`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
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`PACT XPP SCHWEIZ AG,
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`Plaintiff,
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`v.
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`INTEL CORPORATION,
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`Defendant.
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`Case No. 1:19-cv-01006-JDW
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`MEMORANDUM
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`This patent litigation between PACT XPP Schweiz AG (“PACT”) and Intel
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`Corporation (“Intel”) concerns patents for the data processing architecture in computer
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`chips. Intel has moved for summary judgment of noninfringement, while PACT seeks
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`summary judgment on Intel’s affirmative defenses.
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`I.
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`BACKGROUND
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`A.
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`Facts
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`Modern computers need to store, access, and move information and data at high
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`speeds. Both PACT and Intel developed multi-processor computer chips that increase
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`processing speeds and expand memory storage. The chips’ efficacy depends on their
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`internal architecture, through which they move information between, and access memory
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`from, multiple processors and memory caches. The Parties have developed chip
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`architecture for many years.
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`Case 1:19-cv-01006-JDW Document 399 Filed 03/24/23 Page 2 of 18 PageID #: 55109
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`
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`PACT and Intel have a long history. In relevant part, PACT met with Intel in the early
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`2000s to discuss PACT’s multi-processor technology. There is no evidence that anyone
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`from Intel’s engineering team attended those meetings or received information from
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`those meetings. At the time, PACT didn’t hold patents to any of the relevant technology.
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`No working relationship, partnership, or license agreement resulted from those meetings.
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`In 2012, PACT shared a list of its patents and patent applications with Intel and
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`asked if Intel would like to license any of its technology. There’s no evidence that Intel
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`knew the patents in suit existed, or that PACT was prosecuting those applications.
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`Ultimately, Intel didn’t seek a license.
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`
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`Intel started marketing multi-core processor technology in 2011. It is undisputed
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`that Intel’s chips execute series of instructions, which are passed along from processor to
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`processor, and which allow the cores to access and store memory in multiple memory
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`caches. PACT claims Intel’s system infringes its patents for multi-processor systems, which
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`claim multi-processor chips that execute sequences of data functions. This suit followed.
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`B.
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`Procedural History
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`On May 30, 2019, PACT filed a complaint asserting that Intel infringed 12 of its
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`patents, including U.S. Patent No. 8,312,301 (the “’301 Patent”), U.S. Patent No. 8,471,593
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`(the “’593 Patent), and U.S. Patent No. 9,250,908 (the “‘908 Patent”). Intel answered and
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`asserted counterclaims on June 4, 2019. By motion and with the Court’s permission, Intel
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`Amended its answer on September 10, 2020. The Parties have participated in multiple
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`2
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`rounds of inter partes review (“IPR”), as well as appeals of those petitions to the Federal
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`Circuit, which have invalidated a significant number of claims and patents. Litigation
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`regarding two additional patents remains stayed pending the outcome of such
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`proceedings. The Parties filed Motions For Summary Judgment on June 21, 2022.
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`Since the Parties filed their summary judgment motions, several developments
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`have changed the scope of the case. First, the Federal Circuit invalidated claim 17 of the
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`‘301 Patent. Second, the Federal Circuit reversed the PTAB and invalidated U.S. Patent No.
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`9,552,047 (the “’047 Patent”) and U.S. Patent No. 9,436,631 (the “‘631 Patent”). Third,
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`following a ruling in the Federal Circuit about the ‘908 Patent, PACT dismissed its claims
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`about that patent. These developments render moot all of Intel’s arguments about those
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`patents or patent claims. It also renders moot Intel’s Motion To Strike Portions Of PACT’s
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`Expert’s Reports (D.I. 274), which relates to expert opinions about the ‘631 Patent. (It’s
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`possible, of course, that PACT will seek and obtain rehearing, rehearing en banc, or
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`certiorari concerning the ‘047 and ‘631 Patents. If so, I can revisit the mootness
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`determination.)
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`II.
