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`C.A. No. 2022-____-____
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`SHERRIE DEMBROWSKI,
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`Plaintiff,
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`v.
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`SNAP INC.,
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`Defendant.
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`VERIFIED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
`Plaintiff Sherrie Dembrowski (“Plaintiff”), on behalf of herself and similarly
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`situated holders of Class A Common Stock of Snap Inc. (“Snap” or the “Company”),
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`brings this Verified Class Action Complaint (the “Complaint”) to remedy the
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`Company’s violation of 8 Del. C. § 242(b)(2) (“Section 242(b)(2)”). The allegations
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`herein are based on Plaintiff’s knowledge as to herself and, as to all other matters,
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`on information and belief, including counsel’s investigation and review of publicly
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`available information.
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`I. NATURE OF THE ACTION
`This case shows that, while the Delaware General Corporation Law
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`1.
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`(“DGCL”) is broadly enabling, when the legislature wants a stockholder power to
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`be mandatory it knows just how to achieve that objective. Section 242(b)(2)
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`guarantees the holders of any class or series of stock a separate class or series vote
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`on any amendment that adversely affects any of the powers or rights appurtenant to
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`EFiled: Nov 17 2022 10:49AM EST
`Transaction ID 68398341
`Case No. 2022-1042-
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`that stock, “whether or not entitled to vote thereon by the certificate of
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`incorporation.”
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`2.
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`Because voting rights are presumed if not otherwise limited in a charter,
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`the only reasonable reading of the above statutory language is that even if a class of
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`stock is typically not entitled to vote on other matters, a charter amendment
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`adversely affecting the “powers, preferences or special rights” appurtenant to that
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`class of stock still requires an approving vote.
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`3.
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`As explained below, on August 24, 2022, Snap’s controllers (thanks to
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`their power over a class of super-voting shares) adopted an amendment to Article VI
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`of Snap’s Amended and Restated Certificate of Incorporation (the “Charter”), which
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`purports to provide exculpation from personal liability for reckless or grossly
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`negligent conduct to the Company’s officers, including the controllers themselves
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`(the “Charter Amendment”).
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`4. When public market investors acquired Snap’s Class A non-voting
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`shares, they knew they would not get voting rights for most transactions, but that
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`they would in the specific instances when the DGCL assures such a vote. Snap failed
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`to provide the statutorily required separate class vote on the Charter Amendment,
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`even though it eliminated one of the core “powers, preferences or special rights”
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`belonging to its Class A stockholders.
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`5.
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`Since 1986, Section 102(b)(7) of the DGCL has permitted corporate
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`charters to exculpate directors from personal liability for breaches of the duty of
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`care. Since the allocation of managerial responsibility within the basic Delaware
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`corporate structure contemplates directors playing an oversight role but generally
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`relying on the diligence and care of senior officers and other members of
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`management, stockholders have generally supported such charter amendments.
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`6.
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`Since Delaware first recognized the fiduciary duty of care, corporate
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`officers accepted the risk that if they performed in a reckless or grossly negligent
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`manner, they could be sued for damages for breach of their duty of care (and have
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`been handsomely compensated while bearing such risk).
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`7.
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`As of August 1, 2022, however, the Delaware legislature amended the
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`DGCL to permit corporations to offer broad exculpation for corporate officers, even
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`though officers are generally paid many multiples of the amounts paid to outside
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`directors and are expected to perform their jobs in a non-reckless manner.
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`8.
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`The fact that the law permits a company to adopt charter provisions that
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`eliminate the power of stockholders to seek relief for reckless or grossly negligent
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`conduct by enumerated officers does not, however, mean that investors in Delaware
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`companies are required to (or would) approve it. More pertinently, when investors
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`acquire stock pursuant to a statute guaranteeing them a vote on future charter
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`amendments that adversely affect the powers and rights of that class of stock
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`“whether or not” such vote is provided by the relevant articles of incorporation, the
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`company issuing such stock cannot deny those investors such a vote.
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`9.
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`Snap is a camera company, best known for its flagship product,
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`Snapchat. Snapchat is a mobile application that allows users to communicate with
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`family and friends through short videos and images that are deleted by default after
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`a fixed period of time. Like other social media platforms, Snap profits from
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`partnering with advertisers who promote products and content to its users.
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`10.
