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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`I.
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`INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................ 1
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`II. JURISDICTION ................................................................................................................... 9
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`III. PARTIES ............................................................................................................................. 10
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`IV. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS ............................................................................................. 10
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`A. DoD's CLOUD MODERNIZATION INITIATIVE ..................................................................... 10
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`B. THE EVALUATION CRITERIA .......................................... .................................................... 11
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`C.
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`INITIAL PROPOSAL EVALUATIONS, COMPETITIVE RANGE DETERMINATION, AND
`DISCUSSIONS ................... ........ .... .. .......................... ....... .. .. ............ .................. ... ...... ......... 26
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`D. ORIGINAL FINAL PROPOSAL EVALUATIONS ................................ ................................... .... 28
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`E.
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`PRESIDENT TRUMP'S INTERFERENCE WITH THE JEDI PROCUREMENT PROCESS ................ 31
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`F. DoD's ORIGINAL CONTRACT AWARD AND ANEMIC DEBRIEFING ..................................... 37
`
`G. AWS FILES POST-AWARD BID PROTEST TO CHALLENGE DoD's FLAWED AND BIASED
`AW ARD DECISION, AND THE COURT PRELIMINARILY ENJOINS PERFORMANCE ................. 39
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`H. THE GOVERNMENT'S CORRECTIVE ACTION ....................................................................... 40
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`I. DoD's RE-AWARD SOURCE SELECTION DECISION AND DEBRIEFING ................................ 43
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`J. DoD's POST-REMAND REEVALUATION Is UNREASONABLE AND PLAGUED BY DISPARATE
`TREATMENT ............................................... .. ............................................. ·········· ... ............ 44
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`K. DoD's PROPOSAL REEVALUATIONS AND SOURCE SELECTION DECISION DEMONSTRATE
`THAT THE RE-AWARD WAS THE PRODUCT OF BIAS, BAD FAITH, AND UNDUE INFLUENCE
`......................................................................................................................................... 137
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`L.
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`THE WHITE HOUSE'S OBSTRUCTION OF THE DoDIG INVESTIGATION INTO THE JEDI
`SOURCE SELECTION ................................. .. ...................................................... ................ 143
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`M. DOD' S RE-A WARD TO MICROSOFT IS THE PRODUCT OF AN INCREASINGLY CORRUPT
`ENVIRONMENT UNDER THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION ........... .. ........................................ 14 7
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`CLAIMS FOR RELIEF ........................................................................................................... 160
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`PRAYER FOR RELIEF .......................................................................................................... 171
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`3.
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`AWS's emergence as the lowest priced offeror complicated DoD's efforts to steer
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`the contract to Microsoft. Unable to rely on Microsoft's purported price advantage, the only way
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`DoD could direct the re-award to Microsoft was to further distort the evaluation record because,
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`aside from the offerors' technical approaches to Price Scenario 6 and the resulting total evaluated
`
`prices, nothing else changed in the underlying proposals. Faced with the untenable combination
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`of Microsoft's technical inferiority and now-higher price, DoD manipulated its evaluations to a
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`degree that belies any fa<;ade of rationality.
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`4.
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`To give the appearance of a fair and considered reevaluation, DoD corrected some
`
`of the initial errors A WS identified by revising the evaluations either to acknowledge an
`
`overlooked A WS strength or to revise an improperly assessed weakness. But DoD simultaneously
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`undertook to negate many of the advantages assessed to A WS by finding some "new" purported
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`weakness in AWS's proposal, by identifying "new" supposed technical advantages in Microsoft's
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`proposal, or by ignoring the RFP's evaluation criteria entirely. The net result-a technical
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`reevaluation in which Microsoft marginally came out on top--is riddled with errors even more
`
`egregious than those that plagued the initial award. These errors require even closer scrutiny from
`
`this Court.
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`5.
