DOCKET NO.: UWY-CV24-5034035-S
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`JORDAN GEFFERT
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`V.
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`BRANDON MARFYAK
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`SUPERIOR COURT
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`J.D. OF WATERBURY
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`AT WATERBURY
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`APRIL 26, 2024
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`I.
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`PLAINTIFF’S POST TRIAL MEMORANDUM OF LAW
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`Procedural Background
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`This case was initiated as a Prejudgment Remedy (PJR) Action seeking replevin of a dog
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`named “Lucy” pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stats. § 52-515. A two day hearing on the PJR was held on
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`April 3 and April 4, 2024. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Parties stipulated on the record
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`that the hearing could be converted to a trial on the merits of the dispute, and that the court would
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`make a final judgment on the matter on the evidence presented during the 2-day hearing. The
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`Court heard oral argument after conclusion of the evidence on April 4, 2024. The Court ordered
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`simultaneous briefs to be submitted on April 26, 2024.
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`II.
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`Plaintiff’s Witnesses and Exhibits
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`The Defendant did not offer any witness testimony. The Plaintiff presented the following
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`witnesses:
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`1)
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`2)
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`3)
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`4)
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`5)
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`Defendant Brandon Marfyak.
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`Jason Scozzafava, Keeper of Records of Embrace Animal Hospital.
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`Nicole Gallaher, Principal of Murphy’s Paw Rescue, Inc., an animal rescue organization.
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`Plaintiff Jordan Geffert.
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`Carlos Correia, Owner of Coaching for Paws, LLC, a dog training business.
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`1
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`The following exhibits were admitted as full exhibits for the Plaintiff:
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`Pl. 1 Records of Murphy’s Paw Rescue.
`Pl. 2 Records of Embrace Animal Hospital.
`Pl. 3 Rabies Certificate, dated 03-07-2023.
`Pl. 4 Dog license with the Town of Watertown.
`Pl. 5 RCO pet receipt for dog training.
`Pl. 6 Pet insurance receipts from February 4, 2023 to February 6, 2024.
`Pl. 7 Coaching for Paws LLC receipt for dog training.
`Pl. 8 Food receipt for dog food.
`Pl. 9 Murphy’s Paw Receipt for Lucy’s adoption.
`Pl. 10 Photo of Lucy
`Pl. 11 Subpoenaed records of Embrace Animal Hospital.
`Pl. 12 Subpoenaed records of Murphy’s Paw Rescue.
`Pl. 13 Subpoenaed records of Coaching for Paws LLC.
`Pl. 14 Watertown Dog License Application.
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`III. Background
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`Plaintiff Jordan Geffert and Defendant Brandon Marfyak met in 2020. Both are hospital
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`nurses. The Plaintiff works in the burn unit at Bridgeport Hospital. (Trial Transcript, April 3, p.
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`62, lines 9-14.) The Defendant works in the intensive care unit at Waterbury Hospital. In 2022,
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`they decided to move in together at the condominium owned by the Defendant located at 245
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`Cherry Ave., Unit I-13, Watertown, Connecticut. (Tr. Tr., Exhibit A, April 3, p. 2, lines 6-25.)
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`There was no agreement on how living expenses would be paid for or shared, nor agreement on
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`how expenses with regard to Lucy would be paid for or shared. (Tr. Tr., April 3, p. 31, line 25-27;
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`p. 32, lines 1-14.)
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`In April 2022, the parties discussed acquiring a dog. At that time, the Plaintiff and
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`Defendant worked different schedules, so the Plaintiff was alone in the evening. (Tr. Tr., April 3,
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`p. 66, lines 2-8.) She wanted a dog to keep her company. (Id.) The Plaintiff located the dog now in
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`dispute, Lucy, through Murphy’s Paw Rescue, Inc., (“Murphy’s Paw”) an animal rescue run by
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`2
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`Nicole Gallagher. (Tr. Tr., April 3, p. 2, lines 2-11.) The Plaintiff chose Lucy from the Murphy’s
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`Paw website because she noticed that no one else had applied for the dog and she wanted to give
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`the dog a good life. (Tr. Tr., April 3, p. 70, lines 24-27; p. 71, line 1.) The Plaintiff sent several
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`emails to Murphy’s Paw and in one stated, “ My boyfriend and I have settled into a townhouse and
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`are looking to start a family with a dog.” (Pl. Ex. 1, email dated April 13, 2022.)
