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`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
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`In the Matter of December 15, 2021,
`Subpoena Issued by the United States
`House of Representatives Select Committee
`to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
`the United States Capitol
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`
`PLAINTIFF,
`c/o Brand Woodward Law
`1808 Park Road Northwest
`Washington, District of Columbia 20010,
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`v.
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`VERIZON COMMUNICATIONS INC.,
`c/o Verizon Security Subpoena Compliance
`180 Washington Valley Road
`Bedminster, New Jersey 07921
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`DEFENDANT.
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`COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
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`Plaintiff, by and through the undersigned counsel, brings this action for declaratory and
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`injunctive relief alleging as follows:
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`THE PARTIES
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`1.
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`Plaintiff is the recipient of correspondence from Defendant Verizon
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`Communications Inc. (“Verizon”) advising that certain phone records associated with the phone
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`number Plaintiff maintains with Defendant Verizon have been subpoenaed by the United States
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`House of Representatives Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United
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`States Capitol (“Select Committee”). Concomitantly with the docketing of this Complaint,
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`Plaintiff will file a Motion to proceed in this action anonymously. See In re Sealed Case, 931
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`F.3d 92 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
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`Case 1:22-cv-00018 Document 1 Filed 01/05/22 Page 2 of 11
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`2.
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`Defendant Verizon Communications Inc., is a Delaware Corporation with its
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`principal place of business in New York City, New York. Plaintiff has been advised that
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`communications regarding the subpoena in question are to be directed to Verizon’s Verizon
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`Security Subpoena Compliance division.
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`JURISDICTION AND VENUE
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`3.
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`This Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and
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`1343. This case challenges the validity of a subpoena issued by the United States House of
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`Representatives Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
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`Capitol. It raises claims regarding the scope of the investigative power of Congress under
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`Article I of the United States Constitution, claims under the Stored Communications Act, 18
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`U.S.C. § 2701, and claims under the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 222.
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`4.
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`Venue is proper before this court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391 because a
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`substantial part of the events giving rise to these claims – the issuance of the subpoena at issue –
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`was occurred within this District.
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`FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
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`5.
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`In a well-known episode on January 6, 2021, a large group of protestors in
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`Washington, D.C., entered the United States Capitol, breached security, and disrupted the
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`counting of the Electoral College votes until order was restored. The United States Department
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`of Justice has arrested and charged more than 725 individuals in connection with the events of
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`January 6th.
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`6.
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`On June 28, 2021, Speaker Nancy Pelosi introduced House Resolution 503,
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`“Establishing the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
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`Capitol.” Two days later, the House passed H. Res. 503.
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`Page 2
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`Case 1:22-cv-00018 Document 1 Filed 01/05/22 Page 3 of 11
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`7.
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`H. Res. 503 instructs the Speaker of the House to appoint thirteen Members to the
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`Select Committee and to designate one Member to serve as chair of the Select Committee. See
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`H. Res. Sec. 2. Speaker Pelosi appointed and designated Rep. Bennie Thompson (D-MS 2nd
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`Dis.) to serve as Chairman of the Select Committee.
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`8. H. Res 503 Section 3 establishes the Select Committee for three purposes:
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`a. To investigate and report upon the facts, circumstances, and causes relating to
`the January 6, 2021, domestic terrorist attack upon the United States Capitol
`Complex (hereafter referred to as the “domestic terrorist attack on the
`Capitol”) and relating to the interference with the peaceful transfer of power,
`including facts and causes relating to the preparedness and response of the
`United States Capitol Police and other Federal, State, and local law
`enforcement agencies in the National Capital Region and other
`instrumentalities of government, as well as the influencing factors that
`fomented such an attack on American representative democracy while
`engaged in a constitutional process.
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`b. To examine and evaluate evidence developed by relevant Federal, State, and
`local governmental agencies regarding the facts and circumstances
`surrounding the domestic terrorist attack on the Capitol and targeted violence
`and domestic terrorism relevant to such terrorist attack.
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`c. To build upon the investigations of other entities and avoid unnecessary
`duplication of efforts by reviewing the investigations, findings, conclusions,
`and recommendations of other executive branch, congressional, or
`independent bipartisan or nonpartisan commission investigations into the
`domestic terrorist attack on the Capitol, including investigations into
`influencing factors related to such attack.
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`9.
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`H. Res. 503 Section 4 establishes three “functions” of the Select Committee: (1)
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`to “investigate the facts, circumstances, and causes relating to the domestic terror attack on the
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`Capitol”; (2) to “identify, review, and evaluate the causes of and the lessons learned from the
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`domestic terrorist attack on the Capitol”; and (3) to “issue a final report to the House containing
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`such findings, conclusions, and recommendations for corrective measures described in
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`subsection (c) as it may deem necessary.”
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`Page 3
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`Case 1:22-cv-00018 Document 1 Filed 01/05/22 Page 4 of 11
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`10.
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`Subsection (c) of Section 4 describes three categories of “corrective measures”:
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`“changes in law, policy procedure, rules, or regulations that could be taken” (1) “to prevent
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`future acts of violence, domestic terrorism, and domestic violent extremism, including acts
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`targeted at American democratic institutions”; (2) “to improve the security posture of the United
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`States Capitol Complex while preserving accessibility of the Capitol Complex for all
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`Americans”; and (3) “to strengthen the security and resilience of the United States American
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`democratic institutions against violence, domestic terrorism, and domestic violent extremism.”
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`11.
