DOCKET NO. WWM-CV24-6031487-S
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`MARC AYOTTE
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`STATE OF CONNECTICUT
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`SUPERIOR COURT
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`JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
`WINDHAM
`AT PUTNAM
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`MARCH 17, 2025
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`DEFENDANT’S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S APPLICATION TO VACATE
`ARBITRATION AWARD
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`I.
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`FACTUAL BACKGROUND
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`The Defendant State of Connecticut, Department of Correction, entered into a collective
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`bargaining agreement with Council 4 of the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal
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`Employees covering the period of July 1, 2021, through June 30, 2025. Plaintiff’s Exhibit A. The
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`collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) covers bargaining unit members within the Department
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`of Correction, including Plaintiff Marc Ayotte. Plaintiff’s application to vacate concerns an
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`arbitrator’s award ruling Plaintiff’s termination from his position was for just cause. The
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`stipulated, unrestricted submission and the award are as follows:
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`Was the Grievant, Marc Ayotte, terminated for just cause?
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`If not, what shall be the remedy consistent with the NP-4 contract?
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`Award
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`The Grievant, Marc Ayotte, was terminated for just cause. The grievance
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`is denied.
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`Entry No. 104.00, Plaintiff’s Brief, Exhibit G, p. 1; Exhibit 1, Attached.
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`The facts leading to Plaintiff’s termination are discussed at length in the arbitrator’s
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`decision. Id. Plaintiff began his employment at the Department of Correction (“DOC”) as a
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`Corrections Officer (“CO”) in November 2012. Id. At orientation, all new employees receive a
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`copy of the employee handbook, which includes a copy of DOC Administrative Directive 2.17
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`1
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`(“A.D. 2.17”), Professional Boundaries/Undue Familiarity. Id. At orientation, plaintiff signed
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`off that he had reviewed A.D. 2.17 with a DOC personnel officer. Id. DOC required staff,
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`including Plaintiff, to attend subsequent refresher presentations on A.D. 2.17. Id.
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`The arbitrator looked closely at the requirements of A.D. 2.17 and DOC’s Undue
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`Familiarity Policy:
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`Therefore, the Department of Correction shall not permit or tolerate
`personal or social relationships between its staff and those
`incarcerated or under supervision.
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`When professionalism is not maintained, the security of our
`facilities is jeopardized, and individual judgment is inevitably
`impaired. Thus, the Department shall investigate and scrutinize all
`relationships that appear inappropriate. AD 2.17, Undue Familiarity,
`clarifies behaviors that are strictly prohibitive by the Department of
`Correction. Each staff member has received a copy of this directive
`and it is also available for review in each unit of the Agency. It is
`imperative that you are fully cognizant of these behaviors.
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`Any contact or relationship which appears inappropriate shall be
`investigated and scrutinized. Any finding of inappropriate conduct
`shall be subject, on a case-by-case basis, to appropriate disciplinary
`action, up to and including dismissal.
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`The Department recognizes that there are situations where
`relationships may exist before an individual is committed to the
`Department’s custody or supervision. In such cases, it is required
`that the employee immediately report these relationships in writing
`to the unit administrator.
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`Plaintiff’s Exhibit G, Arbitrator’s Decision p. 2.
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`The arbitrator specifically noted in his decision that “Prior to the events at issue here, the
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`record shows that the [Plaintiff] was an exemplary employee with a perfect attendance record, no
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`prior discipline, and an excellent performance record.” Id.
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`In May 2020, DOC selected Plaintiff to serve as an Intelligence Officer (IO) and instructed
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`him to develop Sources of Information (SOI’s). Id. SOI’s are inmates who can provide
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`2
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`information to support facility security and inmate safety. Id. Plaintiff’s training for his new
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`position consisted of a four-hour course on the use of the Securus call monitoring system. Id.
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`On July 1, 2020, the Plaintiff took a training class on Administrative Directive 2.17,
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`“Professional Boundaries” which presented several workplace scenarios and then asked whether
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`any were violations of the directive. Id. One slide in the presentation identified the following
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`scenario as a violation of Administrative Directive 2.17: “You go to speak to an inmate about a
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`Disciplinary Report, he gets angry, begins cursing at you, and invites you to his private parts.
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`Without hesitation, you tell the inmate, ‘I saw you get strip searched and I am not impressed.’”
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`Id. at 2-3.