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`The Plaintiff coordinated an appointment to meet Lucy at the home were Lucy was being
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`homed. (Tr. Tr., April 3, p. 70, lines 6-8.) In anticipation of adopting Lucy, the Plaintiff set aside
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`money for the adoption, and purchased bedding, toys and food. (Tr. Tr., April 3, p. 72, lines 10-
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`27.) The day before the appointment, the Plaintiff informed the Defendant they would be meeting
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`Lucy. (Tr. Tr., April 3, p. 68, lines 22-26.) On April 19, 2022, the Parties met Lucy and “adopted”
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`her. (Pl. Ex. 1.) The Plaintiff filled out the 2-page Murphy’s Paw Rescue adoption form. (Pl. Ex.
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`1, p. 2; Tr. Tr., April 3, p. 71, lines 18-27.) Both Parties signed the form. The Plaintiff paid the
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`fee for Lucy. (Pl. Ex. 1, p. 3.) The Defendant reimbursed the Plaintiff for half of the adoption
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`expense. The Defendant did not reimburse the Plaintiff for any other expenses pertaining to Lucy.
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`(Tr. Tr., April 3, p. 73, lines 12-16.)
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`The Parties lived together at the condominium in Watertown until November 2023. While
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`at work on November 14, 2023, the Plaintiff discovered that the Defendant had been texting
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`another woman. (Tr. Tr., April 4, p. 27, lines 26-27; p. 28, lines 1-4.) The next day, the Plaintiff
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`returned to the condominium to gather a few belongings. (Tr. Tr., April 3, p. 104, lines 11-27;
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`105, lines 11-24.)She did not know at that time whether the relationship had ended, but she was
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`3
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`emotionally distraught.1 The Plaintiff returned to the Watertown condominium a few days later to
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`pick up a few other personal belongings. A few days after that, the Plaintiff returned a third time
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`but was unable to enter because the Defendant had changed the locks. (Tr. Tr., April 3, p. 23,
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`lines 25-27, p. 24, lines 1-9.)The Defendant testified that he had the locks changed under the
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`advice of counsel. When the Plaintiff came back a fourth time, the Defendant kept Lucy in a
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`closed bedroom in the upstairs of the condominium.
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`The Defendant testified without reservation that on repeated occasions, by multiple people,
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`he was asked to give Lucy to the Plaintiff and he refused. (Tr. Tr., April 3, p. 13, lines 21-23; p.
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`25, lines 19-21; p. 46, lines 26-27; p. 47, lines 1-3; p 53, lines 15-20.) The Defendant admitted that
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`while the Plaintiff’s belongings were being moved out, the Plaintiff’s uncle and mother asked him
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`to return Lucy to the Plaintiff. He refused. (Id.) In a later text message, the Plaintiff “begged” the
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`Defendant to return Lucy, but the Defendant ignored her request. (Def. Ex. D, p. 17; Tr. Tr., April
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`4, p. 30, lines 1-6.) The Plaintiff testified that she was afraid to confront the Defendant in person
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`because the Defendant was larger than her and could be abusive when he drank. (Tr. Tr., April 3,
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`p. 92, lines 22-27; p. 93, 1-9.) The Plaintiff testified that she spoke to the police, but they could not
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`help her. The PJR to recover Lucy followed.
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`Further relevant facts are set forth below.
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`IV.
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`Law and Argument
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`As a replevin action involving a dog, the law to be applied in this case is controlled by the
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`replevin statute, Conn. Gen. Stats. § 52-515, and Angrave v. Oates, 90 Conn. App. 427, 430 (2005).
