
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`Law Offices of Cynthia M. Garraty
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`B. NEGLIGENCE, DUTY, AND CAUSATION
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`(i) GENERALLY
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` The essential elements of a cause of action sounding in negligence are well
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`known: duty, breach of that duty, causation, and actual injury. RK Constructors, Inc.
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`v. Fusco Corp., 231 Conn. 381, 384 (1994).
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` (ii) DUTY
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` The existence of a duty is a question of law and only if such a duty is found to
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`exist does the trier of fact then determine whether the defendant violated that duty in
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`the particular situation at hand. Murillo v. Seymour Ambulance Assn., Inc., 264 Conn.
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`474, 479 (2003). The Connecticut Supreme Court has stated that the test for the
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`existence of a legal duty of care entails (1) a determination of whether an ordinary
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`person in the defendant's position, knowing what the defendant knew or should have
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`known, would anticipate that harm of the general nature of that suffered was likely to
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`result, and (2) a determination, on the basis of a public policy analysis, of whether the
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`defendant's responsibility for its negligent conduct should extend to the particular
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`consequences or particular plaintiff in the case. Id. The first part of the test invokes
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`the question of foreseeability, and the second part invokes the question of policy. Id.
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` “‘A simple conclusion that the harm to the plaintiff was foreseeable… cannot by
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`itself mandate a determination that a legal duty exists. Many harms are quite literally
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`Law Offices of Cynthia M. Garraty
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`foreseeable, yet for pragmatic reasons, no recovery is allowed…. A further inquiry
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`must be made, for we recognize that duty is not sacrosanct in itself, but is only an
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`expression of the sum total of those considerations of policy which lead the law to
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`say that the plaintiff is entitled to protection…. While it may seem that there should
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`be a remedy for every wrong, this is an ideal limited perforce by the realities of this
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`world. Every injury has ramifying consequences, like the ripplings of the waters,
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`without end. The problem for the law is to limit the legal consequences of wrongs to a
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`controllable degree…. The final step in the duty inquiry, then, is to make a
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`determination of the fundamental policy of the law, as to whether the defendant's
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`responsibility should extend to such results.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
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`Lombard v. Edward J. Peters, Jr., P.C., 252 Conn. 623, 633, 749 A. 2d 630 (2000).’”
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`Murillo, 264 Conn. at 479-80.
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` The question of foreseeability has been decided as a matter of law. In Lodge v.
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`Arett Sales Corp., 246 Conn. 563 (1998), the plaintiffs were two firefighters, the
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`representatives of the estates of two other firefighters, and spouses of three of the
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`firefighters. Id. at 566-67. The action was brought against several defendants for
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`negligently causing the transmission of a false fire alarm to which the plaintiff
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`firefighters responded during which the brakes on the fire engine failed, causing the
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`engine to strike a tree. Id. at 567. The jury returned a verdict against the defendants
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`in favor the plaintiffs in excess of $4.4 million. Id. The dispositive issue in the appeals
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`P. O. Box 2903, Hartford, Connecticut 06104-2903 • (203) 407-6000• FAX: (855-424-4385)
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`Law Offices of Cynthia M. Garraty
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`was whether the defendants, who negligently caused the transmission of the fire
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`alarm, were liable to the plaintiffs, who were injured during an accident precipitated
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`by the negligent maintenance of failure of the brakes on the responding fire engine.
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`Id. at 566. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment and remanded the case to the
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`trial court with direction to render judgment for the defendants. Id. at 586. The Court
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`stated that only if a duty is found to exist, as a matter of law, does the trier of fact go
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`on to determine whether the defendant violated that duty. Id. at 571. The Court
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`agreed with the defendants that the analysis of foreseeability logically could not be
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`extended so far that the term “general harm” incorporates any accident involving a
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`fire engine responding to a false alarm with no consideration given to the direct
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`cause of the accident. Id. at 574. It is impractical, if not impossible, according to the
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`Court, to separate the question of duty from an analysis of the cause of the harm
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`when the duty is asserted against one who is not the direct cause of the harm. Id.