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`LEGAL STANDARD
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`
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`Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) permits a party to seek, and a court to enter,
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`summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any
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`material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
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`56(a). The moving party has the initial burden of proving the absence of a genuinely
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`3
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`Case 1:19-cv-01006-JDW Document 399 Filed 03/24/23 Page 4 of 18 PageID #: 55111
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`disputed material fact relative to the claims in question. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
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`317, 330 (1986). Material facts are those “that could affect the outcome” of the
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`proceeding, and “a dispute about a material fact is ‘genuine’ if the evidence is sufficient
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`to permit a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Lamont v. New
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`Jersey, 637 F.3d 177, 181 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
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`242, 248 (1986)). The burden on the moving party may be discharged by pointing out to
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`the district court that there is an absence of evidence supporting the non-moving party's
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`case. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.
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`
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`The burden then shifts to the non-movant to demonstrate the existence of a
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`genuine issue for trial. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586–
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`87 (1986). A non-moving party asserting that a fact is genuinely disputed must support
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`such an assertion by: “(A) citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including
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`depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations,
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`stipulations ..., admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials; or (B) showing that
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`the materials cited [by the opposing party] do not establish the absence ... of a genuine
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`dispute ....” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1).
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`
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`When determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, the court must
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`view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all
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`reasonable inferences in that party's favor. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007). A
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`dispute is “genuine” only if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a
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`4
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`verdict for the non-moving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247–49. If the non-moving party
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`fails to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of its case with respect to which
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`it has the burden of proof, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
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`See Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322.
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`III.
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`DISCUSSION
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`A.
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`Intel’s Motion
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`1.
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`The ‘301 Patent
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`The surviving claims of the ‘301 patent require “a plurality of data processing
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`elements adapted for programmably processing sequences.” (‘301 Patent at 15:60-61.)
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`During claim construction, I gave this language its plain and ordinary meaning. Later, to
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`distinguish the ‘301 Patent over prior art during IPR, PACT argued that the term
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`“sequences” is limited to data processors and does not include instruction processors. The
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`PTAB neither adopted nor rejected that construction. Instead, the PTAB cited my
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`construction and gave the term its plain and ordinary meaning. Intel asserts that PACT’s
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`argument before the PTAB constitutes a disclaimer of scope, meaning that Intel can’t
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`infringe because its chips only process instructions.
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`
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`Statements made during IPR can constitute prosecution disclaimer. See Aylus
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`Networks, Inc. v. Apple Inc., 856 F.3d 1353, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2017). For this doctrine to apply,
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`the disclaimer must be “both clear and unmistakable to one of ordinary skill in the art.”
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`Tech. Props. Ltd. LLC v. Huawei Techs. Co., 849 F.3d 1349, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citations
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`5
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`omitted). If the challenged statements are ambiguous or amenable to multiple reasonable
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`interpretations, prosecution disclaimer is not established.” Id. at 1358 (same). This rule
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`ensures that claims aren’t argued one way to maintain patentability and another against
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`an accused infringer. See CUPP Computing AS v. Trend Micro Inc., 53 F.4th 1376, 1383
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`(Fed. Cir, 2022). An argument made in IPR may lead to disclaimer even when the PTAB
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`doesn’t adopt it, because the statements “still inform the proper construction of the term.”
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`Am. Piledriving Equipment, Inc. v. Geoquip, Inc., 637 F.3d 1324, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
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`
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`During oral argument at IPR, PACT stated that the term “sequences” is limited to
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`processing sequences of data:
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`Petitioner says that they can interpret this phrase in two ways, as
`sequences of instructions or sequences of data. Now, they claim that
`if you interpret this as sequences of instructions, then any processing
`element will read on it, but that would essentially read out the term
`from the phrase because the phrase is a plurality of data processing
`elements adopted for programmably processing sequences. If any
`processing element processes
`instructions, which any DRAM
`processor will do, that doesn’t give any meaning to the term. You
`know, we focus on the sequences of data, and this is where, you
`know, we say that data is passed from one PE to another, the results
`of one PE is passed on another PE.
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`(D.I. 318-4 (emphasis added).) PACT later reiterated its disclaimer when it attempted to
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`distinguish the Nicol prior art:
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`I wanted to respond to Petitioner Slide 37. This is about sequences
`of instructions. They point to Dr. Mangione-Smith’s deposition
`transcript, and they say this is admissions that meets the claim
`language. Nothing in this passage points to the claim language.