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`1 The Plaintiff’s distress lasted throughout the holidays, and was so severe that the Plaintiff’s employer
`gave her the holidays off. (Tr. Tr., April 4, p. 28, lines 21-27; p. 29, line 1.)
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`4
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`“[T]his not a contract action and, thus, it is not within the court's power to determine
`which party has superior title to the animal. Rather, this is a replevin action, which
`involves a comparison of the superiority and inferiority of competing rights to possess the
`animal. In Connecticut, an action of replevin is purely statutory in nature. General
`Statutes § 52-515 provides that ‘the action of replevin may be maintained to recover any
`goods or chattels in which the plaintiff has a general or special property interest with a
`right to immediate possession and which are wrongfully detained from him in any
`manner, together with the damages for such wrongful detention.’”
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`(Emphasis added.) (Internal citations omitted.) Id. at 430. "In Connecticut, replevin proceedings are
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`governed by statute rather than by the rules that apply to common-law actions of replevin.” Cornelio v.
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`Stamford Hospital, 246 Conn. 45, 49 (1998). Inasmuch as the replevin statute was first enacted in
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`1949, case law prior thereto and pertaining to common law actions for replevin are not controlling.
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`The Plaintiff has the burden to establish the following elements: (1) Lucy is a "good or chattel"
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`within the meaning of Section 52-515; (2) she has a superior general or special property interest in
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`Lucy as compared to the interests of the Defendant; (3) she has a right to immediate possession of
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`Lucy; and (4) the Defendant wrongfully detained Lucy from her. Even though people
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`anthropomorphize dogs, the Appellate court has stated that “[a] claim of replevin does not involve the
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`best interest of the dog, which is a chattel under General Statutes § 22-350 (‘all dogs are deemed to be
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`personal property’).” Angrave at 430 n.3. During oral argument, the Parties did not dispute element
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`one – that Lucy is a good or chattel within the meaning of Section 52-515.
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`In considering whether Ms. Geffert had a superior general or special property interest in Lucy
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`as compared to the Defendant, Connecticut statutes applicable to dog “owners” and dog “keepers”
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`cannot be ignored. Connecticut statutes make a distinction between an “owner” and “keeper” of a dog.
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`The only instance that could be found applicable solely to an “owner” of a dog is Conn. Gen. Stats. §
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`22-339c(a)(3)(A)2 pertaining to a certificate of rabies vaccination. In relevant part, Section 22-
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`339c(a)(3)(A) mandates that a rabies certificate contain “[t]he name and address of [the dog’s] owner,”
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`(emphasis added) among other things. The same statute makes a distinction in Subsection (b) between
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`an “owner” and a “keeper.” Section 22-339c(b), mandates that the “owner or keeper” of a dog shall
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`keep a copy of the certificate.
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`Plaintiff’s Exhibit 3 is Lucy’s rabies certificate issued on March 7, 2023, which is eight (8)
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`months before the Parties separated. The certificate is in the name of the Plaintiff, Jordan Geffert. The
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`Defendant testified that he knew of the rabies certificate from the time it was issued, and he knew it
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`was in the Plaintiff’s name. He further testified he made no effort to have the certificate changed
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`despite his claim now to be Lucy’s rightful owner.
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`Based upon Conn. Gen. Stats. § 22-339c, the rabies certificate in the name of the Plaintiff is
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`prima facie evidence of her being Lucy’s owner. As prima facie evidence, the burden shifts to the
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`Defendant to prove he is the owner. See American Home Mortgage Servicing v. Reilly, 157 Conn. App.
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`127, 133 (2015) (holding that the “holder of a note satisfies the plaintiff’s burden of demonstrating that
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`it is the owner of the note because under Conn. Gen. Stats. § 49-17, the holder is presumed to be the
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`owner.”)
