Case 1:24-cv-00502-JCB Document 36 Filed 01/27/25 Page 1 of 10 PageID #: 520
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`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
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`C.A. No. 24-502 (JCB)
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`)))))))))
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`ETISON LLC d/b/a CLICKFUNNELS,
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`Plaintiff,
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`v.
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`HIGHLEVEL, INC.
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`Defendant.
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`PLAINTIFF ETISON LLC D/B/A CLICKFUNNELS’
`NOTICE OF SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITY
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`Plaintiff Etison LLC d/b/a ClickFunnels hereby provides a copy of Glanta Ltd. v. Soapy
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`Care Ltd., No. 24-365-RGA, 2025 WL 219971 (D. Del. Jan. 16, 2025), the decision that
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`ClickFunnels’ counsel referred to as “Judge Andrews’ decision from last week” (or words to that
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`effect) during the hearing on January 24, 2025.
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`MORRIS, NICHOLS, ARSHT & TUNNELL LLP
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`/s/ Michael J. Flynn
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`
`
`
`Michael J. Flynn (#5333)
`1201 North Market Street
`P.O. Box 1347
`Wilmington, DE 19899
`(302) 658-9200
`mflynn@morrisnichols.com
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`Attorneys for Plaintiff
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`OF COUNSEL:
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`John M. Hintz
`MAYNARD NEXSEN PC
`The Fred F. French Building
`551 Fifth Avenue, Suite 1600
`New York, NY 10176
`(646) 609-9280
`
`
`
` January 27, 2025
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`

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`Case 1:24-cv-00502-JCB Document 36 Filed 01/27/25 Page 2 of 10 PageID #: 521
`Case 1:24-cv-00502-JCB
`Document36_
`Filed 01/27/25
`Page 2 of 10 PagelD #: 521
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`EXHIBIT 1
`EXHIBIT1
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`Case 1:24-cv-00502-JCB Document 36 Filed 01/27/25 Page 3 of 10 PageID #: 522
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`GLANTA LIMITED, Plaintiff, v. SOAPY CARE LTD., and SOAPY..., Slip Copy (2025)
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`2025 WL 219971
`Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
`United States District Court, D. Delaware.
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`GLANTA LIMITED, Plaintiff,
`v.
`SOAPY CARE LTD., and SOAPY USA INC., Defendants.
`
`Civil Action No. 24-00365-RGA
`|
`Filed 01/16/2025
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`Attorneys and Law Firms
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`Philip A. Rovner, Nicole Kathleen Pedi, POTTER ANDERSON & CORROON, LLP, Wilmington, DE; Nicola A. Pisano,
`Regis C. Worley, EVERSHEDS-SUTHERLAND, San Diego, CA, Attorneys for Plaintiff.
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`James Harry Stone Levine, TROUTMAN PEPPER LOCKE LLP, Wilmington, DE, Attorney for Defendants.
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`MEMORANDUM OPINION
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`ANDREWS, U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE:
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`*1 Before me is Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint for failure to state a claim. (D.I. 11). 1 have reviewed the
`parties’ briefing and Plaintiff's notice of supplemental authority. (D.I. 12, 13, 16, 18). For the reasons set forth below,
`Defendants’ motion is GRANTED as to claims 1 and 7 and DENIED without prejudice as all other claims.
`
`
`
`I. BACKGROUND
`Plaintiff Glanta brought this suit against Defendants Soapy Care and Soapy USA (collectively “Soapy”). Glanta asserts patent
`infringement of “at least” claims 1 and 7 of U.S. Patent No. 8,090,155 (“the ’155 patent”). (D.I. 1 at 3–4). Soapy moves to
`dismiss Glanta's complaint (Id.), arguing the asserted claims of the ’155 patent are invalid for lack of patentable subject
`matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. (D.I. 12 at 1).
`
`
`Glanta “develop[s] and market[s] hand washing monitoring technology under the ‘SureWash’ brand.” (D.I. 1 ¶ 1). The
`USPTO issued the ’155 patent in January 2012. (Id. ¶ 8; ’155 patent). It appears to have a priority date of 2006. (D.I. 13 at 3).
`The ’155 patent, titled “Hand Washing Monitoring System,” is directed to a system that provides “hygiene training using
`cameras to give feedback on hand hygiene technique.” (D.I. 1 ¶ 9). Glanta is the assignee of all right, title, and interest in the
`’155 patent. (Id. ¶ 8).