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`The Plaintiff later applied for a vacant Phone Monitor position and was selected for the
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`position. Id. at 3. Phone Monitors’ primary responsibility is monitoring the phone calls of inmates
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`and reporting any intelligence learned from this activity. Id. Plaintiff attended the full-day Phone
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`Monitor training along with six other trainees, which ran from 8:30 AM to 4:30 PM and covered
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`the dangers and prohibitions of Undue Familiarity. Id. The arbitrator found that “While the
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`[Plaintiff] had taken Professional Boundaries training multiple times, and most recently in July
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`2020, the record shows that less than five months later, on December 10, 2020, the [Plaintiff] was
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`recorded allowing an inmate to drink ‘pruno,’ an alcoholic drink; and, in November 2021, the
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`[Plaintiff] was recorded discussing masturbating in the shower with an inmate, in violation of AD
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`2.17.” Id.
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` Deputy Warden Perez oversaw activities of the Telephone Monitoring Unit when he was
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`a Captain, including targeted reviews of inmate mail and phone calls for information pertaining
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`to suspected criminal activity. Id. On December 10, 2021, while reviewing his emergency call
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`report, then-Captain Perez noticed a ten-minute phone call, which was unusual, as such calls were
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`3
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`typically very short, due to inmate safety concerns. Id. Captain Perez listened to the call, “heard
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`many disturbing things,” and documented the call in his incident report. Id. “The call begins with
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`Inmate 1 calling the [Plaintiff] ‘baby,’ and the [Plaintiff] stating, ‘I got my dick in my hand. I’m
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`getting ready to pee.’” Id. As a result of the December 10, 2021 call, on December 20, 2021 the
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`DOC authorized a Security Division investigation into the Plaintiff’s alleged Undue Familiarity
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`with inmates. Id. Captain Julian Russell was assigned to conduct the investigation. Id.
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`During the investigation, Plaintiff admitted that he had purposely abstained from giving
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`inmates urinalysis tests and that he had promised inmates that he would stay away from them
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`after they had told him that they had used drugs. Id. When asked at the arbitration hearing if he
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`had ever given inmates information on whether their cells were going to be searched, Plaintiff
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`responded “Yes.” Id. at 3-4. Similarly, when asked if he had ever given permission to an inmate
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`to buy drugs, Plaintiff also responded “Yes.” Id. at 4.
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`Captain Russell also interviewed the Plaintiff’s immediate supervisor, Correctional
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`Counselor Supervisor Creig Dumas. Id. Captain Russell concluded that Supervisor Dumas was
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`unaware of the Plaintiff’s misconduct during this time but should have been aware. Id.
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`Accordingly, he found Supervisor Dumas culpable of violations of A.D. 2.17, surrounding his
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`failure to supervise the Plaintiff. Id.
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`“Due to the nature of their work, Phone Monitors are held to the highest standard in
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`conducting their work activities.” Id. “The record shows that in cases where, following an
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`investigation, it is concluded that an employee has engaged in undue familiarity with an inmate,
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`the remedy is usually discharge of the employee.” Id.
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`Plaintiff was notified by letter dated August 31, 2022 that he was being dismissed for
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`violations of A.D. 2.17, employee conduct wherein an investigation substantiated that he engaged
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`4
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`in Undue Familiarity which jeopardized the safety and security of the facility. Id. Plaintiff’s union
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`grieved the dismissal through Step III and then moved the grievance to arbitration. Id.
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`The arbitrator concluded his factual findings by noting “The [Plaintiff] had good-to-
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`excellent performance ratings and no record of discipline prior to the matter at issue here.” Id.
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`II.
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`STANDARD OF REVIEW
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`“Arbitration is a favored method to prevent litigation, promote tranquility and expedite
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`the equitable settlement of disputes.” Board of Ed. v. Local R1-126, NAGE, 108 Conn. App. 35,
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`39 (2008). Our courts have long recognized, therefore, that “[a]rbitration is a creature of contract
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`and the parties themselves, by their submission, define the powers of the arbitrators.” Malecki v.
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`Burnham, 181 Conn. 211, 212-13 (1980). “The authority of an arbitrator to adjudicate the
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`controversy is limited only if the agreement contains express language restricting the breadth of
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`issues, reserving explicit rights, or conditioning the award on court review.” Town of Stratford v.
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`Int'l Fedn. & Tech. Eng'rs, 155 Conn. App. 246, 252 (2015), citing Industrial Risk Insurers v.
