Case 1:21-cv-00360 Document 1 Filed 02/09/21 Page 1 of 22
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
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`Case No._______________________
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`CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
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`DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
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`CLIFFY CARE LANDSCAPING LLC
`15837 S. Mahaffie Street
`Olathe, KS 66062
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`on behalf of itself and all others similarly
`situated,
` Plaintiff,
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`v.
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`FACEBOOK, INC.
`1601 Willow Road
`Menlo Park, CA 94025
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`GOOGLE LLC
`1600 Amphitheatre Parkway
`Mountain View, CA 94043,
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`and
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`ALPHABET INC.
`1600 Amphitheatre Parkway
`Mountain View, CA 94043
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` Defendants.
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`Plaintiff, individually and on behalf of a Class of all those similarly situated, brings this
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`class action complaint for equitable relief and treble damages against Defendants, FACEBOOK,
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`INC. (“Facebook”), GOOGLE LLC, and ALPHABET INC. (collectively, “Google”) for
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`violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1, and alleges as follows:
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`Case 1:21-cv-00360 Document 1 Filed 02/09/21 Page 2 of 22
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`I.
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`NATURE OF THIS ACTION
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`1.
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`In 2019, spending in the United States on digital, online advertising reached
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`$129.34 billion, exceeding for the first time the total spent in the U.S. on all forms of traditional
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`print, radio, television and billboard advertising. In 2021, digital ad spending in the U.S. is
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`expected to reach $198 billion, about a third of which, or $66.2 billion, will be spent on search
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`advertising, in which advertisers target search engine users searching for a particular product or
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`service and pay to have ads placed next to the search results. This audience is composed mostly
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`of users of Google, which has an 88% share of search queries in the U.S. and a 92% share of
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`search queries worldwide. The remaining U.S. digital ad spend, or about $132 billion, will be
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`spent on display advertising, in which advertisers place images, banners, or videos on websites
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`likely to be viewed by the advertiser’s target audience.
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`2.
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`About 86% of today’s online display advertising will be bought and sold
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`electronically at high speeds through centralized trading venues known as “exchanges.”
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`Beginning in 2005, the rise of electronic ad trading, known as “programmatic advertising,” has
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`transformed advertising from a relationship business to a commodity business, with publishers1
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`and advertisers transacting with each other in an electronic spot market. Google’s advertising
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`exchange alone trades ad spaces targeted to billions of individual users and processes tens of
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`billions of targeted ads daily.
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`3.
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`With enormous audiences, a huge inventory of content, and the advantages of
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`network effects and technological prowess, Google, Facebook, and Amazon control about 79%
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`of non-search digital advertising. Facebook’s 2.8 billion monthly users and Google’s 1.8 billion
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`1 A publisher is the operator of a website or mobile app that makes space available for the
`display of advertisements, including images, banners, and videos.
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`2
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`Gmail account holders—together with their identities, search and browsing histories, spending
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`habits, social connections, and locations—endow these firms with unprecedented capacity to
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`reach and target consumers. In addition to selling display space on their “owned-and-operated”
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`properties, Google, Facebook, and to a lesser extent, Amazon, also sell advertisers space on third
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`party websites, acting as intermediaries in what has become known as the “open display”
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`advertising market.
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`4.
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`A large proportion of open display advertising is sold directly to advertisers
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`through the “ad networks” operated by each of these firms: the Google Display Network
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`(“GDN”) (part of Google Ads), the Facebook Audience Network (“FAN”), and the Amazon
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`Demand Side Platform (“Amazon DSP”). Defendants’ ad networks, GDN and FAN, accounts for
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`about 67% of the total open display ad spend, while Amazon’s share and those of other networks
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`are far lower.
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`5.