`Again, this is consistent with our point that if you interpret
`sequences – programmably processing sequences to be
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`6
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`sequences of instructions, then, sure, it’s a very broad term.
`We’re not disputing the general processing elements of Nicol on due
`process instructions, and our expert does not dispute that. That’s not
`saying it meets the claim language argument. We’re saying, if you
`interpret that way, it’s superfluous as far as the claim language
`is concerned.
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` (D.I. 284-12 at 5 (emphasis added).) PACT’s arguments during IPR constitute a “clear and
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`unmistakable” disclaimer of processing sequences of instructions.
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`
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`PACT is wrong that its arguments can’t constitute disclaimer because the PTAB
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`rejected its proposed construction. There is unreported Federal Circuit caselaw that,
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`because a “skilled artisan” would look to a patent’s entire history to determine claim
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`scope, arguments that the PTAB rejects can’t constitute disclaimer. See Galderma Lab’ys,
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`L.P. v. Amneal Pharms. LLC, 806 Fed. Appx. 1007, 1010-11 (Fed. Cir, 2020). But I don’t have
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`to decide if that decision is persuasive because the PTAB didn’t reject PACT’s construction
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`limiting the claims to processing sequences of data. Instead, it rejected PACT’s
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`construction that “require[d] data output from one [processor] to another [processor].”
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`(D.I. 318-5 at 3.) The two arguments are not the same. The PTAB found that no
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`construction was necessary because the parties agreed that the plain and ordinary
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`meaning should apply in the IPR, and because I already ruled that the plain and ordinary
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`meaning applies. That is not a rejection of PACT’s argument. See Galderma, 806 Fed. Appx.
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`at 1011 (distinguishing American Piledriving because in Galderma there was a clear
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`rejection of the proposed construction). Because the PTAB, standing in the Examiner’s
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`shoes as a neutral interpreter of the ‘301 Patent, did not reject PACT’s argument that the
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`7
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`Case 1:19-cv-01006-JDW Document 399 Filed 03/24/23 Page 8 of 18 PageID #: 55115
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`term “sequences” is limited to data sequences, that argument informs how PTAB
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`understood the term’s plain and ordinary meaning. See Am. Piledriving, 637 F.3d at 1336.
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`Therefore, prosecution disclaimer applies.
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`The Parties don’t dispute that Intel’s chips only process sequences of instructions.
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`Because PACT disclaimed sequences of instructions and limited its claims to data
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`sequences, Intel’s product can’t infringe.
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`2.
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`The ‘593 Patent
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`The ‘593 Patent requires a “bus system [that] includes a first structure dedicated
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`for data transfer in a first direction and a second structure dedicated for data transfer in
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`a second direction; and each of at least some of the data processing cores includes a
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`physically dedicated connection to at least one physically assigned one of the plurality of
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`memory units” or a “dedicated connection to at least one assigned one of the plurality of
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`memory units.” (‘593 Patent at 12:35-44, 13:42-54.) In other words, the ‘593 Patent
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`incorporates two main limitations: (1) a system with two dedicated connections
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`transferring data in different directions, and (2) processors with exclusive connections to
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`corresponding memory units. The Parties dispute whether Intel’s chips meet these
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`limitations.
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`PACT claims that Intel’s processors (“cores”) are directly connected to physically
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`adjacent (“co-located”) memory units (“LLC slices”) via bus segments in a device called a
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`“C-Bo.” There is a dispute of fact as to whether the C-Bo constitutes an access point or
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`8
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`acts as a combined path to the LLC slice, and whether there is a secondary bus path in the
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`C-Bo for non-co-located cores. If the C-Bo acts only as an interface, but there are separate
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`bus paths within it for co-located and non-co-located cores, it’s possible that it infringes.
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`But if the signals overlap in the C-Bo, then it might not infringe. The Parties have provided
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`expert testimony and other evidence to support their positions. Therefore, a jury must
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`hear these facts and decide infringement.
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`3. Willful infringement
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`Willful infringement means “deliberate or intentional” infringement. SRI Int’l, Inc. v.
