Case 1:14-cv-01504-JEB Document 20 Filed 04/10/15 Page 1 of 15
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
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`APP DYNAMIC EHF,
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`Plaintiff,
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`v.
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`Civil Action No. 14-1504 (JEB)
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`ERLING ORMAR VIGNISSON,
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`Defendant.
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`MEMORANDUM OPINION
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`While this case arises from an otherwise commonplace business relationship gone sour,
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`the parties are not the typical ones to enter this Courthouse’s doors. On one side stands Plaintiff
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`App Dynamic ehf, an Icelandic computer-startup company; on the other is Defendant Erling
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`Ormar Vignisson, a former employee and an Icelandic citizen living in Sweden. Their falling
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`out has precipitated this suit alleging, inter alia, breach of contract, an invalid U.S. copyright
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`registration, and fraud on the U.S. Copyright Office. In moving to dismiss, Defendant raises
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`three different grounds for jettisoning the case: lack of personal jurisdiction, lack of subject-
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`matter jurisdiction, and failure to state a claim. The Court need look no farther than the first to
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`grant the Motion.
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`I.
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`Background
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`According to the Complaint, which the Court must credit at this stage, App Dynamic was
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`founded by Pratik Kumar and his wife as an Icelandic computer-software-development company
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`that produces applications for both Apple and Microsoft operating systems. See Compl., ¶¶ 3, 9.
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`In 2008, Kumar began to develop his first application, called Remote Jr. See id., ¶¶ 10-11. The
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`Case 1:14-cv-01504-JEB Document 20 Filed 04/10/15 Page 2 of 15
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`initial version, 1.3, was released in April 2009; Kumar continued to develop the application and
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`released a second version, 2.0, two months later. Id., ¶¶ 12-13.
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`In August of 2009, he hired Vignisson to handle tasks related to Remote Jr., such as
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`marketing, updating website content, providing customer services, and creating updated graphics
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`and user-interface elements. Id., ¶ 15. A third version, 2.2, was subsequently released during
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`Vignisson’s employment on November 10, 2009. Id., ¶ 22. The two men “agreed that Kumar
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`would exclusively own any work created by Defendant related to Remote Jr.™ in performance
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`of his duties, along with any rights, such as copyright, to those works.” Id., ¶ 15. Defendant
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`would receive 20% of the profits as compensation, and this agreement was finalized with a
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`handshake. Id. Such memorialization, impressively, seems to be the rule in Iceland.
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`In April 2010, when Vignisson’s work performance did not meet Kumar’s standards,
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`Defendant was fired. Id., ¶ 27. Kumar requested that Vignisson deliver the master graphic and
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`icon files of the app in return for payment through the end of April, and the parties agreed to this
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`with another good, old-fashioned handshake. Id. Defendant, however, did not turn over the
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`master files and instead wrote Kumar an email claiming that he Vignisson was a copyright owner
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`of Remote Jr. and demanding additional compensation. Id., ¶¶ 28-29.
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`On June 16, 2011, using these master files, Vignisson registered U.S. Copyright
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`Registration No. VA1-805-490 entitled “Remote Jr. – iPhone Application Design.” Id., ¶¶ 33-
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`35, 43. On the registration form, Defendant claimed that he was the copyright owner, did not
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`limit his claim, listed the date of first publication as the date that version 2.2 was released, and
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`certified that all statements were correct. Id., ¶¶ 36-38, 42.
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`On April 26, 2012, Vignisson next sent Apple a cease-and-desist letter, demanding that it
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`stop the sales of Remote HD, a later version of the application that Kumar had developed. Id., ¶¶
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`Case 1:14-cv-01504-JEB Document 20 Filed 04/10/15 Page 3 of 15
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`30-31, 44. He threatened further action against the company if it did not comply and attached his
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`new U.S. copyright registration. Id., ¶¶ 44-45. In March 2014, Vignisson sued Plaintiff and
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`Kumar in the District Court of Reykjaness, Iceland, for allegedly infringing Defendant’s new
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`U.S. copyright over Remote Jr. Id., ¶ 48. The suit was dismissed on December 17, 2014. See
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`Opp., Exh. J (Verdict of the District of Reykjanes in case no. E330/2014) at 9.