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`In an apparent attempt to counter the rabies certificate issued in the Plaintiff’s name, the
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`Defendant had Lucy re-vaccinated for rabies on April 2, 2024 – the day before the first day of evidence
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`– at Stone veterinary clinic, a new veterinary clinic for Lucy.3 (Tr. Tr., April 3, p. 14, lines 8-15.)
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`2 At oral argument, Counsel believes he may have misstated the statute citation in oral argument. The
`correct citation is Section 22-339c(a)(3)(A).
`3 Previously, Lucy had been seen only by Embrace Animal Hospital except for 1 emergency visit to a
`24hr emergency clinic.
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`Notably, the rabies certificate issued on March 7, 2023, and in the Plaintiff’s name clearly states the
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`vaccine type as “vaccine 3 year” and further makes clear the “Expiration Date – 3 years from 03-07-
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`2023.” It was plainly clear on the face of the March 7, 2023, rabies certificate that Lucy was not due to
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`be revaccinated until March 3, 2026. The Defendant is an experienced hospital nurse and should be
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`expected to understand the import of a 3 year vaccine. He admitted that, according to the terms of the
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`certificate, Lucy’s vaccine did not expire until March 7, 2026. In short, there was no need to have
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`Lucy revaccinated 2 years early.
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`As the trier of fact, the court resolves issues of credibility. See State v. Nowell, 262 Conn. 686,
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`695 (2003); Lacic v. Tomas, 78 Conn. App. 406, 409-10, cert. denied, 266 Conn. 922 (2003). "[I]t is
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`the trier's exclusive province to weigh the conflicting evidence, determine the credibility of witnesses
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`and determine whether to accept some, all or none of a witness' testimony." (Internal quotation marks
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`omitted.) Hoffer v. Swan Lake Ass'n., Inc., 66 Conn. App. 858, 861 (2001). The Plaintiff’s testimony
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`that he had Lucy re-vaccinated 2 years early, the day before trial, under the “advice” of the new
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`veterinarian, was not credible and not sufficient to rebut Plaintiff’s presumptive ownership established
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`by the March 7, 2023, rabies certificate. The vaccination the day before the hearing was Defendant’s
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`obvious attempt to create evidence to support his claim to Lucy while he was in possession and control
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`of the dog to the exclusion of the Plaintiff. Indeed, on cross examination the Defendant admitted when
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`he took her to Stone Veterinary Clinic he new Lucy’s rabies vaccine was not due. (Tr. Tr., April 3, p.
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`58, lines 2-4.)
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`As to the Dog License (Plaintiff’s Exhibit 4) being in the Defendant’s name, it carries little
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`weight. Pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stats. § 22-338, entitled “Licensing of dogs,” subsection (a) states an
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`“owner or keeper” of a dog “shall cause such dog to be licensed in the town clerk’s office where such
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`dog is kept . . . .” Under 22-339c(a), “Such [rabies] certificate shall be the official proof of rabies
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`vaccination and shall be submitted to a town clerk . . . ” at the time of licensing. A copy of the Town
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`of Watertown’s dog license application was offered as Exhibit 14.
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`The Plaintiff filled out the Watertown dog license application and filled out the check to pay for
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`the license. The Defendant only signed the check. It was the Plaintiff as Lucy’s owner that caused
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`Lucy to be licensed. Indeed, the dog license application itself does not indicate that the Defendant or
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`the Plaintiff is an owner or keeper. It is silent as to that issue. However, the Plaintiff testified that the
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`March 7, 2023, rabies certificate (Plaintiff’s 3) with the Plaintiff’s name as the owner was filed with
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`the Town along with license application. So, according to the rabies certificate required to be filed
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`with the dog license application, the Plaintiff owned Lucy.
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`The Murphy’s Paw adoption paper (Exhibit 1) lists both the Plaintiff and the Defendant. Like
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`the Watertown dog license application, the Plaintiff filled it out. Moreover, as stated in oral argument,
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`people tend to anthropomorphize dogs, but the Appellate Court has made clear that dogs are chattel.
