DOCKET NO.: NNI-CV-24-6034104-S
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`CARLY BROW
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`V.
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`MICHAEL KING
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`SUPERIOR COURT
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`J.D. OF NEW HAVEN
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`AT MERIDEN
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`APRIL 14, 2025
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`OBJECTION TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME
`TO RESPOND TO PLAINTIFF’S OFFER OF COMPROMISE
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`Plaintiff, Carly Brow (“Plaintiff”), hereby objects to Defendant, Michael King
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`(“Defendant’s”), Motion for Extension of Time to Respond to Plaintiff’s Offer of Compromise (Ent.
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`No. 115.00). Defendants have all the information necessary to respond to Plaintiff’s Offer of
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`Compromise. The plaintiff provided initial discovery compliance on December 9, 2023. The
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`plaintiff has provided supplemental compliance on February 3, 2025, and on March 26, 2025. The
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`deposition of the plaintiff was noticed by the defendant and took place on March 5, 2025. This case
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`is based on a motor vehicle collision that occurred on January 17, 2024, in which the plaintiff was
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`the operator of a vehicle turning left at a green arrow at an intersection when the defendant, who had
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`a red light, entered the intersection and collided with the plaintiff’s vehicle. Plaintiff provided initial
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`compliance and supplemental compliance, which includes all medical treatment the plaintiff has
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`undergone to date. Therefore, it is clear, Defendants have more than enough information to
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`adequately evaluate Plaintiff’s Offer of Compromise filed for the policy limits of $100,000. (Ent.
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`No. 115.00).
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`As more fully set forth herein,
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`the provisions of the Offer of Compromise statute,
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`Connecticut General Statutes §52-192a, are mandatory and the time limits adopted in the
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`amendment to that statute in 2005, with which the plaintiff has complied, do not contemplate
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`that the Offer of Compromise be filed only after a defendant has had all the time it needs to
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`review a case. For the reasons stated below, Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court sustain her
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`Objection.
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`I.
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`Background and Procedural History
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`Defendants have all
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`the information necessary to respond to Plaintiff’s Offer of
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`Compromise. The complaint in this matter was filed with this court on September 6, 2024, with the
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`defendant appearing on September 10, 2024. The plaintiff provided initial discovery compliance on
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`December 9, 2024.
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`The plaintiff then provided supplemental compliance on February 3, 2025 which included
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`the remaining outstanding medical records and bills from the Caldarone Chiropractic Center, which
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`were a total of 12 pages of medical records. The deposition of the plaintiff was noticed by the
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`defendant and took place on March 5, 2025. Following that deposition, defense requested and the
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`plaintiff provided supplemental compliance on March 26, 2025, which included the plaintiff’s prior
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`chiropractic records which were a total of 40 pages. Defense also requested the police report from
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`that prior collision, which although outside the scope of standard discovery was obtained and
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`provided. Plaintiff provided initial compliance and supplemental compliance, which includes all
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`medical treatment the plaintiff has undergone to date.
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`On March 26, 2025, plaintiff filed an Offer of Compromise for $100,000.00 (One Hundred
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`Thousand Dollars) (#115.00). Defendant then filed a Motion for Extension of Time to respond to
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`Plaintiff’s Offer of Compromise (#116.00) on March 28, 2025, seeking an extension of time until
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`May 26, 2025 so that it could have time to obtain outstanding medical records from the plaintiff.
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`Importantly, the plaintiff has provided all medical records and bills received to date which included
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`all treatment plaintiff received to date for this incident, and has requested any outstanding prior
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`records that are related and have not already been provided.
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`I.
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`Argument
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`This action has been pending since September 6, 2024. Defendants were served with
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`Plaintiff’s Complaint on August 30, 2024.
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`(Ent. No. 100.30). Plaintiff waited well beyond the
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`required one hundred and eighty (180) days prior to the filing of her Offer of Compromise.
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`The factual circumstances surrounding this case are not complicated. The plaintiff was the
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`driver of a motor vehicle that was struck by another vehicle on January 17, 2024 (Complaint). The
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`defendant is well-aware of the allegations in this case. The defendant has had more than enough
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`time to evaluate this case and is fully capable of responding to Plaintiff’s Offer of Compromise at
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`this time. The defendant has the plaintiff’s medical records and has had the opportunity to depose
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`the plaintiff/ The original compliance, and subsequent supplemental compliance included medical
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`records detailing Plaintiff’s injuries suffered in this incident, as well as related prior chiropractic
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`treatment.