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`Plaintiff has responded by filing this action, which alleges the following:
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`Count I: Breach of contract relating to the oral agreements wherein Defendant assigned
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`copyright interests to Kumar. See Compl., ¶ 54.
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`Count II: Declaratory judgment that Plaintiff is the copyright owner of the works claimed
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`in U.S. Copyright Registration No. VA 1-805-490. Id., ¶ 62.
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`Count III: Declaratory judgment that such U.S. copyright registration is invalid. Id., ¶¶
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`65-66, 68.
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`Count IV: Declaratory judgment that Defendant committed fraud upon the U.S.
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`Copyright Office when he knowingly falsified material information on his application, which he
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`intended the office to rely upon in granting the copyright registration. Id., ¶ 74.
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`Vignisson has now filed a Motion to Dismiss. In a rather unorthodox practice, which the
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`Court does not endorse, he filed three separate Memoranda supporting his Motion, one making
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`each of the following arguments: (1) the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction under Federal
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`Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1); (2) it further lacks personal jurisdiction over Defendant under
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`Rule 12(b)(2); and (3) Count II of the Complaint does not state a claim upon which relief may be
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`granted under Rule 12(b)(6).
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`Case 1:14-cv-01504-JEB Document 20 Filed 04/10/15 Page 4 of 15
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`II.
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`Legal Standard
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`As the Court addresses only the question of personal jurisdiction, it will articulate just
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`that standard. Under Rule 12(b)(2), a defendant may move to dismiss a suit if the court lacks
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`personal jurisdiction over him. Personal jurisdiction determines the court’s “authority over the
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`parties . . . , so that the court’s decision will bind them.” Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526
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`U.S. 574, 577 (1999). The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that such jurisdiction exists.
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`See FC Inv. Grp. LC v. IFX Markets, Ltd., 529 F.3d 1087, 1091 (D.C. Cir. 2008). In deciding
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`whether the plaintiff has shown a factual basis for personal jurisdiction over a defendant, the
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`court resolves factual discrepancies in favor of the plaintiff. See Crane v. N.Y. Zoological
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`Soc’y, 894 F.2d 454, 456 (D.C. Cir. 1990). When personal jurisdiction is challenged, “the
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`district court has considerable procedural leeway in choosing a methodology for deciding the
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`motion.” 5B Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller et al., Federal Practice and Procedure §
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`1351 (3d ed. 2004). The court may rest on the allegations in the pleadings, collect affidavits and
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`other evidence, or even hold a hearing. See id.
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`III. Analysis
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`In analyzing the present Motion, the Court first sets forth some general principles
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`regarding personal jurisdiction and then considers the government-contacts exception. After
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`concluding that it has no jurisdiction under the facts alleged, the Court subsequently addresses
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`whether jurisdictional discovery is appropriate and ends by examining the consequences of a
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`finding of no jurisdiction here.
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`A. Personal Jurisdiction
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`Personal jurisdiction may take the form of general or specific jurisdiction. General
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`jurisdiction exists where a non-resident defendant maintains sufficiently systematic and
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`Case 1:14-cv-01504-JEB Document 20 Filed 04/10/15 Page 5 of 15
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`continuous contacts with the forum state, regardless of whether those contacts gave rise to the
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`claim in the particular suit. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S.
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`408, 414-15 (1984). In this case, Plaintiff makes no allegation (in either the Complaint or its
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`Opposition) that Vignisson has had any “systematic and continuous contacts” with this forum.
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`This Court, therefore, cannot exercise general jurisdiction over him.
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`This leaves the possibility of specific jurisdiction. “In contrast to general, all-purpose
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`jurisdiction, specific jurisdiction is confined to adjudication of issues deriving from, or connected
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`with, the very controversy that establishes jurisdiction.” Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations,
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`S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2851 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). In other words,
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`specific jurisdiction exists where a claim arises out of the non-resident defendant’s contacts with
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`the forum. See Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414 n.8; see also United States v. Ferrara, 54 F.3d 825,
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`828 (D.C. Cir. 1995). “A plaintiff seeking to establish specific jurisdiction over a non-resident
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`defendant must establish that specific jurisdiction comports with the forum’s long-arm statute
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`and does not violate due process.” FC Inv. Grp., 529 F.3d at 1094-95 (internal citation omitted).
