Case 1:20-cv-01629-RGA-JLH Document 46 Filed 07/12/21 Page 1 of 13 PageID #: 557
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`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
`
`
`RIDESHARE DISPLAYS, INC.,
`
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`)))))))))
`
`
`)
`
`
`
`
`v.
`
`
`LYFT, INC.,
`
`
`Defendant.
`______________________________________
`
`
`
`
`
`
`C.A. No. 20-1629-RGA-JLH
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`
`
`
`
`
`REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
`Pending before the Court is Defendant Lyft, Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss the Complaint
`
`Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). (D.I. 14.) As announced at the hearing on June 10, 2021, I
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`recommend that the Court DENY Lyft, Inc.’s motion without prejudice to Lyft’s ability to raise
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`its 35 U.S.C. § 101 arguments at the summary judgment stage.
`
`I.
`
`LEGAL STANDARDS
`
`A. Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim
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`A defendant may move to dismiss a complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
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`12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain
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`sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
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`Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
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`570 (2007)). A claim is plausible on its face when the complaint contains “factual content that
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`allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
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`alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). A possibility of relief is not enough. Id. “Where
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`a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability, it ‘stops short of
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`the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550
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`

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`Case 1:20-cv-01629-RGA-JLH Document 46 Filed 07/12/21 Page 2 of 13 PageID #: 558
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`U.S. at 557).
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`In determining the sufficiency of the complaint, I must assume all “well-pleaded facts” are
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`true but need not assume the truth of legal conclusions. Id. at 679. “[W]hen the allegations in a
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`complaint, however true, could not raise a claim of entitlement to relief, this basic deficiency
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`should be exposed at the point of minimum expenditure of time and money by the parties and the
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`court.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558 (internal quotation marks omitted).
`
`B.
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`Patent Eligibility Under 35 U.S.C. § 101
`
`Section 101 defines the categories of subject matter that are patent eligible. It provides:
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`“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition
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`of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the
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`conditions and requirements of this title.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. The Supreme Court has recognized
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`three exceptions to the broad statutory categories of patent-eligible subject matter: “laws of nature,
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`natural phenomena, and abstract ideas” are not patent-eligible. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175,
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`185 (1981). “Whether a claim recites patent-eligible subject matter is a question of law which may
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`contain disputes over underlying facts.” Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1368 (Fed. Cir.
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`2018).
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`The Supreme Court has established a two-step test for determining whether patent claims
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`are invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208 (2014). In step
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`one, the court must “determine whether the claims at issue are directed to a patent-ineligible
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`concept.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 218. This first step requires the court to “examine the ‘focus’ of the
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`claim, i.e., its ‘character as a whole,’ in order to determine whether the claim is directed to an
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`abstract idea.” Epic IP LLC v. Backblaze, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 3d 733, 736 (D. Del. 2018) (Bryson,
`
`J.) (quoting SAP Am., Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC, 898 F.3d 1161, 1167 (Fed. Cir. 2018); Internet
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`Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d 1343, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2015)).
`2
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`

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`Because “all inventions . . . embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or apply laws of nature, natural
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`phenomena, or abstract ideas,” Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., 566 U.S. 66, 71
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`(2012), “courts ‘must be careful to avoid oversimplifying the claims’ by looking at them generally
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`and failing to account for the specific requirements of the claims.” McRO v. Bandai Namco Games
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`Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting In re TLI Commc’ns LLC Pat. Litig., 823
`
`F.3d 607, 611 (Fed. Cir. 2016)); see also Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1337
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`(Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[D]escribing the claims at [too] high [a] level of abstraction and untethered from
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`the language of the claims all but ensures that the exceptions to § 101 swallow the rule.”). “At
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`step one, therefore, it is not enough to merely identify a patent-ineligible concept underlying the
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`claim; [the court] must determine whether that patent-ineligible concept is what the claim is
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`‘directed to.’” Rapid Litig. Mgmt. Ltd. v. CellzDirect, Inc., 827 F.3d 1042, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
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`If the claims are not directed to a patent-ineligible concept, then the claims are patent-eligible
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`under § 101 and the analysis is over. If, however, the claims are directed to a patent-ineligible
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`concept, then the analysis proceeds to step two.