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`A recent Superior Court case presents a thorough review of case law regarding the Offer of
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`Compromise Statute and holds that the time frames in that statute are mandatory. Baker v. Babb,
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`Judicial District of Ansonia-Milford At Milford, No. AANCV206040047S, 2021 Conn. Super.
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`LEXIS 708 (May 5, 2021, Pierson, J.).
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`As in this case, in Baker, Judge Pierson considered a case where the plaintiff had filed a
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`timely Offer of Compromise and the defendant filed a motion for extension of time to respond to
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`offer of compromise, seeking an extension of time to respond to the plaintiff's offer of
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`compromise "until thirty days from the completion of discovery in this matter."
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`Connecticut General Statute § 52-192a reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
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`(a). . .after commencement of any civil action. . .seeking the recovery of money
`damages, whether or not other relief is sought, the plaintiff may, not earlier than
`one hundred eighty days after service of process is made upon the defendant in
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`such action but not later than thirty days before trial, file with the clerk of the court
`a written offer of compromise. . .directed to the defendant or the defendant’s
`attorney, offering to settle the claim underlying the action for a sum certain. .
`.Within thirty days after being notified of the filing of the offer of compromise and
`prior to the rendering of a verdict by the jury or an award by the court, the
`defendant or the defendant’s attorney may file with the clerk of the court a written
`acceptance of the offer of compromise agreeing to settle the claim underlying the
`action for the sum certain specified in the plaintiff’s offer of compromise. . .If the
`offer of compromise is not accepted within thirty days and prior to the rendering of
`a verdict by the jury or an award by the court, the offer of compromise shall be
`considered rejected and not subject to acceptance unless refiled.
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`Emphasis added.
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`Judge Pierson considered the existing caselaw in Baker as follows:
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`"There currently exists a split of authority among the superior courts as to the court's
`authority to extend the time to respond to an offer of compromise. Some have
`concluded that the thirty-day period is mandatory and not subject to extension, . . .
`Others have ruled that the court may extend the time to respond to an offer of
`compromise either because the language of the statute and the rule is directory, . . .;
`or the mandate of the language is subject to modification for equitable reasons; . . ."
`(Citations omitted.) Drayson v. Chubb National Insurance Co., Superior Court,
`judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. NNH-CV-15-6054474 S (December 18,
`2015, Alander, J.) (61 Conn. L. Rptr. 533, 2015 Conn. Super. LEXIS 3090). The
`defendant's motion requires this court to weigh in on the ongoing debate.
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`An early case holding that the thirty-day limitation period is mandatory is Meyers v.
`Troncale, Superior Court,
`judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV-00-
`0439881 S (January 2, 2002, Robinson, R., J.) (31 Conn. L. Rptr. 179, 2002 Conn.
`Super. LEXIS 63). In that case,
`then-Judge (now Chief Justice) Robinson,
`in
`examining similar language contained in the predecessor offer of judgment statute
`(§52-192[a]), reasoned that while "the defendants in the instant action seek to extend
`the time period to accept the offer, . . . there does not appear to be any statutory
`enabling legislation within the provisions of the statute that provides such relief."
`After examining the language of the statute, the Meyers court concluded that the
`statutory text "expressly states what happens to an offer . . . if it is not accepted by a
`defendant within [the] thirty day period[:] it
`is rejected and not subject
`to
`acceptance unless refiled." Id., 180, 2002 Conn. Super. LEXIS 63. Accord Bernache
`v. Wheeler, Superior Court, judicial district of Tolland, Docket No. CV-10-6000999
`S (July 26, 2010, Sferrazza, J.) (50 Conn. L. Rptr. 393, 2010 Conn. Super. LEXIS
`1946); Cohen v. Bridgeport Hospital, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield,
`Docket No. 317327 (May 24, 1996, Levin, J.) (17 Conn. L. Rptr. 181, 1996 Conn.
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`Super. LEXIS 1332).
`Baker v. Babb, supra, at *3-4. Emphasis added.
`Judge Pierson further stated:
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`the
`With the foregoing principles in mind, the court turns to a consideration of
`relevant language of §52-192a which reads, "[i]f the offer of compromise is not
`accepted within thirty days and prior to the rendering of a verdict by the jury or an
`award by the court, the offer of compromise shall be considered rejected and not
`subject to acceptance unless refiled." (Emphasis added.); see also Practice Book §17-
`16. On its face, any commonly approved usage of
`the language employed
`demonstrates that the time limitation for accepting an offer of compromise, imposed
`by the legislature, is clear and unambiguous. The offer must be accepted within
`thirty days or it shall be considered rejected and not subject
`to acceptance.