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`Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection & Ins. Co., 258 Conn. 101, 109 (2001). “In the absence of any
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`such qualifications, an agreement is unrestricted.” Id.
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`When a submission to an arbitrator is unrestricted, such as in this matter, judicial review
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`of the arbitral decision is narrowly confined, and the arbitrator’s decision is considered final and
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`binding—courts will not review the evidence considered by the arbitrators nor will they review
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`the award for errors of law or fact. Hartford v. Board of Mediation & Arbitration, 211 Conn. 7,
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`14 (1989); see also City of Meriden v. AFSCME, Local 1016, 213 Conn. App. 184, 193 (2022).
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`Furthermore, every reasonable presumption will be made in favor of the award and of the
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`arbitrator’s acts and proceedings. City of New Haven v. AFSCME, Council 4, Local 3144, 338
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`Conn. 154, 170-71 (2021). Thus, under this limited review, the “resulting award” will be
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`reviewed by the court “to determine if the award conforms to the submission.” Town of Stratford
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`v. Int’l Fedn. & Tech. Eng’rs, supra. And, it is the plaintiff’s burden to prove that there is some
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`error with the award itself. Malecki v. Burnham, supra, 214.
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`III. LAW AND ARGUMENT
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`a. Judicial Intervention is Limited Because the Submission Was Unrestricted
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`And the Award Conformed to the Submission.
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`Connecticut courts have long recognized that “[a]rbitration is a creature of contract and
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`the parties themselves, by their submission, define the powers of the arbitrators.” Malecki v.
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`Burnham, supra, 214. In City of New Haven v. AFSCME, Council 15, Local 530, the Connecticut
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`Supreme Court reiterated the longstanding, basic principle supporting the autonomy of arbitration
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`and minimal judicial review of consensual arbitration awards. 208 Conn. 411 (1988). Specifically,
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`the Court provided that if “the parties mutually agree to submit their dispute to arbitration, the
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`resulting award is not reviewable for errors of law or fact” because “[j]udicial review of an
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`unrestricted submission is limited to a comparison between the submission and the award to see
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`whether, in accordance with the powers conferred upon the arbitrators, their award conforms to
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`the submission.” Id., 415. Courts, therefore, are required to “first determine whether the
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`submission was restricted or unrestricted” to determine the proper standard of review. Local 1042,
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`Council 4, AFSCME v. Bd. Of Educ. Of Norwalk, 66 Conn. App. 457, 460 (2001).
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`In the parties’ collective bargaining agreement, they agreed to arbitrate grievances
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`involving the discharge of an employee. Plaintiff’s Exhibit A. The CBA places no restrictions on
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`the arbitrator and merely provides that his/her decision “shall be final and binding on the parties
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`in accordance with the Connecticut General Statutes Section 52-418, provided, however, neither
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`the submission of questions of arbitrability to any arbitrator in the first instance nor any voluntary
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`submission shall be deemed to diminish the scope of judicial review over arbitral awards,
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`including awards on arbitrability.” Id. at 20. Because the parties agreed to submit their disputes
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`to arbitration for resolution, “the arbitration clause is a written submission to arbitration.” Local
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`1042, Council 4, AFSCME v. Bd. Of Educ. Of Norwalk, supra.
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`Next, to determine whether the submission is unrestricted, the “authority of the arbitrator”
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`must be examined. Id. Simply, if the authority of the arbitrator is limited by “express language
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`restricting the breadth of issues, reserving explicit rights, or conditioning the award on court
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`review,” the submission is restricted. Id.; see also Exley v. Connecticut Yankee Greyhound Racing,
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`Inc., 59 Conn. App. 224, 229 (2000) (finding that a submission is restricted “only if the agreement
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`contains express language restricting the breadth of issues, reserving explicit rights, or
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`conditioning the award on court review”). In the absence of such language, the agreement is
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`unrestricted. Local 1042, Council 4, AFSCME v. Bd. Of Educ. Of Norwalk, supra.
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`Here, the unrestricted nature of the submission is apparent from its plain language. The
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`arbitrator was asked to resolve whether the plaintiff was dismissed for just cause and what the
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`remedy should be if he was not. Plaintiff’s Exhibit G. The arbitrator decided precisely the issue
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`the parties sought when he denied the grievance; thus, the decision and award conformed to the
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`submission. Plaintiff’s Exhibit G, p. 7; see also Local 1042, Council 4 AFSCME v. Bd. Of Educ.