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`For example, under Factor 2 (Logical Isolation and Secure Data Transfer), DoD
`
`arbitrarily minimized the advantages of AWS's revolutionary Nitro hypervisor. Even though the
`
`Technical Evaluation Board ("TEB") assigned Nitro multiple strengths and the Source Selection
`
`Evaluation Board ("SSEB") recognized that Nitro gives A WS an overall
`
`the Source Selection Advisory Council ("SSAC") inexplicably downplayed
`
`the significance of Nitro based on a l l eg ed - that have no basis in reality. The SSAC
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`then doubled down on its attempt to eliminate AWS's comparative advantage by claiming the
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`. DoD then compounded these errors by assessing
`
`A WS unreasonable weaknesses and disparately failing to recognize strengths in A WS's proposal.
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`6.
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`DoD again sought to manufacture parity under Factor 3 (Tactical Edge). DoD
`
`concluded the offerors' approaches to the tactical edge requirements were relatively equal, but it
`
`reached that decision only by ignoring the blatant deficiencies in Microsoft's approach and the
`
`clear advantages in AWS's. In particular, DoD ignored Microsoft's
`
`. This failure should have earned Microsoft a deficiency
`
`that rendered Microsoft ineligible for award. Instead, DoD ignored it and focused on further
`
`minimizing A WS's comparative advantage. DoD assigned AWS unwarranted weaknesses and
`
`risks, while assigning strengths to Microsoft that defy logic and common sense-all the while
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`ignoring the fundamental fact that A WS proposed tactical edge devices that are
`
`7.
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`DoD's confounding evaluations continued under Factor 4 (Information Security
`
`and Access Controls). In the pre-remand final evaluation, the TEB, the SSEB, the SSAC, and the
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`Source Selection Authority ("SSA") agreed that neither offeror possessed any advantage under
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`Factor 4.
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`-
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`3
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`. DoD then went a step
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`further by assigning A WS an unrelated risk that was not identified in the pre-remand evaluations,
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`while continuing to overlook Microsoft's inability to
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`. But, even putting aside these transparent attempts to manufacture advantages
`
`for Microsoft, DoD's conclusions are simply incorrect. AWS deserved the exact same strengths
`
`that Microsoft received for its
`
`. A WS's proposal also patently
`
`contradicts the risk assessed by DoD at the eleventh hour. And, Microsoft itself admits-
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`8.
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`Gross errors also compromised DoD's evaluation under Factor 5 (Application and
`
`Data Hosting and Portability), where DoD repeatedly discounted A WS's comparative advantages
`
`to conclude that A WS and Microsoft were relatively equal. In particular, the SSAC downplayed
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`the significance of AWS's data export capability, which the SSEB concluded was
`
`because
`
`The
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`SSAC then compounded this unreasonable assessment by concluding that AWS's failover support
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`across geographically redundant resources, which the TEB and the SSEB recognized as a strength,
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`. Finally, the TEB, the SSEB, the SSAC, and the SSA all
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`failed to recognize that A WS's marketplace offerings are qualitatively
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`superior
`
`to Microsoft's offerings, and therefore represented yet another differentiating strength.
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`9.
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`DoD's evaluation under Factor 6 (Management and Task Order ("TO") 001) suffers
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`from similar infirmities. Even though the RFP clearly differentiated the technical and price
`
`factors-including expressly prohibiting offerors from including pricing information in any non(cid:173)
`
`price volume-the SSAC unreasonably considered the purported pricing benefits of Microsoft's
`
`program management support to suggest that Microsoft has a technical advantage under Factor 6.
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`4
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`acknowledge these glaring inadequacies for the failures that they are, DoD inexplicably found
`
`Microsoft was "Completely Successful" with no risk increases across all second demonstration
`
`scenarios. The Agency's reevaluation of the Factor 8 Demonstration shows the lengths to which
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`DoD has gone to steer the re-award of the JEDI Contract to Microsoft, irrespective of technical
`
`merit, the solicitation criteria, or the needs of the warfighter.
`
`12.
`
`These patent errors alone warrant invalidating the re-award. But these errors did
`
`not occur in a vacuum. Instead, they can best be explained as the latest manifestation of President
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`Trump's determination to steer the JEDI Contract away from AWS.
`
`13.
`
`The President's interference in DoD's procurement decisions has been pervasive.
`
`It has destroyed the requisite impartial discharge of the procurement process by causing DoD
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`procurement personnel to abandon their responsibility to apply the RFP' s stated evaluation criteria
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`reasonably, consistently, and fairly.