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`Angrave at 430 n.3. Phrases like “adoption” are human efforts to anthropomorphize dogs through
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`language. Furthermore, this is a case about possession of Lucy not title to Lucy. As made perfectly
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`clear in Angrave, a replevin action is “ . . .not a contract action and, thus, it is not within the court's
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`power to determine which party has superior title to the animal. Rather, this is a replevin action, which
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`involves a comparison of the superiority and inferiority of competing rights to possess the animal.”
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`(Italics added.) Angrave at 430 n.3.
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`Because of the Murphy’s Paw adoption paperwork, the Court asked for law regarding partition
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`actions, noting the similarity of weighing the equitable interests in partitioning real property with
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`weighing the competing equitable interests to the chattel at issue in this case. “A partition action,
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`although a creature of statute, is an equitable action, which invokes the court's equity
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`jurisdiction. Fernandes v. Rodriguez, 255 Conn. 47, 59, 761 A.2d 1283 (2000). ‘The determination of
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`what equity requires in a particular case, the balancing of the equities, is a matter for the discretion of
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`the trial court." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) May v. Retarides, 83 Conn. App. 286, 295, cert.
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`denied, 271 Conn. 908 (2004).” DiCerto v. Jones, 2007 Conn. Super. LEXIS 508 *7-8 (2007).
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`Just like a partition action, the trial court in Angrave considered a “balance of equities.” Based
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`upon the evidence in Angrave, the trial court stated as follows:
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`Once one then returns to a balancing of the equities, it is also felt that plaintiff's
`entitlement is clearly superior. In terms of length of possession, length of care,
`exclusivity in cost-bearing for care, entry fees, and diagnostic radiology, the
`balance virtually entirely favors plaintiff.
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`Angrave v. Oates, No. CV040352012, 2004 Conn. Super. LEXIS 3002, at *7-8 (Super. Ct. Oct. 8,
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`2004). "Equitable determinations that depend on the balancing of many factors are committed to the
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`sound discretion of the trial court." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Wendell Corp.
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`Trustee v. Thurston, 239 Conn. 109, 114 (1996); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Palumbo, 109 Conn. App. 731,
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`736 (2008) ("The determination of what equity requires in a particular case, the balancing of the
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`equities, is a matter for the discretion of the trial court . . ."); Sunset Mortgage v. Agolio, 109 Conn.
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`App. 198, 203 (2008) ("[T]he trial court may examine all relevant factors to ensure that complete
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`justice is done . . . The determination of what equity requires in a particular case, the balancing of the
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`equities, is a matter for the discretion of the trial court." (Internal quotation marks omitted.)).
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`With regard to Lucy, the balance of equities favor the Plaintiff in every way. At trial, the
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`Defendant used the word “primary” to describe how he believed the Plaintiff was listed in
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`Embrace Animal Hospital’s records. Primary best describes the Plaintiff with regard to all
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`aspects involving Lucy. In contrast, “incidental” best describes the Defendant with regard to all
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`aspects involving Lucy. Based upon the balance of equities discussed below, the Plaintiff has a
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`right to immediate possession of Lucy.
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`First, as to the adoption, the evidence was that the Plaintiff coordinated every aspect of
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`acquiring Lucy. The Plaintiff made initial and follow-up contacts with Nicole Gallagher from
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`Murphy’s Paw. She selected Lucy, and scheduled the appointment to meet her. She set aside
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`money for the adoption, paid for the adoption, filled out the adoption document, and purchased
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`bedding, toys and food in preparation for Lucy’s arrival and for afterwards. (Tr. Tr., April 3, p.
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`72, lines 7-27.) The Defendant only attended the appointment to meet Lucy with the Plaintiff,
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`and subsequently reimbursed the Plaintiff for half of the adoption. (Tr. Tr., April 3, p. 4, lines 16-
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`19.) The Plaintiff was primary to the adoption, while the Defendant was merely incidental to it.
