UNITED STATES COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE
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` Court No. 25-cv-00317
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`COMPLAINT
`Plaintiff SyncLync Inc., (“SyncLync” or “Plaintiff” ), by and through its attorneys,
`alleges as follows:
`1. The President of the United States claims the au thority to unilaterally levy tariffs
`on goods imported from any and every country in the world, at any rate, calculated via any
`methodology—or mere caprice—immediately, with no notice, or public comment, or phase- in,
`or delay in implementation, despite massive economi c impacts that are likely to do severe
`damage to the global economy.
`2. If actually granted by statute, this power would be an unlawful delegation of
`legislative power to the executive without any intelligible principle to limit his discretion.
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`SYNCLYNC INC.,
` Plaintiff,
` v.
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`The UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; UNITED
`STATES CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION;
`RODNEY SCOTT, in his official capacity as
`Commissioner of United States Customs and Border
`Protection ; DONALD J. TRUMP, in his official
`capacity as President of the United States ;
`EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT;
`JAMIESON GREER, in his official capacity as United
`States Trade Representative ; OFFICE OF THE
`UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE;
`HOWARD LUTNICK, in his official capacity as
`Secretary of Commerce ,
` Defendants.
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`3. But Congress has not delegated any such power. T he statute the President
`invokes— the International Emergency Economic Power s Act (“IEEPA”)—does not authorize
`the President to unilaterally issue across-the-board worldwide tariffs.
`4. Even if the statute did delegate such power—whic h it did not—the President’s
`justification does not meet the standards set forth in the IEEPA. His claimed emergency is a
`figment of his own imagination: trade deficits, which have persisted for decades without causing
`economic harm, are not an emergency. Nor do these t rade deficits constitute an “unusual and
`extraordinary threat.” The President’s attempt to use IEEPA to impose sweeping tariffs also runs
`afoul of the major questions doctrine.
`5. This Court should declare the President’s unprec edented power grab illegal, enjoin
`the operation of the executive actions that purport to impose these tariffs under the IEEPA, and
`reaffirm this country’s core founding principle: there shall be no taxation without representation
`and order the immediate refund, with interest, of a ll of the unlawful duties collected from
`plaintiffs.
`JURISDICTION
`6. The Court has subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1581 because this
`action is commenced against an officer of the Unite d States and arises out of an executive order
`providing for tariffs. 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i)(1)(B); see Silfab Solar, Inc. v. United States , 296 F. Supp.
`3d 1296 (Ct Int’l Trade 2018).
`7. The Court possesses all the powers in law and eq uity of, or as conferred by statute
`upon, a district court of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 1585. The Court may enter a money judgment
`for or against the United States in any civil actio n commenced under 28 U.S.C. § 1581 or 28
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`U.S.C. § 1582 and may also order any other form of relief that is appropriate in a civil action,
`including but not limited to declaratory judgments, orders of remand, injunctions, and writs of
`mandamus and prohibition. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2643(a)(1), (c)(1).
`PARTIES
`8. Plaintiff SyncLync is a privately-held importer of hearing wellness solutions.
`Plaintiff SyncLync is therefore an interested party pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 2631(i).
`9. Defendant United States of America is the federa l government of the United States
`of America.
`10. Defendant United States Customs and Border Prot ection (“CPB”) is a federal
`agency and a component of the Department of Homeland Security, responsible for, among other
`things, securing ports of entry and collecting tari ffs on imported goods. It is headquartered in
`Washington, D.C.
`11. Defendant Rodney Scott is the Commissioner of U nited States Customs and
`Border Protection. He is sued in his official capacity.
`12. Defendant Donald J. Trump is the President of t he United States and is sued in
`his official capacity.
`13. Defendant Executive Office of the President is the federal agency that oversees
`core functions of the executive branch, including t he Office of the United States Trade
`Representative. It is headquartered in Washington, D.C.
`14. Defendant Jameson Greer is the United States Tr ade Representative and is sued in
`his official capacity.