`
`14.
`
`President Trump has made no secret of his deep personal dislike for Mr. Bezos,
`
`Amazon, and the Washington Post, or of his express desire to harm them. As detailed in the
`
`original Complaint, President Trump made his feelings clear even before he entered office, when
`
`he promised voters that if he became the President, Amazon would have "such problems." Once
`
`in office, he took concrete actions to make good on his rhetoric, including with respect to A WS's
`
`participation in the JEDI procurement:
`
`•
`
`In the summer of 2018 ( a time when industry analysts widely reported that A WS was best
`qualified to win the JEDI Contract), President Trump reportedly directed his then-Secretary
`of Defense James Mattis to "screw Amazon" out of the contract.
`
`• During a press conference held on July 18, 2019, President Trump claimed that he had been
`getting "tremendous complaints about the contract with the Pentagon and with Amazon,"
`and that he would personally "ask[] [DoD] to look at it very closely to see what's going
`on." That same day, President Trump's eldest son, Donald Trump, Jr., alleged in a tweet
`that Mr. Bezos and Amazon had engaged in "shady and potentially corrupt practices," and
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`6
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`ominously predicted that it "may come back to bite them" with respect to JEDI. President
`Trump endorsed these statements a few days later, when he tweeted television coverage
`decrying the JEDI Contract as the "Bezos bailout."
`
`•
`
`In early August 2019, President Trump's newly appointed Secretary of Defense Mark
`Esper confirmed that the Trump Administration had directed him to "take a hard look" into
`the JEDI Contract based on complaints the President purportedly received regarding A WS.
`As was widely reported at the time: "The White House reportedly directed the Department
`of Defense to review a $10 billion cloud contract because it would probably go to
`Amazon."
`
`15.
`
`President Trump's campaign against an award of the JEDI Contract to AWS had
`
`its intended effect. Under overt and escalating pressure from President Trump, DoD departed from
`
`procurement rules to reject A WS's superior proposal. DoD's errors produced the flawed October
`
`2019 award to Microsoft that was the subject of this Court's prior review.
`
`16.
`
`Faced with the Court's February 2020 ruling that AWS was likely to succeed on
`
`the merits, DoD undertook corrective action amidst an increasingly corrupt environment in which
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`President Trump has made clear that anyone in the federal government who does not do his bidding
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`will face the most severe career reprisals. From Department of Justice prosecutors, to inspectors
`
`general of numerous federal agencies, to public health officials during the COVID-19 pandemic,
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`actions adverse or perceived to be adverse to President Trump have resulted in demotion or, more
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`often, dismissal.
`
`17.
`
`DoD-inherently
`
`responsive both
`
`institutionally and Constitutionally
`
`to
`
`presidential commands-is a frequent target of President Trump's bully politics. Since DoD
`
`commenced its corrective action, President Trump and his Administration have intensified a
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`campaign of interference and retribution against those in DoD perceived as disloyal to the
`
`President or capable of reaching conclusions at odds with his personal interests. Faced with
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`President Trump's years-long campaign against awarding the JEDI Contract to AWS, the specter
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`7
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`III.
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`PARTIES
`
`23.
`
`Plaintiff is A WS, a subsidiary of Amazon. A WS is the leading provider of scalable
`
`cloud computing services to individuals, companies, and governments. A WS is located at 410
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`Terry Avenue North, Seattle, WA 98109.
`
`24.
`
`Defendant is the United States of America, acting by and through DoD.
`
`25.
`
`Defendant-Intervenor is Microsoft Corporation. Microsoft is located at One
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`Microsoft Way, Redmond, WA 98052.
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`IV.
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`FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
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`A.
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`DoD's Cloud Modernization Initiative
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`26.
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`Over the past several years, DoD has sought to modernize its information
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`technology infrastructure to ensure it remains the most capable, nimble, and secure defense
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`institution in the world. As part of this modernization initiative, in September 2017, DoD
`
`announced the JEDI program, DoD's plan to upgrade and consolidate its cloud computing
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`infrastructure to enable "emerging technologies to meet warfighter needs" and maintain "our
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`military's technological advantage."
