Case 1:20-cv-03190-RCL Document 43 Filed 04/06/21 Page 1 of 18
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`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
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`CASE NO. 1:20-cv-3190-RCL
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`AMERICAN SOYBEAN ASSOCIATION,
`and PLAINS COTTON GROWERS, INC.,
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` Plaintiffs,
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`v.
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`U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
`AGENCY, et al.,
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` Federal Defendants, and
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`BASF CORPORATION, et al.,
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` Defendant-Intervenors.
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`FEDERAL DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR PARTIAL DISMISSAL OF
`COUNTS II AND IV OF THE COMPLAINT
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`Case 1:20-cv-03190-RCL Document 43 Filed 04/06/21 Page 2 of 18
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`PAGE
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`INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................... 1
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`STATUTORY AND REGULATORY BACKGROUND .............................................................. 2
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`FACTUAL BACKGROUND ......................................................................................................... 4
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`STANDARD OF REVIEW ............................................................................................................ 6
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`ARGUMENT .................................................................................................................................. 7
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`I.
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`II.
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`COUNT II SHOULD BE DISMISSED BECAUSE PLAINTIFFS DID NOT COMPLY
`WITH THE MANDATORY AND JURISDICTIONAL NOTICE REQUIREMENTS
`FOR ESA CITIZEN SUITS. .............................................................................................. 7
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`THE COURT SHOULD ALSO DISMISS COUNT IV FOR LACK OF SUBJECT
`MATTER JURISDICTION. ............................................................................................. 10
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`CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................. 12
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
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`CASES PAGE(S)
`Am. Freedom Law Ctr. v. Obama,
`821 F.3d 44 (D.C. Cir. 2016) ...................................................................................................... 6
`Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
`556 U.S. 662 (2009) .................................................................................................................... 7
`Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
`550 U.S. 544 (2007) .................................................................................................................... 7
`Browning v. Clinton,
`292 F.3d 235 (D.C. Cir. 2002) .................................................................................................... 7
`Building Indus. Ass’n v. Lujan,
`785 F. Supp. 1020 (D.D.C. 1992) ............................................................................................... 9
`Calif. ex rel. Lockyer v. U.S. Dep’t of Agriculture,
`575 F.3d 999 (9th Cir. 2009) ....................................................................................................... 3
`Common Sense Salmon Recovery v. Evans,
`329 F. Supp. 2d 96 (D.D.C. 2004) .............................................................................................. 8
`Coos Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs v. Kempthorne,
`531 F.3d 792 (9th Cir. 2008) ..................................................................................................... 10
`Friends of Animals v. Ashe,
`51 F. Supp. 3d 77 (D.D.C. 2014) ................................................................................................ 8
`Friends of Animals v. Salazar,
`670 F. Supp. 2d 7 (D.D.C. 2009) ................................................................................................ 8
`Gem Cty. Mosquito Abatement Dist. v. EPA,
`398 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2005) .............................................................................................. 10
`Hallstrom v. Tillamook County,
`493 U.S. 20 (1989) .................................................................................................................. 8, 9
`Keepseagle v. Vilsack,
`815 F.3d 28 (D.C. Cir. 2016) ...................................................................................................... 6
`Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am.,
`511 U.S. 375 (1994) .................................................................................................................... 6
`Lovitky v. Trump,
`918 F.3d 160 (D.C. Cir. 2019) .................................................................................................. 10
`Metz v. BAE Sys. Tech. Solutions & Servs., Inc.,
`774 F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir. 2014) .................................................................................................... 11
`Nat’l Family Farm Coalition, et al., v. EPA,
`966 F.3d 893 (9th Cir. 2020) ....................................................................................................... 3
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`Proie v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv.,
`No. 11-cv-5955-BHS, 2012 WL 1536756 (W.D. Wash., May 1, 2012) .................................. 10
`Research Air, Inc., v. Norton,
`No. 05-cv-623-RMC, 2006 WL 508341 (D.D.C. Mar. 1, 2006) ............................................ 8, 9
`Safari Club Intern. v. Jewell,
`960 F. Supp. 2d 17 (D.D.C. 2013) .............................................................................................. 8
`Southwest Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation,
`143 F.3d 515 (9th Cir. 1998) ....................................................................................................... 9
`W. Watersheds Project v. Kraayenbrink,
`632 F.3d 472 (9th Cir. 2011) ............................................................................................. 3, 4, 10
`Wash. Toxics Coalition v. EPA,
`413 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2005) ................................................................................................... 10
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`
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`STATUTES
`5 U.S.C. § 704 ................................................................................................................................. 9