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`At step two, the court “consider[s] the elements of each claim both individually and as an
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`ordered combination” to determine if there is an “inventive concept—i.e., an element or
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`combination of elements that is sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to
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`significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible concept] itself.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 217-18
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`(internal quotations and citations omitted). “It is well-settled that mere recitation of concrete,
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`tangible components is insufficient to confer patent eligibility to an otherwise abstract idea.” TLI
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`Commc’ns, 823 F.3d at 613. Thus, “[m]erely reciting the use of a generic computer or adding the
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`words ‘apply it with a computer’” does not transform a patent-ineligible concept into patent
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`eligible subject matter. Two-Way Media Ltd. v. Comcast Cable Commc’ns, LLC, 874 F.3d 1329,
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`
`
`3
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`Case 1:20-cv-01629-RGA-JLH Document 46 Filed 07/12/21 Page 4 of 13 PageID #: 560
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`1338 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Alice, 573 U.S. at 223). Nor is there an inventive concept when the
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`claims “[s]imply append[ ] conventional steps, specified at a high level of generality” to a patent
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`ineligible concept. Alice, 573 U.S. at 222.
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`Conversely, claims pass muster at step two when they “involve more than performance of
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`well-understood, routine, and conventional activities previously known to the industry.”
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`Berkheimer, 881 F.3d at 1367 (citation and internal marks omitted). “The mere fact that something
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`is disclosed in a piece of prior art . . . does not mean it was well-understood, routine, and
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`conventional.” Id. at 1369. Moreover, “an inventive concept can be found in the non-conventional
`
`and non-generic arrangement of known, conventional pieces.” Bascom Glob. Internet Servs., Inc.
`
`v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2019). Whether an activity was well-
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`understood, routine, or conventional to a person of ordinary skill in the art is a question of fact.
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`Berkheimer, 881 F.3d at 1368.
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`II.
`
`DISCUSSION
`
`My report and recommendation regarding the pending motion was announced from the
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`bench at the conclusion of the hearing as follows:
`
`This is my report and recommendation on the pending
`motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim in RideShare Displays,
`Inc. v. Lyft, Inc. That’s [Civil Action] Number 20-1629. The motion
`is at Docket Number 14.
`
` have reviewed the parties’ briefing on the motion as well
`as their supplemental 101-day letters.1 I’ve also carefully
`considered the argument[s] that the parties made this morning at the
`hearing. I will summarize the reason[s] for my recommendation [in
`a moment], but before I do, I want to be clear that my failure to
`address [a] particular argument[ ] does not mean that I did not
`consider it. I also note that, while we will not be issuing a separate,
`
` I
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`
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`1 (D.I. 15, 17, 20, 39, 40.)
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`4
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`

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`issue a written document
`written recommendation, we will
`incorporating the recommendation I’m about to make.
`
`For the following reasons, I recommend that the Court deny
`Lyft’s motion to dismiss without prejudice to Lyft’s ability to renew
`its § 101 arguments at the summary judgment stage.
`
`[Background]
`
`RSDI filed this suit for patent infringement on November 30,
`2020, and, shortly thereafter, filed its first amended complaint.2
`RSDI’s amended complaint asserts five patents against Lyft. All
`five are entitled “Vehicle Identification System,” and they all have
`the same specification.3 There are a total of 45 claims across the
`five patents.
`
`On February 9, 2021, Lyft moved to dismiss the FAC.4 Lyft
`contends that every claim of each of the five patents in suit [is]
`directed to patent-ineligible subject matter and, therefore, is
`unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 101 and the Supreme Court’s
`decision in Alice.5 [Lyft also contends that the FAC fails to plead
`facts sufficient to state a claim for infringement of the ’199 Patent.]
`
`[Discussion]
`
`I’m not going to read into the record the law that applies to
`motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of
`Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) or the law that applies to the Court’s
`assessment of validity under § 101. I previously set forth the
`applicable legal standards in another report and recommendation,
`CoolTVNetwork.com v. Facebook.6 I incorporate those legal
`standards by reference and hereby adopt them into my report.
`
`
`2 (D.I. 1, 6.)