`
`27.
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`DoD launched its search for a cloud solution that could meet its stringent
`
`requirements, including handling complex management of unclassified, Secret, and Top Secret
`
`information, and supporting advanced data-analytic capabilities like machine learning and
`
`artificial intelligence. Over the next several months, DoD invited the public, including industry
`
`and technological leaders, to provide input on the JEDI RFP. After reviewing more than 1,500
`
`questions and comments in response to multiple drafts of the RFP, DoD finalized the JEDI RFP
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`on July 26, 2018. See generally AR Tab 1.
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`d.
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`For Price Scenario 3, "the degree to which the technical approach and
`
`Unpriced [Basis of Estimate ('BOE')] evidence a technically feasible approach when considering
`
`the secure data transfer requirements in Section L for this Factor and the specific scenario
`
`requirements in Attachment L-2," and "the degree to which the technical approach and Unpriced
`
`BOE for Price Scenario 3 and the Offeror's overall secure data transfer approach under this Factor
`
`are consistent across the documents," id. at 181481-82.
`
`3.
`
`Factor 3: Tactical Edge
`
`39.
`
`Under Factor 3, the RFP required DoD to evaluate each offeror's approach to
`
`DoD's tactical edge requirements to determine "how well the proposed approach balances
`
`portability against capability to enhance warfighting capacity across the range of military
`
`operations in support of national defense." Id. at 181481. The "tactical edge" refers to operational
`
`environments with limited communications connectivity and storage availability-e.g., combat
`
`zones where military personnel have limited ability to connect to the cloud and must rely on
`
`portable devices for operations.
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`In addition, DoD was to evaluate "the degree to which the
`
`proposed tactical edge devices address the requirements in Section L, Factor 3(l)(a-g) while also
`
`accounting for the practicalities of using the proposed offerings in the tactical edge environment."
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`Id. The RFP explained that DoD prefers a solution that more broadly addresses the full range of
`
`military operations, rather than a solution that only addresses a subset of military operations. Id.
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`It also stated DoD would place "far greater emphasis on existing solutions that meet all of the
`
`requirements in Attachment L-1, JEDI Cloud SOO." Id.
`
`40.
`
`The RFP contained further evaluation criteria depending on whether tactical edge
`
`devices fell within Category One ( durable, ruggedized, and portable compute and storage) or
`
`Category Two (static, modular, rapidly deployable data centers). Id. at 181470-71. Offerors were
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`required to submit at least one tactical edge device in each category, and were encouraged to
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`propose devices to satisfy the "full range of military operations." Id. at 1814 70-71, 181481.
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`a.
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`For Category One devices, DoD was to evaluate the degree to which each
`
`offeror's approach addresses the requirements in Section L, Factor 3(2)(a)(i-viii). Id. at 181481.
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`In addition, for Factor 3(2)(ix), DoD was to evaluate how well the devices balance power
`
`requirements and physical dimensions in delivering capability within the range of military
`
`operations to forces deployed in support of a Geographic Combatant Commander or applicable
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`training exercises. Id. Further, DoD was to evaluate how well devices balance portability with
`
`capability to enhance warfighting capacity across the range of military operations in support of the
`
`national defense. Id.
`
`b.
`
`For Category Two devices, DoD was to evaluate the degree to which each
`
`offeror's approach addresses the requirements in Section L, Factor 3(2)(b)(i). Id. In addition, for
`
`Factor 3(2)(b)(ii), DoD was to evaluate how well the approach for Category Two devices balances
`
`power requirements and physical dimensions in delivering capability across the range of military
`
`operations. Id.
`
`c.
`
`Unclassified tactical edge devices from Category One had to be in
`
`production by January 11, 2019, while unclassified modular data centers from Category Two had
`
`to be in production by the first day of the post-award kickoff event. Id. The RFP explained DoD
`
`would "consider additional tactical edge capabilities that will be in production by January 19,
`
`2020, but with lesser weight than existing solutions that meet the requirements in Attachment L-1,
`
`JEDI Cloud SOO." Id.
`
`41.