`16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) ........................................................................................................................ 2
`16 U.S.C. § 1532(6) ........................................................................................................................ 2
`16 U.S.C. § 1532(20) ...................................................................................................................... 2
`16 U.S.C. § 1533 ............................................................................................................................. 2
`16 U.S.C. § 1533(c) ........................................................................................................................ 2
`16 U.S.C. § 1536 ............................................................................................................................. 2
`16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) .................................................................................................................... 2
`16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) ...................................................................................................................... 11
`16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(1) ........................................................................................................... 1, 4, 9
`16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(2) ............................................................................................................... 1, 8
`16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(2)(A)(i) .............................................................................................2, 4, 9, 10
`28 U.S.C. § 2201 ........................................................................................................................... 11
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`RULES
`Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) ............................................................................. 1, 6, 10
`Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) ............................................................................. 1, 7, 10
`Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d) ............................................................................................ 1
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`REGULATIONS
`50 C.F.R. pt. 402 ............................................................................................................................. 2
`50 C.F.R. § 402.01 .......................................................................................................................... 3
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`50 C.F.R. § 402.12 ...........................................................................................................................3
`50 C.F.R. § 402.13 ...........................................................................................................................3
`50 C.F.R. § 402.13(a).......................................................................................................................3
`50 C.F.R. § 402.14 .......................................................................................................................2, 3
`50 C.F.R. § 402.14(a).......................................................................................................................3
`50 C.F.R. § 402.14(b) ......................................................................................................................3
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`Case 1:20-cv-03190-RCL Document 43 Filed 04/06/21 Page 6 of 18
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`Federal Defendants, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Michael S. Regan1, in his
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`official capacity as the Administrator of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, and Marietta
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`Echeverria, in her official capacity as Acting Division Director of the U.S. Environmental
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`Protection Agency, Office of Pesticide Programs, Registration Division (collectively, “Federal
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`Defendants”), respectfully move this Court pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)
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`for lack of jurisdiction to dismiss Counts II and IV of Plaintiffs’ Complaint (ECF No. 1) because,
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`inter alia, Plaintiffs have failed to comply with the Endangered Species Act’s (“ESA”) requisite
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`60-day notice requirement. Federal Defendants move in the alternative for dismissal of Count II
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`pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
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`INTRODUCTION
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`In October 2020, EPA registered three dicamba-based pesticides under the Federal
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`Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (“FIFRA”) for use “over-the-top” of genetically
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`modified cotton and soybean plants. Plaintiffs, the American Soybean Association and Plains
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`Cotton Growers, Inc., mistakenly believe that certain 57- to 310-foot buffer zones, measured
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`from the edge of agricultural fields inward, which EPA included in those registrations to protect
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`ESA listed species (“ESA Buffers”), are excessive. Plaintiffs allege at Count II that the ESA
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`Buffers are “unnecessary” to comply with ESA Section 7(a)(2).
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`Count II is an ESA citizen-suit claim, and so Plaintiffs were required to provide EPA of
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`its intent to sue, and then wait 60 days to allow it the opportunity to consider the allegations and
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`revisit or amend its decision if appropriate. 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(1)-(2).
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`1 Michael S. Regan is automatically substituted for Andrew R. Wheeler pursuant to Federal Rule
`of Civil Procedure 25(d).
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`1
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`Plaintiffs did not do so here. As such, Plaintiffs have failed to comply with the mandatory
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`and jurisdictional notice requirements of the ESA’s citizen suit provision, 16 U.S.C. §
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`1540(g)(2)(A)(i), and the Court should dismiss Count II.