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`Defendants’ horizontally competing ad networks, GDN and FAN, should
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`vigorously compete for advertisers and publishers, but they do not. Instead, as alleged in a
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`Complaint filed against Google on December 16, 2020 by 10 state attorneys general2 and
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`elaborated upon in an article in the New York Times on January 17, 2021,3 Defendants conspired
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`to allocate to one another the advertisers and publishers affiliated with each network and to
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`eliminate competition between them in the open display advertising market. In an agreement that
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`Google insiders codenamed “Jedi Blue,” Facebook agreed to bid FAN’s demand through
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`Google’s ad exchange, rather than directly through multiple exchanges using a competing
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`technology called “header bidding.” In return for that agreement, FAN received (i) preferential
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`2 Texas et al. v. Google LLC, Complaint (E.D.Tx. 4:20-cv-00957, filed Dec. 12, 2020).
`3 Daisuke Wakabayashi and Tiffany Hsu, “Behind a Secret Deal Between Google and
`Facebook,” New York Times, Jan. 17, 2021, available at https://nyti.ms/3imRzwt.
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`3
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`treatment over other bidders, including a guaranteed “win rate,”; (ii) superior information about
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`the advertising opportunity, including the identity of the user most of the time; and (iii) increased
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`“timeouts” for Facebook to bid before it was excluded from the auction, all of which allowed
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`Facebook to bid and win more often relative to non-Facebook bidders.
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`6.
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`Defendants’ conspiracy to collude rather than compete violates Section 1 of the
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`Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1, and has caused and will continue to cause injury and economic
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`harm to Plaintiff and all other similarly situated advertisers that bid through Google’s Open
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`Bidding program through any non-FAN ad network or demand-side platform, including Google
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`Ads and GDN, for which Plaintiff seeks appropriate equitable relief and damages through this
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`action.
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`II.
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`JURISDICTION AND VENUE
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`7.
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`This Court has original jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s federal antitrust claims, which
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`arise under Sections 1 and 15 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 15, and Sections 4 and 16 of
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`the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 15 and 26. The Court also has diversity jurisdiction over this
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`action under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d), because at least one
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`class member is of diverse citizenship from Defendants, there are more than 100 class members
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`nationally, and the aggregate amount in controversy exceeds $5,000,000. This Court also has
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`subject matter jurisdiction over Sherman Act claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 & 1337.
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`8.
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`This Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendants, which are found and
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`transact business in this district.
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`9.
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`The Venue is proper in this District pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), (c), and (d)
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`because during the Class Period (defined below), Defendants resided, transacted business, and
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`had agents in this district.
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`10.
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`Defendants’ acts were within the flow of, were intended to have, and did have a
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`substantial effect on the interstate commerce of the United States.
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`III.
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`PARTIES
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`A.
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`Plaintiff
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`11.
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`Plaintiff Cliffy Care Landscaping is a limited liability company in good standing,
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`registered in the state of Kansas, with a principal place of business at 15837 S. Mahaffie Street,
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`Olathe, Kansas, 66062. Plaintiff purchased display advertising through Google Ads between
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`September 2018 and the present.
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`B.
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`Defendants
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`12.
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`Defendant Facebook, Inc., is a publicly traded, for-profit company, organized
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`under the laws of Delaware with its principal place of business at 1601 Willow Road, Menlo
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`Park, California. Facebook’s principal business provides personal social network services to
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`approximately 3 billion people throughout the world through control of its network, known
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`internally as “Facebook Blue.”
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`13.
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`Defendant Google LLC, is a limited liability company organized under the laws
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`of Delaware with its principal place of business at 1600 Amphitheatre Parkway, Mountain View,
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`California. Google LLC is a wholly owned and controlled subsidiary of XXVI Holding Inc.,
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`which is a subsidiary of Defendant Alphabet Inc.
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`14.
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`Defendant Alphabet Inc., is a publicly traded, for-profit company organized under
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`the laws of Delaware with its principal place of business at 1600 Amphitheatre Parkway,
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`Mountain View, California. Google LLC is a wholly owned subsidiary of Alphabet.
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`15.
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`Defendants Google LLC and Alphabet Inc., are collectively referred to herein as
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`“Google.” Google is a technology company that provides internet-related services and products,
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`including online advertising technologies, the world’s most dominant search engine, and the
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`world’s most visited website, YouTube.