`
`Finally, the RFP stated DoD would evaluate Price Scenarios 2, 3, and 5 under
`
`Factor 3 as follows:
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`f.
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`The degree to which the offeror is able to erase data in any environment,
`
`id..
`
`g.
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`The degree to which data generated by all intrusion detection technology,
`
`network traffic analysis tools, or any other threat detection performed is captured; the efficacy of
`
`analysis on the data generated; the degree to which users can control the manner in which
`
`notifications are communicated, and the breadth of configuration options for alerts generated by
`
`threat detection systems; and whether the offeror provides the ability to deliver raw logs to the
`
`Government for analysis, id.; and
`
`h.
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`The efficacy and quality of the process for onboarding new services into the
`
`offeror' s marketplace in a rapid and secure manner, and the degree to which the offeror is able to
`
`add offerings rapidly and securely to the marketplace in the examples provided, id.
`
`44. With regard to access controls, DoD was to evaluate the degree to which the
`
`solution met the requirements in Section L, Factor 4(2)(a-e), based on the following criteria:
`
`a.
`
`The range of functionality for creating, applying, and managing technical
`
`policies for one workspace and across all JEDI Cloud workspaces, id.;
`
`b.
`
`The degree of granularity of the permissions available, and the ease of
`
`discovery and assignment to roles, id.;
`
`c.
`
`The efficacy of the capability to tag data objects and resources for billing
`
`tracking, access control, and assignment of technical policy, id.;
`
`d.
`
`The range of capability, ease of implementation, and use of modern
`
`standards for federated, token-based, time-limited authentication and role assumptions, id.; and
`
`e.
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`The degree to which the offeror has implemented modern standards for any
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`Application Programming Interfaces ("API") and Command Line Interference ("CLI") access and
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`10.
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`Best Value Award Criteria
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`59.
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`Section L of the RFP informed offerors that DoD "anticipate[d] awarding a single
`
`ID/IQ contract, for the JEDI Cloud, to the responsive and responsible Offeror whose proposal
`
`represents the best value to the Government, as set forth in Section M .... " Id. at 181454.
`
`60.
`
`Section M, in tum, stated that "[b ]est value will be based on a detailed evaluation
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`of all factors," and that "[i]n determining the best value, the Government may employ a tradeoff
`
`process allowing for an award to other than the Offeror proposing the lowest price or achieving
`
`the highest adjectival rating." Id. at 181478.
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`11.
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`Source Selection Team
`
`61.
`
`As required by DoD regulations at 48 C.F.R § 215.303(b)(2), a Source Selection
`
`Plan described the roles and responsibilities of the Source Selection Team ("SST") for proposal
`
`evaluations, the best value tradeoff determination, and the award decision. AR Tab 305. The SST
`
`for the JEDI procurement consisted of, in descending order of authority, the SSA, the SSAC, the
`
`SSEB, and the Price Evaluation Board ("PEB"). Id. at 64342. Reporting to the SSEB were the
`
`TEBs for each of Factors 1 through 6; a Small Business Evaluation Board for Factor 7; and a
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`Demonstration Evaluation Board for Factor 8. Id. The SSAC considered the non-price and price
`
`evaluation criteria collectively. Id. The SST also included the contracting officer team, legal
`
`counsel team, and non-voting advisors. Id.
`
`62.
`
`Under the JEDI Source Selection Plan, the SSEB, which consists of a single
`
`Chairperson, compiles and independently analyzes the findings of the Factor TEBs (Factors 2
`
`through 6), Small Business Evaluation Board (Factor 7), and Demonstration Evaluation Board
`
`(Factor 8) in an Executive Summary to support a best value award determination. Id. at 64345.
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`The SSAC, in tum, "perform[s] a comparative analysis of the evaluations performed by the SSEB
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`from AWS's final evaluation. ECF No. 1 ,r,r 111-15; ECF No. 130-1 at 51-52. Third, it assessed
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`unwarranted weaknesses and risk increases. ECF No. 1 ,r,r 120-21.
`
`74.