`Moreover, the language suggests strongly that the limitations period is mandatory
`and not directory. To begin, the word "shall" is used. While not sufficient in and of
`itself to impose a mandatory duty, use of the word "shall" is significant and supports
`the conclusion that a mandatory
`duty was intended. More importantly, the statute
`uses negative terms, to the effect that any offer of compromise not accepted within
`the designated time period shall be considered "rejected and not subject
`to
`acceptance . . ." Thus, the provision at issue "expressly invalidates any action taken
`after noncompliance with the provision." Starble v. Inland Wetlands Commission of
`New Hartford, supra, 183 Conn.App. 287. The thirty-day limitation period of §52-
`192a is clear, unambiguous, and mandatory.
`Id., at *8-9. Emphasis added.
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`Judge Pierson also cited the Appellate case of Larmel v. Metro N. Commuter R.R., 200
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`Conn. App. 600, 240 A.3d 1056, 240 A.3d 1056 (2020):
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`Section 52-192a encourages fair and reasonable compromise between litigants by
`penalizing a party [who] fails to accept a reasonable offer of settlement . . . In other
`words, interest awarded under §52-192a is solely related to a defendant's rejection of an
`advantageous offer to settle before trial and his subsequent waste of judicial resources.'
`(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Birkhamshaw v. Socha, 156 Conn.App. 453, 513,
`115 A.3d 1, cert. denied, 317 Conn. 913, 116 A.3d 812 (2015).
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`Id., at *12.
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`The Court in Baker further pointed out that §52-192a was not designed to allow the parties
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`to complete discovery or develop fully all facts deemed necessary by a particular defendant, prior to
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`requiring a defendant to respond to an offer of compromise. Rather, “the purpose of §52-192a is to
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`encourage early, fair, and reasonable settlements, and to encourage plaintiffs to make offers of
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`judgment promptly." (Citations omitted; emphasis added.) Lutynski v. B.B. and J. Trucking, Inc., 31
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`Conn.App. 806, 813-14, 628 A.2d 1 (1993), aff'd, 229 Conn. 525, 642 A.2d 7 (1994).
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`Judge Pierson also noted that 52-192a is devoid of any language stating that a defendant has
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`the right to develop a full factual record in discovery prior to being required to respond to an offer of
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`compromise. He further noted that the 2005 Amendment to that statute built in a period for
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`discovery, wanted to encourage that such discovery take place expediently, so that a defendant
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`could assess his settlement position within 180 days of the filing of the complaint:
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`The legislative history of the current version of §52-192a supports these conclusions.
`The 2005 amendments to the statute, which, inter alia, changed the nomenclature of the
`offer from an "offer of judgment" to an "offer of compromise," also established the 180-
`day and thirty-day limitations periods of the current law. See Public Acts 2005, No. 05-
`275, §4. In making these changes, the legislature demonstrated its sensitivity to
`criticism of the prior offer of judgment
`statute on the grounds that it did not allow
`sufficient time for defendants to develop facts that would permit an informed response.
`Prior to the 2005 amendment of §52-192a, a plaintiff was permitted to file an offer of
`judgment at any time "[a]fter commencement of any civil action," as long as the offer
`was not filed later than thirty days before trial. See Public Acts 2001, No. 01-71, §1. In
`modifying the time limitations applicable to the filing and acceptance of offers of
`compromise, the legislature created a system it deemed sufficient to allow defendants to
`make a meaningfully informed response.
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`The proponent of the 2005 amendments in the Senate observed that "under this section,
`we have modified the timeframe within which such an Offer of Compromise can be
`submitted. And under current law, any time after the commencement of an action, an
`Offer of Judgment may be filed. Under this proposal, however, we have created a 180-
`day blackout period, if you will, at the beginning of the case, so that the defendants
`have a meaningful opportunity to undertake discovery, so that they have a reasonable
`basis of facts and law to determine whether to accept an Offer of Compromise. And,
`Mr. President, if such an Offer of Compromise [*15]
`is to be accepted, it would be
`within 30 days after the Offer had been filed." (Emphasis added.) 48 S. Proc., Pt. 14,
`2005 Sess., pp. 4412-13, remarks of Senator Andrew J. McDonald. In other words, in
`amending the prior offer of judgment statute—which allowed for the defendant to file
`an offer of judgment at any time after the commencement of the case the legislature
`imposed a scheme, including time limitations, which it deemed sufficient to permit a
`defendant to investigate a claim for purposes of responding to an offer of compromise.