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`16.
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`Defendants’ conduct was authorized, ordered, or performed by their directors,
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`officers, managers, agents, employees, or representatives in the course of their employment and
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`while actively engaged in the management of Defendants’ affairs.
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`17.
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`Defendants, through their subsidiaries, divisions, affiliates and agents, operated as
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`a single unified entity with each acting as the alter ego, agent or joint-venturer of or for the other
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`with respect to the acts, violations, and common course of conduct alleged herein and under the
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`authority and apparent authority of parent entities, principals and controlling parties.
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`IV. CLASS ALLEGATIONS
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`18.
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`Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of itself and as a class action under Rules
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`23(a), (b)(2) and (b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of the members of the
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`following Class:
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`All persons who purchased digital display advertising through
`Google Ads, Amazon DSP, or other non-Facebook demand-side
`platform to reach consumers in the United States between
`September 2018 and the present (“Class Period”).
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`Specifically excluded from this Class are the Defendants; the officers, directors or
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`employees of any Defendant; any entity in which any Defendant has a controlling interest; and
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`any affiliate, legal representative, heir or assign of any Defendant. Also excluded from this
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`Class are any federal, state or local governmental entities, any judicial officer presiding over
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`this action and the members of his/her immediate family and judicial staff, and any juror
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`assigned to this action.
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`19.
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`Class Identity/Ascertainability: The Class is readily identifiable and is one for
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`which records should exist.
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`20.
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`Numerosity: Due to the nature of the trade and commerce involved, Plaintiff
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`believes there are thousands of Class members as above described, the exact number and their
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`identities being known to Defendants and their Co-conspirators.
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`21.
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`Typicality: Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the members of the Class
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`because Plaintiff, directly from one or more of the Defendants or their co-conspirators, and
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`therefore Plaintiff’s claims arise from the same common course of conduct giving rise to the
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`claims of the members of the Class and the relief sought is common to the Class.
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`22.
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`The facts of this case are the same for all members of the class in that Defendants’
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`conduct in conspiring and agreeing to restrain competition was the same for all members of the
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`class.
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`23.
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`The same legal standards govern resolution of each claim set forth below for all
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`members of the class and across each of the class member’s individual claims. If Defendants are
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`liable to one member of the class, Defendants are liable to all members of the class.
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`24.
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`Because the claims of each member of the Class have a common origin and share
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`a common basis in terms of Defendant’s systematic misconduct, there are common questions of
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`fact and law which exist and which are susceptible to common answers as to each Class member
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`under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)(2), and which predominate over any questions
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`affecting only individual members under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b).
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`25.
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` Commonality: There are questions of law and fact common to the Class,
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`including, but not limited to:
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`a. Whether Defendants entered into a conspiracy and agreement to cooperate
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`in the open display advertising market rather than compete;
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`b. Whether Defendants’ agreement allocated customers between them;
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`c. Whether Defendants’ agreement allocated market segments in the ad tech
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`stack between them;
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`d. Whether Google entered into an agreement with Facebook for Facebook to
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`win a fixed percentage of Google’s auctions;
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`e. Whether Facebook was granted preferences not granted to other bidders in
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`Google’s auctions;
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`f. Whether Defendants’ agreement unreasonably restrained trade and thereby
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`violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1;
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`g. Whether Defendants’ violation was a cause of injury-in-fact to Plaintiff
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`and the class members and whether such injury constituted antitrust injury;
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`h. The appropriate measure and quantum of aggregate damages suffered by
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`the class caused by Defendants’ violation; and,
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`i. Whether Defendants should be permanently enjoined from engaging in the
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`same or similar concerted action or agreement in the future.
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`26.
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`Predominance: These and other common questions of law or fact predominate
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`over any questions affecting only individual members of the Class.
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`27.