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`Under Factor 3, DoD deviated from the evaluation criteria and engaged in disparate
`
`treatment. Even though A WS' s tactical devices are
`
`than Microsoft's, and
`
`DoD
`
`inexplicably determined A WS and Microsoft deserved equal ratings, rather than finding
`
`Microsoft's deficient proposal ineligible for award. ECF No. 1 ,r,r 122-31; ECF No. 130-1 at
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`31-35. DoD compounded this arbitrary decision by assigning A WS's Category One devices
`
`erroneous and disparate weaknesses and risks. ECF No. 1 ,r,r 122-31; ECF No. 130-1 at 35-40.
`
`75.
`
`Under Factor 4, DoD deviated from the RFP's evaluation criteria by failing to credit
`
`A WS for its substantial information security and access control capabilities and arbitrarily
`
`concluding that Microsoft and A WS proposed comparable solutions. ECF No. 1 ,r,r 132-39; ECF
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`No. 130-1 at 45-46. DoD compounded these errors by also failing to recognize that Microsoft
`
`. ECF No. 130-1 at 44-45 n.19.
`
`76.
`
`Under Factor 5, DoD failed to recognize that Microsoft's proposal was not eligible
`
`for award because Microsoft proposed noncompliant cloud storage in response to Price Scenario
`
`6, a deficiency that affected both the total evaluated price calculation and the best value
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`determination. ECF No. 130-1 at 16-22. DoD compounded this error by also misevaluating
`
`A WS's third-party marketplace offerings and ignoring strengths in A WS's proposals, including
`
`those previously assessed. ECF No. 1 ,r,r 141-52; ECF No. 130-1 at 47-49, 51-52.
`
`77.
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`Under Factor 6, DoD arbitrarily determined that Microsoft's theoretical and
`
`unproven proposed management approach deserved a higher rating than A WS's proven and tested
`
`management approach by relying on artificial discriminators favoring Microsoft. ECF No. 1
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`30
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`,r,r 159-167; ECF No. 130-1 at 53-55. For example, DoD incorrectly determined that only
`
`Microsoft proposed
`
`, when AWS also provided such capabilities. ECF No. 130-1 at 53-55. DoD also
`
`ignored AWS's superior data center offering and A WS's directly relevant experience performing
`
`a
`
`to build private cloud infrastructure for the
`
`ECF No. 1 ,I,J 159-167; ECF No. 130-1 at 53-55.
`
`78.
`
`Finally, under Factor 8, DoD erroneously concluded that A WS's and Microsoft's
`
`respective cloud solution demonstrations were equal despite the fact that A WS successfully
`
`completed each of the scenarios in the second demonstration conducted by DoD, while Microsoft
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`. See ECF No. 1 ,i,i 168-72; see also ECF No. 130-1 at 22-30.
`
`79.
`
`Each of the foregoing evaluation errors gave the false appearance of technical parity
`
`or Microsoft advantages, and skewed the best value source selection decision in Microsoft's favor.
`
`Indeed, DoD's evaluation of the relative merits of the offerors' proposals and the resulting best
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`value determination lacked any rational basis, and were inexplicable-unless considered in light
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`of the pervasive and improper presidential pressure that caused DoD procurement officials to allow
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`bias and bad faith to dictate their evaluations and award decision.
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`E.
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`President Trump's Interference with the JEDI Procurement Process
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`80.
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`As A WS detailed in its original Complaint, President Trump's animosity toward
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`Mr. Bezos, Amazon, and the Washington Post is long standing and well known. See ECF No. 1
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`,r,r 84-98. Even before President Trump entered office, he promised that if he became the
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`President, Amazon would have "such problems" because he claimed-with zero basis in fact(cid:173)
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`Amazon was subsidizing the Washington Post to give Mr. Bezos "political power" against him.
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`as "The Amazon" process) "very seriously" and would "be asking [DoD] to look at it very closely"
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`because of the "tremendous complaints about the contract with the Pentagon and with Amazon."
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`Id. ,r 95. Four days later, President Trump tweeted a video from a Fox News segment calling the
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`JEDI Contract the "Bezos Bailout," and unleashed yet another series of attacks on the "Amazon
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`Washington Post." Id. ,r 97.
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`85.