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`The Court noted that the duty inquiry relating to the attenuation between the plaintiff’s
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`harm and the defendant’s negligent conduct is quite similar to the analysis that courts
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`engage in with respect to proximate cause. Id., note 9. The Court stated that due
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`care does not require that one guard against eventualities which are at best too
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`remote to be reasonably foreseeable. Id. at 575. The Court concluded that the
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`defendants owed no duty to the plaintiffs because (1) the harm was not reasonably
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`foreseeable and (2) the fundamental policy of the law as to which defendants’
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`P. O. Box 2903, Hartford, Connecticut 06104-2903 • (203) 407-6000• FAX: (855-424-4385)
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`Law Offices of Cynthia M. Garraty
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`responsibility should extend weighed in favor of concluding that there should be no
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`legal responsibility. Id. at 577. Liability attaches only for reasonably foreseeable
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`consequences and may not be imposed merely because it might have been
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`foreseeable that some accident could have occurred. Id. The Court explained that it
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`would serve no legitimate objective of the law to impose liability on the defendants for
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`a harm that they reasonably could not be expected to anticipate and over which they
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`had no control. Id. at 578. “To hold otherwise would be to convert the imperfect vision
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`of reasonable foreseeability into the perfect vision of hindsight.” Id., quoting Burns v.
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`Gleason Plant Security, 10 Conn. App. 480, 486 (1987). In addition, the Court found
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`that liability should not attach because of those policy considerations relating to the
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`underlying purposes of tort recovery; namely, compensation of innocent parties,
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`shifting loss to responsible parties or distributing it among appropriate entities and
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`deterrence of wrongful conduct. Id. at 578-79. The Court found that the benefits to be
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`derived from requiring the defendants to compensate the plaintiffs were outweighed
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`by the costs associated with that compensation. Id. at 579.
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` (iii) CAUSATION
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` To prevail in a negligence claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the
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`defendant’s conduct was a legal cause of the injuries. Doe v. Manheimner, 212
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`Conn. 748, 757 (1989), overruled in part on other grounds, Stewart v. Federated
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`Dept. Stores, Inc., 234 Conn. 597, 608 (1995). The causal relation between the
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`P. O. Box 2903, Hartford, Connecticut 06104-2903 • (203) 407-6000• FAX: (855-424-4385)
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`Law Offices of Cynthia M. Garraty
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`defendant’s allegedly wrongful conduct and the plaintiff’s injuries must be shown in
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`order for the plaintiff to recover. Wu v. Fairfield, 204 Conn. 435, 438 (1987). This
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`causal connection must be based upon more than conjecture and surmise. Id. at 439.
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`Furthermore, although a jury is entitled to disbelieve any evidence, it may not draw a
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`contrary inference on the basis of that disbelief. Paige v. St. Andrew’s Roman
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`Catholic Church Corp., 250 Conn. 14, 18 (1999). See also Novak v. Anderson, 178
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`Conn. 506, 508 (1979) (a jury may accept or reject a party’s testimony, but a jury in
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`rejecting such testimony cannot conclude that the opposite is true).
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` Legal cause has two components: causation in fact and proximate cause. Doe,
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`212 Conn. at 757. The test for causation in fact is whether the injury would have
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`occurred were if not for the actor’s conduct. Id. If the plaintiff’s injury would have
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`occurred regardless of the defendant’s conduct, then the defendant’s conduct was
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`not a cause in fact of the plaintiff’s injury. Stewart, 234 Conn. at 605. An act or
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`omission cannot be regarded as the cause of an event which would have happened if
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`the act or omission had not occurred. Shaughnessy v. Morrison, 116 Conn. 661, 666
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`(1933). Proximate cause is an actual cause that is a substantial factor in the resulting
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`harm. Doe, 212 Conn. at 757. Legal cause can be pictorially portrayed as a Venn
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`diagram, with the circle representing cause in fact completely subsuming the smaller
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`circle representing proximate cause. Stewart, 234 Conn. at 606.