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`Second, as to medical care and food for Lucy, the Plaintiff selected Embrace Animal
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`Hospital, paid for all veterinary care and for the one emergency room visit. She paid for health
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`insurance for Lucy from May 2022 to February 2024. (Pl. Ex. 6; Tr. Tr., April 3, p. 79, lines 16-
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`27; p. 80, lines 1-16.) Furthermore, the Plaintiff scheduled and took Lucy to all appointments
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`including the one emergency appointment when Lucy was vomiting blood. (Tr. Tr., April 3, p.
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`74, lines 12-27.) The Defendant only attended a couple appointments, and those were with the
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`Plaintiff. (Id.) Notably, the Defendant was not listed anywhere in the veterinary records. (Pl. Ex.
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`11.) The Plaintiff had Lucy’s food on autoship with Amazon (Pl. 8)4, and she paid for the food.
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`4 The Plaintiff testified that Exhibit 8 was an example of one dog food receipt for Lucy, but that the
`food was on regular autoship.
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`(Tr. Tr., April 3, p. 85, lines 21-27; p. 86, lines 1-16.) The Defendant did not reimburse the
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`Plaintiff for any food or medical costs. The Plaintiff was the primary person if not the sole
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`person with regard to Lucy’s medical care and feeding, while the Defendant was merely
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`incidental to them.
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`Third, as to dog training, the Plaintiff selected a dog training company, paid for a month
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`of dog training that cost $2,658.75 (Pl. Ex. 7), and took Lucy to most of her daily training. (Tr.
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`Tr., April 3, p. 80, line 27; p. 81, lines 1-27; p. 82, lines 1-27; p. 83, lines 1-23.) The Defendant
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`did not reimburse the Plaintiff for the training cost. (Id.) There were 4-5 training sessions per
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`week for 4 weeks. (Id.) Out of those roughly 16-20 sessions, which required a morning dropoff
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`and daily pickup, the Defendant only took Lucy “a couple times.” (Id.) The remaining days were
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`taken care of by the Plaintiff or her mother.5 (Id.) The Plaintiff was primary for the dog training
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`(Tr. Tr. April 3, p. 22, lines 19-24), while the Defendant was merely incidental to it.
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`Fourth, as to licensing, the evidence was that the Plaintiff filled out the application, filled
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`out the check, and sent the license application to the Town along with the rabies certificate that
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`was in the Plaintiff’s name. (Tr. Tr., April 3, p. 76, lines 18-27; p. 77, lines1-24; p. 78, lines 1-9.)
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`All the Defendant did was sign the check. (Id.) To be sure, the Plaintiff testified that the reason
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`she filled out the dog license in the Defendant’s name was due to the regulations of the
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`Defendant’s condominium to which she had no ownership interest. (Id.) With regard to licensing,
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`the Plaintiff was primary, while the Defendant was merely incidental.
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`5 Even with regard to coordinating care when neither the Plaintiff nor the Defendant was able to watch
`Lucy, the Plaintiff was primary. The Plaintiff arranged for her mother to watch Lucy, and she
`coordinated the drop-offs and pickups. (Id.)
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`All of the equitable considerations favor the Plaintiff in terms of adoption, medical care,
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`feeding, training, licensing and vaccinations, payment of expenses and overall care of Lucy. In
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`not one area could the Defendant’s actions or conduct be considered superior to those of the
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`Plaintiff.
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`As to wrongful detention, Section 52-515 requires a plaintiff have a general or special property
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`interest “ . . . which are wrongfully detained from [her] in any manner . . . .” (Emphasis added.)
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`“Wrongfully” is defined as “in a wrong manner; unjustly; in a manner contrary to the moral law, or to
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`justice.” Black’s Law Dictionary (Sixth Ed. 1990), p. 1613.
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`During oral argument the Defendant suggested that a wrongful detainer must involve some
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`tortious act. That is not the law. First, the statute itself refers to chattel being “wrongfully detained . . .