`
`
`Soapy devotes roughly four pages of its briefing to its representative claim analysis. (D.I. 12 at 6–8; D.I. 16 at 2–3). Soapy
`asserts that claim 1, the only independent claim, is representative because all thirty-seven claims are “directed to the same
`basic process” and abstract idea: “analyzing and generating a response to hand washing motion.” (D.I. 12 at 6, 7). Soapy
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`GLANTA LIMITED, Plaintiff, v. SOAPY CARE LTD., and SOAPY..., Slip Copy (2025)
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`argues that the dependent claims “merely add insignificant limitations,” such as “generic components” and “generic image
`processing.” (Id. at 7). Glanta denies that claim 1 is representative. (D.I. 13 at 8). Glanta argues the dependent claims add
`“pioneering improvements” that are not “generic.” (Id.). Glanta argues that the algorithms and programming of the system,
`specified in some of the dependent claims, allow it to analyze hand washing movements in a more comprehensive way than
`existed in the prior art at the time. (Id. at 8, 10–11; see ’155 patent at 2:1–5).
`
`
`“Courts may treat a claim as representative ... if the patentee does not present any meaningful argument for the distinctive
`significance of any claim limitations not found in the representative claim[.]” Mobile Acuity Ltd. v. Blippar Ltd., 110 F.4th
`1280, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2024) (quoting Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2018)). “The patent challenger
`who identifies a claim as representative of a group of claims bears the initial burden to make a prima facie showing that a
`group of claims are substantially similar and linked to the same ineligible concept.” Id. (internal citation omitted). “Once this
`occurs, the burden shifts to the patent owner to present non-frivolous arguments as to why the eligibility of the identified
`representative claim cannot fairly be treated as decisive of the eligibility of all claims in the group.” Id.
`
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`*2 Certain limitations present in the dependent claims, such as being “battery powered” (claim 5) or being contained within a
`“soap dispensing unit” (claim 7), do appear merely to add generic components. (’155 patent at 13:66–67, 14:5–6). But Glanta
`provides a non-frivolous argument as to why claim 1 should not be treated as representative for all claims and I am not
`convinced that Soapy met its burden to prove otherwise. Therefore, I will limit analysis to the two clearly-asserted claims:
`claim 1 and claim 7. Claim 1 is clearly representative of claim 7.
`
`
`Claim 1 states:
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`1. A hand washing monitoring system comprising a camera, a processor, the processor being adapted to receive from the
`camera images of hand washing activity, characterized in that, the processor is adapted to:
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`analyse mutual motion of hands to determine if the hands mutually move in desired poses, and if so, the durations of the
`patterns; and
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`generate a hand washing quality indication according to the analysis.
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`(’155 patent at 13:48–56).
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`Claim 7 states:
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`7. A soap dispensing unit comprising a monitoring system as claimed in claim 1. (’155 patent at 14:5–6).
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`
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`II. LEGAL STANDARD
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`A. Motion to Dismiss
`The Federal Rules require a complainant to provide “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
`entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The Rules allow the accused party to bring a motion to dismiss the claim for failing
`to meet this standard. Fed. R. Civ. P 12(b)(6). A Rule 12(b)(6) motion may be granted only if, accepting the well-pleaded
`allegations in the complaint as true and viewing them in the light most favorable to the complainant, a court concludes that
`those allegations “could not raise a claim of entitlement to relief.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007).
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`GLANTA LIMITED, Plaintiff, v. SOAPY CARE LTD., and SOAPY..., Slip Copy (2025)
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`“Though ‘detailed factual allegations’ are not required, a complaint must do more than simply provide ‘labels and
`conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.’ ” Davis v. Abington Mem'l Hosp., 765 F.3d 236,
`241 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). I am “not required to credit bald assertions or legal conclusions
`improperly alleged in the complaint.” In re Rockefeller Ctr. Props., Inc. Sec. Litig., 311 F.3d 198, 216 (3d Cir. 2002). A
`complaint may not be dismissed, however, “for imperfect statement of the legal theory supporting the claim asserted.”
`Johnson v. City of Shelby, 574 U.S. 10, 11 (2014).