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`Adequacy: Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Class in
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`that Plaintiff’s interest are aligned with, and not antagonistic to, those of the other members of
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`the Class and Plaintiff has retained counsel competent and experienced in the prosecution of the
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`class actions and antitrust litigation to represent itself and the Class.
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`28.
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`Superiority and Manageability: A class action is superior to other available
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`methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy since individual joinder of all
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`damaged Class members is impractical. Prosecution as a class action will eliminate the
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`possibility of repetitious litigation. The damages suffered by individual Class members are
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`relatively small, given the expense and burden of individual prosecution of the claims asserted in
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`this litigation and Class members’ interests in individually controlling the prosecution of separate
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`actions is de minimis and impracticable. Absent a class action, it would not be feasible for Class
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`members to seek redress for the violations of law herein alleged. Further, individual litigation
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`presents the potential for inconsistent or contradictory judgments and would greatly magnify the
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`delay and expense to all parties and to the court system. The Class members’ interests in
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`individually controlling the prosecution of separate actions is de minimis and impracticable and
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`it is desirable to concentrate litigation of these claims this forum. There are no known or
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`apparent likely difficulties in managing a class action. A class action will provide the benefits of
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`unitary adjudication, economy of scale and comprehensive supervision by a single court.
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`V.
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`FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
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`29. When a user visits a website or uses a mobile application, the ad space on the
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`page is instantly routed into one or more ad exchanges to be sold to the highest bidder in a real-
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`time, electronic auction. At the conclusion of the auction, the winning advertiser’s ad displays to
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`the user in time for the page to load and before the user has noticed anything has occurred. The
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`user just sees the website page and the ad targeted to them. This process is known as
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`“programmatic display advertising.” Although some advertising space is sold at fixed prices
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`through direct deals between publishers and advertisers or media agencies, most display
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`advertising is sold programmatically. More than 86% of online display advertising traded
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`programmatically in 2020.
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`30.
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`The scale of Google’s audience and Facebook’s social network is large enough
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`for Defendants to offer their own self-serve interfaces for programmatic trading. Advertisers
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`engage Google and Facebook to place ads on Google and Facebook owned-and-operated sites,
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`such as YouTube (owned by Google) and Instagram (owned by Facebook). The placement of ads
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`on Google and Facebook’s own sites are said to be placed within the firm’s “walled garden” and
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`is sometimes known as “first party” display advertising. Over half of first party display
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`advertising is generated by Facebook (for space on Facebook Blue and Instagram), with the
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`second highest share belonging to Google (primarily for YouTube). Operators of walled gardens
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`enjoy an intrinsic advantage over other sellers of programmatic display advertising because
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`media companies with authenticated users achieve significantly better economics than media
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`companies with anonymous traffic.
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`31.
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`For most other publishers of online content, however, programmatic trading is
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`only possible through a range of intermediaries between advertisers and publishers known as the
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`“ad tech stack.” Google and Facebook both leverage the information they know about users, their
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`programmatic trading technologies, and their enormous customer base of advertisers and media
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`agencies to sell impression-targeted display ad space on behalf of other market participants.
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`Known as “open display advertising,” advertisers in this market buy inventory from many
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`publishers with a smaller scale (for example, newspapers and app providers). Open display
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`advertising comprises 30-40% of total programmatic display ad expenditures. Because they
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`maintain much richer and higher quality user data and exhibit much greater scale and reach than
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`their rivals, Google and Facebook enjoy a substantial competitive advantage over other
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`intermediaries in the open display market. For example, Google can track users’ visits to at least
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`70% of the top one million sites on the internet and has tags (including as a third party) tracking
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`user behavior on over 80% of popular websites. Facebook has the second highest prevalence of
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`tags, covering between 40-50% of the most popular websites. Amazon, which operates a similar
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`walled garden, is growing their open display intermediation business, but remains third after
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`Google and Facebook, with less than 10% of the open display ad market. The non-walled garden
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`share of programmatic open display advertising has declined by roughly $1 billion/year for the
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`past several years.
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`32.