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`The Court similarly lacks jurisdiction over Count IV, which requests that the Court
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`declare EPA’s ESA Section 7(a)(2) “no effect” determinations and “may affect, not likely to
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`adversely affect” determination valid. Neither the Declaratory Judgment Act, the Administrative
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`Procedure Act (“APA”), nor the ESA provides subject matter jurisdiction. The Court should
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`accordingly dismiss Count IV.
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`STATUTORY AND REGULATORY BACKGROUND
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`Congress enacted the ESA in 1973 to, among other things, conserve endangered and
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`threatened species and their habitat. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531(b), 1532(6), 1532(20), 1533. The
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`ESA requires a list of all endangered or threatened species to be maintained. Id. § 1533(c). The
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`ESA imposes certain legal requirements protecting “listed species.” As pertinent here, ESA
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`Section 7(a)(2) requires federal agencies to “insure that any action authorized, funded, or carried
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`out by such agency . . . is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered
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`species or threatened species or result in the destruction or adverse modification” of designated
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`critical habitat. Id. § 1536(a)(2) (“ESA Section 7(a)(2)”). To help ensure compliance with this
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`requirement, ESA Section 7(a)(2) and its implementing regulations delineate a process for
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`determining the biological impacts of a proposed action known as ESA Section 7(a)(2)
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`consultation. 16 U.S.C. § 1536; 50 C.F.R. pt. 402.
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`Through this process, an agency proposing an action (“the action agency”) must
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`determine whether its action “may affect” a listed species or the designated critical habitat for a
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`listed species. 50 C.F.R. § 402.14. If the action agency determines that its proposed action will
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`have “no effect” on a listed species or its designated critical habitat, ESA Section 7(a)(2)
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`consultation is not triggered, and the process comes to an end. Id. § 402.12; Nat’l Family Farm
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`Coalition, et al., v. EPA, 966 F.3d 893, 922 (9th Cir. 2020) (citing Calif. ex rel. Lockyer v. U.S.
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`Dep’t of Agriculture, 575 F.3d 999, 1019 (9th Cir. 2009)). A court’s review of whether an
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`agency's no effect determination was arbitrary and capricious turns on “whether the [agency]
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`‘considered the relevant factors and articulated a rational connection between the facts found and
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`the choice made.’ ” W. Watersheds Project v. Kraayenbrink, 632 F.3d 472, 496 (9th Cir. 2011)
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`(citation omitted).
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`Where the action agency determines that its action “may affect” listed species or
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`designated critical habitat, it must consult with either the Fish and Wildlife Service (“FWS”) or
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`National Marine Fisheries Service (“NMFS”) (“the consulting agencies”), depending on the
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`species involved. Id. §§ 402.13, 402.14. There are two types of consultation: informal and
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`formal. Informal consultation is an optional process that includes all discussions,
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`correspondence, etc., between the action agency and consulting agencies undertaken to assist in
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`determining whether formal consultation is required. Id. § 402.13(a). If, during informal
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`consultation, the consulting agency concurs with the action agency’s determination that the
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`action is not likely to adversely affect listed species or critical habitat (a “may affect, not likely to
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`adversely affect” finding), the consultation process is terminated, and no further action is
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`necessary. Id. On the other hand, if an agency determines that its actions “may affect” and are
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`likely to adversely affect a listed species or its critical habitat, the agency must consult formally
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`with either FWS or NMFS. 50 C.F.R. §§ 402.01; 402.14(a)-(b).
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`If an entity wishes to challenge whether the action agency complied with its ESA Section
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`7(a)(2) obligations, including any “no effect” determinations (as EPA did here), they must abide
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`by the requirements of ESA’s citizen suit provision, which provides (as relevant here) that:
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`(1) . . . any person may commence a civil suit on his own behalf—
`(A) to enjoin any person, including the United States and any other governmental
`instrumentality or agency . . . , who is alleged to be in violation of any provision
`of this chapter or regulation issued under the authority thereof; . . . .