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`Of Norwalk, supra, 461.
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`The award clearly drew its essence from the terms of the parties’ collective bargaining
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`agreement. Under these circumstances, the court cannot engage in a de novo review – it cannot
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`review the evidence or the law and may not substitute its judgment for that of the arbitrator. See
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`Kellogg v. Middlesex Mut. Assur. Co., 326 Conn. 638, 646 (2017). Therefore, “every reasonable
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`presumption and intendment will be made in favor of the award and the arbitrator’s acts and
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`proceedings.” Id. And, the court may only vacate under the limited conditions contained in Conn.
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`Gen. Stat. § 52-418(a). Id.
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`b. The Arbitrator’s Actions Did Not Prejudice the Plaintiff’s Rights Under
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`Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-418(a)(3)
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`In his application to vacate the arbitration award, Plaintiff cites to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-
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`418(a)(3) to argue that he was prejudiced by the arbitrator’s actions; however, rather than citing
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`to any procedural deficiencies in the arbitration process as this section contemplates, Plaintiff
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`instead seeks to relitigate the underlying facts of the arbitration award. This is not the intention of
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`this section of the statute.
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`Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-418(a)(3) states, in relevant part, “Upon the application of any party
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`to an arbitration, the superior court for the judicial district in which one of the parties …shall
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`make an order vacating the award if it finds any of the following defects:…(3) if the arbitrators
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`have been guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing upon sufficient cause shown
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`or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy or of any other action by
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`which the rights of any party have been prejudiced…” This provision states three separate grounds
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`for finding a defect in an arbitration: a refusal to postpone the hearing for good cause, a refusal to
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`hear evidence, and an additional clause encompassing “any other action by which the rights of
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`any party have been prejudiced.” Id. Plaintiff’s first argument relies on this third ground. Our
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`Supreme Court in Kellogg squarely addressed the meaning of this third basis. “Our cases have
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`treated the third provision as applying to other varieties of procedural irregularity.” Kellogg v.
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`Middlesex Mut. Assur. Co, 326 Conn. 638, 647 (2017) (emphasis in original) citing O &
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`G/O'Connell Joint Venture v. Chase Family Ltd. Partnership No. 3, 203 Conn. 133, 146-47 (1987)
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`(actions of arbitrators that warrant vacating arbitration award include participation in ex parte
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`communications, ex parte receipt of evidence as to material fact without notice to party, holding
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`hearings in absence of member of arbitration panel, and undertaking independent investigation
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`into material matter after close of hearings and without notice to parties). Our courts “have not
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`extended the reach of this clause to empower a court simply to disagree with the arbiter’s ultimate
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`conclusions on the questions submitted to arbitration. Id. at 647-648 citing AFSCME, Council 4,
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`Local 1303-325 v. Westbrook, 309 Conn. 767, 777 (2013) ("[i]t is clear that a party cannot object
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`to an award [that] accomplishes precisely what the arbitrators were authorized to do merely
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`because that party dislikes the results"). The Supreme Court further reasoned “To do so would
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`completely destroy the deference our law affords to the arbitration process by allowing the trial
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`court to substitute its own judgment on the merits of the question submitted to arbitration.” Id. at
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`648 citing Comprehensive Orthopaedics & Musculoskeletal Care, LLC v. Axtmayer, 293 Conn.
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`748, 753-54 (2009) (arbitration awards are not subject to de novo review). The Kellogg court was
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`specific that “a challenge to an arbitration award under § 52-418(a)(3) is limited to whether a
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`party was ‘deprived of a full and fair hearing before the arbitration panel.’” Id. citing Bridgeport
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`v. Kasper Group, Inc., 278 Conn. 466, 475 (2017). In Kellogg the Supreme Court found that the
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`trial court’s disagreement with the amount of the arbitration award did not establish that the
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`arbitrators violated § 52-418(a)(3) and was not a proper ground of vacating the award. Id. at 649.
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`“In the absence of any determination that the appraisal panel engaged in misconduct impacting
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`the fairness of the arbitration procedures, the trial court’s disagreement with the appraisal panel’s
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`ultimate conclusions cannot justify vacating its award.” Id. (emphasis in original).
