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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
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`UNITED FOOD AND COMMERCIAL
`WORKERS UNION, LOCAL No. 227, et al.,
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`Plaintiffs,
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`v.
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`UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
`AGRICULTURE,
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`Defendant.
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`Civil Action No. 20-2045 (TJK)
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`MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
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`Plaintiffs, five local labor unions and their international affiliate, sue the Department of
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`Agriculture under the Administrative Procedure Act to challenge a waiver program for line
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`speeds at poultry processing plants. Under the program, plants where Plaintiffs’ members work
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`are operating at speeds faster than the maximum rate set by regulation, which Plaintiffs say
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`increases workers’ risk of injury. Before the Court is Defendant’s motion to dismiss under Rule
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`12(b)(1) for lack of standing and under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim because, it
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`argues, worker safety falls outside the zone of interests protected by the governing statute. For
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`the reasons explained below, the Court holds that Plaintiffs have standing and fall within the
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`zone of interests. Thus, it denies the motion.
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`Background
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`The U.S. Department of Agriculture (“USDA”) regulates poultry producers through its
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`Food Safety Inspection Service (“FSIS”) under the Poultry Products Inspection Act (“PPIA”).
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`The PPIA was enacted to protect the health and welfare of consumers “by assuring that poultry
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`products distributed to them are wholesome, not adulterated, and properly marked, labeled, and
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`packaged.” 21 U.S.C. § 451. During processing, workers perform repetitive tasks, such as
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`hanging chickens on lines and using saws, knives, scissors, and other tools to debone the birds,
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`while working on lines that carry chicken carcasses through the plant. ECF No. 1 (“Compl.”)
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`¶¶ 16–18. Line speed, or the speed at which the carcasses move, is quantified by the number of
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`birds per minute (bpm), which reflects the time it takes a carcass to be inspected. Id. ¶ 27.
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`Under its current poultry inspection system, the FSIS established a maximum line speed
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`of 140 bpm. Id. ¶¶ 28–29, 32–33. After at first proposing 175 bpm, the FSIS ultimately chose
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`the lower speed after considering comments, including some about worker safety. Id. ¶¶ 29, 31,
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`33. In 2018, the FSIS denied a petition from the National Chicken Council, an industry trade
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`association, to increase maximum line speeds. Id. ¶¶ 41–45. Instead, the FSIS announced a
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`waiver program to allow some poultry producers to operate at speeds up to 175 bpm if they
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`satisfied certain criteria, such as a history of regulatory compliance. Id. ¶¶ 46–50. A plant that
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`receives a waiver must routinely operate at least one line at speeds above 140 bpm on average.
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`Id. ¶ 59. As of March 20, 2020, the FSIS is no longer accepting waiver applications, but to date
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`it has granted line-speed waivers to 35 chicken processing plants. Id. ¶¶ 63–64.
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`Plaintiffs represent employees who work on poultry processing lines at plants that have
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`received waivers. Id. ¶¶ 1, 65. Plaintiffs bring claims under the Administrative Procedure Act
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`(“APA”), asserting that the USDA enacted the wavier program without the required notice and
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`comment rulemaking procedures, and that its decision to do so was both arbitrary and capricious
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`and otherwise unlawful. Id. ¶ 76–90. Defendant, the USDA, has moved to dismiss under Rules
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`12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). Defendant argues Plaintiffs lack standing because they have not shown
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`that an increase above 140 bpm causes a substantial increase in the risk of injury. ECF No. 9 at
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`3. In the alternative, Defendant argues that Plaintiffs fail to state a claim because the PPIA is
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`2
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`concerned with consumer, not worker, safety, and thus their claims thus fall outside the statute’s
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`zone of interests. Id.
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`Legal Standard
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`A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) “presents a threshold
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`challenge to the court’s jurisdiction.” Haase v. Sessions, 835 F.2d 902, 906 (D.C. Cir. 1987). As
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`federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, it is “presumed that a cause lies outside this
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`limited jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). Thus,
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`when faced with a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1), “the plaintiff bears the burden of
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`establishing jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence.” Moran v. U.S. Capitol Police Bd.,
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`820 F. Supp. 2d 48, 53 (D.D.C. 2011) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561
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`(1992)). In reviewing such a motion, while the Court is not limited to the allegations in the
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`complaint and may consider materials outside the pleadings, the Court must “accept all of the
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`factual allegations in [the] complaint as true.” Jerome Stevens Pharm., Inc. v. FDA, 402 F.3d
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`1249, 1253 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S.