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`15. Defendant Office of the United States Trade Rep resentative is the federal agency
`responsible for developing United States trade policy. It is headquartered in Washington, D.C.
`16. Defendant Howard Lutnick is the United States S ecretary of Commerce and is
`sued in his official capacity.
`TIMELINESS OF THE ACTION
`17. A plaintiff must commence an action under 28 U. S.C. § 1581(i)(1)(B) “within two
`years after the cause of action first accrues.” 28 U.S.C. § 2636(i).
`18. Plaintiffs commenced this action by filing a su mmons and complaint with the
`Court on November 20, 2025. As this matter has been commenced within two years of the action
`of the United States, such action satisfies the tim eliness requirement in accordance with 19
`U.S.C. § 1621.
`STANDING
`19. To establish standing, a plaintiff must show injury in fact, causation, and
`redressability. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife , 504 U.S. 555, 560-561 (1992). Plaintiffs are
`harmed by the challenged tariff action because each Plaintiff directly imported goods from
`China and other countries subject to the Challenged Orders, and each thus must pay additional
`tariffs to the federal government because of the Challenged Orders and corresponding revisions
`to the HTSUS. See TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez , 594 U.S. 413, 425 (2021) (“If a defendant has
`caused physical or monetary injury to the plaintiff, the plaintiff has suffered a concrete injury in
`fact under Article III.”); Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 599 (2007)
`(“being forced to pay” money to the government “causes a real and immediate economic
`injury”). Declaratory and injunctive relief will redress these injuries because Plaintiffs will no
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`longer be required to pay the tariff or make harmful changes to their business operations to
`account for increased costs.
`FACTS
`1. On February 1, 2025, the President issued Execut ive Order 14195, entitled
`“Imposing Duties to Address the Synthetic Opioid Su pply Chain in the People’s Republic of
`China” (the “China Executive Order”).1
`2. The China Executive Order declared that a nation al emergency posed by the influx
`of illegal aliens and drugs into the United States applied to the Chinese government’s failure to
`“arrest, seize, detain, or otherwise intercept chemical precursor suppliers, money launderers, other
`TCOs, criminals at large, and drugs.” It declared that China’s failure to act constituted “an unusual
`and extraordinary threat, which has its source in substantial part outside the United States, to the
`national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States.”
`3. The China Executive Order imposed an incremental 10% tariff in addition to
`existing tariffs on all imports from China.
`4. On March 3, 2025, the President issued Executive Order 14228, entitled
`“Further Amendment to Duties Addressing the Synthetic Opioi d Supply Chain in the People's
`Republic of China,” 2 which doubled the incremental tariffs on imports f rom China to 20%. As
`justification for the rate increase, it stated that the Chinese government had “not taken adequate
`steps to alleviate the illicit drug crisis.”
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`1 Available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidenti al-actions/2025/02/imposing- duties-to- address-the-synthetic-
`opioid-supply-chain-in-the-peoples-republic-of- chi na/.
`2 Available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidenti al-actions/2025/04/further- amendment-to- duties-addressing-
`the-synthetic-opioid-supply-chain-in-the-peoples- r epublic-of-china-as- applied-to-low-value-imports/.
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`5. On April 2, 2025, “Liberation Day,” the Presiden t issued Executive Order
`14257, entitled “Regulating Imports with a Reciproc al Tariff to Rectify Trade Practices that
`Contribute to Large and Persistent Annual United St ates Goods Trade Deficits” (the “Liberation
`Day Order”).3
`6. The Liberation Day Order imposed sweeping new ta riffs at rates not seen since
`the Great Depression—including a global 10% tariffs on nearly all countries in the world,
`regardless of whether they impose tariffs on United States products, the rates at which they do
`so, or the existence of any trade agreements govern ing the relationship. These tariffs even
`applied to places with no civilian population or in ternational trade activity, such as the British
`Indian Ocean Territory, whose only human inhabitant s belong to a joint American and British
`military base on the island of Diego Garcia, and th e Heard and McDonald Islands, which are
`inhabited only by penguins and seals.