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`
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` A
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` complainant must plead facts sufficient to show that a claim has “substantive plausibility.” Id. at 12. That plausibility must
`be found on the face of the complaint. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “A claim has facial plausibility when the
`plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
`misconduct alleged.” Id. Deciding whether a claim is plausible is a “context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to
`draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679.
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`B. Patent-Eligible Subject Matter
`*3 Patentability under 35 U.S.C. § 101 is a threshold legal issue. Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 602 (2010). Accordingly, the
`§ 101 inquiry is properly raised at the pleading stage if it is apparent from the face of the patent that the asserted claims are
`not directed to eligible subject matter. See Cleveland Clinic Found. v. True Health Diagnostics LLC, 859 F.3d 1352, 1360
`(Fed. Cir. 2017). “[P]atent eligibility can be determined at the 12(b)(6) stage without the aid of expert testimony.” Yu v. Apple
`Inc., 1 F.4th 1040, 1046 (Fed. Cir. 2021). The inquiry is appropriate at this stage “only when there are no factual allegations
`that, taken as true, prevent resolving the eligibility question as a matter of law.” Aatrix Software, Inc. v. Green Shades
`Software, Inc., 882 F.3d 1121, 1125 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
`
`
`Section 101 of the Patent Act defines patent-eligible subject matter. It provides: “Whoever invents or discovers any new and
`useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a
`patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. The Supreme Court recognizes three
`categories of subject matter that are not eligible for patents—laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas. Alice
`Corp. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014). The purpose of these exceptions is to protect the “basic tools of scientific
`and technological work.” Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Lab'ys, Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 71 (2012) (internal citation
`omitted). “Method[s] of organizing human activity,” “analyzing information by steps people go through in their minds,” and
`mathematical algorithms have been recognized as categories of abstract ideas. Alice, 573 U.S. at 220, 222; Elec. Power Grp.,
`LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
`
`In Alice, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the framework laid out in Mayo “for distinguishing patents that claim laws of nature,
`natural phenomena, and abstract ideas from those that claim patent-eligible applications of those concepts.” Alice, 573 U.S. at
`217. The framework is a two-step process. Id.
`
`
`At step one, I must decide whether the claims are drawn to a patent-ineligible concept. Id. I determine whether the “focus” of
`the claims is “a specific means or method that improves the relevant technology” or rather is “directed to a result or effect
`that itself is the abstract idea.” Contour IP Holding LLC v. GoPro, Inc., 113 F.4th 1373, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2024) (internal
`citation omitted) (citing McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2016)); see Enfish,
`LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335–36 (Fed. Cir. 2016). At this step, “the claims are considered in their entirety to
`ascertain whether their character as a whole is directed to excluded subject matter.” McRO, 837 F.3d at 1312 (quoting
`Internet Pats. Corp. v. Active Network Inc., 790 F.3d 1343, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2015)). If the claims are not directed to, or
`focused on, a patent-ineligible concept, then the inquiry ends, and the claims are not ineligible under § 101. Id. If the claims
`are directed to a patent-ineligible concept, I proceed to step two. Id.
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`GLANTA LIMITED, Plaintiff, v. SOAPY CARE LTD., and SOAPY..., Slip Copy (2025)
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`At step two, I “scrutinize the claim elements more microscopically[.]” Elec. Power Grp., 830 F.3d at 1354. I must look to
`“the elements of [the] claim both individually and as an ordered combination” to see if there is an “inventive concept—i.e.,
`an element or combination of elements that is sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more
`than a patent upon the ineligible concept itself.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18 (cleaned up). “A claim that recites an abstract idea
`must include additional features to ensure that the claim is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the abstract
`idea.” Id. at 221 (cleaned up).
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`*4 Further, “the prohibition against patenting abstract ideas cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of [the
`idea] to a particular technological environment.” Id. at 222 (alteration in original) (quoting Bilski, 561 U.S. at 610). Thus,
`neither “the mere recitation of a generic computer” nor “vague, functional descriptions of server components” can render an
`abstract idea into a patentable invention. Id. at 223; TLI Commc'ns LLC v. AV Auto., L.L.C. (In re TLI Commc'ns LLC Pat.
`Litig.), 823 F.3d 607, 615 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Likewise, limiting the invention to a particular field does not suffice to confer
`patentability. See Elec. Power Grp., 830 F.3d at 1354 (finding that limiting claims to the “particular technological
`environment of power-grid monitoring” was insufficient alone to render abstract idea patentable).