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`Cisco Systems, Inc., 14 F.4th 1323, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2021). Culpability for willful infringement
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`“is generally measured against the knowledge of the actor at the time of the challenged
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`conduct.” Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 579 U.S. 93, 105 (2016). “Knowledge of the
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`asserted patent[s] and evidence of infringement is necessary, but not sufficient, for a
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`finding of willfulness.” Bayer Healthcare LLC v. Baxalta Inc., 989 F.3d 964, 988 (Fed. Cir.
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`2021). “[T]he patentee must show the accused infringer had a specific intent to infringe at
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`the time of the challenged conduct.” Id. at 987.
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`
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`The undisputed facts in this case don’t rise to the level of deliberate infringement.
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`PACT offers three facts for support: (1) PACT’s presentations to Intel regarding its
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`technology between 2005-2007; (2) a 2012 email from PACT to Intel containing a
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`spreadsheet of patents and patent applications and an offer to license those patents; and
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`(3) PACT’s original complaint, which it filed in February of 2019 and then voluntarily
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`9
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`Case 1:19-cv-01006-JDW Document 399 Filed 03/24/23 Page 10 of 18 PageID #: 55117
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`dismissed, all in Case No. 19-cv-00267 (the “Original Complaint”). None of these are
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`sufficient to prevail on a willful infringement claim.
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`First, there’s no evidence suggesting Intel knew about the existence of PACT’s
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`patents prior to February 2019, or that it knew that it was infringing those patents. PACT
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`admits that the patents didn’t exist when it presented its technology to Intel between
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`2005 and 2007. PACT points out that the patents in suit claim a priority date of 2005, but
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`that’s irrelevant for purposes of willful infringement because it doesn’t mean that Intel
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`had the requisite knowledge of those patents (or patent applications) at that time. Even
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`if Intel knew about the patents once they issued, it says nothing of Intel’s knowledge or
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`intent between 2005 and the issue date. Additionally, PACT provides no evidence that
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`Intel copied its technology based on those presentations. That’s not enough to support a
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`copying allegation.
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`Second, there’s no evidence that Intel knew the ’593 Patent existed after PACT’s
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`2012 email, and that correspondence did not reference any of the other patents in suit.
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`The spreadsheets that PACT attached to the email included the ‘593 Patent’s application
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`number, not the patent itself. The PTO often rejects patent applications, so a pending
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`application doesn’t signal Intel’s knowledge that a patent existed. Additionally, Intel
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`responded that it might be interested in licensing patents and requested more
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`information, but PACT doesn’t point to any evidence that it responded with details
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`regarding its patents or technology.
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`10
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`PACT also attempts to infer Intel’s state of mind regarding the 2012 email by
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`pointing to contemporaneous internal emails on Intel’s privilege logs. But none of those
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`emails indicates that Intel knew of the ‘593 Patent, or that it even discussed the ‘593 Patent
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`internally. The log indicates there were conversations surrounding patent analysis, which
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`could be relevant to any of the dozens, if not hundreds, of patents referenced in the
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`spreadsheets that PACT sent. (See D.I. 318-29.) It would be a logical leap, not just a
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`reasonable inference, to assume that any of those analyses relates to the ‘593 Patent, and
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`PACT is only entitled to reasonable inferences, not logical leaps, in opposing summary
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`judgment.
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`Third, and finally, although the Original Complaint informed Intel of PACT’s patents
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`and infringement contentions, it doesn’t create a claim for willful infringement. Other
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`judges in this district have found that “where the defendant’s alleged knowledge of the
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`asserted patents is based solely on the content of that complaint or a prior version of the
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`complaint filed in the same lawsuit,” there is no claim for willful infringement. See, e.g.,
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`Boston Sci. Corp. v. Nevro Corp., 560 F. Supp. 3d 837, 845 (D. Del. 2021) (citation omitted).
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`I agree with Judge Connelly’s conclusion in that case. There are many reasons why a
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`complaint can’t constitute the basis willful infringement, among them that a complaint
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`can’t constitute an element of a claim that it purports to raise, and that it would mean all
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`infringement suits involve willful infringement. See Id.; Wrinkl, Inc. v. Facebook, Inc., No.