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`Here, as in Kellogg, Plaintiff improperly cites to the provision of § 52-418 which
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`contemplates procedural deficiencies to vacate the arbitrator’s decision. In his application to
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`vacate, Plaintiff sets out his argument that “the arbitrator engaged in misconduct by ignoring the
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`9
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`procedural flaws in the investigation of Plaintiff.” (Doc. # 104.00 p. 9). Plaintiff then outlines
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`evidence that he argues the arbitrator did not properly consider. Nowhere in his argument pursuant
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`to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-418(a)(3) does he direct us to any procedural shortcomings by the
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`arbitrator.
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`In this segment of his argument, Plaintiff further concludes that the arbitrator refused to
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`address alleged procedural flaws in the investigation of Plaintiff, and therefore “deprived the
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`Plaintiff of a fair evaluation of the evidence.” (Doc. # 104.00 p. 11). Plaintiff concludes “By
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`excluding this context, the arbitrator failed to consider evidence material to the controversy, as
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`required by § 52-418(a)(3).” While it is unclear from his application to vacate whether Plaintiff
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`is arguing that the arbitrator refused to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy,
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`this is also an improper reliance on this provision of the statute. Sec. 52-418(a)(3) is clear in that
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`arbitration awards can be vacated if an arbitrator improperly refuses to hear pertinent or material
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`evidence, not for the way in which they weigh or credit evidence as is argued by the Plaintiff in
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`his application. Plaintiff, in fact, specifically cites to the evidence that was presented at the
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`hearing, indicating that it was heard by the arbitrator. Plaintiff, again, has not raised a procedural
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`issue, but instead, disagrees with how the arbitrator evaluated the evidence and made conclusions
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`based on that evidence.
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` Rather than raise issue with any procedural deficiencies as contemplated by Conn. Gen.
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`Stat. § 52-418(a)(3), Plaintiff improperly relies on the statute to relitigate the underlying facts of
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`the arbitration decision. For these reasons, his application to vacate should be denied.
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`c. The Arbitrator Did Not Exceed or Imperfectly Execute His Powers
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`According to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-418(a)(4)
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`10
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`In his application to vacate, Plaintiff next cites to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-418(a)(4) for the
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`contention that the arbitrator exceeded and imperfectly executed his powers by “narrowly
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`focusing on the language of Administrative Directive 2.17 without addressing whether the
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`Plaintiff’s termination was justified under the broader just cause standard required by the
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`collective bargaining agreement (CBA).” (Doc. #104.00 p. 12). Plaintiff again mischaracterizes
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`the function of this provision of § 52-418 to relitigate the underlying facts of the arbitration.
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`“…[S]ubdivision (4) of § 52-418 (a) provides that an arbitration award shall be vacated
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`‘if the arbitrators have exceeded their powers or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final
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`and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.’ ‘[A] claim that the
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`arbitrators have ‘exceeded their powers’ may be established under § 52-418 in either one of two
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`ways: (1) the award fails to conform to the submission, or, in other words, falls outside the scope
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`of the submission; or (2) the arbitrators manifestly disregarded the law.’” Elm City Loc., CACP v.
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`City of New Haven, 230 Conn. App. 847, 854-855 (2025) citing, Harty v. Cantor Fitzgerald &
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`Co., 275 Conn. 72, 85, 881 A.2d 139 (2005).
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`“The standard for reviewing a claim that the award does not conform to the submission
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`requires what [our Supreme Court has] termed in effect, de novo judicial review. . . . The de novo
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`label in this context means something very different from typical de novo review because review
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`under this standard and in this setting is limited to a comparison of the award to the submission.
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`Our inquiry generally is limited to a determination as to whether the parties have vested the
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`arbitrators with the authority to decide the issue presented or to award the relief conferred.” Elm
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`City Loc., CACP v. City of New Haven, supra, citing, ARVYS Protein, Inc. v. A/F Protein, Inc.,
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`219 Conn. App. 20, 31, cert. denied, 347 Conn. 905, 297 A.3d 198 (2023). Here the arbitrator’s
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`decision precisely conforms to the submission by the parties.