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`
`
`III. DISCUSSION
`
`A. Alice Step One
`Soapy asserts that the ’155 patent is a “quintessential ‘do it on a computer’ patent.” (D.I. 12 at 11 (quoting Univ. of Fla. Rsch.
`Found., Inc. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 916 F.3d 1363, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2019))). Soapy argues that claim 1 is “directed to an
`unpatentable abstract idea because [it] claim[s] nothing more than the fundamental practice of analyzing and generating a
`response to hand washing motion.” (Id. at 8). Further, Soapy argues that claim 1 recites analyzing hand washing motions
`without providing any particular way that this analysis should take place. (Id. at 12).
`
`
`Glanta argues that the focus of the claims is on an “improved and inventive system” for hand washing “programmed in ways
`not previously suggested in the prior art.” (D.I. 13 at 10). Glanta contends that the patent provides “specific algorithms and
`models” to accomplish the task of hand washing monitoring with precision that exceeds the capabilities of human beings. (Id.
`at 12, 19). Particularly, the algorithms not only monitor prescribed poses during hand washing, but also “ensure that the poses
`are maintained for prescribed durations.” (Id. at 5). Glanta argues that claim 1 should be read in light of the specification,
`which discloses specific “algorithmic and physical improvements in machine vision” previously unknown in the field of hand
`washing technology. (Id. at 13–15). Glanta also notes that the conventionality of patent claims should be assessed as of the
`time of filing. (Id. at 13).
`
`I agree with Soapy that claim 1 is directed to an abstract idea.
`
`
`The claim at issue in McRO, cited by Glanta (Id. at 16), provides an illustrative contrast to claim 1 of the ’155 patent. The
`claim in McRO provided a method for “automatically animating lip synchronization and facial expression of three-
`dimensional characters” using algorithmic rules dealing with “morph weight” and phoneme sequences. McRO, 837 F.3d at
`1307–08. Though not claimed with specificity, “the claimed rules... [were] limited to rules with certain common
`characteristics, i.e., a genus.” Id. at 1313. Previously, human animators had performed this synchronization manually and
`subjectively. Id. at 1307.
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`GLANTA LIMITED, Plaintiff, v. SOAPY CARE LTD., and SOAPY..., Slip Copy (2025)
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`At step one, the Federal Circuit in McRO found that the claim at issue was not directed to an abstract idea because it used a
`“particular type” of “limited rules in a process specifically designed to achieve an improved technological result in
`conventional industry practice.” Id. at 1314, 1316. The rules did not merely “use a computer as a tool to automate
`conventional activity” because the human animators used a different process than the one that was claimed. Id. at 1314. Thus,
`the claims focused on a patentable “means or method of producing a certain result, or effect, and not ... the result or effect
`produced.” Id. at 1314 (citing Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 182 n.7 (1981)). Notably, the limitation to certain types of
`rules in the McRO claim was “apparent on the face of the claims.” Id. at 1311.
`
`
`*5 In contrast, claim 1 of the ’155 patent claims a system comprising a “camera” and a “processor” configured to (1)
`“analyse” the motion of hands into various poses and the duration of those poses, and (2) “generate” a result. (’155 patent at
`48–56). Looking at claim 1 as a whole, the system focuses on the act of washing one's hands and analyzing conformance with
`a standard—in other words, the system claims the abstract ideas of “organizing human activity,” and “analyzing information
`by steps people go through in their minds” as implemented on a computer. Alice, 573 U.S. at 220, 222; Elec. Power Grp., 830
`F.3d at 1354. Human beings attempting to wash their hands according to a standard would likewise “analyse” how well they
`struck certain poses and how long those poses were held. Performing this activity using a “camera” and a “processor” rather
`than eyes and a brain does not make it patentable. See In re TLI Commc'ns, 823 F.3d at 615.
`
`
`Further, unlike McRO, nothing in the language of claim 1 limits the system to particular algorithms or types of algorithms
`that improve the functioning of the technology. See Contour IP Holding, 113 F.4th at 1379 (citing McRO, 837 F.3d at 1314).