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`The ad tech stack that connects advertisers with publishers consists of the
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`following types of participants, starting with the advertiser-facing (demand side) participants:
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`a. Media agencies, used by large advertisers to plan and deliver advertising
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`campaigns and provide technical expertise to execute programmatic
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`buying;
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`b. Advertiser ad servers, used by advertisers and media agencies to store ads
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`and deliver them to publishers;
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`c. Demand side platforms (“DSPs”), used by advertisers and media agencies
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`to bid on and buy advertising space (inventory) from multiple sources
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`according to the buyer’s objectives and data about the inventory and the
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`final user;
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`d. Supply side platforms (“SSPs”), used by publishers to collect bids from
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`DSPs, automate the sale of inventory through real-time auctions or direct
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`deals with advertisers, and perform the ad exchange function;
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`e. Publisher ad servers (“PAS”), used by publishers to manage inventory and
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`to determine which ads to serve based on the bids received from SSPs or
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`agreed between the publisher and advertisers.
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`33.
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`On September 15, 2020, the Subcommittee on Antitrust, Competition Policy, and
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`Consumer Rights of the Senate Judiciary Committee held a hearing on the subject of “Stacking
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`Case 1:21-cv-00360 Document 1 Filed 02/09/21 Page 12 of 22
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`the Tech: Has Google Harmed Competition in Online Advertising?” The Subcommittee’s
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`Majority Staff Report and Recommendations, released on October 6, 2020, reported that Google
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`captures over 50% of the market across the ad tech stack. It runs the leading ad exchange
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`(formerly known as AdX), while also running buy-side and sell-side intermediary platforms
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`trading on this exchange. Google’s dominance is a result of a series of acquisitions completed
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`since 2008, when Google purchased the leading ad server, DoubleClick, which provided the
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`technology for Google’s current PAS. Two years later, Google acquired AdMob, the largest ad
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`server for the mobile application market. In 2010, Google acquired Invite Media, which it re-
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`launched in 2012 as DoubleClick Bid Manager and eventually converted into Google’s
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`enterprise DSP, Display & Video 360 (“DV 360”). In 2011, Google purchased AdMeld, one of
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`the largest display advertising SSPs, which it integrated into AdX, Google’s existing exchange.
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`And in 2014, Google bought Adometry, an analytics and attribution provider it then integrated
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`into Google Analytics. On October 20, 2020, the Department of Justice brought suit against
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`Google for monopolization of the search and search advertising markets, followed by the suit
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`brought by the Texas attorney general and nine other state attorneys general for monopolization
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`and attempted monopolization of the PAS, ad exchange, and DSP display advertising markets. It
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`is unusual, to say the least, for a single company to represent both sellers and buyers in the same
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`market, and to set the rules for, and conduct, the auctions that determine the winners, losers, and
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`prices in that market.
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`34.
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`After Google’s 2008 acquisition of DoubleClick, the leading intermediary on the
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`publisher side, DoubleClick immediately began preferentially routing trading activity to AdX,
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`Google’s ad exchange. By 2011, AdX was the leading exchange in the market with the highest
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`trading volume. At the time, bidding for ad space was conducted sequentially, in a system called
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`the “waterfall.” In this system, a publisher ad server offers a particular impression to a particular
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`exchange; if that exchange produced a bid above the reserve price, the ad was placed. If the
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`exchange did not produce an acceptable bid, the ad server would offer the impression to the
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`exchange next in line, proceeding down a “waterfall” until the impression was sold to a buyer.
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`Typically, Google’s AdX was first in line, would assess whether the impression was a valuable
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`user or was instead a low-value impression like a bot. If the former, then Google AdX would bid
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`on the opportunity, if the latter, it would pass the opportunity to the next exchange in line. Aware
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`it was in second place, the second exchange would bid low to account for the risk that the
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`opportunity had low or zero value. The order of exchanges in the waterfall was determined by
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`historical average bid levels.
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`35.