`The district courts shall have jurisdiction, without regard to the amount in
`controversy or the citizenship of the parties, to enforce any such provision or
`regulation, or to order the Secretary to perform such act or duty, as the case may
`be.
`(2)(A) No action may be commenced under subparagraph (1)(A) of this section—
`(i) prior to sixty days after written notice of the violation has been given to the
`Secretary, and to any alleged violator of any such provision or regulation[.]
`16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(1)-(2)(A)(i).
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`FACTUAL BACKGROUND
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`On July 2, 2020, Defendant-Intervenors, Bayer CropScience LP (“Bayer”) and BASF
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`Corporation (“BASF”) individually submitted applications to EPA for new registrations of
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`dicamba-based pesticides, Bayer’s XtendiMax and BASF’s Engenia, for use on cotton and
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`soybean plants genetically modified to tolerate the pesticide active ingredient dicamba. Dkt. 1-1
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`at 3.2 On August 12, 2020, Defendant-Intervenor Syngenta Crop Protection, LLP submitted a
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`separate application for amendment of its registration of a pesticide product containing dicamba
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`named Tavium to allow its continued use on dicamba-tolerant cotton and soybean plants. Id. On
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`2 EPA’s registration of uses of dicamba-based pesticides for over-the-top use on dicamba-
`tolerant cotton and soybeans dates to 2016. Dkt. 1-10 at 3-11.
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`October 27, 2020, after conducting extensive analysis, EPA registered XtendiMax and Engenia,
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`and amended the Tavium registration, under Section 3(c)(5) of FIFRA.3
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`In order to directly address the ESA requirements for this action on dicamba, EPA
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`developed control measures that support a “no effect” finding and integrated those into its
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`registration decision. This required EPA to conduct species-specific “effects” determinations. To
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`do so, EPA conducted evaluations to make effect determinations for federally-listed endangered
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`and threatened species and designated critical habitat. Dkt. 1-1 at 3, 26-28. As part of this
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`process, EPA evaluated the potential for off-field transport of dicamba by the combination of
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`spray drift and vapor-phase transport (movement that occurs post-application), taking into
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`account the measures intended to control such off-field transport (“control measures”) mandated
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`on the product labeling. Id. at 26. These control measures included a mandatory 310-ft in-field
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`downwind spray drift setback (or buffer) to address drift of fine liquid droplets, and an in-field
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`57-ft omnidirectional volatile emissions application buffer to address vapor-phase transport. Id.
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`at 27. This 57-ft omnidirectional volatile-emissions application buffer, in combination with the
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`temporal prohibition against application of Tavium, Xtendimax, and Engenia after June 30 (for
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`3 Dkt. 1-1 at 6; see generally Dkt. Nos. 1-1 (EPA’s Oct. 26, 2020, Memorandum Supporting
`Decision to Approve Registration for the Uses of Dicamba on Dicamba Tolerant Cotton and
`Soybean), 1-3 (EPA’s Notice of Pesticide Registration to BASF regarding Engenia pesticide
`product); 1-4 (EPA’s Notice to Syngenta Crop Protection, LLC regarding registration of A21472
`Plus VaporGrip Technology); 1-5 (EPA’s Notice to Bayer Cropscience LP regarding registration
`of XtendiMax with VaporGrip Technology); 1-6 & 1-7 (EPA’s Oct. 26, 2020, Assessment of the
`Benefits of Dicamba Use in Genetically Modified, Dicamba Tolerant Cotton and Soybean
`Production, respectively); Dkt. 1-8 (EPA’s Oct. 26, 2020, Dicamba Use on Genetically Modified
`Dicamba-Tolerant (DT) Cotton and Soybean: Incidents and Impacts to Users and Non-Users
`from Proposed Registrations); Dkt. 1-9 (EPA’s Oct. 26, 2020, Dicamba: Consideration of Newly
`Submitted Mutagenicity Data and Human Health Risk Assessment Summary); 1-10 (EPA’s
`Dicamba DGA and BAPMA salts – 2020 Ecological Assessment of Dicamba Use on Dicamba-
`Tolerant (DT) Cotton and Soybean Including Effects Determinations for Federally Listed
`Threatened and Endangered Species).