`
`
`
`3 The asserted patents are U.S. Patent. Nos. 9,892,637 (“’637 Patent”), 10,169,987 (“’987
`Patent”), 10,395,525 (“’525 Patent”), 10,559,199 (“’199 Patent”), and 10,748,417 (“’417 Patent”).
`
`4 (D.I. 14.)
`
`5 See Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208 (2014).
`
`6 See CoolTVNetwork.com v. Facebook, Inc., C.A. No. 19-292-LPS-JLH, 2019 WL
`4415283 at *3, *10-11 (D. Del. Sept. 16, 2019).
`
`
`
`5
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`

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`[Invalidity Under § 101]
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`Starting with the 101 argument, I conclude that Lyft’s 101
`motion should be denied without prejudice to Lyft’s ability to re-
`raise invalidity under § 101 at the summary judgment stage. I reach
`this conclusion for three independent reasons.
`
`First, as a threshold matter, I’m unpersuaded by Lyft’s
`assertion that it is appropriate at this stage to treat claim 1 of the ’987
`Patent as representative such that all of the claims rise and fall with
`that claim.7 As I mentioned, there are [a] total of 45 claims across
`the five asserted patents. After carefully reviewing the claims, I
`agree with RSDI that claim 1 of the ’987 Patent is not necessarily
`representative of all of the claims of all of the patents.
`
`[As] one example, some of the claims additionally require
`that the controller [ ] transmit an indicator signal to a mobile device
`associated with a rider, which, as the specification explains, can
`allow the driver to verify that he or she is picking up the correct
`rider.8 As another example, some claims also require that the
`indicator signal be transmitted from the controller only when the
`rider and driver are within a predetermined distance of one another.9
`
`7 Claim 1 of the ’987 Patent reads:
`
`1. A vehicle identification system, comprising:
`a display associated with a vehicle, wherein the display is located to
`be visible from an exterior of the vehicle by a rider;
`a controller communicatively coupled to a network and configured
`to, in response to receipt of a signal from a user, generate
`and transmit a first signal representing an indicator via the
`network to a mobile communication device associated with
`a driver of the vehicle; and
`wherein, in response to receiving the first signal, the mobile
`communication device associated with the driver of the
`vehicle generates and transmits a second signal representing
`the indicator to the display, the indicator identifies the
`vehicle.
`
`8 See, e.g., ’637 Patent, claim 13 (controller generates signals which are transmitted to
`mobile communication devices associated with the driver and user); id. at 5:61-65 (“Once the user
`P has identified the vehicle 20, the user P may be requested to show the indicator 111 displayed
`on his/her mobile communication device 140 to the driver D, e.g., to allow the driver D to verify
`that he/she is picking up the person who actually requested the ride service.”).
`
`9 See, e.g., ’637 Patent, claim 1; ’199 Patent, claim 1.
`
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`6
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`
`As I will explain in a minute, I agree with RSDI that it would
`be inappropriate at this stage of the case to conclude, as a matter of
`law, that all of the claimed arrangements are generic and
`conventional. Accordingly, I cannot conclude at this stage of the
`case that claim 1 of the ’987 Patent is representative of all of the
`claims in the asserted patents.
`
`Moving to Alice step one, I’m not persuaded at this stage of
`the case that all of the claims are directed to an abstract idea, and
`that is the second reason that I recommend denying the motion to
`dismiss.
`
`At step one of the Alice inquiry, I must “examine the ‘focus’
`of the claim, i.e., its ‘character as a whole,’ in order to determine
`whether the claim is directed to an abstract idea.”10 Lyft asserts that
`all of the claims are directed to the abstract idea of “identifying a
`particular vehicle using visual indicators.”11
`
`As an initial matter, I am concerned that Lyft has done what
`the Federal Circuit has cautioned against: its description of the focus
`of the claims is at too high a level of abstraction and is “untethered
`from the language of the claims.”12 While there is no dispute that
`all of the claims are [ ] directed to systems and methods for vehicle
`identification, the claim language does contain some detail about the
`manner in which those vehicles are identified.13
`
`In particular, most of the claims require the communication
`of an indicator by a separate controller to mobile devices associated
`with the driver and the display of that indicator on the exterior of the
`vehicle where it can be viewed by the rider so that they can verify
`they are getting into the correct vehicle. Some claims additionally
`require that the controller also generate a signal to be sent to the
`passenger which the driver can use to verify that he or she is picking
`up the correct rider. [Moreover,] the specification suggests that,
`prior to the patented invention, there was a need to improve rider
`
`10 Epic IP, 351 F. Supp. 3d at 736.