`7. In addition to the global 10% tariff, the Libera tion Day Order levied much higher
`tariff rates on dozens of countries based on what t he administration claimed to be an estimate of
`“tariff and nontariff barriers,” but ultimately turned out to be a simple ratio of the trade deficit in
`goods (excluding services) as a percentage of total U.S. imports from the given country.
`8. The chosen formula is not an accepted methodology f or calculating trade barriers
`and has no basis in economic theory.
`9. On April 9, 2025, the President issued an additi onal Executive Order, entitled
`“Modifying Reciprocal Tariff Rates to Reflect Tradi ng Partner Retaliation And Alignment,” 4
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`3 Available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidenti al-actions/2025/04/regulating- imports- with-a-reciprocal-
`tariff-to-rectify-trade-practices-that-contribute-t o-large- and-persistent-annual- united-states-goods -trade-deficits/.
`4 Available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidenti al-actions/2025/04/modifying- reciprocal- tariff-rates-to-
`reflect-trading-partner-retaliation-and-alignment/.
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`which paused the elevated tariff rates on most countries for 90 days, while leaving the global 10%
`tariff in place for all countries.
`10. The April 9 Order did not reduce the tariff rat e applied to imports from China.
`Instead, it imposed a new, higher tariff rate of 12 5% on Chinese goods in retaliation for China’s
`imposition of its own tariffs in response to the President’s imposition of elevated tariffs on China.
`The tariff rate imposed on China was later increased to 145%.
`11. On April 11, 2025, the President issued a Memor andum entitled “Clarification
`of Exceptions Under Executive Order 14257 of April 2, 2025, as Amended,” 5 providing
`clarification of allowable exceptions under the Lib eration Day Order. The Memorandum states
`that “semiconductors,” defined as including product s classified in various headings and
`subheadings of Chapters 84 and 85 of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States
`(HTSUS), are exempted from the tariffs imposed by t he Liberation Day Order.
`12. On May 12, 2025, the President issued Executive Order, entitled “Modifying
`Reciprocal Tariff Rates to Reflect Discussion with the People’s Republic of China,”6 lowering the
`IEEPA Reciprocal tariff of Chinese goods from 125% to 10%. However, the 20% tariff imposed
`by Executive Order 14228, entitled “Further Amendme nt to Duties Addressing the Synthetic
`Opioid Supply Chain in the People's Republic of China,” continued to exist.
`13. On July 30, 2025, the President issued Executiv e Order 14323, entitled
`“Addressing Threats to the United States by the Gov ernment of Brazil,” 7 which imposed an
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`5 Available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidenti al-actions/2025/04/clarification-of- exceptions-under-
`executive-order-14257-of-april-2-2025-as-amended/.
`6 Available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidenti al-actions/2025/05/modifying-reciprocal- tariff-rat es-to-reflect-
`discussions-with-the-peoples-republic-of-china/.
`7 Available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidenti al-actions/2025/07/addressing-threats-to- the-us/.
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`additional 40% tariff on imports from Brazil. This Executive Order cited the political prosecution
`of former President Jair Bolsonaro, which constitut ed “an unusual and extraordinary threat,” as
`the reason for this additional tariff. Id.
`14. On July 31, 2025, the President issued Executiv e Order 14257, entitled “Further
`Modifying the Reciprocal Tariff Rates,” 8 which reinstated the country-specific IEEPA Reciprocal
`tariff. Imports from countries covered by Executive Order 14257 were imposed with a tariff rate
`of at least 10%.
`15. Also on July 31, 2025, the President issued Exe cutive Order, entitled “Amendment
`to Duties to Address the Flow of Illicit Drugs Acro ss Our Northern Border,” 9 which imposed an
`additional 25% tariff on imports from Canada, effectively raising the tariff on Canada to 35%.
`16. On August 6, 2025, the President issued Executi ve Order 14329, entitled
`“Addressing Threats to the United States by the Gov ernment of the Russian Federation.” 10 This
`Executive Order imposed an additional 25% tariff on imports from India for “directly or
`indirectly importing Russian Federation oil.” Id.