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`315, 327 (1991)).
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`To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain sufficient
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`factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft
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`v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
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`(2007)). The Court must “accept the well-pleaded factual allegations as true and draw all
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`reasonable inferences from those allegations in the plaintiff's favor.” Arpaio v. Obama, 797 F.3d
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`11, 19 (D.C. Cir. 2015). But “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,
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`supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
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` Analysis
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`A.
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`Associational Standing
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`An association like Plaintiffs may have standing “to redress its members’ injuries, even
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`without a showing of injury to the association itself.” United Food & Commercial Workers Loc.
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`751 v. Brown Grp., Inc., 517 U.S. 544, 552 (1996). At the motion to dismiss stage, the
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`association “must plausibly allege or otherwise offer facts sufficient to permit the reasonable
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`inference (1) that the plaintiff has at least one member who ‘would otherwise have standing to
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`sue in [her] own right’; (2) that ‘the interests’ the association ‘seeks to protect are germane to
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`[its] purpose’; and (3) that ‘neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the
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`participation of [the] individual members in the lawsuit.’” Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. Trump, 297 F.
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`Supp. 3d 6, 17–18 (D.D.C. 2018) (quoting Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advertising Comm’n, 432
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`U.S. 333, 343 (1977)).
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`Plaintiffs have met all three requirements, even if it is not a slam dunk for them. As
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`explained in more detail in a separate section below, Plaintiffs have established that workers on
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`poultry lines with increased line speeds would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right.
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`And in turn, Plaintiffs have no trouble showing that they have “at least one member” who works
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`on such a line. Pub. Citizen, 297 F. Supp. 3d at 17. Indeed, Plaintiffs represent workers who
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`work on poultry processing lines at plants that have received FSIS waivers allowing the plants to
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`increase line speeds from 140 bpm to 175 bpm, and have submitted declarations from such
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`workers. See Compl. ¶¶ 9–14; ECF No. 11 at 20–21 (citing declarations of workers). And
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`because a plant that receives a waiver must routinely operate at least one line at speeds above
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`140 bpm on average, or risk having its waiver revoked, these members have been subjected to
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`4
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`the faster line speeds and the associated increased risk of injury.1 Compl. ¶ 59; ECF No. 11-5
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`(“Lewis Decl.”) ¶¶ 11–13 (reporting faster line speeds); ECF No. 11-14 (“Foster Decl.”)
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`¶ 8 (same). Plaintiffs satisfy the germaneness element as well because they seek to protect the
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`safety and health of workers, which is not merely germane, but central, to a union’s purpose.
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`Finally, the asserted APA claims do not require the individual members’ participation in this
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`lawsuit. This third element “focus[es] on matters of administrative convenience and efficiency,
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`not on elements of a case or controversy.” Loc. 751, 517 U.S. at 557. Individual union members
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`are unnecessary parties here because, as Plaintiffs point out, the merits of the APA claims
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`asserted turn only on the administrative record, and not their particular circumstances. See ECF
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`No. 11 at 20.
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`B.
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`Article III Standing
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`The core of the associational standing analysis in this case turns on whether the workers
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`have standing to otherwise sue in their own right under the familiar, three-part Article III
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`standing test. To establish standing, a plaintiff must show that (1) he has “suffered an injury in
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`fact—an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b)
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`actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical,” (2) “a causal connection” exists between the
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`injury and the challenged conduct, and (3) a favorable decision will likely redress the
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`injury. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
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`1 Defendant is correct that Plaintiffs must show “that at least one specifically identified member
`has suffered an injury-in-fact.” See ECF No. 9 at 12 (quoting Am. Chem. Council v. Dep’t of
`Transp., 468 F.3d 810, 815 (D.C. Cir. 2006)). But to the extent Defendant suggests Plaintiffs
`must have done so in the complaint, that is not required. Declarations suffice, such as those
`submitted by Plaintiffs. See Am. Chem. Council, 468 F.3d at 820 (contemplating that plaintiff
`organization could have submitted evidence identifying members specifically harmed);
`WildEarth Guardians v. Zinke, 368 F. Supp. 3d 41, 61 (D.D.C. 2019) (declarations supported
`injury in fact).