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`in any manner.” The legislature chose the word “wrongfully” and not the word “tortiously.” Second,
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`the Appellate Court in Angrave did not use the word “tortiously.” The two words are not synonyms
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`and not interchangeable. To recover in tort, a party must prove the existence of an actionable harm and
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`actual damages resulting therefrom. See Black’s Law Dictionary (Sixth Ed. 1990), p. 1489. Under the
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`replevin statute, a Plaintiff does not have to prove damages above detainer of the chattel; detainer of
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`the chattel is the harm although damages for the detention may also be recovered. See Section 52-515
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`(“The action of replevin may be maintained to recover goods or chattels . . . together with the damages
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`for such wrongful detention.”).
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`The Defendant admitted that he would not give Lucy to the Plaintiff. The Defendant held Lucy
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`in a closed room on at least one occasion while the Plaintiff retrieved her belongings. The Defendant
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`denied the requests of the Plaintiff’s uncle and mother to return Lucy to the Plaintiff. In one text
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`message, the Plaintiff “begged” the Defendant to return Lucy, but the Plaintiff ignored her request.
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`The Plaintiff testified that she was afraid to confront the Defendant in person and simply take Lucy
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`because the Defendant was larger than her and could be abusive and violent when he drank. (Tr. Tr.,
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`April 3, p. 91, line 21-27; p. 92, lines 1-27; p. 93, lines 1-9; p. 105, lines 13-26.) The Plaintiff testified
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`that she spoke to the police, but they could not help her. In the face of the equities, the Defendant’s
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`exercise of dominion and control over Lucy to the exclusion of the Plaintiff, his detention of Lucy and
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`repeated refusal to hand her over after repeated demands, were all wrongful.6
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`Lastly, the Defendant comes to the Court with unclean hands.
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`"The doctrine of unclean hands expresses the principle that where a plaintiff seeks
`equitable relief, he must show that his conduct has been fair, equitable and honest as to
`the particular controversy in issue. . . . Unless the plaintiff's conduct is of such a character
`as to be condemned and pronounced wrongful by honest and fair-minded people, the
`doctrine of unclean hands does not apply."
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`(Citation omitted.) Bauer v. Waste Management of Connecticut, Inc., 239 Conn. 515, 525
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`(1996). The "application of the doctrine of unclean hands rests within the sound discretion of the
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`trial court." A & B Auto Salvage, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 189 Conn. 573, 578, 456 A.2d
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`1187 (1983). The doctrine may be applied in equity and contract actions. Webster Bank, N.A. v.
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`Banner Spring Corp., No. LLICV116004628S, 2012 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1705, at *23-24
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`(Super. Ct. July 3, 2012).
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` The Defendant seeks the court to find in his favor on the balance of equities, and also claims
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`an agreement between the Parties that Lucy would remain with him if the Parties broke up (in his
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`words) “for any reason.” Despite many text messages, being offered into evidence, none contained
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`6 There was testimony that the Defendant had offered to allow the Plaintiff to “visit” Lucy after the
`breakup, which the Plaintiff refused. Given the Plaintiff’s superior possessory interest to Lucy,
`Plaintiff was under no obligation to accept “visitation” of Lucy where the Defendant was essentially
`exercising possessory control.
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`such an agreement. The Defendant even admitted those were his words, and not the Plaintiff’s words.
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`(Tr. Tr., April 3, p. 27, lines 14-16.) In either case, the Defendant comes before the court with unclean
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`hands because he precipitated the Parties’ breakup by his texting another woman. To be sure, the
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`Parties are in the present dispute due to the Defendant’s conduct. No reasonable person would
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`conclude his actions texting another woman were honest or fair minded when in a committed
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`cohabitating romantic relationship with the Plaintiff. The Defendant should not benefit by his
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`wrongful conduct by being awarded Lucy.
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`Notwithstanding unclean hand, to establish an agreement there must have been a meeting of the
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`minds as to the terms and there must have been consideration. There was not sufficient evidence for
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`either.