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`It turns out, however, that the Court need not weigh the due-process implications here
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`because resolution of the jurisdictional question hinges on the District’s long-arm statute. That
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`statute, which has been given an “‘expansive interpretation’” in the District of Columbia, Helmer
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`v. Doletskaya, 393 F.3d 201, 205 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (citation omitted), enables a court to exercise
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`personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant where a claim arises from his transacting any
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`business in the District. See D.C. Code § 13-423(a)(1). Plaintiff argues that Vignisson
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`“transact[ed] business” here by “intentionally and fraudulently register[ing] a U.S. Copyright . . .
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`with the U.S. Copyright Office located in the District of Columbia.” Compl., ¶ 6. This, App
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`Dynamic concludes, subjects him to jurisdiction here.
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`Case 1:14-cv-01504-JEB Document 20 Filed 04/10/15 Page 6 of 15
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`B. Government-Contacts Exception
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`Defendant does not deny that his copyright registration constitutes a “contact” with the
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`District of Columbia, but he nonetheless contends that an exception to the transacting-business
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`prong of the District’s long-arm statute protects him. He cites the so-called “government-
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`contacts principle,” which provides that entry into the District by non-residents for the sole
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`purpose of contacting federal governmental agencies cannot serve as a basis for personal
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`jurisdiction. See Alkanani v. Aegis Def. Srvs. LLC, 976 F. Supp. 2d 13, 25 (D.D.C. 2014);
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`Freiman v. Lazur, 925 F. Supp. 14, 24 (D.D.C. 1996) (citing Envtl. Research Int’l, Inc. v.
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`Lockwood Greene Engineers, Inc., 355 A.2d 808 (D.C. 1976)). This exception derives from the
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`“unique character of the District as the seat of the national government,” and it recognizes that
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`there is a “correlative need for unfettered access to federal departments and agencies for the
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`entire national citizenry.” Envtl. Research, 355 A.2d at 813. To rule otherwise “would pose a
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`threat to free public participation in government” and “would threaten to convert the District of
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`Columbia into a national judicial forum.” Id.
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`Plaintiff rejoins that the government-contacts exception does not apply here because
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`“fraudulent petitions to the federal government are not protected by the government contacts
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`exception.” Opp. at 16. Although such an “exception to the exception” does exist, it is
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`considerably narrower than App Dynamic believes. In fact, in its most recent articulation by the
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`D.C. Court of Appeals, the fraud exception is limited to those petitions that use “the government
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`as an instrumentality of fraud, and thereby cause[] unwarranted government action against
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`another . . . .” Companhia Brasileira Carbureto De Calcio v. Applied Indus. Materials Corp., 35
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`A.3d 1127, 1134 (D.C. 2012) (Companhia II) (internal citations omitted). The background to
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`this D.C.C.A. opinion may prove useful at this point.
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`Case 1:14-cv-01504-JEB Document 20 Filed 04/10/15 Page 7 of 15
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`Companhia originated as a federal action brought here by Brazilian corporations against
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`American corporations based outside of the District of Columbia. See Companhia Brasileira
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`Carbureto De Calcio v. Applied Indus. Materials Corp., 640 F. 3d 369, 370 (D.C. Cir. 2011)
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`(Companhia I). The Brazilian plaintiffs alleged that the American defendants had submitted
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`fraudulent petitions to the U.S. International Trade Commission, located here in Washington,
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`which had led to the ITC’s imposing duties on the Brazilian plaintiffs’ products. Id. The district
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`court dismissed the plaintiffs’ suit for lack of personal jurisdiction under the government-
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`contacts exception. Id.