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`1.
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`Injury in Fact
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`An increased risk of harm may satisfy the injury in fact requirement when there is
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`“both (i) a substantially increased risk of harm and (ii) a substantial probability of harm with that
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`increase taken into account.” Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 489 F.3d
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`1279, 1295 (D.C. Cir. 2007). As the Supreme Court recently put it, “a person exposed to a risk
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`of future harm may pursue forward-looking, injunctive relief to prevent the harm from occurring,
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`at least so long as the risk of harm is sufficiently imminent and substantial.” TransUnion LLC v.
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`Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190, 2210 (2021). While the Constitution “compels a very strict
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`understanding of what increases in risk and overall risk levels can count as ‘substantial,’” Pub.
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`Citizen, 489 F.3d at 1296, “the D.C. Circuit has instructed that the ‘proper way’ to analyze such a
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`claim is through the lens of imminence: to ‘consider the ultimate alleged harm—such as death,
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`physical injury, or property damage from car accidents—as the concrete and particularized injury
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`and then to determine whether the increased risk of such harm makes injury to an individual
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`citizen sufficiently ‘imminent’ for standing purposes,’” Pub. Emps. for Envtl. Resp. v. Bernhardt,
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`No. 18-cv-1547 (JDB), 2020 WL 601783, at *4 (D.D.C. Feb. 7, 2020) (quoting Pub. Citizen, 489
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`F.3d at 1298).
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`A substantial increase in the risk of harm is a “a significant increase in risk that, while not
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`necessarily quantifiable, is ‘sufficient to take the suit out of the category of the hypothetical.’”
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`Food & Water Watch, Inc. v. Vilsack, 79 F. Supp. 3d 174, 189 (D.D.C.), aff’d, 808 F.3d 905
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`(D.C. Cir. 2015) (quoting Sierra Club v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 754 F.3d 995, 1001 (D.C. Cir.
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`2014)). While “a plaintiff must ordinarily show that the defendant’s action has made
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`it much more likely that the harm plaintiff fears will occur than would otherwise be the case . . .
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`if the threatened injury is severe, ‘relatively modest increments in risk should qualify for
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`standing.’” Id. (quoting Mountain States Legal Found. v. Glickman, 92 F.3d 1228, 1235 (D.C.
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`Cir. 1996)).
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`Plaintiffs assert that their injury is the increased risk that their members will suffer
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`injuries—such as musculoskeletal disorders like carpal tunnel syndrome and tendonitis—while
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`working on chicken processing lines that, under the waiver program, run at speeds above 140
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`bpm. Although it is a close call, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have established injury in fact.
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`They have submitted studies, reports, and declarations that show that faster line speeds increase
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`the number of repetitive motions performed by poultry workers, which in turn substantially
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`increases the risk of injury. As at least one worker has attested, line speed increases the number
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`of motions he must make and thus, his pain. Foster Decl. ¶ 8 (“When the line speeds up and I
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`have to make more and faster motions, my pain increases.”); see also Lewis Decl. ¶¶ 11–13
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`(“Several months ago, the plant started raising line speeds to 150 birds per minute. . . . Since the
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`speed increase, workers have had difficulty keeping up with the pace of production . . . [and]
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`people also have complained of more pain.”). Plaintiffs have also submitted reports showing that
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`workers’ reporting of these issues is widespread. See ECF No. 11-16 Ex. C (“Human Rights
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`Watch Report”) at 49 (“Nearly all workers who spoke with Human Rights Watch identified the
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`same factor that compounds their risk of injury and illness: speed. . . . For decades, federal
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`studies, medical literature, and workers’ surveys have found that rapid work speed in the meat
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`and poultry industry increases risk of injury and illness.”); ECF No. 11-16 Ex. E (“Oxfam
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`Report”) at 24 (“Workers surveyed over the last several years report that the line speed is an
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`enormous part of the reason that workers get injured.”).