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`Google’s policy of refusing to let publishers on Google’s ad server route their ad
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`spaces to more than one exchange at a time drew the ire of the industry. By 2015, publishers had
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`developed a method known as “header bidding” in an attempt to avoid Google’s routing
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`restrictions and to push the advertising market to function more like other electronic trading
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`markets. In header bidding, a publisher inserts a piece of JavaScript code into the header section
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`of their webpages. When a user visits a page, the JavaScript routes information about the
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`website’s ad space to multiple ad exchanges, bypassing Google’s PAS. Publishers could route
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`inventory to a dozen exchanges at once, instead of routing them to Google’s exchange first. This
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`version of header bidding is known as “client-side” header bidding because the bid-request
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`information is stored on the user’s device rather on a server. With client-side header bidding,
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`websites use a “wrapper” that sets a universal timeout, a common time limit within which all
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`exchanges must submit a bid. In header bidding, all the SSPs (exchanges) get the chance to view
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`the impression at the same time and submit their respective bids before the ad server is called,
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`which is why header bidding is also referred to as pre-bidding. Header bidding solved the
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`problem that arises when an ad exchange with an early place in the waterfall sequence produced
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`a bid above the publisher’s minimum acceptable price and won the impression even if an
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`exchange later in the waterfall sequence had elicited a substantially higher bid, a situation
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`illustrated in the following figure:
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`36. Moreover, by setting longer timeouts, publishers found they could neutralize any
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`speed advantages that Google might have from the colocation of its DSPs (Google Ads and
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`DV360) and its exchange, AdX. Publishers also found that header bidding not only offered
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`increased yields but increased transparency, because publishers know what each advertiser is
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`willing to bid before the publisher calls its ad server and can gauge the effect of adjustments in
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`the timeout on yield. By 2016, about 70% of major publishers had adopted header bidding.
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`37.
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`Although header bidding offered publishers certain benefits, it also introduced
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`some problems. Header bidding can be difficult to implement, requiring both advertising
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`operations and development resources and it requires the addition of extra code on the webpage
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`which can slow down the publisher’s website and detract from the site’s user experience.
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`Nonetheless, header bidding was widely viewed in the industry as a viable means of challenging
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`Google’s hold on the exchange market.
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`38.
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`Google refused to participate in header bidding, which severely limited the
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`participants in header bidding auctions because of the large advertiser demand it controls.
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`Moreover, even though the introduction of header bidding created an environment where the bids
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`submitted by SSPs participate in a final, first-price auction, Google’s refusal resulted in Google
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`getting a “last look” at bid opportunities because the winning bids from the non-Google
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`exchanges participating in header bidding were then sent to Google’s PAS. Google’s PAS then
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`submitted it to AdX to see if the bid could be improved, essentially using the results of the
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`header bidding auction as a floor price for AdX bidders. This set-up is inefficient, of course,
`
`because advertisers bidding on the other exchanges do not have the opportunity to outbid the
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`winner of the AdX auction.
`
`39.
`
`Instead of adopting header bidding, Google responded by introducing two
`
`innovations, a development framework called Accelerated Mobile Pages (“AMP”), which it
`
`launched in early 2016, and its own version of header bidding, called Open Bidding (formerly
`
`known as Exchange Bidding), which was developed in 2016 but became available in April 2018.
`
`Both initiatives were ostensibly intended to address the latency and retooling problems with
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`client-side header bidding, but according to the United Kingdom’s Competition & Markets
`
`Authority (“CMA”) (the U.K.’s antitrust enforcement agency), “a major reason for the
`
`introduction of Exchange Bidding appears to have been protecting Google’s revenues from the
`
`impact of header bidding … .”4 Moreover, the AMP solution restricted the use of JavaScript,
`
`
`4 Online Platforms and Digital Advertising, Market Study Final Report (July 2020),
`Appendix M, ¶ 36, available at:
`https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/online-platforms-and-digital-advertising-market-study.