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`On appeal, the D.C. Circuit acknowledged that the “scope of the government contacts
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`exception is unsettled [ ] under the D.C. Court of Appeals’ precedent.” Id. at 371-72. The
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`Circuit also noted that since the D.C.C.A. “is of course the controlling authority for interpretation
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`of D.C. law, and that court promulgated the government contacts exception,” it was “appropriate
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`to certify to the D.C.C.A.” the following question:
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`Under District of Columbia law, does a petition sent to a federal
`government agency in the District provide a basis for establishing
`personal jurisdiction over the petitioner when the plaintiff has
`alleged
`that
`the petition fraudulently
`induced unwarranted
`government action against the plaintiff?
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`Id. at 371.
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`The D.C.C.A. answered the certified question in the affirmative. The exception it set
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`forth is a narrow one: a non-resident “who uses the government as an instrumentality of fraud,
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`and thereby causes unwarranted government action against another, forfeits the protection of the
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`government contacts exception.” Companhia II, 35 A.3d at 1134 (emphasis added). Put another
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`way, those who enter the District “to fraudulently induce unwarranted government action against
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`others, and succeed in doing so,” will not “be able to avoid defending their actions in this
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`Case 1:14-cv-01504-JEB Document 20 Filed 04/10/15 Page 8 of 15
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`jurisdiction by cloaking themselves in the government contacts doctrine.” Id. at 1133. It is
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`noteworthy, for our purposes, that the D.C.C.A. emphasized the provoking of government action
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`against another; it did not premise jurisdiction on the mere filing of a fraudulent petition.
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`Reading the fraud exception in this circumscribed manner is in keeping with that court’s
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`reasoning. In laying the foundation of the doctrine, it noted the “legitimate concern that
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`recognizing a fraud exception to the government contacts principle could expose the District to
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`an ‘unrelenting wave’ of litigation . . . largely negat[ing] the government contacts exception.”
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`Id. at 1134 (citing Nichols, 783 F. Supp. at 243, and Companhia I, 640 F.3d at 373). The court
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`thus emphasized that “[c]ases in which this fraud exception applies should be rare indeed . . . . It
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`will not be sufficient to allege that the petitioner presented an unbalanced view of the issue or
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`even that he made a false statement.” Id. In addition, “[u]nsupported allegations that a
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`defendant has fraudulently induced unwarranted government action against the plaintiff will not
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`be sufficient to invoke the fraud exception.” Id. at 1134-35 (citing Nichols, 783 F. Supp. at 243-
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`44).
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`Courts in this district have followed this mandate, holding that the contours of this “very
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`narrow fraud exception” are “crystal clear” in requiring both using the government as an
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`instrumentality of fraud and thereby causing “unwarranted government action against another.”
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`Morgan v. Richmond Sch. of Health and Tech., Inc., 857 F. Supp. 2d 104, 109 (D.D.C. 2012)
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`(holding fraud exception to government-contacts doctrine inapplicable where no allegations that
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`government agency committed any actions against plaintiff); see also Shaheen v. Smith, 994 F.
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`Supp. 2d 77, 86 (D.D.C. 2013) (holding narrow fraud exception inapplicable because
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`government agency – the SEC – did not take any action against plaintiff as result of defendants’
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`actions).
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`Case 1:14-cv-01504-JEB Document 20 Filed 04/10/15 Page 9 of 15
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`App Dynamic nonetheless maintains that this case fits within the fraud exception because
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`Vignisson made multiple misrepresentations to the “Copyright Office with the goal of ensuring
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`that the Copyright Office issued a copyright registration to Defendant in a form that Defendant
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`could use against Plaintiff.” Opp. at 18. After the Office registered Vignisson’s copyright
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`application, moreover, he “began to affirmatively wield the copyright in attempts to harm
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`Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s business relationships.” Id. at 19.
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`This is not enough. The fraud exception is limited to petitions to a federal government
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`agency that fraudulently induce “unwarranted government action against the plaintiff.”
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`Companhia II, 35 A.3d at 1130, 1134-35 (emphasis added); see also Companhia I, 640 F.3d at
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`371. The fatal flaw here – despite Defendant’s allegedly unbecoming conduct – is that there is
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`nothing in the record that suggests that the U.S. Copyright Office took any unwarranted action
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`against Plaintiff. Had the Office, for example, imposed a duty upon it for the Remote HD app or
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`forced Apple to stop sales of the app, this might be a different situation. In the instant case,
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`however, the only actions taken against Plaintiff thus far have been by Defendant; the Copyright
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`Office has done no more than register the copyright. App Dynamic’s allegation of fraud,
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`therefore, does not fall within the exception announced in Companhia, and the government-
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`contacts doctrine applies to bar personal jurisdiction.