`17. On August 11, 2025, the President issued Execut ive Order 14358, entitled
`“Further Modifying Reciprocal Tariff Rates to Refle ct Ongoing Discussions with the People’s
`Republic of China,” 11 extending the suspension of China’s country-specif ic IEEPA tariff rate
`until November 10, 2025.
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`8 Available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidenti al-actions/2025/07/further-modifying-the- reciprocal-tariff-
`rates/#top.
`9 Available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidenti al-actions/2025/07/amendment-to-duties- to-address-the-flow-
`of-illicit-drugs-across-our-northern-border-9350/.
`10 Available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidenti al-actions/2025/08/addressing-threats-to- the-united-states-by-
`the-government-of-the-russian-federation/.
`11 Available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidenti al-actions/2025/08/further-modifying- reciprocal-tariff-rates-
`to-reflect-ongoing-discussions-with-the-peoples-rep ublic-of-china/.
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`18. On November 4, 2025, the President issued Execu tive Order 14357, entitled
`“Modifying Duties addressing the Synthetic Opioid S upply Chain in the People’s Republic of
`China,” 12 reducing the 20% additional tariff (imposed by Exe cutive Order 14228, “Further
`Amendment to Duties Addressing the Synthetic Opioid Supply Chain in the People's Republic of
`China”) to 10%.
`19. Additionally, on November 4, 2025, the Preside nt issued Executive Order 14358,
`entitled “Modifying Reciprocal Tariff Rates Consist ent With the Economic and Trade
`Arrangement Between the United States and the Peopl e's Republic of China,” further extending
`the suspension of China’s country-specific IEEPA ta riff rate until November 10, 2026.
`20. On November 14, 2025, the President issued Exec utive Order entitled “Modifying
`the Scope of the Reciprocal Tariff with Respect to Certain Agricultural Products” amending the
`scope of products covered by IEEPA Reciprocal tarif fs imposed by the Liberation Day Order.
`21. As a statutory basis, the Liberation Day Order, Executive Order 14323, Executive
`Order 14257, and Executive Order 14329 all cite the International Emergency Economic Powers
`Act of 1977, 50 U.S.C. § 1701 et seq. (“IEEPA”), th e National Emergencies Act, 50 U.S.C. §
`1601 et seq., section 604 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended, 19 U.S.C. § 2483, and section
`301 of title 3, United States Code.
`22. None of these statutes grants the President the authority to impose tariffs, and the
`extent that the provide for any relief, there must be an actual “emergency”. Such statutes do not
`permit the taking of relief on an unsupported pretext.
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`12 Available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidenti al-actions/2025/11/modifying-duties-addressing-the-synthetic-
`opioid-supply-chain-in-the-peoples-republic-of-chin a/.
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`23. The Constitution explicitly reserves to Congres s the power to “lay and collect
`taxes, duties, imposts and excises,” and “[t]o regu late commerce with foreign nations.” U.S.
`Const. art. I, § 8 cl.1, 3.
`24. Title 19 of the United States Code, “Customs an d Duties,” (as opposed to Title
`50, “War and National Defense”) is where one would expect to find such presidential authority,
`but it makes no mention of such authority.
`25. Congress knew how to grant the President tariff authority if it wanted to.
`26. Under 19 U.S. Code § 1862, the President has a clear framework for adjusting
`duties and import restrictions for the purpose of “ safeguarding national security.” Yet the
`President has attempted to avoid that framework by stretching Congress’s specific grant of
`emergency authority into general tariff authority. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Occupational
`Safety & Health Admin ., 595 U.S. 109, 125 (2022) (quoting Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns , 531
`U.S. 457, 468 (2001)) (Congress “does not . . . ‘hide elephants in mouseholes’”).
`27. Other specific grants of authority for the Pres ident to impose tariffs in limited
`specific circumstances exist. Under 19 U.S.C. § 241 1, the President may impose tariffs on other
`countries that have violated trade agreements. A nd the President may provide specific,
`targeted relief to industries that need time to adj ust to foreign competition pursuant to 19
`U.S.C. § 2251.