`
`
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`15
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`Case 1:21-cv-00360 Document 1 Filed 02/09/21 Page 16 of 22
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`precisely the code that websites (in the case of AMP, mobile apps) needed to implement client-
`
`side header bidding.5
`
`40.
`
`Both innovations move control of the bidding process onto Google’s servers.
`
`Although both header bidding and Open Bidding are designed to allow simultaneous auctions at
`
`several exchanges, Open Bidding requires calls to ad exchanges to be made from Google’s ad
`
`server rather than from the user’s device. For this reason, Open Bidding is known as server-side
`
`header bidding. At the same time, Google imposed tighter timeout restrictions, refused to share
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`user data (thereby requiring non-Google exchanges to engage in a time-consuming process of
`
`“cookie matching” to identify the user), and levied a 5-10% fee on ads from non-Google ad
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`exchanges.
`
`41.
`
`Similarly, the AMP framework requires publishers to allow Google to host
`
`publishers’ content on its own servers to enable them to be served faster. Once a publisher loads
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`content in AMP format, Google creates a cached version on Google’s servers. Each time a user
`
`navigates to the publisher’s AMP content from a Google property (e.g., Search or Google News),
`
`instead of directing the user to the publisher’s server, Google serves the AMP content from
`
`Google’s AMP cache server, a practice which prevents publishers from collecting their own data
`
`on its users.
`
`42.
`
`Google could profitably resist adopting header bidding and promote the AMP
`
`framework only because publishers cannot ignore its huge user base. But, Facebook controls
`
`even greater demand, accounting for over half of all display advertising revenue and considered
`
`
`5 Google recently loosened its restrictions on the use of JavaScript in its AMP solution, but it
`remains incompatible with client-side header bidding in its original form because it limits the
`number of vendors that publishers can route to five, allows only a single cookie-sync, and
`imposes strict trading timeouts.
`
`
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`Case 1:21-cv-00360 Document 1 Filed 02/09/21 Page 17 of 22
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`a ‘must have’ platform by many advertisers. It has a significant user data advantage, which both
`
`increases the value of its advertising inventory and creates additional barriers for its competitors
`
`to overcome. Through FAN, the Facebook Audience Network, Facebook sells space outside its
`
`walled garden, including space on over half of all mobile apps available on the Google Play
`
`Store. More than a billion people per month see an advertisement in a website or mobile app
`
`through FAN. Moreover, because consumers now use their phones more than their computers
`
`and publishers receive approximately 60% of their traffic from mobile use, Facebook’s user base
`
`and mobile inventory have become even more important.
`
`43.
`
`In March 2017, Facebook announced that the company had chosen a group of
`
`technology partners through which it would implement a header bidding solution that opened
`
`FAN’s demand source directly to web and mobile app publishers, enabling publishers and
`
`advertisers to avoid the fees for transacting through Google’s ad server. The competitive threat
`
`posed by Facebook’s adoption of header bidding was not lost on Google. According to the Wall
`
`Street Journal, Google advertising executive Chris LaSala wrote in an internal document
`
`outlining the company’s 2017 priorities: “Need to fight off the existential threat posed by header
`
`bidding and FAN.”6 The Times reported a Google executive calling for “an all hands on deck
`
`approach.” 7
`
`44.
`
`The specter of Facebook, Amazon, and thousands of publishers lining up in 2017
`
`to resist Google’s dominance over the ad tech stack by promoting technology that would enable
`
`
`6 Ryan Tracy and Jeff Horwitz, “Inside the Google-Facebook Ad Deal at the Heart of a
`Price-Fixing Lawsuit,” Wall Street Journal, Dec. 29, 2020, available at
`https://www.wsj.com/articles/inside-the-google-facebook-ad-deal-at-the-heart-of-a-price-fixing-
`lawsuit-11609254758.
`7 Daisuke Wakabayashi and Tiffany Hsu, “Behind a Secret Deal Between Google and
`Facebook,” New York Times, Jan. 17, 2021, available at https://nyti.ms/3imRzwt.
`
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`17
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`Case 1:21-c