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`C. Jurisdictional Discovery
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`Plaintiff alternatively argues that if the Court is not inclined to find personal jurisdiction,
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`it should nonetheless permit jurisdictional discovery. See Opp. at 20-21. App Dynamic
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`generally cites EV-Fadl v. Cent. Bank of Jordan, 75 F.3d 668, 676 (D.C. Cir. 1996), to argue that
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`“[a] plaintiff faced with a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction is entitled to
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`Case 1:14-cv-01504-JEB Document 20 Filed 04/10/15 Page 10 of 15
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`reasonable discovery, lest the defendant defeat the jurisdiction of a federal court by withholding
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`information on its contacts with the forum.” Id. at 676.
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` “It is well established that the ‘district court has broad discretion in its resolution of
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`[jurisdictional] discovery problems.’” FC Inv. Grp., 529 F.3d at 1093 (quoting Naartex, 722
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`F.2d at 788). The standard for permitting jurisdictional discovery is “quite liberal.” Diamond
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`Chem. Co. v. Atofina Chems., Inc., 268 F. Supp. 2d 1, 15 (D.D.C. 2003). This Circuit has held
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`that “if a party demonstrates that it can supplement its jurisdictional allegations through
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`discovery, then jurisdictional discovery is justified.” GTE New Media Srvs. Inc. v. BellSouth
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`Corp., 199 F.3d 1343, 1351 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
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`“Although discovery should be granted freely, it can be denied when the plaintiff has
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`failed to present facts that could establish jurisdiction.” Acker v. Royal Merchant Bank &
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`Finance Co., No. 98-392, 1999 WL 1273476, at *5 (D.D.C. Feb. 10, 1999) (citing Caribbean
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`Broad. Sys., Ltd. v. Cable & Wireless PLC, 148 F.3d 1080, 1089-90 (D.C. Cir. 1998)). “[I]n
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`order to get jurisdictional discovery a plaintiff must have at least a good faith belief that such
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`discovery will enable it to show that the court has personal jurisdiction over the defendant.”
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`Caribbean Broad, 148 F.3d at 1090. “[M]ere conjecture or speculation” that discovery could
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`lead to personal jurisdiction is insufficient for a court to permit it. See FC Inv. Grp., 529 F.3d at
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`1094. “Therefore, a plaintiff must include some facts about what additional discovery could
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`produce.” Shaheen, 994 F. Supp. 2d at 89. “Where there is no showing of how jurisdictional
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`discovery would help plaintiff discover anything new, ‘it [is] inappropriate to subject
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`[defendants] to the burden and expense of discovery.’” Atlantigas Corp. v. Nisource, 290 F.
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`Supp. 2d 34, 53 (D.D.C. 2003) (citing COMSAT Corp. v. Finshipyards S.A.M., 900 F. Supp.
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`515, 524 n.4 (D.D.C. 1995)).
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`Case 1:14-cv-01504-JEB Document 20 Filed 04/10/15 Page 11 of 15
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`In this case, App Dynamic contends it is entitled to discovery because “Defendant has
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`traveled many times to the U.S.” Opp. at 20-21. Kumar admits, however, that he “do[es] not
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`know specifically where in the U.S. [Defendant] has been, or what he has done while there.”
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`Opp., Exh. A (Declaration of Pratik Kumar), ¶ 4. Vignisson responds that this hardly establishes
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`a good-faith belief that, as a resident of Sweden, he “stealthily has the type of continuous and
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`systematic” presence in the District necessary for general jurisdiction. See Reply at 10-11 (citing
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`Alkanani, 976 F. Supp. at 21. Defendant further argues that App Dynamic has no basis to
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`believe that he had other contacts with the District regarding this intellectual property – beyond
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`the aforementioned communications with the Copyright Office – such that “Plaintiff’s claims can
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`be said to arise out of such contacts as required for specific jurisdiction.” Id. (emphasis added).