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`28. IEEPA provides that the President may:
`(A) investigate, regulate, or prohibit—
`(i) any transactions in foreign exchange,
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`(ii) transfers of credit or payments between, by, throug h, or to any banking
`institution, to the extent that such transfers or payments involve any interest
`of any foreign country or a national thereof,
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`(iii) the importing or exporting of currency or securities, by any person, or with
`respect to any property, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States;
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`(B) investigate, block during the pendency of an in vestigation, regulate, direct and
`compel, nullify, void, prevent or prohibit, any acq uisition, holding, withholding,
`use, transfer, withdrawal, transportation, importation or exportation of, or dealing
`in, or exercising any right, power, or privilege wi th respect to, or transactions
`involving, any property in which any foreign country or a national thereof has any
`interest by any person, or with respect to any prop erty, subject to the jurisdiction
`of the United States . . . .
`50 U.S.C. § 1702.
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`29. IEEPA further provides that these authorities “ may only be exercised to deal with
`an unusual and extraordinary threat with respect to which a national emergency has been declared
`for purposes of this chapter and may not be exercis ed for any other purpose.” 50 U.S.C. §
`1701(b).
`30. The word “tariff” does not appear in the IEEPA, nor does any synonym or
`equivalent.
`31. No previous President has used IEEPA to impose tariffs, except for President
`Trump himself briefly during his first term, in an executive action that was withdrawn before it
`was fully implemented or subject to judicial review . Tom Campbell, Presidential Authority to
`Impose Tariffs, 83 La. L. Rev. 596, 597 (2023).
`32. The “unusual and extraordinary threat” asserted as a “national emergency” by the
`Liberation Day Order is not an emergency, and is no t unusual, extraordinary, new, unexpected,
`odd, or even surprising.
`33. According to the Liberation Day order, the Pres ident
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`find[s] that underlying conditions, including a lac k of reciprocity in our
`bilateral trade relationships, disparate tariff rat es and non-tariff barriers,
`and U.S. trading partners’ economic policies that suppress domestic wages
`and consumption, as indicated by large and persiste nt annual U.S. goods
`trade deficits, constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national
`security and economy of the United States. That thr eat has its source in
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`whole or substantial part outside the United States in the domestic economic
`policies of key trading partners and structural imb alances in the global
`trading system. I hereby declare a national emergen cy with respect to this
`threat. 13
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`34. In other words, the national emergency claimed to be unusual and extraordinary in
`this case is the existence of bilateral trade defic its in goods (excluding services, for which the
`United States runs a trade surplus with the world) with some foreign trading partners.
`35. Trade deficits are not unusual or extraordinary —the United States has run a net
`trade deficit at most times since World War II, and consistently since the 1970s. Brian Reinbold,
`Yi Wen, Historical U.S. Trade Deficits, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, May 17, 2019.
`14 That
`necessarily includes bilateral trade deficits with many individual nations.
`36. Nor are trade deficits an emergency or even necessa rily a problem; they simply
`mean that some other country sells lots of things A mericans want to buy, or that its people are
`unwilling or unable (often because of poverty) to p urchase many American goods.15 Moreover,
`trade deficits go hand in hand with capital surplus es, which increases investment in the United
`States. Norbert Michel, Trade and Investment Are Not a Balancing Ac t, Cato Institute, Nov. 9,
`2023.16
`37. Section 604 of the Trade Act of 1974 provides t hat “[t]he President shall from
`time to time, as appropriate, embody in the Harmoni zed Tariff Schedule of the United States
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`13 Available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidenti al-actions/2025/04/regulating- imports- with-a-reciprocal-
`tariff-to-rectify-trade-practices-that-contribute-t o-large- and-persistent-annual- united-states-goods -trade-deficits/.
`14 Available at https://www.stlouisfed.org/on-the-eco nomy/2019/may/historical-u-s- trade-deficits.