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`Snap’s two co-founders, primarily through their ownership of all of the
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`Company’s super-voting Class C Common Stock, “control over 99% of the voting
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`power of [Snap’s] outstanding capital stock.” These two co-founders also serve as
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`Snap’s Chief Executive Officer and Chief Technology Officer, i.e., both are
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`Company officers in additional to their roles as members of Snap’s board of directors
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`(the “Board”).
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`11.
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`The Company’s only publicly traded shares are Class A Common
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`Stock, which are not given a vote except as required by law. Accordingly, the power
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`to bring suit to hold fiduciaries accountable for breaching their fiduciary duties is
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`particularly valuable to Class A Common Stockholders.
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`12.
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`Snap’s directors and officers have become the subject of various types
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`of lawsuits, and surely anticipated that claims for breach of duty, including
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`potentially claims for breach of the duty of care, would continue. Moreover, a core
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`entitlement and expectation for Snap’s Class A Common Stockholders is that their
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`officers will conduct their jobs in a manner that is neither reckless nor grossly
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`negligent. And a core power of Class A Common stockholders has been, until the
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`Charter Amendment, the power to enforce such expectation by suing officers who
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`conduct their jobs in a grossly-negligent or reckless manner.
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`13. On August 24, 2022, Snap approved the Charter Amendment and
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`adopted it by written consent of the Class C Common Stockholders, purporting to
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`eliminate one of the “powers, preferences or special rights” appurtenant to
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`ownership of Class A Common Stock — the power to seek relief for reckless or
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`grossly negligent conduct among the Company’s officers. Snap disclosed that the
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`Charter Amendment was adopted following Board approval and submission of
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`written consents of 231,626,943 shares of Class C Common Stock, and the Company
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`said that the Charter Amendment “has been duly adopted in accordance with Section
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`242 of the Delaware General Corporation Law.”
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`14.
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`Since Snap’s co-founders hold all of the Company’s Class C Common
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`Stock, it follows that they voted to exculpate Company officers to the “fullest extent
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`permitted” by Delaware law.
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`15. No vote was solicited or obtained from the Class A Common
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`Stockholders, even though Section 242(b)(2) plainly required such a vote.
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`16.
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`Plaintiff seeks judicial relief to invalidate the Charter Amendment
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`because it was not validly approved by the Class A Common Stockholders.
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`PARTIES
`II.
`Plaintiff Sherrie Dembrowski (as defined above, “Plaintiff”) owns
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`17.
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`shares of Snap Class A Common Stock and has owned Snap Class A Common Stock
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`at all relevant times.
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`18. Defendant Snap (as defined above, “Snap” or the “Company”) is a
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`camera company best known for its flagship product, Snapchat, a mobile camera
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`application which allows users to communicate using photos and short videos. Snap
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`is incorporated in Delaware with its principal executive offices in California.
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`A.
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`FACTUAL BACKGROUND
`III.
`SNAP’S UNUSUAL (AND CONTROVERSIAL) TRI-CLASS STOCK
`STRUCTURE
`19.
`Snap was originally formed as a California LLC, Future Freshman,
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`LLC, in 2010, and incorporated in Delaware as Snapchat, Inc. in 2012. The
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`Company subsequently changed its name to Snap Inc. in 2016.
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`20. When Snap completed its initial public offering (“IPO”) in March 2017,
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`it took a controversial approach: Snap was the first company to conduct an IPO that
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`issued only non-voting shares to the public.
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`21.
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`Since the IPO, Snap’s stock structure contains three classes:
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`a. Class A: Snap issued approximately 1.3 billion shares of Class
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`A Common Stock, which currently do not have voting rights
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`except as required by law, including under Section 242. These
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`shares are publicly traded and a substantial majority of them are
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`owned by public stockholders.
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`b. Class B: Snap issued approximately 22 million shares of Class
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`B Common Stock, which are entitled to one vote per share, and
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`which are not publicly traded.
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`c. Class C: Snap issued approximately 230 million shares of Class
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`C Common Stock, 100% of which are owned by Snap’s co-
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`founders. These shares are entitled to ten votes per share and are
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`not publicly traded.
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`22.
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`In addition to holding nearly all of Snap’s voting power through their
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`ownership of the Class C Common Stock, the co-founders are both Board members
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`and officers of the Company, currently serving as its Chief Executive Officer and
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`Chief Technology Officer. In its annual report, Snap classifies each of these roles
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`as “Executive Officer” positions, and discloses that the Chief Executive Officer role
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`is one of the Company’s mostly highly compensated executive officers.
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`B.