`
`11 (D.I. 15 at 3.)
`
`12 Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1337.
`
`13 Cf. Core Wireless Licensing S.A.R.L. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 880 F.3d 1356, 1362-63 (Fed.
`Cir. 2018) (claim covering a “particular manner of summarizing and presenting information in
`electronic devices” was not directed to an abstract idea).
`
`
`
`7
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`

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`and driver security and that the claimed invention, with a separate
`controller that sends a verification signal to the driver and the rider,
`is a solution to that problem.14
`
`Thus, at this point in the case, I’m unpersuaded that all 45
`claims are only directed to the abstract idea of “identifying a
`particular vehicle using visual indicators.”15 However, I cannot say
`on this record that the claims are not directed to one or more other
`abstract ideas yet to be articulated. Accordingly, I recommend that
`Lyft be given a chance to re-raise its step one arguments at the
`summary judgment stage.
`
`Before I leave step one, I have a couple of other comments.
`At this stage in the development of § 101 law, it is widely
`acknowledged that there is no single, comprehensive definition of
`what is an abstract idea and that determining which claims are
`directed to abstract ideas and which are not has not proved to be a
`simple task. The Federal Circuit has indicated that it is thus also [ ]
`useful [ ] at step one to compare the claims at issue to claims that
`have been considered in other decisions.16
`
`Accordingly, I also compared the claims at issue in this case
`to several lines of cases in which the Federal Circuit found claims
`to be abstract ideas. Judge Bryson, sitting as a District Court Judge
`in our district, summarized three of those lines of cases in his
`opinion in Epic v. Backblaze.17
`
`One line of cases, including Alice, holds that “method[s] of
`organizing human activity,” such as fundamental economic
`
`
`14 See, e.g., ’987 Patent, 1:59-61.
`
`15 Cf. Mod Stack LLC v. Aculab, Inc., No. 18-332-CFC, 2019 WL 3532185, at *4 (D. Del.
`Aug. 2, 2019) (denying motion to dismiss under § 101 when the defendant’s articulation of the
`abstract idea was oversimplified); 3G Licensing, S.A. v. HTC Corp., No. 17-83-LPS, 2019 WL
`2904670, at *2 (D. Del. July 5, 2019) (“While it may be possible that claim 1 could be accurately
`characterized as directed to some abstract idea, all I need to decide today [at the motion to dismiss
`stage] is that the claim is not directed to the abstract idea articulated by defendant.”); Groove Dig.,
`Inc. v. Jam City, Inc., No. 18-1331-RGA, 2019 WL 351254, at *3 (D. Del. Jan. 29, 2019) (denying
`motion to dismiss under § 101 without prejudice to renew the issue on summary judgment when
`the defendant’s proposed abstract idea did not “satisfactorily capture the substance of the claims”).
`
`16 See Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1334.
`
`17 351 F. Supp. 3d at 737-740.
`
`8
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`practices, are unpatentable.18 I am not persuaded that this case is
`like those cases.
`
` A
`
` second line of cases, including Enfish and Core Wireless,
`draws the distinction between claims that are directed to an
`improvement in computer technology and claims that use a
`computer to perform typical computer tasks.19 But the distinctions
`drawn in that line of cases, in my view, are most appropriately
`applied to inventions directed to computer applications and
`software. The asserted patents here are not directed solely to a
`computer application but to a method implemented using computer
`technology.
`
` A
`
` third line of cases, including Interval Licensing and
`Intellectual Ventures [ ], asks whether a claim lists functions with
`general terms rather than reciting a specific means of achieving the
`claimed function.20 Whether the claims here fall under this line of
`cases is a closer question. Indeed, this case has, as Lyft suggests,
`similarities to the claims in Secured Mail that the Federal Circuit
`found were directed to an abstract idea.21 As in Secured Mail, the
`claims here have steps that are not limited by rules as to how those
`steps are achieved. I also think that the claims here have similarities
`to the Bascom case relied on by RSDI insofar as there is a credible
`argument that the invention itself is directed to how certain
`conventional elements are arranged, notwithstanding [that] the
`Federal Circuit in Bascom stated that the claims there did not
`“readily lend themselves to a step-one finding that they are directed
`to a nonabstract idea.”22
`
`In sum, I do think that it is a close question. However, even
`if I agreed with Lyft that every single one of the claims was directed
`to an abstract idea, the motion should still be denied at step two.