`15 Economists generally agree bilateral trade deficits are not a meaningful problem at all, much less an emergency or
`an extraordinary and unusual threat. For overviews, see James McBride and Andrew Chatzky, The U.S. Trade
`Deficit: How Much Does It Matter? , Council on Foreign Relations (2019), available at
`https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/us-trade-deficit-h ow-much- does-it-matter (noting that most economist s
`recognize bilateral trade deficits do not matter, and the overall trade deficit is determined mainly by macroeconomic
`forces); Michael Chapman, Ignore the Politicians: Trade Deficits Don’t Really Matter , Cato Institute (Aug. 29,
`2024), available at https://www.cato.org/blog/ignor e-politicians-trade- deficits-dont-really-matter (summarizing
`standard economic analysis showing that trade defic its don’t matter).
`16 Available at https://www.cato.org/policy-analysis/trade-investment-are-not-balancing-act.
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`the substance of the relevant provisions of this ch apter, and of other Acts affecting import
`treatment, and actions thereunder, including remova l, modification, continuance, or imposition
`of any rate of duty or other import restriction.” 1 9 U.S.C. § 2483.
`38. Section 604 is a bookkeeping provision: it assi gns to the President the task of
`periodically updating the Harmonized Tariff Schedul e to reflect changes in policy that have
`occurred. It does not set out any power, authority, or process by which the President may
`unilaterally set such policies.
`39. The National Emergencies Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq., provides the general
`framework for declarations of national emergencies. It explicitly disclaims granting any
`substantive authority itself, instead requiring tha t “[w]hen the President declares a national
`emergency, no powers or authorities made available by statute for use in the event of an emergency
`shall be exercised unless and until the President s pecifies the provisions of law under which he
`proposes that he, or other officers will act.” 50 U.S.C. § 1631.
`40. 3 U.S.C. § 301 gives the President “[g]eneral authorization to delegate functions”
`to subordinate federal officials. It has nothing to do with tariffs or trade regulation.
`STANDARD OF REVIEW
` 41. The Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), codi fied at 5 U.S.C. § 706, provided
`that the Court has the authority to “hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and
`conclusions found to be . . . arbitrary, capricious , an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
`accordance with law” or “in excess of statutory jur isdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of
`statutory right.”
`42. The court presumes judicial review of the President ’s action under the APA
`is available. Patel v. Garland, 596 U.S. 328, 346 (2022). See USP Holdings, Inc. v. United States,
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`36 F.4th 1359, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2022) (holding that actions challenging the President’s violation of
`the statutory authority delegated to him are subjec t to judicial review); Florsheim Shoe Co. v.
`United States, 744 F.2d 787, 795 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (“[T]he Executive’s decisions in the sphere of
`international trade are reviewable only to determin e whether the President’s action falls within
`his delegated authority, whether the statutory language has been properly construed, and whether
`the President’s action conforms with the relevant procedural requirements.”); Maple Leaf Fish Co.
`v. United States, 762 F.2d 86, 89 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (“For a court to interpose, there has to be a clear
`misconstruction of the governing statute, a signifi cant procedural violation, or action outside
`delegated authority.”); United States v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. , 20 C.C.P.A. 295, 305 (1932)
`(reviewing the President’s issuance of a proclamation “for the purpose of determining whether he
`has exceeded the powers delegated to him.”).
`43. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1585, the Court possess es all the power in law and equity
`of a United States district court.
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`CLAIMS
`COUNT I:
`The President’s Action Levying Tariffs Exceeds His Statutory Authority.
`44. The allegations of paragraphs 1 through 43 are incorporated by reference and
`restated as if fully set forth herein.
`45. Presidential authority to unilaterally impose w orldwide tariffs, if Congress were
`to grant it at all, must be granted clearly and unm istakably—not through some implication so
`vague and indeterminate that it went unnoticed by every other President for nearly five decades.
`See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Occupational Safety & Health Admin., 595 U.S. at 125 (quoting
`Whitman, 531 U.S. at 468) (“Congress does not usually ‘hid e elephants in mouseholes.’”).
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`46. IEEPA does not mention tariffs or duties, nor at any point does it suggest that
`it is granting the power to lay and collect such.