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`Moreover, expert declarations and studies bear out the connection between faster line
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`speeds, increased repetitive motions, and a substantially increased risk of injury. See ECF No.
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`11-2 (“Fagan Decl.”) Ex. B at 5–6 (“Line speed is one of many workplace factors that increase
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`risk of injury to workers. Decreasing line speed, thereby decreasing repetitions, helps to lower
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`ergonomic risk.”); ECF No. 11-16 Ex. F (“OHSA Ergonomics Webpage”) at 1 (“Most all jobs in
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`poultry processing involve highly repetitive tasks — repeating the same motions over and over
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`again at a fast pace with little variation in the tasks. . . . When motions are repeated frequently
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`(e.g., every few seconds) for prolonged periods, such as several hours without any break or over
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`an entire workshift, there may be inadequate time for muscles and tendons to recover. If the
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`repetitive tasks also involve other ergonomic risk factors, muscles and tendons become
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`extremely strained or fatigued more quickly.”); Oxfam Report at 24 (line speeds are an
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`“enormous part of the reason that workers get injured”). Again, while it is a close call, Plaintiffs’
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`submissions are “sufficient to take [the] suit out of the category of the hypothetical.” Sierra
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`Club, 754 F.3d at 1001. Indeed, because Plaintiffs’ members are at substantial risk of
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`“permanent and disabling” injury, Human Rights Watch Report” at 35, even “relatively modest
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`increments in risk should qualify for standing,” see Mountain States Legal Found., 92 F.3d at
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`1235.
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`Having established this first element of the test—albeit by a thin margin—Plaintiffs have
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`little trouble satisfying the second: that there is a substantial probability of harm, after
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`considering the increase in risk of injury. Plaintiffs have shown that poultry workers have a
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`substantial probability of serious workplace injury, period—and that probability only grows with
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`the increase in line speed. See, e.g., ECF No. 11-16 Ex. B (“OHSA Regional Instruction”) at 2
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`(noting that the rate of carpal tunnel syndrome among poultry workers is 4.3 times higher than
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`for workers in private industry); ECF No. 11-17 Ex. G (“Galassi Memo”) at 2 (“Poultry industry
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`employers in 2013 were also more than 4.5 times more likely to identify repetitive motion as the
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`exposure resulting in a serious injury, compared to employers in all industries in 2013.”).
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`Defendant argues that Plaintiffs have not shown specifically how much higher the risk is,
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`or that there is a particular risk associated with speeds over 140 bpm, and point out that Plaintiffs
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`have presented no evidence of increased rates of injury since the waiver program began. See
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`ECF No. 9 at 15; ECF No. 12 at 6. But the D.C. Circuit has “refused to require a quantitative
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`analysis in order to establish standing in increased risk-of-harm cases,” Food & Water Watch,
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`Inc., 808 F.3d at 917, and the Court may draw on “experience and common sense” in evaluating
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`whether there is a substantial risk of injury, Attias v. Carefirst, Inc., 865 F.3d 620, 628 (D.C. Cir.
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`2017). Given the evidence submitted that line speed is a key factor in poultry workers’
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`workplace injuries, it is consistent with common sense that a line speed greater than 140 bpm
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`substantially increases their risk of injury. Moreover, although Plaintiffs have not presented
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`statistical evidence to show that increased rates of injury have materialized, that is so because the
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`line speed increases have not been in place long enough to cause the kinds of injuries at issue.
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`See ECF No. 11-16 Ex. A (“GAO Report”) at 30 (noting that 10 months “was not sufficient for a
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`change in workers’ health to appear”); Human Rights Watch Report at 35 (“Since cumulative
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`trauma damages internal parts of the body—muscles, tendons, bones, and nerves—it may not be
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`immediately apparent and is often not treated until damage is permanent and disabling.”); ECF
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`No. 11-17 Ex. I (“NIOSH Letter”) at 2 (ten months that had elapsed since implementation of
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`increased line speeds “was not sufficient to result in a change in health status”). Given the
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`evidence Plaintiffs have submitted, this additional evidence is unnecessary for Plaintiffs to show
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`injury in fact on an increased-risk theory.