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`P. O. Box 2903, Hartford, Connecticut 06104-2903 • (203) 407-6000• FAX: (855-424-4385)
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`Law Offices of Cynthia M. Garraty
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` Causation has been determined as a matter of law in numerous cases. Kumah
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`v. Brown, 130 Conn. App. 343 (2011) turned on the issue of proximate cause. The
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`plaintiff automobile operator approached the scene of an accident and skidded
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`through safety cones and collided with a parked fire truck. Id. at 345-46. The named
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`defendant, over two hours earlier, had lost control of his tractor trailer and made
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`contact with a Jersey barrier and bridge railing, causing diesel fuel to leak onto the
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`highway. Id. at 345. At the time that the plaintiff approached the scene, the
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`defendant’s truck had been removed from the area but the scene was still being
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`cleaned up. Id. The trial court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment
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`on the basis that the later collision with the emergency vehicle was not reasonably
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`foreseeable and the Appellate Court affirmed. Id. at 344-46. The Court reiterated the
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`components of legal cause. The first component is causation in fact: where the test is
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`whether the injury would have occurred were it not for the actor’s negligence. Id. at
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`347. The second component is proximate cause: where the test is whether a
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`defendant’s conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about the plaintiff’s injury. Id.
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`The Court noted that although Connecticut decisional law discussed foreseeability in
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`connection with causation, the question of foreseeability originally derived from
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`jurisprudence concerning duty of care. Id. at 348-49. The Court found that connecting
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`the defendant’s alleged negligent acts to the harm suffered by the plaintiff would
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`require conjecture; by the time that the plaintiff collided with the fire truck, the
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`P. O. Box 2903, Hartford, Connecticut 06104-2903 • (203) 407-6000• FAX: (855-424-4385)
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`Law Offices of Cynthia M. Garraty
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`defendant’s truck had been removed and while some diesel fuel remained it was
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`speculative as to whether the plaintiff would have crashed had he encountered it; it
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`also was conjecture as to whether the collision would have occurred had the police
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`set up the traffic pattern differently. Id. at 351.
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` The Appellate Court in Kumah found guidance in several opinions in which the
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`issue of causation was determined as a matter of law: Coste v. Riverside Motors,
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`Inc., 24 Conn. App. 109, 113-15 (1991) (affirmed the granting of a motion to strike a
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`claim because the allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint were insufficient for proof of
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`proximate cause against the plaintiff’s employer in refusing the plaintiff’s request to
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`leave work early due to a snowstorm, finding that it was conjecture as to whether the
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`driving conditions may have been better at a different time ); Medcalf v. Washington
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`Heights Condominium Assn. Inc, 57 Conn. App. 12, 14-18, cert. denied, 253 Conn.
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`923 (2000)( reversed the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s motion for directed
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`verdict, holding as a matter of law that the jury could not reasonably have found that
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`the assault on the plaintiff, who was waiting outside the door to an apartment
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`building, by a third person was within the foreseeable scope of risk created by the
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`defendants’ failure to maintain the intercom system and, therefore, there was no
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`proximate cause); Alexander v. Vernon, 101 Conn. App. 477, 478-91 (2007)(affirmed
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`summary judgment rendered by the trial court in favor of the defendant on the ground
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`that there was no evidence to support causation in fact and that it would have
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`required mere conjecture for a fact finder to conclude that the murder of the plaintiff’s
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`decedent by her estranged husband in her mother’s house would have been
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`prevented had the police acted differently).
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`C. LIABILITY OF OCCUPIERS OF LAND
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` In order to recover in an action sounding in premises liability, the plaintiff must
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`prove that the defendant had actual notice of the presence of the specific unsafe
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`condition which caused the plaintiff’s fall or constructive notice of that condition.
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`Riccio v. Harbour Village Condominium Assn., Inc., 281 Conn. 160, 164-65 (2007).
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`Constructive notice is where the situation had existed for such a length of time that,
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`had the defendants exercised reasonable supervision of the premises, the
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`defendants would have known of its existence. Kirby v. Zlotnick, 160 Conn. 341, 344
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`(1971). The notice must be of the very defect which occasioned the injury. Prato v.