`It is true that at step one the claims must be read in light of the specification. Packet Intelligence LLC v. NetScout Sys., 965
`F.3d 1299, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2020); Elec. Power Grp., 830 F.3d at 1355. The specification of the ’155 patent includes more
`detail than the claims. But details in the specification are meant to provide context for the claims and do not factor into the
`patentability analysis if those details are not also claimed. See AI Visualize, Inc. v. Nuance Commc'ns Inc., 97 F.4th 1371,
`1379 (Fed. Cir. 2024). “Even a specification full of technical details about a physical invention may nonetheless conclude
`with claims that claim nothing more than the broad law or abstract idea underlying the claims, thus preempting all use of that
`law or idea.” ChargePoint, Inc. v. SemaConnect, Inc., 920 F.3d 759, 769 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
`
`
`The claims found to be directed to an abstract idea in Electric Power Group are more analogous to claim 1 of the ’155 patent.
`The representative claim in Electric Power Group disclosed a method of “detecting and analyzing events in real-time” from
`multiple data streams on an interconnected electric power grid, displaying results of that analysis, and “deriving a composite
`indicator of reliability that is an indicator of power grid vulnerability.” Elec. Power Grp., 830 F.3d at 1351–52. In that case,
`the Federal Circuit described the claims as focused on a “combination of ... abstract-idea processes.” Id. at 1354. Specifically,
`the claims disclosed “a process of gathering and analyzing information of a specified content, then displaying the results, and
`not any particular assertedly inventive technology for performing those functions.” Id. Unlike Enfish, in which there was a
`claimed advance that improved computer functionality, the focus of the claims in Electric Power Group was on
`“independently abstract ideas that use computers as tools.” Id. (citing Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1335–36).
`
`
`Like claim 1 of the ’155 patent, the claims in Electric Power Group did not “require a new source or type of information, or
`new techniques for analyzing it” and new algorithms were not claimed. Id. at 1355. Also similar to claim 1, nothing in the
`Electric Power Group claims “require[d] anything other than off-the-shelf, conventional computer, network, and display
`technology for gathering, sending, and presenting the desired information.” Id.
`
`
`Glanta directed my attention to Contour IP in its notice of supplemental authority. (D.I. 18). This case further supports a
`finding that claim 1 is directed to unpatentable subject matter. The claims in Contour IP were directed to a portable digital
`camera that simultaneously generated both high quality and low quality video recordings so that the low quality video could
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`be streamed to a remote device and reviewed. Contour IP, 113 F.4th at 1376. The claim language in the Contour IP patent
`disclosed a processor configured to generate two data streams of differing quality while recording. Id.
`
`
`*6 The Federal Circuit determined that, in order to effect parallel data stream processing, this limitation “require[d] specific,
`technological means ...that in turn provide[d] technological improvement to the real time viewing capabilities ... on a remote
`device.” Id. at 1379. Simply employing conventional components, such as a processor and a camera, did not alone mean that
`the claim was directed to an abstract idea. Id. at 1380. Rather, the claim language in Contour IP caused the conventional
`camera component to “operate differently than it otherwise could” through the disclosure of recording multiple video streams
`in parallel and wirelessly sending the lower quality stream to a remote device. Id.
`
`
`Claim 1 of the ’155 patent provides no similar identifiable improvement in the functioning of conventional components or
`otherwise changes how they usually operate. Instead, it “abstractly covers results without regard to a specific process or
`machinery for achieving those results.” Id. at 1379 (cleaned up) (citing McRO, 837 F.3d at 1314). Therefore, I find that, when
`viewed as a whole, the system in claim 1 is directed to the abstract idea of observing and analyzing a user's hand washing
`motions and displaying the results of that analysis.
`
`
`B. Alice Step Two
`At step two, I examine the claim limitations “both individually and as an ordered combination” to determine whether the
`claims disclose an “inventive concept sufficient to transform the claimed abstract idea into a patent eligible application.”
`Alice, 573 U.S. at 217, 221 (cleaned up). If a claim is directed to an abstract idea at step one, to be patentable at step two the
`claim “must include additional features” that “must be more than well-understood, routine, conventional activity.”
`Ultramercial Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 715 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (internal citation omitted).
`
`
`Much of the analysis at step one carries over to step two. As the Federal Circuit stated in In re Killian:
`
`We have explained that claims for methods that improve an existing technological process include an inventive
`concept at step two. And claims that recite a specific, discrete implementation of the abstract idea rather than
`preempting all ways of achieving an abstract idea using a computer may include an inventive concept. But claims
`to an abstract idea implemented on generic computer components, without providing a specific technical solution
`beyond simply using generic computer concepts in a conventional way do not pass muster at step two. Neither
`attempting to limit the use of the idea to a particular technological environment nor a wholly generic computer
`implementation is sufficient.