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`Defendant also contends that Plaintiffs’ argument does not account for countervailing
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`measures that plants could take to reduce the risk of injury. According to Defendant, Plaintiffs
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`“have failed to account for the changes that plants can make to their production lines to
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`accommodate greater speeds, such as changes to staffing levels, layout, and equipment, which [a
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`National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health letter to the FSIS] shows can keep the
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`overall level of exposure to repetitive and forceful motions for each worker steady.” ECF No. 9
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`at 18. But these are merely hypothetical steps that plants could take to reduce worker injury.
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`ECF No. 12 at 8. In contrast, in the case that Defendant relies on to support this argument, Food
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`& Water Watch, Inc. v. Vilsack, 808 F.3d 905 (D.C. Cir. 2015), the plaintiffs failed to consider
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`safety measures that had been required by rule when estimating their increased risk of harm from
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`a new system of poultry inspection. The D.C. Circuit reasoned that the complaint did not
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`plausibly allege that the new system substantially increased the risk of foodborne illness
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`compared to the prior one because it failed to grapple with the fact that the new method required
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`“increased offline verification inspectors”—and thus prevented the Court from inferring that the
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`new system, as a whole, would impact the amount of adulterated poultry. Id. at 916. Here, no
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`similar safety measures are required to receive a waiver, nor have Defendants provided evidence
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`of any poultry producers actually trying to mitigate the risk of injury from increased line speeds.2
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`For these reasons, Plaintiffs have showed both a substantially increased risk of harm and
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`a substantial probability of harm after taking that increased risk into account—and thus an injury
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`in fact.
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`2 In addition, Food & Water Watch and another case Defendant cites are distinguishable from the
`situation here because the plaintiffs in those cases were not directly impacted by the regulation at
`issue. See Pub. Citizen, 489 F.3d at 1284, 1291; Food & Water Watch, 808 F.3d at 909. In
`contrast, Plaintiffs represent workers directly affected by the line speed increase, and there is a
`straightforward causal link between increased line speeds and risk of worker injury. See Pub.
`Citizen, 489 F.3d at 1289 (“[S]tanding is ‘substantially more difficult to establish’ where . . . the
`parties invoking federal jurisdiction are not ‘the object of the government action or inaction’ they
`challenge.” (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 562)).
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`2.
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`Causation and Redressability
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` Plaintiffs have also satisfied the other two standing elements: causation and
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`redressability. The causal connection between increasing line speeds and increased injury to
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`workers is straightforward for the reasons set forth above, and the Court may redress that
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`increased risk of injury by vacating the waiver program if it was unlawfully promulgated.
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`*
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`*
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`*
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`For all the above reasons, Plaintiffs have established associational standing to bring their
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`APA claims.
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`C.
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`Zone of Interests
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`To state a claim created by statute, a plaintiff’s asserted interests must be “arguably
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`within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute.” Match-E-Be-Nash-She-
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`Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak, 567 U.S. 209, 224 (2012) (quotation
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`omitted). The zone-of-interests test is a low bar and “forecloses suit only when a plaintiff's
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`‘interests are so marginally related to or inconsistent with the purposes implicit in the statute that
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`it cannot reasonably be assumed that Congress intended to permit the suit.’” Id. at 225. The
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`Supreme Court has “always conspicuously included the word ‘arguably’ in the test to indicate
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`that the benefit of any doubt goes to the plaintiff.” Id.