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`Additionally, Defendant submitted a second declaration acknowledging studies in Florida and
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`travel to the U.S. on vacation and for conferences, but denying travel to the District of Columbia
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`and visits regarding Remote Jr. See Reply, Exh. A (Second Declaration of Erling Vignisson), ¶¶
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`6-8.
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`Vignisson’s position carries the day since App Dynamic has not demonstrated how
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`discovery would help establish jurisdiction. Plaintiff has not alleged a single potential contact or
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`pointed to any fact that, if discovered, would “indicate that a court in the District of Columbia
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`might . . . assert jurisdiction” over Vignisson. Caribbean Broad, 148 F.3d at 1089. Its request to
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`seek “jurisdictional discovery of other, unalleged contacts between [Defendant] and the District
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`of Columbia” is “based on mere conjecture or speculation.” NBC-USA Housing, Inc., Twenty-
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`Six v. Donovan, 741 F. Supp. 2d 55, 61 (D.D.C. 2010) (citing FC Inv. Grp., 529 F.3d at 1093).
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`Requesting jurisdictional discovery because Plaintiff believes Defendant has traveled to this
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`country “many times” does not constitute the required “detailed showing of what discovery it
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`Case 1:14-cv-01504-JEB Document 20 Filed 04/10/15 Page 12 of 15
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`wishes to conduct or what result it thinks such discovery would produce.” United States v.
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`Philip Morris Inc., 116 F. Supp. 2d 116, 130 n.16 (D.D.C. 2000). Travel “many times” to this
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`country includes possible travel to not only the District of Columbia, but also to 50 states and
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`additional territories, spanning almost 4 million square miles.
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`Plaintiff rejoins by citing GTE New Media, where the court permitted jurisdictional
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`discovery even though the record before the court was “plainly inadequate,” and there was
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`“absolutely no merit to [the plaintiff’s] bold claim” of jurisdiction. 199 F.3d at 1351-52.
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`Such reliance is misplaced. Although the court permitted discovery despite an “inadequate”
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`record, the plaintiffs there at least cited what specific information and facts they would target to
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`establish jurisdiction. Id. at 1349-51. Discovery was also permitted because there existed
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`confusion regarding the actions of the parent company versus those of its subsidiaries, and
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`jurisdictional discovery could help analyze which company made what contacts and where. Id.
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`at 1352.
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`Plaintiff here, in contrast, offers no specifics of any facts that could establish jurisdiction.
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`Cf., e.g., Diamond Chem., 268 F. Supp. 2d at 15-16 (allowing discovery because plaintiffs
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`pointed to specific activity of companies that would show managerial control, flow of funds, and
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`knowledge of and participation in conspiracy); Davis v. Grant Park Nursing Home, LP, 639 F.
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`Supp. 2d 60, 74-75 (D.D.C. 2009) (permitting jurisdictional discovery of specific documents that
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`would reveal alleged exertion of control between defendant corporations); In re Fort Totten
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`Metrorail Cases, 756 F. Supp. 2d 132, 138 (D.D.C. 2010) (permitting jurisdictional discovery of
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`additional information on sales data and defendant’s knowledge about use of its products).
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`Although Plaintiff asserts that jurisdictional discovery should be “freely given,” its
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`request is insufficient and constitutes nothing more than a “speculative fishing expedition.”
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`Case 1:14-cv-01504-JEB Document 20 Filed 04/10/15 Page 13 of 15
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`Shaheen, 994 F. Supp. 2d at 89. As this Circuit recently held, “To nonetheless allow Plaintiff to
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`conduct jurisdictional discovery would require this Court to construe this Circuit’s admittedly
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`liberal jurisdictional discovery standard in such a way as to render it meaningless.” NBC-USA,
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`741 F. Supp. 2d at 61. This Court thus declines the request.
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`D. Consequences
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`Although App Dynamic never raised the issue, the Court last addresses the consequences
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`of its ruling. Assuming arguendo that no personal jurisdiction exists over Vignisson anywhere
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`in the United States, does that mean that no U.S. court could ever review the validity of a U.S.