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`soybeans) and July 30 (for cotton),4 and a host of other control measures, collectively allowed
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`EPA to determine that there would be “no discernible effects for listed species off of the treated
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`field.” Id. at 26. Therefore, EPA made “no effect” determinations for twenty-two species and one
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`“may affect, not likely to adversely affect” determination (“Effect Determinations”). Id. at 28.5
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`The three mandatory control measures challenged by Plaintiffs are essential elements of EPA’s
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`decision. EPA’s Effect Determinations were based on the control measures and are the basis for
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`complying with ESA Section 7(a)(2).
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`STANDARD OF REVIEW
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`Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, possessing only those powers specifically
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`granted to them by either the U.S. Constitution or Congress. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co.
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`of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). “It is to be presumed that a cause lies outside this limited
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`jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting
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`jurisdiction.” Id. (citations omitted); Keepseagle v. Vilsack, 815 F.3d 28, 32 (D.C. Cir. 2016). In
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`a facial challenge regarding the court’s jurisdiction brought under Federal Rule of Civil
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`Procedure 12(b)(1), the court is required to “accept as true all of the factual allegations contained
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`in the complaint.” Am. Freedom Law Ctr. v. Obama, 821 F.3d 44, 49 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (citation
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`omitted). But courts “may consider materials outside the pleadings in deciding whether to grant a
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`motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.” Id. (citation omitted). If a court determines that it
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`lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear and decide a claim, the claim must be dismissed. Fed. R.
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`Civ. P. 12(b)(1).
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`A challenge brought under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal
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`4 This temporal limitation reduces the timing of applications that would have occurred when
`temperature conditions favor volatility. Id. at 28.
`5 EPA obtained FWS’ concurrence on its one “may affect, not likely to adversely affect”
`determination. Id.
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`sufficiency of the claims asserted in a complaint. Browning v. Clinton, 292 F.3d 235, 242 (D.C.
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`Cir. 2002). To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain
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`sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
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`Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
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`570 (2007)). A claim is facially plausible when there are sufficient factual allegations to draw
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`“the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S.
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`at 678. Although a court must accept as true the factual allegations in the complaint, it is “not
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`bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation,” and a “formulaic
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`recitation of the elements of a cause of action” is not enough. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
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`Moreover, a complaint is not sufficient if it “tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further
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`factual enhancement.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557) (citations
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`omitted).
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`ARGUMENT
`COUNT II SHOULD BE DISMISSED BECAUSE PLAINTIFFS DID NOT
`COMPLY WITH THE MANDATORY AND JURISDICTIONAL NOTICE
`REQUIREMENTS FOR ESA CITIZEN SUITS.
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`Plaintiffs’ Complaint demonstrates Plaintiffs’ intent to challenge EPA’s compliance with
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`I.
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`ESA Section 7(a)(2). Plaintiffs maintain that the EPA, in calculating and applying the ESA
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`Buffers, “imposed an array of application and use conditions on soybean and cotton growers.”
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`Dkt. 1 (Complaint) ¶ 5. They argue that the ESA Buffers are “problematic” and may impact their
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`members’ productivity. Id. at ¶¶ 6, 88. Plaintiffs go on to state that in including the ESA Buffers,
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`the EPA took action “under the ESA” and that the ESA Buffers are judicially reviewable “under
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`the ESA.” Id. ¶¶ 24, 119, 120 (Plaintiffs alleging ESA Buffers were “action taken in compliance”
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`with ESA); see also id. ¶¶ 26-30. Plaintiffs contend that the ESA Buffers “exceed EPA’s
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`authority under the ESA and are unnecessary to comply with” the ESA. Id. ¶ 121. Finally,
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`Plaintiffs request that the Court “declare that the ESA Buffers exceed EPA’s authority under the
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`ESA” and seek “remand of EPA’s temporal dicamba application restrictions and spatial
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`application buffers.” Id. ¶¶ 29, 35. The suite of documents Plaintiffs refer to as the “Dicamba
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`Decision” further confirms that Plaintiffs target an aspect of EPA’s ESA “Effect
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`Determinations,” and therefore the agency’s compliance with ESA Section 7(a)(2). See, e.g.,
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`Dkt. 1-1 at 3-5, 8, 13-14, 18, 21, 24, 28; Dkt. 1-10 at 8, 66-71, 301.