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`Furthermore, contrary to Plaintiff’s position, the arbitrator did address whether the
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`Plaintiff’s termination was justified pursuant to the Collective Bargaining Agreement; Plaintiff
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`simply disagrees with the outcome of that determination. In his decision, the arbitrator specifically
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`cites:
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`Under Article 13, Section 3, of the parties’ collective bargaining
`agreement, the State may discharge an employee only “for just
`cause.” In discharge cases, as in other discipline cases, the
`employer has the burden of proof in making its case. The elements
`of “just cause” are well-established over years of labor arbitration
`practice and are codified in State regulations. These requirements
`include whether the rule alleged to have been violated was
`reasonable and fairly applied; whether the employee was aware of
`the rule and the consequences for violating it; whether the employer
`conducted a fair and thorough investigation; whether employees
`who violated the rule were treated the same; and, whether the
`discipline assessed was appropriate for the alleged conduct.
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`Plaintiff’s Exhibit G, Arbitrator’s Decision p. 5.
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`The arbitrator continued to discuss each of these requirements, focusing on Plaintiff’s
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`violation of Administrative Directive 2.17, which was the basis of his dismissal. His decision
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`concludes “For the above-stated reasons, I conclude that the Grievant violated the undue
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`familiarity policy. Accordingly, the Agency’s dismissal of the Grievant, Marc Ayotte, was for just
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`cause.” Arbitrator’s Decision p. 7. This analysis and conclusion fall squarely within the issue
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`submitted by the parties to the arbitrator: “Was the Grievant, Marc Ayotte, terminated for just
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`cause? If not, what shall be the remedy consistent with the NP-4 Contract?”
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`Plaintiff, however, requests this court to review the conclusions drawn by the arbitrator
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`under the guise that he exceeded his authority. The review of whether an arbitrator has exceeded
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`their authority is very limited.
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`In determining whether an arbitrat[ion] [panel] has exceeded the
`authority granted under the contract, a court cannot base the decision
`on whether the court would have ordered the same relief, or whether
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`12
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`or not the arbitrator[s] correctly interpreted the contract. The court
`must instead focus on whether the [arbitrators] had authority to
`reach a certain issue, not whether that issue was correctly decided.
`Consequently, as long as the arbitrator[s] [are] even arguably
`construing or applying the contract and acting within the scope of
`authority, the award must be enforced. The arbitrator[ s'] decision
`cannot be overturned even if the court is convinced that the
`arbitrator[s] committed serious error. . . . Moreover, [e]very
`reasonable presumption and intendment will be made in favor of the
`award and of the arbitrator[s'] acts and proceedings. Hence, the
`burden rests on the party challenging the award to produce evidence
`sufficient to show that it does not conform to the submission. . . .
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`Such a limited scope of judicial review is warranted given the fact
`that the parties voluntarily bargained for the decision of the
`arbitrator[s] and, as such, the parties are presumed to have assumed
`the risks of and waived objections to that decision. . . . It is clear that
`a party cannot object to an award which accomplishes precisely
`what the arbitrators were authorized to do merely because that party
`dislikes the results.
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`Elm City Loc., CACP v. City of New Haven, 230 Conn. App. 847, 855-856 (2025), citing
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`Comprehensive Orthopaedics & Musculoskeletal Care, LLC v. Axtmayer, 293 Conn. 748, 755-
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`56, 980 A.2d 297 (2009) (emphasis added).
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`“If the award conforms to the submission, the arbitrators have not exceeded their powers.”
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`Exley v. Connecticut Yankee Greyhound Racing, Inc., supra, 59 Conn. App. 224, 228 (2000)
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`(internal quotation marks omitted.) “Furthermore, [a]rbitration awards . . . are not to be
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`invalidated merely because they rest on an allegedly erroneous interpretation or application of the
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`relevant collective bargaining agreement . . . Rather, . . . the reviewing court is limited to
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`considering whether the collective bargaining agreement, rather than some outside source, is the
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`foundation on which the arbitral decision rests . . . If that criterion is satisfied . . . then [the court]
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`cannot conclude that the arbitrator exceeded his authority or imperfectly executed his duty.” Burr
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`Road Operating Co. II, LLC v. New England Health Care Employees Union, District 1199, 162
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`Conn.App. 525, 535 (2016) (Internal quotation marks omitted).
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`The arbitrator in the instant case clearly reviewed the evidence before him within the
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`confines of the issue submitted by the parties. And he made conclusions based this evidence and
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`his interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement. Therefore, the arbitrator did not exceed
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`or imperfectly execute his powers according to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-418(a)(4) and the award
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`should not be vacated on that basis.
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`d. The Arbitrator Made a Mutual, Final, Definite Award Upon the Subject
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`Matter Submitted.