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`Copyright Office registration procured by a fraudulent filing? As it turns out, this is the wrong
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`question. The authority to invalidate or cancel Defendant’s copyright registration lies with the
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`Copyright Office itself.
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`The Register of Copyrights is vested with the exclusive and comprehensive authority to
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`set regulations consistent with copyright statutes. See 17 U.S.C. § 701(a) (“All administrative
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`functions and duties under this title, except as otherwise specified, are the responsibility of the
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`Register of Copyrights . . . .”); 17 U.S.C. § 702 (“The Register of Copyrights is authorized to
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`establish regulations not inconsistent with law for the administration of the functions and duties
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`made the responsibility of the Register under this title.”). Title 37 C.F.R. § 201, et seq. defines
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`the procedures to cancel a copyright, and nowhere in those regulations is judicial cancellation
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`discussed. It appears, instead, that cancellations are limited to the Copyright Office alone. See
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`37 C.F.R. § 201.7(a) (“Cancellation is an action taken by the Copyright Office whereby [] the
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`registration is eliminated on the ground that the registration is invalid under the applicable law
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`and regulations . . . .”).
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`Caselaw on this issue is scarce, but the Ninth Circuit has also held:
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`Case 1:14-cv-01504-JEB Document 20 Filed 04/10/15 Page 14 of 15
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`[T]here is an administrative process for cancellation, albeit ill-
`defined, in the Copyright Office. Referral . . . is therefore
`appropriate for the Register of Copyrights to determine to what
`extent administrative cancellation remedies are available to third
`parties who seek registration cancellation. In sum, this case
`requires the resolution of an issue within the jurisdiction of an
`administrative body exercising statutory and comprehensive
`regulatory authority over a national activity that requires
`expertise and uniformity in administration.
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`Syntek Seminconductor Co., Ltd. v. Microchip Tech. Inc., 307 F.3d 775, 782 (9th Cir. 2002).
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`Additionally, the Third Circuit recently held that the district court had erred in ordering a
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`cancellation of a copyright registration “because there is no statutory indication whatsoever that
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`courts have such authority,” and, indeed, “there is substantial indication that courts do not have
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`such authority.” Brownstein v. Lindsay, 742 F.3d 55, 75 (3d Cir. 2014). The Third Circuit,
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`however, did emphasize that “[t]his does not mean that courts have no place in the cancellation
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`process and that aggrieved parties are without recourse to the courts”; although “courts may not
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`directly cancel copyright registrations, courts have an oversight role in the administrative
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`functions of the Copyright Office.” Id. at 76. “Thus, aggrieved parties may challenge an
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`unfavorable decision by the Copyright Office in a cancellation matter by challenging its decision
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`in court under the APA.” Id.
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`The Third Circuit further noted that “[i]t goes without saying that courts are authorized to
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`police copyright registrations through authorship and infringement claims” because “a
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`registration does not secure or create a copyright, as a right, or guarantee success on the merits of
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`a claim . . . .” Id., at 76-77. Additionally, the court made clear, it was
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`in no way holding that courts are incapable of invaliding underlying
`copyrights. While the two concepts are undoubtedly related, the
`distinction matters. Holding that federal courts have the authority
`to cancel registrations would essentially be declaring that the
`judicial branch has the authority to order a legislative branch agency
`that is not a party to the litigation to take an affirmative action . . . .
`
`
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`14
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`

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`Case 1:14-cv-01504-JEB Document 20 Filed 04/10/15 Page 15 of 15
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`Courts have no authority to cancel copyright registrations because
`that authority resides exclusively with the Copyright Office.
`
`
`Id. at 77.
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`Plaintiff may thus pursue its dispute regarding registration through the Copyright Office.
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`And, of course, an Icelandic court would presumably have the authority to determine the validity
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`of App Dynamic’s contract and copyright claims. Plaintiff, therefore, may seek appropriate
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`relief in the proper fora should it so desire.
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`IV. Conclusion
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`For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss for lack of
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`personal jurisdiction and denies Plaintiff’s request for jurisdictional discovery.
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`/s/ James E. Boasberg
` JAMES E. BOASBERG
`
`United States District Judge
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`Date: April 10, 2015
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`15