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`Senator McDonald's statement does not reflect any intention on the part of the
`legislature to afford a defendant an opportunity to conclude discovery, or to be entitled
`to a complete factual
`record, before having to respond to an offer of
`compromise—rather, the time periods established by the legislature were intended to
`provide a "reasonable basis" for a defendant to accept or reject an offer. Id. Thus, the
`purpose and legislative history of §52-192a support the court's conclusion that the
`thirty-day acceptance period is mandatory and not subject to modification by the court.
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`Id., at *13-15. Emphasis added.
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`The Appellate Court has defined Connecticut General Statute § 52-192a as follows:
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`An offer of judgment is an offer to settle the entire case, including claims both
`known and unknown, and both certain and uncertain. Obviously, if injuries worsen
`as time passes, damages will increase, and, if injuries mend, damages will decrease.
`These are the vagaries of offers of settlement . . . There is only one claim underlying
`the plaintiff's action, although its value may change
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`Lutynski v. B.B.&J. Trucking, Inc., 31 Conn. App 806, 813-14 (1994) (internal citations omitted).
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`Regardless of whether or not the value of a plaintiff’s case changes during the pendency of a civil
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`action, the statutory time period for which to respond to an offer of compromise does not. The
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`Supreme Court of Connecticut in Blakeslee Arpaia Chapman, Inc. v. EI Constructors, takes this
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`interpretation even further by stating:
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`The imposition of interest as a result of finding that the plaintiff was entitled to an
`award of damages in excess of the offer of judgment is mandatory. Our courts have
`consistently held that prejudgment interest is to be awarded by the trial court when a
`valid offer of judgment is filed by the plaintiff, the offer is rejected by the defendant,
`and the plaintiff ultimately recovers an amount greater than the offer of judgment
`after trial . . . Moreover, an award of interest under § 52-192a is mandatory, and the
`application of § 52-192a does not depend on an analysis of the underlying
`circumstances of the case or a determination of the facts . . . The statute is admittedly
`punitive in nature . . . It is the punitive aspect of the statute that effectuates the
`underlying purpose of the statute and provides the impetus to settle cases.
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`Blakeslee Arpaia Chapman, Inc. v. EI Constructors, 239 Conn. 708, 752 (1997) (internal citations
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`omitted; internal quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court of Connecticut makes clear that not
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`only is the statutory timeline mandatory, but it is also “admittedly punitive in nature.” Id. The
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`purpose of the statute is to encourage parties to “settle cases.” Id. The defendant should not receive
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`more time because it “would open the door for a defendant in another case to be insulated from
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`liability for interest as a result of delay due to congested dockets. That, however, would defeat the
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`entire purpose of § 52-192a.” Id. at 753, footnote 54.
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`Courts have chosen to uphold the mandatory 30-day statutory requirement as was the case in the
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`recent ruling in, in Lisa Guarda v. Cody Warren, et al. where Judge Knox denied the defendant’s
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`motion for extension of time to respond to the plaintiff’s offer of compromise. Lisa Guarda v. Cody
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`Warren, et al. Judicial District of New Britain at New Britain, No. HHBCV246085888S, 2025
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`(April 8, 2025, J. Knox).
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`In short, Defendants are essentially asking for the Court to remove them from being
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`subject to § 52-192a. However, as Judge Pierson held in Baker v. Babb, supra, the time
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`limitations set forth in that statute are mandatory and designed to promote a fair and
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`reasonable compromise between litigants without unnecessary waste of judicial resources.
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`As such, no extension is warranted here.
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`II.
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`Conclusion
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`There is no basis to grant the relief Defendants are seeking. There is no good cause to
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`allow the Defendant additional time to respond to Plaintiff’s Offer of Compromise. As such,
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`Defendant’s Motion for Extension of Time to Respond to the Plaintiff’s Offer of Compromise
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`(Ent. Nos. 116.00) should be denied in its entirety, and Plaintiff’s Objection should be sustained.
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`WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully requests this Court to deny Defendants’ Motion.
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`THE PLAINTIFF,
`CARLY BROW
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`444624               
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`Rachel Ferreira Barone
`The Flood Law Firm, LLC
`190 Washington Street
`Middletown, CT 06457
`Phone: 860-346-2695
`Juris #: 433718
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`CERTIFICATION
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`I certify that a copy of the above was or will immediately be mailed or delivered
`electronically or non-electronically on April 14, 2025 to all counsel and self- represented parties
`of record and that written consent for electronic delivery was received from all counsel and self-
`represented parties of record who were or will immediately be electronically served:
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`Anita M. Varunes, Esquire
`Varunes & Associates, P.C.
`5 Grand Street
`Hartford, CT 06106
`webmail@varuneslaw.com
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`444624
`Rachel Ferreira Barone
`
`