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`The zone-of-interests standard “is particularly generous as applied to plaintiffs who bring
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`suit under the APA, in light of the need to ‘preserv[e] the flexibility of the APA’s omnibus
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`judicial-review provision, which permits suit for violations of numerous statutes of varying
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`character that do not themselves include causes of action for judicial review.’” Otay Mesa Prop.,
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`L.P. v. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, 144 F. Supp. 3d 35, 58 (D.D.C. 2015) (quoting Lexmark Int'l,
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`Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 130 (2014)); see also Mendoza v. Perez,
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`754 F.3d 1002, 1016 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (“[W]e apply the zone-of-interests test in a manner
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`consistent with ‘Congress's evident intent when enacting the APA to make agency action
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`presumptively reviewable.’” (quoting Patchak, 567 U.S. at 225)). In APA cases, the “relevant
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`zone of interest” is “defined by a substantive statute, not by the APA.” Am. Inst. of Certified
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`Pub. Accountants v. IRS, 746 Fed. Appx. 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (collecting cases). If an agency
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`has a plaintiff’s concerns “in mind” when exercising its authority, “[t]his alone is enough to
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`show that [the plaintiff’s] asserted interests at least arguably fall within the zone-of-interests
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`. . . .” Indian River Cty. v. Dep’t of Transp., 945 F.3d 515, 529 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
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`Here, that statute is the PPIA. It requires USDA inspection of poultry producers and
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`regulates sanitary practices, labeling, and other aspects of the production process. See 21 U.S.C.
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`§ 455 et seq. Defendant argues that Plaintiffs’ claims fall outside the PPIA’s zone of interests
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`because the statute protects the safety of consumers, rather than workers. See ECF No. 9 at 20–
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`21. But even assuming Defendant’s characterization of the PPIA is right, as long as worker
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`safety is more than marginally related to protecting consumers, Plaintiffs claims are within the
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`PPIA’s zone of interests. See Patchak, 567 U.S at 225–27; Indian River, 945 F.3d at 529–30.
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`Plaintiffs’ interests in safe line speeds are more than marginally related to consumers’ interests—
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`in fact, they are aligned with them—because, as another court has observed, “[i]f the conditions
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`for the employees are not safe and sanitary, the safety of the food products they prepare is also at
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`risk.” See United Food & Com. Workers Union, Loc. No. 663 v. Dep’t of Agric., 451 F. Supp. 3d
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`1040, 1053 (D. Minn. 2020). And Plaintiffs cite several examples of instances when the FSIS
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`had the safety of workers in mind when administering the PPIA. See, e.g., ECF No. 11 at 24
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`(“[W]hen FSIS adopted its current 140 bpm line speed maximum, it ‘recognize[d] that evaluation
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`of the effects of line speed on food safety should include the effects of line speed on
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`establishment employee safety.’”) (quoting Proposed Rule, 77 Fed. Reg. at 4423); id. at 24–25
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`(collecting many more examples with citations to the Federal Register).3
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`Defendant’s argument to the contrary relies heavily on the D.C. Circuit’s recent
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`pronouncement that “[p]rotected interests are ones asserted either by ‘intended beneficiaries’ of
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`the statute at issue or by other ‘suitable challengers’—i.e., parties whose interests coincide
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`‘systemically, not fortuitously’ with those of intended beneficiaries.” Twin Rivers Paper Co.
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`LLC v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 934 F.3d 607, 616 (D.C. Cir. 2019). But in that case, the interests
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`of the plaintiffs—stakeholders in the paper industry—were “systematic[ally] misalign[ed] with
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`shareholder preferences” and thus the plaintiffs were distinctly “unqualified to advance the
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`interests of shareholders” by challenging a Securities and Exchange Commission rule that
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`allowed investment companies to post shareholder reports online rather than to send paper
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`copies. Id. at 618. No such misalignment exists here.
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`Thus, Plaintiffs’ claims easily satisfy the zone-of-interests test.
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`3 Defendant does not dispute that the FSIS has considered worker safety but argues that the FSIS
`lacks the legal authority to do so. See ECF No. 12 at 17. But what matters for this purpose is
`merely whether the FSIS had workplace safety “in mind,” and Plaintiffs show that it did. See
`Indian River, 945 F.3d at 529.
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` Conclusion and Order
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`For all the above reasons, it is hereby ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss,
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`ECF No. 9, is DENIED.
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`SO ORDERED.
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`Date: August 20, 2021
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`/s/ Timothy J. Kelly
`TIMOTHY J. KELLY
`United States District Judge
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`14
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