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`Plaintiff next argues in his application to vacate the arbitration award that the arbitrator’s
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`award does not meet the standard of mutual, final and definite. In support of this argument,
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`Plaintiff cites only to Local 63, Textile Workers Union of Am., C.I.O. v. Cheney Bros., 141 Conn.
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`606, 617–18 (1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 959 (1955) for the contention that “an arbitration
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`award must definitively establish the rights and obligations of the parties to be.” (Doc. #104.00
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`p. 14). Plaintiff then contends that the arbitration award does not meet this standard because it is
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`“internally inconsistent, incomplete, and unclear,” without any citation to support that this is the
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`standard.
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`First, the arbitration award does establish the rights and obligations of the parties to the
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`arbitration. The decision also makes it clear that Plaintiff was terminated for just cause. Plaintiff’s
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`Exhibit G, Arbitration Decision, p. 7. This award directly responds to the issue submitted to the
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`arbitrator. There are no issues submitted to the arbitrator that are not addressed by his decision.
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`Plaintiff argues, however, that the decision is internally inconsistent and “fundamentally
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`contradictory.” This argument is misplaced again because it amounts to Plaintiff’s disagreement
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`14
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`with the ultimate decision by the arbitrator. Specifically, the Plaintiff argues that the arbitrator
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`determined the Plaintiff violated Administrative Directive 2.17 and found sufficient evidence to
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`warrant disciplinary action; yet, he failed to address whether the violation warranted termination
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`under the collective bargaining agreement. (Doc. #104.00, p. 14). However, the arbitrator directly
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`addressed the issue of whether termination was warranted; he concluded that it was. Certain
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`factual determinations surrounding the rule Plaintiff violated are squarely relevant to the question
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`of whether Plaintiff was separated for just cause. Those factors explored by the arbitrator include:
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`(1) whether the rule was reasonable and fairly applied, (2) whether Plaintiff was aware of the rule
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`and the consequences for violating it, (3) whether the employer conducted a fair and thorough
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`investigation, (4) whether employees who violated the rule were treated the same, and (5) whether
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`the discipline assessed was appropriate for the alleged misconduct. Plaintiff’s Exhibit G,
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`Arbitrator’s Decision p. 5. The arbitrator addresses each of these inquiries in his decision. This
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`analysis of the Administrative Directive is not an inconsistency and fits precisely within the
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`submission of the parties as to whether Plaintiff was separated for just cause. Because the decision
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`precisely conforms to the Plaintiff’s submission, and clearly establishes the rights and obligations
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`of the parties, it is mutual, final, and definite.
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`e. The Award is Complete.
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`As discussed above, the award is mutual, final and definite; inasmuch as Plaintiff tries to
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`argue that the award is “incomplete” this is not a statutorily-created basis for review of the
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`arbitration decision. Regardless, the award is complete as it precisely addresses the issue
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`submitted by the parties: whether Plaintiff’s employment was terminated for just cause. Plaintiff
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`argues that the “award does not address the DOC’s admitted failure to provide intelligence
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`Officers with training on cultivating SOIs” and “[b]y failing to consider the DOC’s systemic
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`15
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`failure to equip the Plaintiff with the necessary tools and guidance, the award leaves a key issue
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`unresolved.” (Doc. #104.00, p. 15). Plaintiff further argues that the arbitrator “failed to address
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`systemic deficiencies within the DOC’s intelligence operations, including the lack of oversight
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`and clear protocols for Intelligence Officers.” (Doc. #104.00, p. 15). Plaintiff contends “These
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`deficiencies were directly relevant to the arbitrator’s determination of whether the alleged
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`violations justified termination.” (Doc. #104.00, p. 15).
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`The arbitrator squarely addressed the issue of training and determined that Plaintiff had
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`regularly attended Undue Familiarity trainings that covered most, if not all, of the same
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`fundamental and significant concerns and limits addressed in his Phone Monitor training.
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`Plaintiff’s Exhibit G, Arbitrator’s Decision pp. 5-6. The arbitrator determined “The State
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`discharged the [Plaintiff] for engaging in undue familiarity, conveyance of contraband, and lying
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`during the investigation. Section 10 of A.D. 2.6 provides that inappropriate relationship/undue
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`familiarity with an inmate who is under the protection of the Department shall normally result in
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`dismissal.” Plaintiff’s Exhibit G, Arbitrator’s Decision p. 6. The pertinent question regarding
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`training is not what training Plaintiff was provided regarding SOIs, but ins