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`Despite DoD's public statements in late July 2019 that it would announce its final
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`award decision in August, id. ,r 175, on August 1, 2019, DoD abruptly reversed course when
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`President Trump's newly appointed Secretary of Defense, Mark Esper, announced that he had
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`ordered a review of the JEDI procurement process at the President's request. Secretary Esper
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`made clear that he was taking a "hard look" at JEDI because he had "heard from people from the
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`White House." Id. ,r 176.
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`86.
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`Following the surprise delay for that "hard look," Donald Trump, Jr. tweeted
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`several times that, upon completion of the review, A WS would not receive the JEDI Contract(cid:173)
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`including tweeting that it"[ s ]ounds like the corrupt #BezosBailout is in trouble." Id. ,r 177. CNN
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`also independently reported around the same time that President Trump wanted to "scuttle" the
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`JEDI award. Id.
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`87.
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`The unmistakable direction from the White House not to award the JEDI Contract
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`to A WS was not lost on the political appointees and other individuals working on the JEDI source
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`selection. Knowing only too well President Trump's extensive record of dismissing agency
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`officials with whom he disagrees or perceives as disloyal, Secretary Esper, DoD CIO Dana Deasy,
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`Government's Motion for Voluntary Remand. See ECF No. 203. In granting remand, the Court
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`stated that it found "no evidence of frivolity or bad faith on" the part of the Government in
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`requesting remand, but noted that A WS would "have the opportunity to challenge any corrective
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`action proposed by the agency at a later time, once defendant has reevaluated plaintiffs various
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`challenges and announced a comprehensive plan for addressing any errors." ECF No. 205 at 4.
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`103. DoD announced its corrective action on April 21, 2020 by issuing RFP Amendment
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`0007. Amendment 0007 revised the requirements for Price Scenario 6 to allow storage solutions
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`that are accessible "on the order of milli-seconds" rather than "highly accessible"-thereby
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`making compliant the noncompliant storage that Microsoft previously proposed. AR Tab 595 at
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`181509; see also AR Tab 408 at 173459. The corrective action permitted the offerers to revise
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`only those "Price Volume artifacts that are directly impacted as a result" of the changes to their
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`offerings for Price Scenario 6, while also prohibiting the offerers from updating other prices. AR
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`Tab 591 at 181374; AR Tab 592 at 181378.
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`104. After reviewing Amendment 0007, A WS submitted to DoD several questions to
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`clarify the precise parameters and requirements of Price Scenario 6 as amended. Despite the clear
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`benefit of providing clarity to all parties regarding the requirements under Price Scenario 6 as
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`amended, DoD refused to answer several of A WS's clarifying questions, including regarding key
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`issues relating to access time and storage volumes, in its responses to questions from both offerers
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`issued with Amendment 0008. AR Tab 609 at 181610. DoD's refusal to clarify this ambiguity
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`compelled A WS to file an agency-level protest on May 4, 2020, the same day it submitted its
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`second FPR ("FPR2"). AR Tabs 617, 618-32. In response to A WS's agency-level protest, DoD
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`issued Amendment 0009 on May 14, 2020, which addressed AWS's concerns. AR Tabs 642-43.
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`128. Moreover, the SSAC's assessment glosses over the fact that
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`This necessarily means
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`-
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`See AR Tab 610 at 181623. The SSAC was required to exercise its independent
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`judgment reasonably when considering the offerors' logical isolation and separation solutions, but
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`its conduct here fails any test of reasonableness.
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`b)
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`129.
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`In addition to mischaracterizing and downplaying the significance of A WS's
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`logical isolation and separation advantage, the SSAC unreasonably elevated the importance of
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`, doubling down
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`on the same error the SSAC made during the pre-remand final evaluation. Compare AR Tab 737
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`at 210423-25 with AR Tab 457 at 176401.
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`130. On August 23, 2020, the SSAC asked the SSEB to supplement its August 20, 2020
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`AR Tab 734 at 210410. The SSEB reported back
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`Id. at 210411. The SSEB also indicated that A WS did not
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`evaluation report by providing
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`that Microsoft deserved a strength
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`deserve a similar strength
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`-
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`Id. at 210411-12.
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