`
`45 F.4th 1373, 1382–83 (Fed. Cir. 2022) (cleaned up) (internal citations omitted).
`
`
`Glanta points to the inventiveness of the algorithms disclosed in the specification but declines to discuss Alice step two in its
`briefing or identify an “inventive step” present in the claims themselves. (D.I. 13 at 17–18). Glanta also asserts that the
`system performs a task that “would exceed the talents of even the most observant human” because fatigue causes a decline in
`human accuracy. (Id. at 19).
`
`
`As discussed above regarding step 1, despite the contents of the specification, claim 1 discloses only generic computer
`components performing in conventional ways. Claim 1 contains neither a specific technical solution nor a discrete
`implementation of the abstract idea of observing hand washing, analyzing the hand washing, and generating a result.
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`GLANTA LIMITED, Plaintiff, v. SOAPY CARE LTD., and SOAPY..., Slip Copy (2025)
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`Glanta states that algorithms disclosed in the specification provide an improvement on existing technology in that they not
`only monitor a user's poses, but also “ensure that the poses are maintained for prescribed durations.” (Id. at 5). However,
`claim 1 merely says, “analyse mutual motion of hands to determine if the hands mutually move in desired poses, and if so,
`the durations of the patterns.” (’155 patent at 13:52–54). As disclosed in claim 1, the patent would seem to preempt all
`computer implementation of an activity that has been performed by human beings since at least Shakespeare's time.1
`
`1
`
`An observer of Lady Macbeth noted: “It is an accustomed action with her, to seem thus washing her hands. I have
`known her continue in this a quarter of an hour.” William Shakespeare, Macbeth act 5, scene 1, 1. 30–32.
`
`
`
`*7 Further, “the prohibition against patenting abstract ideas cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of [the
`idea] to a particular technological environment.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 222 (alteration in original) (quoting Bilski, 561 U.S. at
`610). Simply housing the system of claim 1 inside a “soap dispensing unit” does not impart claim 7 with an “inventive
`concept.” (see ’155 patent at 14:5–6).
`
`
`Therefore, applying the Alice two-step framework, I find that claims 1 and 7 of the ’155 patent are (1) directed to an abstract
`idea; and (2) fail to recite an inventive concept that would transform them into patentable applications of that idea. Alice, 573
`U.S. 208, 217–18. Claims 1 and 7 are accordingly directed to unpatentable subject matter under § 101. They are the only
`clearly-asserted claims. Therefore, Glanta's complaint (D.I. 1) is DISMISSED with prejudice as to them, but with leave to
`amend as to any of the other claims in the asserted patent.
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`IV. CONCLUSION
`An appropriate order will issue.
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`All Citations
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`Slip Copy, 2025 WL 219971
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`End of Document
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`© 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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` © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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`7
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`Case 1:24-cv-00502-JCB Document 36 Filed 01/27/25 Page 10 of 10 PageID #: 529
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`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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`I hereby certify that on January 27, 2025, I caused the foregoing to be electronically filed
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`with the Clerk of the Court using CM/ECF, which will send notification of such filing to all
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`registered participants.
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`I further certify that I caused copies of the foregoing document to be served on January 27,
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`2025, upon the following in the manner indicated:
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`Daniel M. Silver, Esquire
`Alexandra M. Joyce, Esquire
`MCCARTER & ENGLISH, LLP
`Renaissance Centre
`405 N. King Street, 8th Floor
`Wilmington, Delaware 19801
`Attorneys for Defendant
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`Timothy S. Durst
`Jeffery Baxter
`O’MELVENY & MYERS LLP
`2801 North Harwood Street
`Suite 1600
`Dallas, Texas 752019
`Attorneys for Defendant
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`Robert F. Shaffer
`Khanh Leon
`Patric M. Reinbold
`O’MELVENY & MYERS LLP
`1625 Eye Street, NW
`Washington, DC 20006
`Attorneys for Defendant
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`VIA ELECTRONIC MAIL
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`VIA ELECTRONIC MAIL
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`VIA ELECTRONIC MAIL
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`/s/ Michael J. Flynn
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`Michael J. Flynn (#5333)
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