`
`
`
`
`18 Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 220-21.
`
`19 See Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1326; Core Wireless, 880 F.3d at 1361-63.
`
`20 See Interval Licensing LLC v. AOL, Inc., 896 F.3d 1335, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2018);
`Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Fin. Corp., 850 F.3d 1332, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
`
`21 See Secured Mail Solutions LLC v. Universal Wilde, Inc., 873 F.3d 905, 911 (Fed. Cir.
`
`22 See Bascom, 827 F.3d at 1349.
`
`9
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`2017).
`
`
`
`

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`Case 1:20-cv-01629-RGA-JLH Document 46 Filed 07/12/21 Page 10 of 13 PageID #: 566
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`[B]efore I leave step one, I footnote this final comment. The
`systems and methods recited by the claims here incorporate various
`tangible components, and while I’m mindful of the Federal Circuit’s
`warning that mere recitation of concrete, tangible components is
`insufficient to confer patent eligibility to an otherwise abstract idea,
`I’m also mindful of the Supreme Court’s statement that the machine
`or transformation test, while not the sole test, “is a useful and
`important clue, an investigative tool, for determining whether some
`claimed inventions” satisfy § 101.23 And the machine or
`transformation test appears to be satisfied here.
`
` will now turn to step two of Alice. Even if I were to assume
`that every claim is directed to an abstract idea, I conclude that there
`are disputes of fact that preclude a holding at step two that the claims
`lack an inventive concept.
`
`In the prehearing letters to this Court, the parties analogized
`the claims of the asserted patents to other claims assessed by the
`Federal Circuit. Lyft argues that the claims at issue here are most
`like the claimed mail identification systems found ineligible under
`§ 101 in Secured Mail.24 RSDI argues that the claims are most like
`the internet filtering system that survived a motion to dismiss in
`Bascom.25
`
`The claims here have similarities to both cases, but I
`ultimately agree with RSDI that Bascom prevents the Court from
`concluding, as a matter of law, that the claims here lack an inventive
`concept. Bascom reiterated the principal that an inventive concept
`can be found in the “non-conventional and non-generic arrangement
`of known, conventional pieces.”26 The invention at issue in Bascom
`was a system for filtering internet sites. Each of the individual
`limitations were alleged to be known generic components. There,
`the Federal Circuit concluded that, notwithstanding that filtering
`internet concepts was a known concept, an arrangement where the
`filtering list was located on a remote server instead of on local
`
` I
`
`
`23 Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 604 (2010).
`
`24 (D.I. 40 at 2.)
`
`25 (D.I. 39 at 2-3.)
`
`26 Bascom, 827 F.3d at 1350.
`
`
`
`10
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`hardware could not be said, as a matter of law, to have been
`conventional or generic.27
`
`In this case, RSDI conceded during the argument today that
`the individual elements of the claims are all generic components.28
`Nevertheless, I agree with RSDI that, like in Bascom, there remains
`at least a dispute of fact about whether the claimed arrangement of
`those known, conventional pieces is sufficiently “non-conventional
`and non-generic” to provide an inventive concept.
`
`For example, I cannot say on this record that having an
`arrangement with an externally located controller that separately
`communicates the indicator signal to both the driver’s and the rider’s
`mobile devices is, as a matter of law, conventional or generic.
`Moreover, Plaintiff’s first amended complaint, which I must take as
`true at this stage, alleges that the claimed arrangement of generic
`components is not routine [or] conventional and that the claimed
`invention solves a known problem with ridesharing safety with “a
`unique and previously unknown and non-conventional solution.”29
`
`Accordingly, I recommend that Lyft’s motion be denied for
`the separate and independent reason that there is a dispute of fact as
`to whether the claims include an inventive concept at step two of the
`Alice inquiry.30
`
`
`
`
`
`
`27 Id. at 1352.