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`New Haven, 246 Conn. 638, 642 (1998). On the question of notice, the jury’s
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`consideration must be confined to the defendants’ knowledge and realization of the
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`specific condition causing the injury, and such knowledge and realization cannot be
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`found to exist from a knowledge of the general or overall conditions obtaining on the
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`premises nor from conditions naturally productive of the defect even though
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`subsequently in fact producing it. Monahan v. Montgomery, 153 Conn. 386, 390
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`(1966); Pajor v. Wallingford, 47 Conn. App. 365, 377, cert. denied , 244 Conn. 917
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`(1998) (error in trial court not charging that defendant liable only if it had notice of the
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`particular defect and not merely of conditions naturally productive of the defect and in
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`fact producing it.)
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` The Supreme Court and Appellate Court have on many occasions found the
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`evidence, as a matter of law, insufficient to establish actual or constructive notice of
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`an alleged unsafe condition. In White v. E and F Construction Company, 151 Conn.
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`110, 111 (1963) the plaintiff, an employee of a tenant, was injured from a fall on a
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`wet basement stairway of premises owned the defendant landlord. The trial court
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`directed a verdict for the defendant and the Supreme Court affirmed. Id. at 114.
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`Although there was evidence that the door to the basement was open most of the
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`time for five weeks before the accident and that rain was falling through the open
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`door at the time of the plaintiff’s fall, there was no evidence to charge the defendant
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`with constructive notice of the presence of water itself but only of conditions naturally
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`productive of it. Id. at 113-14.
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` In Bartholomew v. Catania, 161 Conn. 130, 131 (1971), the plaintiff, an
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`ambulance driver, alleged that he was injured on a defective flagstone sidewalk
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`leading to the side entrance to the defendants’ premises. After a plaintiff’s verdict
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`against the defendants, the trial court set aside the verdict and rendered a judgment
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`for the defendants on the ground that the evidence presented was insufficient to
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`sustain the verdict. Id. The Supreme Court found no error. Id. at 135. The Court
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`explained that crucial to the plaintiff’s recovery was proof that the defendants had
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`actual or constructive notice of the presence of the specific defective condition which
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`caused the plaintiff’s fall. Id. at 132. The Court stated the plaintiff’s testimony and
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`evidence focused on a broken piece of flagstone, which the plaintiff evidently stepped
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`on and an indentation. Id. at 132-34. The Court stated that the evidence tended to
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`show the general overall condition of the sidewalk, but that there was no evidence of
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`knowledge by the defendants of the specific defect which caused the injury, and such
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`knowledge cannot be found to exist simply from a knowledge of the general
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`conditions. Id. at 134. The Court stated that without identification in evidence of the
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`presence of a specific unsafe condition, it is insufficient for the jury to conclude that
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`the plaintiff was entitled to a verdict. Id.
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` In McCrorey v. Heilpern, 170 Conn. 220 (1976), the defendant appealed from the
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`trial court’s denial of his motions to set aside the verdict and for judgment
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`notwithstanding the verdict. The plaintiff’s decedent was a tenant in an apartment
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`building owned by the defendant and the decedent fell to the floor in the hallway
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`outside of the kitchen door of her apartment. Id. The jury could reasonably have
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`concluded that there was a hole, large enough to catch the heel of a woman’s shoe,
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`located in the floor of the hallway, and that the decedent’s fall was caused by the
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`heel of her shoe catching or going down into that hole. Id. at 220-21. The Supreme
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`Court stated that it is a familiar rule that a landlord is under a duty to use reasonable
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`Law Offices of Cynthia M. Garraty
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`care to keep those parts of his building, which are under his control, in a reasonably
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`safe condition, and that if he fails in that duty and has actual or constructive notice of
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`the defect in time to remedy it, an injured plaintiff may recover. Id. at 221. The
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`defendant had moved for directed verdict on the ground that there was no evidence
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`from which the jury could reasonably have found that the defendant had actual or
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`constructive notice of any claimed defect. Id. The Court stated that there was no
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`evidence that the defendant had actual notice of the hole prior to the fall, and that in
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`order to charge the defendant with notice of the defect, it was incumbent upon the
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`plaintiff to introduce evidence from which it could have been reasonable for the jury to
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`find that the specific defect had existed for sufficient length of time for the defendant,
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`in the exercise of reasonable care, to have discovered it in time to have remedied it.