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`SNAP AMENDS ITS CHARTER IN VIOLATION OF SECTION
`242(B)(2)
`23. On August 1, 2022, an amendment to 8 Del. C. § 102(b)(7) (“Section
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`102(b)(7)”) became effective that permits exculpation of officers of Delaware
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`corporations. In particular, Section 102(b)(7) now permits a company’s certificate
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`of incorporation to contain a provision eliminating or limiting the personal liability
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`of an officer for monetary damages for breach of fiduciary duty, except in certain
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`enumerated circumstances.
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`24.
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`The permissive exculpation may apply to a company’s president, chief
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`executive officer, chief operating officer, chief financial officer, chief legal officer,
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`controller, treasurer, or chief accounting officer. Such exculpation may also apply
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`to anyone who “[i]s or was identified in the corporation’s public filings with the
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`United States Securities and Exchange Commission because such person is or was
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`1 of the most highly compensated executive officers of the corporation at any time
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`during the course of conduct alleged in the action or proceeding to be wrongful.”
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`See 10 Del. C. § 3114.
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`25. On August 24, 2022, Snap’s Board approved the Charter Amendment
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`by written consent, followed by written consents from all of Snap’s Class C
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`Common Stock. The Charter Amendment, presented in its entirety below and
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`purportedly “adopted in accordance with Section 242 of the Delaware General
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`Corporation Law,” took effect on August 26, 2022:
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`26.
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`The Charter Amendment, however,
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`is
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`invalid.
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` The Charter
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`Amendment runs afoul of Section 242(b)(2) because the vote of Snap’s Class A
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`Common Stockholders was not solicited, much less obtained.
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`27.
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`Section 242(b)(2) provides that holders of a class of stock are “entitled
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`to vote as a class upon a proposed amendment, whether or not entitled to vote
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`thereon by the certificate of incorporation, if the amendment would . . . alter or
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`change the powers, preferences, or special rights of the shares of such class so as to
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`affect them adversely.”
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`28.
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`The Charter Amendment “alter[ed] or change[ed] the powers,
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`preferences, or special rights of the shares of such class so as to affect them
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`adversely.” The Charter Amendment stripped the holders of Class A Common Stock
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`of the power to hold Snap’s officers personally liable for certain breaches of
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`fiduciary duty (namely, reckless or grossly negligent conduct in breach of the duty
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`of care).
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`29.
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`The Company did not seek or obtain an affirmative vote of a majority
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`of Snap Class A Common Stock, voting as a single class, prior to adopting the
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`Charter Amendment.
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`30. While Class A Common Stockholders knew that they were not
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`acquiring voting rights in general in connection with their shares, at least initially,
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`they still retained the power to sue for breaches of fiduciary duty, including if Snap’s
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`executive officers acted in a reckless or grossly negligent manner. That power to
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`hold officers accountable is valuable. Moreover, Plaintiff and other class members
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`acquired their Class A Common Stock with knowledge that the DGCL assured them
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`a separate class vote on future charter amendments that affected the “powers,
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`preferences or special rights” appurtenant to stock ownership adversely.
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`31. As the largest holders of voting shares of Snap stock, and as Company
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`officers, the co-founders of the Company benefit from the Charter Amendment at
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`the expense of the Class A Common Stockholders. Indeed, the interests of the co-
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`founders are directly in conflict with the interests of Class A Common Stockholders
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`with respect to whether Class A Common Stockholders have the legal power to bring
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`suit to hold officers of the Company personally liable for reckless or grossly
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`negligent performance of their duties.
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`32.
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`The Charter Amendment was adopted in violation of Section 242(b)(2)
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`and is therefore invalid and unenforceable.
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`IV. CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS
`Plaintiff, a holder of Snap Class A Common Stock, brings this action
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`33.
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`individually and as a class action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Rules of the Court of
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`Chancery of the State of Delaware on behalf of herself and all record and beneficial
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`holders of Snap Class A Common Stock (the “Class”) who were injured by the
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`Company’s violation of Section 242(b)(2).
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`34.
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`This action is properly maintainable as a class action.
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`35. A class action is superior to other available methods of fair and efficient
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`adjudication of this controversy.
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`36.
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`The Class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable.
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`According to the Company’s October 21, 2022 Form 10-Q, the Company had
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`1,358,835,657 shares of Class A Common Stock outstanding. The number of Class
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`members is believed to be in the thousands, if not millions, and they are likely
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`scattered across the United States.
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`37.