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`As such, it is clear that–although Plaintiffs do not list the citizen suit provision as a basis
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`for their Complaint–Count II alleges a violation by EPA of ESA Section 7(a)(2) and thus
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`Plaintiffs were required to comply with the ESA’s 60-day notice requirement. Dkt. 1 ¶ 17.
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`Jurisdiction under this citizen-suit provision is expressly limited by ESA Section 11(g), which
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`requires a would-be plaintiff to provide EPA with written notice of an alleged violation at least
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`60 days prior to filing a complaint. 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(2). Courts have consistently held that the
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`ESA’s 60-day notice requirement is “mandatory and jurisdictional” and a plaintiff’s failure to
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`provide proper notice warrants dismissal. Friends of Animals v. Ashe, 51 F. Supp. 3d 77, 87
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`(D.D.C. 2014); Rsch. Air, Inc. v. Norton, No. 05-cv-623-RMC, 2006 WL 508341, at *10-11
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`(D.D.C. Mar. 1, 2006); accord Safari Club Int’l v. Jewell, 960 F. Supp. 2d 17 (D.D.C. 2013); see
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`also Friends of Animals v. Salazar, 670 F. Supp. 2d 7, 13 (D.D.C. 2009) (noting that “The
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`Supreme Court has held that similar statutory notice provisions are mandatory and cannot be
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`waived”) (citing Hallstrom v. Tillamook Cnty., 493 U.S. 20, 31 (1989)); Common Sense Salmon
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`Recovery v. Evans, 329 F. Supp. 2d 96, 104 (D.D.C. 2004) (describing the notice requirement as
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`“‘mandatory conditions precedent to commencing suit[,]’ which ‘a district court may not
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`disregard . . . at its discretion’”) (quoting Hallstrom, 493 U.S. at 31). Failure to strictly comply
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`with this “preliminary but stringent” jurisdictional requirement “acts as an absolute bar to
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`bringing suit under the ESA,” Rsch. Air, Inc., 2006 WL 508341, at *10, *11 (quoting Sw. Ctr. for
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`Biological Diversity v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 143 F.3d 515, 520 (9th Cir. 1998)), and
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`courts routinely dismiss ESA claims for failure to provide proper notice. See, e.g., id. at *11
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`(dismissing claims for failure to provide proper notice); Building Indus. Ass’n of S. Cal. v. Lujan,
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`785 F. Supp. 1020, 1022 (D.D.C. 1992) (same). Plaintiffs have provided no notice to EPA
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`regarding alleged ESA violations in connection with the agency’s approval of the dicamba
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`registrations.6 Therefore, the Court must dismiss Count II.
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`
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`The Court should reject any argument that Count II is an Administrative Procedure Act
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`(“APA”) claim, and thus no 60-day notice was required. Count II does not seek review of a
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`“final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court.” 5 U.S.C. § 704.