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`Id. The Court stated that the evidence considered in the light most favorable to the
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`plaintiff, furnished no reasonable basis for the jury’s conclusion that the hole had
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`existed for a sufficient period of time to charge the defendant with notice of it. Id. at
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`222. For all that it appeared, the hole could have come into being only a moment
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`prior to the time of the decedent’s fall, and any determination that it existed for a
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`sufficient length of time for the defendant to have discovered it would have been
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`purely speculative. Id. The Court found error and remanded the case with direction to
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`render judgment for the defendant. Id.
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`P. O. Box 2903, Hartford, Connecticut 06104-2903 • (203) 407-6000• FAX: (855-424-4385)
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`Law Offices of Cynthia M. Garraty
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` In Gulycz v. Stop & Shop Cos., 29 Conn. App. 519, 520, cert. denied, 224 Conn.
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`923 (1992), the plaintiff appealed from a judgment of dismissal rendered during a
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`courtside trial for failure to make out a prima facie case; specifically, by failing to
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`prove that the defendant had either actual or constructive notice of the condition that
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`allegedly existed in the defendant’s store. The plaintiff claimed injuries from a
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`protruding hinge and screw on a shelf at the end of a check-out aisle at the
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`defendant’s store. Id. The Appellate Court stated the plaintiff was a business invitee
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`and that the defendant owed him a duty to keep its premises in a reasonably safe
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`condition. Id. at 521. The Court stated that if that duty is breached, and if the
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`defendant had actual or constructive notice of the defect within a reasonable amount
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`of time to remedy it, then the plaintiff could recover. Id. No evidence of actual notice
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`was introduced at trial. Id. With respect to constructive notice, the Court stated that at
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`least some evidence is necessary to show a sufficient length of time existed for
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`discovery of the condition. Id. The plaintiff contended that the defect was structural in
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`nature and, therefore, must have existed for a sufficient amount of time so allow an
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`inference of constructive notice. Id. at 521-22. The Court in rejecting the plaintiff’s
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`argument, stated that an inference must have a basis in the facts, and the conclusion
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`based on it must not be the result of speculation and conjecture. Id. at 522. The
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`Court further explained that whether a prima facie case has been made out is a
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`question of law for the court. Id. at 523. In affirming the judgment in favor of the
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`Law Offices of Cynthia M. Garraty
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`defendant, the Court stated that no witness testified whether any of the defendant’s
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`employees observed the defect prior to the injury. Id. at 522. The Court stated that if
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`there was some evidence that the defect existed prior to the injury, the trier of fact
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`would have had a basis to determine whether the length of time was sufficient to
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`permit a reasonable inference for a finding of constructive notice. Id.
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` James v. Valley-Shore Y.M.C.A, Inc., 125 Conn. App. 174, 175-76 (2010), cert.
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`denied, 300 Conn. 916 (2011) affirmed the granting of the defendant’s motion for
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`summary judgment on the basis of lack of notice of the alleged defect. The evidence
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`submitted to the trial court revealed that the plaintiff while entering the defendant’s
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`pool slipped and fell. Id. at 176. The plaintiff was able to see clearly as she entered
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`the pool and observed no substance or residue on the step. Id. at 180. After the
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`plaintiff’s fall her husband felt a slimy slippery algae-like build-up on a step. Id. at 181.
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`The plaintiff confirmed that she did not know if the step that her husband examined
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`was the same step on which she slipped. Id. The plaintiff did not allege actual notice
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`of the alleged unsafe condition, but instead relied upon constructive notice. Id. at
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`179. The Appellate Court reiterated that what constitutes a reasonable length of time
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`within which the defendant should have discovered the condition is largely a question
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`of fact to be decided in light of the circumstances of each case. Id. The Court stated
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`that evidence that goes no further than to show the presence of a slippery substance
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`P. O. Box 2903, Hartford, Connecticut 06104-2903 • (203) 407-6000• FAX: (855-424-4385)
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`Law Offices of Cynthia M. Garraty
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`does not warrant an inference of constructive notice to the defendant. Id. The Court
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`further commented that the trier’s consideration must be confined to the defendant’s
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`knowledge, and realization cannot be found to exist from a knowledge of the general
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`or overall conditions obtaining on the premises. Id. at 182. The Court stated that the
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`plaintiff’s husband’s attestation that he felt a slippery residue pertained to the general
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`conditions of the area and was insufficient to establish constructive notice. Id. at 182-
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`83. The Court additionally noted that there was no evidence that the allegedly
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`defective condition existed for such a length of time that the defendant’s employees
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`in the exercise of reasonable care should have discovered it in time to remedy it. Id.