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`20-cv-1345-RGA, 2021 4477022 at *8 (D. Del. Sept. 30, 2021). It would also undermine a
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`11
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`defendant’s ability to put forward a good faith defense.
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`PACT argues that because the Original Complaint is not the same complaint in this
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`case, the logic underpinning Boston Scientific and Wrinkl doesn’t apply. That argument is
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`unpersuasive. The Complaint in this case is based on the same alleged infringement as
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`the Original Complaint. A rule allowing a plaintiff to file a complaint, withdraw it, and then
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`file again to take advantage of enhanced damages would create an incentive to abuse the
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`court system and avoid settlement at the outset. Additionally, Intel could read the fact
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`that PACT voluntarily dismissed its suit as a sign that it thought its infringement
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`contentions were weak and that Intel wasn’t infringing. As such, it undermines the
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`deliberate and intentional state of mind required for willful infringement.
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`
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`PACT also suggests that the communications it had with Intel in 2005 and 2012
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`can inform the willfulness inquiry when it filed and withdrew the Original Complaint in
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`2019. It’s true that courts will look at the totality of circumstances in considering an
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`infringer’s state of mind. See WCM Indus., Inc. v. IPS Corp., 721 Fed. Appx. 959, 970 (Fed.
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`Cir. 2018) (noting willfulness analysis considers the totality of the circumstances of the
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`case). But that doesn’t help PACT here. There’s no indication that pre-suit communications
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`between PACT and Intel contributed to Intel’s knowledge of the patents or the possibility
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`that it was infringing those patents beyond what it learned once it received the Original
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`Complaint. Even if anyone at Intel happened to remember conversations with PACT dating
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`back 7-15 years, there’s no evidence that Intel thought it was infringing PACT’s patents
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`12
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`when it decided to defend itself rather than surrender. The totality of the circumstances
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`don’t change the analysis in this case.
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`B.
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`PACT’s Motion
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`1.
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`IPR estoppel
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`
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`“The petitioner in an inter partes review of a claim in a patent under this chapter
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`that results in a final written decision under section 318(a) . . . may not assert either in a
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`civil action arising in whole or in part under section 1338 of title 28 . . . that the claim is
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`invalid on any ground that the petitioner raised or reasonably could have raised during
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`the inter partes review.” 35 U.S.C. § 315(e)(2). The words “reasonably could have raised”
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`refer to all grounds that a petitioner could have included in an IPR petition. See Cal. Inst.
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`of Tech. v. Broadcom Ltd., 25 F.4th 976, 991 (Fed. Cir. 2022). The raisable bases for
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`invalidity during IPR are limited to “prior art consisting of patents or printed publications.”
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`35 U.S.C. § 311(b). On its face, this rule exempts from IPR estoppel prior art references
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`based on physical devices.
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`Although PACT asks me to disregard Intel’s invalidity arguments based on physical
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`products, it hasn’t shown that any of the physical prior art references that it challenges
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`match the printed publications that Intel raised in IPR proceedings. PACT tries to string
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`together printed references that it claims are “cumulative” of the physical products. But
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`PACT hasn’t pointed me to any legal basis to parse Intel’s legal contentions to decide
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`whether the physical device portion is “cumulative.” PACT cites several cases in which
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`13
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`courts applied IPR estoppel despite the inclusion of physical device prior art in a reference.
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`But those cases are distinguishable because, in each case, the court determined there was
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`a corresponding printed publication matching the physical device. For example, in Wasica
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`Fin. GmbH v. Schrader Int’l, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 3d 448, 454 (D. Del. 2020), Judge Stark noted
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`that the parties didn’t dispute that each the physical product references were fully
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`disclosed in a publication, and that the only difference from the IPR proceeding was the
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`inclusion of the physical device. Similarly, in Milwaukee Elec. Tool Corp. v. Snap-On Inc.,
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`271 F. Supp. 3d 990, 1032 (E.D. Wis. 2017), the court drew a distinction between the
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`printed materials associated with a physical specimen and the specimen itself. It allowed
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`the latter, even if they fell within the scope of the IPR. Other cases PACT cites come to the
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`same conclusion. See Cal. Inst. Of Tech. v. Broadcom Ltd., No. CV 16-3714-GW(AGRx),
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`2019 WL 8192255 at *7 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2019).