`
`
`
`28 June 10, 2021, Hearing Tr. at 27:24-28:6.
`
`29 (D.I. 6 ¶¶ 172, 183, 194, 205, 216.)
`
`30 I do not reach RSDI’s argument that Lyft is estopped from asserting that the claims are
`ineligible based on statements Lyft allegedly made to the PTO during the prosecution of U.S.
`Patent No. 10,636,108.
`
`
`
`11
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`Case 1:20-cv-01629-RGA-JLH Document 46 Filed 07/12/21 Page 12 of 13 PageID #: 568
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`[Infringement of the ’199 Patent]
`
`Finally, Lyft contends that the FAC fails to plausibly allege
`that Lyft infringes claim 1 of the ’199 Patent. In particular, Lyft
`argues that the complaint fails to allege that it controls a third party
`that performs all of the method steps of claim 1 of the ’199 Patent,
`including the step of “identifying the vehicle based on appearance
`of a match, by visual observation of the user.”31
`
`RSDI contends that it has pleaded that Lyft controls the
`performance all of the method steps by its drivers and riders. I agree
`with RSDI that it has adequately pleaded that Lyft conditions the
`use of its rideshare service on the performance of each of the
`claimed method steps.
`
`With respect to the identifying [step], the complaint alleges
`that “[u]nder Lyft’s design and control, a rider application . . . is
`provided that, among other things, provides Lyft’s passengers/
`customers, a method by which to identify a particular vehicle
`operated by a Lyft driver.”32 The complaint further alleges that
`
`31 Claim 1 of the ’199 Patent reads:
`
`1. A vehicle identification method implemented as an Application
`on mobile communication devices over a wireless communication
`network, comprising:
`requesting a ride from a transportation service from a mobile
`communication device of a user;
`determining that a vehicle is within a predetermined distance of the
`location of the user;
`generating a notification signal to a mobile communication device
`associated with a driver of the vehicle;
`generating an indicatory signal representing an indicator;
`displaying the indicator based on the notification signal on a display
`associated with the vehicle, the mobile communication
`device associated with the driver, and the user’s mobile
`communication device, wherein the display associated with
`the vehicle is located to be visible from the exterior of the
`vehicle; and
`identifying the vehicle based on appearance of a match, by visual
`observation of the user, between the indicator being
`displayed on the user’s mobile communication device and
`the indicator being displayed on the display associated with
`the vehicle.
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`32 (D.I. 6 ¶ 124.)
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`12
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`Case 1:20-cv-01629-RGA-JLH Document 46 Filed 07/12/21 Page 13 of 13 PageID #: 569
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`“[Lyft] conditions passengers’ use of its transportation services
`network upon the performance of the steps performed by the Rider
`App, and Lyft establishes the manner or timing of the passengers’
`performance.”33 I do not think that RSDI is required to [say] more
`to state a claim for infringement of claim 1 of the ’199 Patent.34
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`[Conclusion]
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`To sum up, for the reasons I discussed, I recommend that the
`Court deny Lyft’s motion to dismiss. That concludes my report and
`recommendation.
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`This Report and Recommendation is filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), (C),
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`Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(1), and District of Delaware Local Rule 72.1. Any
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`objections to the Report and Recommendation shall be filed within fourteen days and limited to
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`ten pages. Any response shall be filed within fourteen days thereafter and limited to ten pages.
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`The failure of a party to object to legal conclusions may result in the loss of the right to de novo
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`review in the district court.
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`The parties are directed to the Court’s “Standing Order for Objections Filed Under Fed. R.
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`Civ. P. 72,” dated October 9, 2013, a copy of which can be found on the Court’s website.
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`Dated: July 12, 2021
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`33 (Id. ¶ 127.)
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`___________________________________
`THE HONORABLE JENNIFER L. HALL
`UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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`34 Cf. Akamai Techs., Inv. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 797 F.3d 1020, 1023 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
`(en banc) (holding that “liability under § 271(a) can also be found when an alleged infringer
`conditions participation in an activity or receipt of a benefit upon performance of a step or steps
`of a patented method and establishes the manner or timing of that performance”).
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`13
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