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`at 183.
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` Hellamns v. Yale-New Haven Hospital, Inc. 147 Conn. App. 405, 406-07 (2013),
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`cert. granted, 311 Conn. 918 (2014) reversed the judgment in favor of the plaintiff
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`due to the trial court’s application of an incorrect standard of care. The plaintiff, who
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`sought treatment for her pregnancy from the defendant, slipped on a puddle of water
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`in the hallway. Id. The trial court held that extra care was required by the defendant
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`with respect to maintenance of the hallway and that the care included a duty not to
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`allow hazardous material to remain on the floor for any length of time. Id. at 407. The
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`Appellate Court reiterated the general principles in a premises liability case: the
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`defendant owed a business invitee, such as the plaintiff, a duty to make the premises
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`reasonably safe, and that the plaintiff must allege and prove that the defendant had
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`P. O. Box 2903, Hartford, Connecticut 06104-2903 • (203) 407-6000• FAX: (855-424-4385)
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`Law Offices of Cynthia M. Garraty
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`actual or constructive notice of the specific unsafe condition which caused the injury.
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`Id. at 408. The Court held that a duty, as found by the trial court, that a premises
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`owner must ensure that a defect does not exist for any length of time was
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`incompatible with the plaintiff’s well-established burden in a premises liability action
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`to prove that a defect existed for a reasonable length of time, such that the defendant
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`could have both learned of and remedied the condition. Id. at 409. The Court stated
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`that by holding the defendant liable, regardless of whether it was aware of any
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`unsafe conditions, solely because of the population that used the hall, the trial court
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`converted the defendant into an insurer of the safety of people who used the hallway.
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`Id. at 410. The Court further commented that a premises owner is not strictly liable for
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`injuries sustained by business invitees. Id. at 411. The Court also agreed with the
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`defendant that the plaintiff failed to prove that the defendant had notice of the unsafe
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`condition. Id. The Court explained that a plaintiff can establish that a defendant had
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`actual notice of a defective condition by showing that the condition was created by
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`the defendant’s employee or by showing that an employee, operating within the
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`scope of his authority, observed the unsafe condition and was charged with the
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`responsibility to maintain the area or had a duty to report the condition. Id. at 412.
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`With respect to demonstrating constructive notice, the Court stated that the question
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`is whether the condition existed for such a length of time that the defendant should,
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`in the exercise of reasonable care, have discovered it in time to remedy it. Id. The
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`P. O. Box 2903, Hartford, Connecticut 06104-2903 • (203) 407-6000• FAX: (855-424-4385)
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`Law Offices of Cynthia M. Garraty
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`Court summarized the evidence as to notice as follows: the plaintiff testified that a
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`janitor walked past the puddle just before she fell and the defendant’s employee’s
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`testified that after the plaintiff fell he saw a puddle of water but he was unable to
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`figure out the source of the water. Id. at 412-13. The Court commented that while
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`circumstantial evidence can establish notice, a plaintiff’s claim that an employee
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`walked past the defect, without evidence that the employee actually saw the defect,
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`is inadequate. Id. at 413. In addition, the Court stated that evidence that the condition
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`existed a few seconds before the accident is insufficient to establish that the
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`defendant had constructive notice of that condition. Id.
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` Whether the defendant had constructive notice of an unsafe condition was the
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`principal issue in Diaz v. Manchester Memorial Hospital, 161 Conn. App. 787, 788
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`(2015). The plaintiff appealed from a judgment rendered in favor of the defendant in a
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`premises liability case. In particular, the plaintiff claimed that while visitin

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