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`There are questions of law and fact which are common to all Class
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`members and which predominate over any questions affecting only individuals,
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`including, without limitation:
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`a.
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`b.
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`whether the Company violated Section 242(b)(2) with respect to
`the adoption of the Charter Amendment; and
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`the appropriateness of relief, including any equitable, injunctive,
`and/or declaratory remedies.
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`38.
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`Plaintiff’s claims and defenses are typical of the claims and defenses of
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`other Class members, and Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic or adverse to the
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`interests of other Class members. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the
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`interests of the Class.
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`39.
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`Plaintiff is committed to prosecuting this action and has retained
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`competent counsel experienced in litigation of this nature.
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`40. Defendant has acted in a manner that affects Plaintiff and all members
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`of the Class alike, thereby making appropriate injunctive relief and/or corresponding
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`declaratory relief with respect to the Class as a whole.
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`41.
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`The prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the Class
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`would create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual
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`members of the Class, which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for
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`Defendant; or adjudications with respect to individual members of the Class would,
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`as a practical matter, be dispositive of the interest of other members or substantially
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`impair or impede their ability to protect their interests.
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`COUNT I
`Violation of Section 242(b)(2)
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`42.
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`Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation above as if set
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`forth in full herein.
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`43.
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`Section 242(b)(2) requires the separate approval of a specific class of
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`shares to amend a certificate of incorporation “if the amendment would . . . alter or
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`change the powers, preferences, or special rights of the shares of such class so as to
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`affect them adversely.”
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`44. As detailed herein, the Charter Amendment alters or changes the
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`powers, preferences, or special rights of Snap’s Class A Common Stock so as to
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`affect the Class A Common Stock adversely. The Charter Amendment adversely
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`affects the powers, preferences, or special rights of the Company’s Class A Common
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`Stock by stripping their power to hold Snap officers accountable for certain breaches
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`of fiduciary duty.
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`45. As officers and the holders of Snap Class C Common Stock, the co-
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`founders had conflicting interests from the Class A Common Stockholders with
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`respect to the adoption and effectiveness of the Charter Amendment.
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`46. Holders of Snap Class A Common Stock were entitled to a separate
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`class vote on the Charter Amendment pursuant to Section 242(b)(2), but Snap failed
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`to provide holders of the Company’s Class A Common Stock with such a vote.
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`Instead, the Company purported to adopt the Charter Amendment pursuant to
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`Section 242(b)(2) through a vote of only Snap Class C Common Stock, and such
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`approval was invalid.
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`47. As a result, Plaintiff and the Class have been and will continue to be
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`harmed.
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`48.
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`Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to appropriate equitable, injunctive,
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`and/or declaratory relief invalidating the Charter Amendment.
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`PRAYER FOR RELIEF
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`WHEREFORE, Plaintiff demands judgment and relief in her favor and in
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`favor of the Class, and against Defendant, as follows:
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`A.
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`Declaring that the purported Charter Amendment violated Section
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`242(b)(2);
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`B.
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`C.
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`D.
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`Declaring the Charter Amendment void;
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`Certifying the proposed Class;
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`Awarding Plaintiff and the members of the Class their reasonable
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`attorneys’ and experts’ witness fees and other costs; and
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`E.
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`Awarding Plaintiff and the Class such other relief as this Court deems
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`just and equitable.
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`BERNSTEIN LITOWITZ BERGER
` & GROSSMANN LLP
`
` /s/ Daniel E. Meyer
`Gregory V. Varallo (Bar No. 2242)
`Daniel E. Meyer (Bar No. 6876)
`500 Delaware Avenue, Suite 901
`Wilmington, DE 19801
`(302) 364-3600
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`ANDREWS & SPRINGER LLC
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`
` /s/ Craig J. Springer
`Peter B. Andrews (Bar No. 4623)
`Craig J. Springer (Bar No. 5529)
`David M. Sborz (Bar No. 6203)
`Andrew J. Peach (Bar No. 5789)
`Christopher P. Quinn (Bar No. 5823)
`Jackson E. Warren (Bar No. 6957)
`4001 Kennett Pike, Suite 250
`Wilmington, DE 19807
`(302) 504-4957
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`Counsel for Plaintiff
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`OF COUNSEL:
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`Mark Lebovitch
`Sara D. Swartzwelder
`BERNSTEIN LITOWITZ BERGER
` & GROSSMANN LLP
`1251 Avenue of the Americas
`New York, NY 10020
`(212) 554-1400
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`Dated: November 17, 2022
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