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`"In order for an enforceable contract to exist, the court must find that the
`parties' minds had truly met. . . . If there has been a misunderstanding between the
`parties, or a misapprehension by one or both so that their minds have never met,
`no contract has been entered into by them and the court will not make for them
`a contract which they themselves did not make. . . . [A]n agreement must be
`definite and certain as to its terms and requirements. . . . [N]umerous Connecticut
`cases require definite agreement on the essential terms of an enforceable
`agreement. . . . [Furthermore,] [w]hether a term is essential turns on the particular
`circumstances of each case."
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`(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Hawley Avenue Associates, LLC v. Robert D.
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`Russo, M.D. & Associates Radiology, P.C., 130 Conn. App. 823, 828-29 (2011). "The doctrine
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`of consideration is fundamental in the law of contracts, the general rule being that in the absence
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`of consideration an executory promise is unenforceable." State National Bank v. Dick, 164 Conn. 523,
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`529 (1973). The Defendant bears the proof of establishing any contract.
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`The Defendant testified there was a text message detailing the alleged agreement, but despite
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`the Defendant offering numerous texts messages none detailed an agreement that Lucy was to remain
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`with the Defendant if the Parties broke up for any reason. To be sure, Plaintiff denied such an
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`agreement. (Tr. Tr., April 3, p. 93, lines 14-16.) When asked about a text where the Plaintiff
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`referenced a mutual breakup, she said she was arguing to argue and that it was “word vomit.” The texts
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`submitted by the Defendant were messages from the Plaintiff during the period she was distraught,
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`upset at the cheating, grieving the loss of her relationship with the Defendant, and beside herself at
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`being repeatedly denied Lucy who the Plaintiff unquestionably viewed and treated like her child.
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`The Defendant’s testimony as to the terms of the alleged agreement was inconsistent with the
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`text messages he submitted, and the Plaintiff denied the agreement entirely. Based upon the meager
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`record on the contract issue, there is not enough evidence to conclude that there was a definite
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`agreement and certain meeting of the minds, and that is so even if there had been a general discussion
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`about the topic. Furthermore, there was no consideration for the alleged agreement. During cross
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`examination, the Defendant conceded that everything proceeded as usual. Nothing changed. There
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`needed to at least be the proverbial “peppercorn,” but there was not even that.
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`V.
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`Conclusion
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`The equitable considerations in the case weigh heavily if not completely in the Plaintiff’s
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`favor. The evidence overwhelmingly established that the Plaintiff’s property interest in Lucy far
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`outweighed any property interest of the Defendant. Despite that superior interest, the Defendant
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`repeatedly and wrongfully denied the Plaintiff’s requests to return Lucy. Although the
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`Defendant made a passing reference to a contract pertaining to possession of Lucy, there was
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`insufficient evidence that such an agreement existed, that its terms were certain, that there was a
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`meeting of the minds, or that there was any consideration whatseover. To be sure, it was the
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`Defendant’s unclean hands that caused the current situation. He should not benefit at law or
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`equity in the face of his wrongful deeds.
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`Accordingly, the Plaintiff prays for a finding in favor on her claim for replevin, and she
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`seeks an order for immediate return of Lucy to her possession.
`
`THE PLAINTIFF,
`Jordon Geffert
`
`BY:__/R. Bradley Morris/____
`R. Bradley Morris, Esq.
`Morris Law Group LLC
`44 Watertown Road
`Middlebury, Connecticut 06762
`Phone: 203.577.3330
`Juris No. 412795
`Her Attorney
`
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`CERTIFICATION
`
` I
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` certify that a copy of the above was or will immediately be mailed or transmitted electronically on
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`April 26, 2024, to the following counsel of record:
`
`
`Attorney Danie C. Thibodeau
`THIBODEAU BEADNELL LAW GROUP
`52 North Street
`Danbury, CT 06810
`dant@tblawgrp.com
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`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`BY:__/R. Bradley Morris/____
`R. Bradley Morris, Esq.
`Morris Law Group LLC
`44 Watertown Road
`Middlebury, Connecticut 06762
`Phone: 203.577.3330
`Juris No. 412795
`Her Attorney
`
`17
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`