`47. There is no precedent for using IEEPA to impose tariffs. No other President
`has ever done so or ever claimed the power to do so.
`48. The existence of trade deficits in goods with s ome other countries does not
`qualify as a national emergency, as required by IEEPA.
`49. The prosecution of the former leader of a thir d-country for corruption does not
`constitute a national emergency nor is it an unusual and extraordinary threat, as required by
`IEEPA.
`50. Courts are generally skeptical of newly claime d grants of authority discovered
`for the first time in decades-old statutes. Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302,
`324 (2014) (“When an agency claims to discover in a long-extant statute an unheralded power
`to regulate ‘a significant portion of the American economy,’ . . . we typically greet its
`announcement with a measure of skepticism.”) (quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson
`Tobacco Corp. , 529 U.S. 120, 159 (2000)).
`51. Indeed, Congress passed IEEPA to limit wha t it saw as presidential abuses
`of emergency authorities in the years prior to 1977 . Peter E. Harrell, The Case Against IEEPA
`Tariffs, Lawfare, Jan. 31, 2025.17
`52. Congress knows how to grant the President auth ority to impose or adjust tariffs
`when it wishes to, and it has done so in more limit ed statutes contained in Title 19 of the United
`States Code. But the President has decided to avoid the limits on his authority imposed by
`Congress by finding a new never-before-seen authority under IEEPA.
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`17 Available at https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/ the-case-against-ieepa-tariffs.
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`53. The President’s interpretation of IEEPA is not entitled to deference—rather, it
`is the duty of the courts to independently “determine the best reading” of the statute at issue.
`Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 400 (2024).
`54. IEEPA does not grant the President power to imp ose tariffs at all—it does not
`mention such a power or imply it. The President’s actions exceed the statutory authority
`Congress granted him.
`55. “Courts expect Congress to speak clearly if it wishes to assign to an agency
`decisions of vast economic and political significance.” West Virginia v. EPA , 597 U.S. 697,
`716 (2022) (cleaned up) (quoting Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA , 573 U. S. 302, 324
`(2014)). The assertion that IEEPA grants the President his claimed authority raises a major
`question that requires Congress to speak clearly in granting such a broad and consequential
`power to upend the global economy.
`56. “In the absence of a clear mandate in the Act, it is unreasonable to assume that
`Congress intended to give the [President] the unprecedented power over American industry
`that would result from the Government's view.” Indus. Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. API , 448
`U.S. 607, 645 (1980). If anything qualifies as a “decision . . . of vast economic and political
`significance,” requiring a clear statement under the major question doctrine, this is it. West
`Virginia , 597 U.S. at 716.
`57. The Liberation Day Order would impose an estim ated average of almost
`$1,300 in new taxes per year on American households, for a total tax burden of some $1.4 to
`2.2 billion over the next ten years, reducing US gross domestic product by some 0.8%
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`(without accounting for retaliation by foreign states). Erica York & Alex Durante, Trump
`Tariffs: The Economic Impact of the Trump Trade War, Tax Foundation, Apr. 11, 2025.18
`58. This impact is at least as large—and likely mu ch larger—than executive
`actions previously found by the Supreme Court to be “major questions,” requiring a clear
`statement by Congress to authorize executive discretion. See, e.g.¸ Biden v. Nebraska , 600
`U.S. 477 (2023) (approximately $400 billion in student loan forgiveness); West Virginia v.
`Environmental Protection Agency , 597 U.S. 697 (2022) (EPA authority to regulate carbon
`emissions where the administration had not offered a specific emission reduction plan); Nat’l
`Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Occupational Safety & Health Admin. , 595 U.S. 109 (2022)
`(pandemic-era vaccination mandate for workers employed by firms with 100 or more
`employees); Ala. Ass’n of Realtors v. HHS , 594 U.S. 758 (2021) (temporary pandemic-era
`nationwide eviction moratorium).
`59. The tariffs illegally imposed by the President via IEEPA directly and
`irreparably harm Plaintiffs, who will face increase costs for the goods they sell, less demand
`for their higher priced products, and disrupted supply ch