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`Here, the ESA provides a direct avenue for Plaintiffs to seek a remedy. Mapped onto the
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`pertinent language from the ESA citizen suit provision, Plaintiffs have “commence[d] a civil
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`suit” to “to enjoin” EPA, which they “allege[ ] to be in violation of” ESA Section 7(a)(2). 16
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`U.S.C. § 1540(g)(1). This Court has jurisdiction under the ESA “to enforce” that “provision”,
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`i.e., ESA Section 7(a)(2). Id. § 1540(g)(2)(A)(i). An attack on an action agency’s Section 7(a)(2)
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`compliance is plainly a citizen suit claim. W. Watersheds Project, 632 F.3d at 495-97 (citing
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`6 The notice requirement cannot be cured “by either a 60-day stay of the case or by applying
`equitable tolling principles.” Building Indus. Ass’n, 785 F. Supp. at 1022 (citing Hallstrom, 493
`U.S. at 26-28). Counsel for Federal Defendants raised the lack of a 60-day notice letter with
`counsel for Plaintiffs during a February 2, 2021, telephonic conference. Today, April 6, 2021, at
`2:25 p.m. Eastern, counsel for Plaintiffs sent the email attached as Exhibit “A” to counsel for
`Federal Defendants purporting to provide such notice to the undersigned. Exh. “A”. Plaintiffs’
`skeletal letter fails to provide any explanation as to why Plaintiffs believe (mistakenly) that EPA
`has violated the ESA and is therefore facially defective. But in any event, Plaintiffs would have
`had to dismiss their ESA claims prior to serving such letter on the EPA Administrator, which
`they have not done. Plaintiffs’ belatedly-sent letter does not cure Plaintiffs’ failure to provide
`EPA with the required notice. 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(2)(A)(i).
`9
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`

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`Case 1:20-cv-03190-RCL Document 43 Filed 04/06/21 Page 15 of 18
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`Wash. Toxics Coal. v. EPA, 413 F.3d 1024, 1034 (9th Cir. 2005), stating “[b]ecause this
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`substantive statute independently authorizes a private right of action, the APA does not govern
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`plaintiffs’ claims. Plaintiffs’ suits to compel agencies to comply with the substantive provisions
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`of the ESA arise under the ESA citizen suit provision, and not the APA.”). The ESA and
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`pertinent judicial authority thus make it clear that Count II must be brought, if at all, under the
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`ESA citizen-suit provision. Supra at 4-5, 9-10.
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`
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`Moreover, Plaintiffs may not evade the notice requirement by artfully styling their
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`pleading as one seeking relief under the APA. See, e.g., Proie v. NMFS, No. 11-cv-5955-BHS,
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`2012 WL 1536756, at *2-4, *2 n.3 (W.D. Wash., May 1, 2012) (rejecting plaintiff’s “misplaced”
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`“effort to craft an APA claim” out of an ESA citizen-suit claim and finding that the court lacked
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`jurisdiction because plaintiff’s complaint, plead solely as an APA claim, violated the ESA 60-
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`day notice requirement).
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`Because Plaintiffs were required, but failed, to comply with the ESA notice requirement,
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`the Court should dismiss Count II under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1).7
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`II.
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`
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`THE COURT SHOULD ALSO DISMISS COUNT IV FOR LACK OF SUBJECT
`MATTER JURISDICTION.
`The Court also lacks jurisdiction to consider Count IV, which requests that the Court
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`declare that EPA’s “no effect” determinations and “may affect, not likely to adversely affect”
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`determination are valid. Dkt. 1 ¶ 136-137, 139. First, the Declaratory Judgment Act does not
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`provide an independent source of jurisdiction to consider Count IV. Lovitky v. Trump, 918 F.3d
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`160, 161 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (28 U.S.C. 2201 “(declaratory judgment) is not an independent
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`7 Alternatively, for the same reasons, the Court may dismiss Count II under Fed. R. Civ. P.
`12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. See Coos Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs v. Kempthorne, 531 F.3d
`792, 810 (9th Cir. 2008) (affirming dismissal on grounds that the court “lacked jurisdiction and,
`in the alternative, that [plaintiff] had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted”).
`10
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`

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`Case 1:20-cv-03190-RCL Document 43 Filed 04/06/21 Page 16 of 18
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`source of Federal jurisdiction.”) (quoting Metz v. BAE Sys. Tech. Solutions & Servs., Inc., 774
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`F.3d 18, 25, n.8 (D.C. Cir. 2014)).8
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`
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`Second, the APA does not provide subject matter jurisdiction, either. Like Count II,
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`Count IV concerns an action agency–EPA–taking an action pursuant to ESA Section 7(a)(2).
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`Cases concerning such action agency