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`
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`PACT asks me to “dig into the substance of [Intel’s] references and determine that
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`the physical devices do not add anything beyond the written references,” but I won’t. See
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`Microchip Tech. Inc. v. Aptiv Servs. US LLC, No. 1:17-cv-01194, 2020 WL 4335519 at *4 (D.
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`Del. Jul. 28, 2020). Intel disputes whether the documents PACT cites were either available
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`to it or include all the relevant features of the physical product, and its expert will testify
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`that the combination of the physical and printed prior art is significant. I have no basis to
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`disregard such testimony and those references.
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`2.
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`Inequitable conduct
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`14
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`
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`The inequitable conduct defense bars enforcement of a patent if, during the
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`prosecution of that patent, the patentee misrepresented or omitted material information
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`with the specific intent to deceive the Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”). In re
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`Rembrandt Techs. LP Patent Litig., 899 F.3d 1254, 1272 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting
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`Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1285-87 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en
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`banc)). Intent and materiality are separate elements. Id. Materiality means but-for
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`materiality. Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1291. ”Prior art is but-for material if the PTO would
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`have denied a claim had it known of the undisclosed prior art.” Cal. Inst. Of Tech., 25 F.4th
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`at 991. (Fed. Cir. 2021). Intent to deceive must be the single most reasonable inference
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`drawn from the evidence if there are other possible reasons for the patentee’s actions.
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`Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1290.
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`
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`Intel points to four actions it says are grounds for inequitable conduct. The first is
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`that PACT intentionally buried prior art references in its patent applications. Intel argues
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`that the PTO would have denied the ‘593 and ‘908 Patents based on that prior art. There
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`are disputes of material fact regarding the materiality of those prior art references and
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`whether PACT intentionally buried them to deceive the PTO. For example, Intel’s expert
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`will testify that the reference was not cumulative of others provided to the PTO, and that
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`it would have been material. Intel also cites evidence that despite the PTO’s repeated
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`objections to PACT’s “voluminous” information disclosure statements containing only
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`marginally relevant or irrelevant citations, and PACTs awareness of the importance of the
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`prior art in question, PACT continued to dump documents. This testimony suffices.
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`Therefore, I won’t grant summary judgment on the inequitable conduct defense.
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`PACT argues that the Federal Circuit’s holding in Fiskars, Inc. v. Hung Mfg. Co., 221
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`F.3d 1318, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2000) precludes basing an inequitable conduct defense on
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`burying. I rejected that argument in a prior order (See D.I. 151 at 3 (“The Federal Circuit
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`has recognized burying as a cognizable claim in Molins. Molins PLC v. Textron, Inc., 48
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`F.3d 1172 (Fed. Cir. 1995). Nothing in Fiskars suggests the Federal Circuit overturned that
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`precedent.”).) PACT doesn’t cite anything in its brief that changes my mind.
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`The remainder of Intel’s inequitable conduct contentions are irrelevant because
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`burying is a sufficient ground, so this defense will remain in the case. I won’t parse each
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`basis for inequitable conduct to decide how Intel may assert the defense. PACT may object
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`to evidence of that conduct in limine or at a later stage of proceedings.
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`3. Marking
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`PACT seeks summary judgment of Intel’s marking defense. The defense was
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`relevant only to the ‘301 and ‘047 Patents. I’m granting summary judgment on the former
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`patent, and the Federal Circuit invalidated the latter, so the Motion on this defense is
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`moot.
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`4.
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`Intel’s Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Affirmative Defenses, And Intel’s
`First Counterclaim
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`PACT moved for summary judgment on Intel’s Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Affirmative
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`Defenses, as well as Intel’s First counterclaim. Intel doesn’t contest it, so I’ll grant summary
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`judgment.
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`IV.
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`CONCLUSION
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`The Court will grant summary judgment on the ‘301 Patent, as well as Intel’s Fifth,
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`Sixth, and Seventh Affirmative defenses, and Intel’s First Counterclaim. An appropriate
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`Order follows.
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`BY THE COURT:
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`/s/ Joshua D. Wolson
`JOSHUA D. WOLSON, J.
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`March 24, 2023
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