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`H. Res. 503 Section 5(c)(4) authorizes the Chair of the Select Committee to “issue
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`subpoenas pursuant to clause 2(m) of Rule XI [subpoena power] in the investigation and study
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`conducted pursuant to sections 3 and 4 of this resolution.”
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`12.
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`On December 15, 2021, Chairman Thompson, on behalf of the Select Committee,
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`issued a subpoena to Defendant Verizon seeking records concerning phone numbers listed in
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`“Section B, below.”
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`13.
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`On December 17, 2021, Defendant Verizon wrote Plaintiff, copying the
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`undersigned counsel, to advise that it “ha[d] received a subpoena requiring the production of
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`certain records associated with the phone number referenced above” and attaching “[a] copy of
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`the subpoena” excluding “Section B, which identifies the phone number referenced above but
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`also those of other Verizon subscribers.”
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`14.
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`In other words, nowhere within the copy of the Select Committee’s subpoena
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`provided to Plaintiff is Plaintiff’s identify, or any other customer whose records are sought,
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`disclosed. A copy of the subpoena provided to Plaintiff by Verizon is attached hereto as Exhibit
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`A.
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`Page 4
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`Case 1:22-cv-00018 Document 1 Filed 01/05/22 Page 5 of 11
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`15.
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`The Select Committee’s subpoena instructs Defendant Verizon to produce
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`subscriber information and cell phone data associated with Plaintiff’s personal cell phone. The
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`subscriber information requested includes subscriber names and contact information, authorized
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`users, time of service provided, account changes, associated IP addresses, and other metadata.
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`The cell phone data requested could include all calls, text messages, and other records of
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`communications associated with the phone number. This data can be used for historic cell site
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`analysis. The subpoena seeks this information from November 1, 2020 through January 31,
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`2021.
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`COUNT I
`(Declaratory Relief Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201)
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`16.
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`Plaintiff repeats, realleges, and incorporates the allegations in paragraphs 1
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`through 15 as if set forth herein.
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`17.
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`Congress’s broad “power of inquiry—with process to enforce it—is an essential
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`and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function.” McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 174
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`(1927). Accordingly, Congress and its duly authorized committees may issue a subpoena where
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`the information sought “is related to, and in furtherance of, a legitimate task of Congress,”
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`Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187 (1957), and the subpoena serves a “valid legislative
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`purpose.” Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 161 (1955). At the same time, because
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`Congress’s subpoena power “is justified as an adjunct to the legislative process, it is subject to
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`several limitations,” Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP, 140 S. Ct. 2019, 2031 (2020), limitations
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`which stem directly from the Constitution. Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 182-89 (1880).
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`18.
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`Specifically, the Constitution permits Congress to enact only certain kinds of
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`legislation, see, e.g., U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, and Congress’s power to investigate “is justified as
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`an adjunct to the legislative process, it is subject to several limitations.” Mazars, 140 S. Ct. at
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`Page 5
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`Case 1:22-cv-00018 Document 1 Filed 01/05/22 Page 6 of 11
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`2031. These limitations include that Congress may not issue a subpoena for the purposes of “law
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`enforcement” because “those powers are assigned under our Constitution to the Executive and
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`the Judiciary,” Quinn, 349 U.S. at 161, or to “try” someone “of any crime or wrongdoing,
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`McGrain, 273 U.S. at 179; nor does Congress have any “general power to inquire into private
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`affairs and compel disclosure,” McGrain, 273 U.S. at 173-74, or the “power to expose for the
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`sake of exposure,” Watkins, 354 U.S. at 200. Also importantly, Congressional investigations
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`“conducted solely for the personal aggrandizement of the investigators or to ‘punish’ those
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`investigated are indefensible.” Watkins, 354 U.S. at 187, Mazars, 140 S. Ct. at 2032.
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`Additionally, as the Supreme Court has recognized: “[t]he Bill of Rights s applicable to
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`[congressional] investigations as to all forms of government action,” and the Select Committee
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`may not “abridge[]. . . the First Amendment freedoms of speech, press, religion, or political
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`belief and association” in the name of advancing its investigation. Watkins, 354 U.S. at 188. See
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`also United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 46-47 (1953).
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`19.
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`Thus, to ensure that a Congressional inquiry meets a “valid legislative purpose,”
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`an inquiring committee must define “with the same degree of explicitness and clarity that the
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`Due Process Clause requires in the expression of any element of a criminal offense” its
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`“jurisdictional pertinency” so as to avoid the “vice for vagueness.” Watkins, 354 U.S. at 206-09.
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`See also id. at 206 (“When the definition of jurisdictional pertinency is as uncertain and
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`wavering as in the case of the Un-American Activities Committee, it becomes extremely difficult
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`for the Committee to limit its inquiries to statutory pertinency.”).
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`20.
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`The Select Committee has not demonstrated a “valid legislative purpose”
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`justifying its need for a subpoena of private citizen data: the subscriber information as well as
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`connection records and records of session times and durations sought by its December 15, 2021
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`Page 6
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`Case 1:22-cv-00018 Document 1 Filed 01/05/22 Page 7 of 11
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`subpoena to Defendant Verizon. Consequently, the Select Committee cannot establish sufficient
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`jurisdictional pertinence justifying the breadth of the Verizon subpoena’s demand for private
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`citizen data. It has not, because it can not.
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`21.
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`House Counsel Douglas Letter summarized the purported purpose of the Select
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`Committee as follows:
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`[W]e need to figure out what was the atmosphere that brought . . . about
`[the events of January 6, including] the many attempts that were made
`before the election to try to build the nature of mistrust about the election
`itself, which goes to undermine our democracy, so that if President Trump
`did lose he would be able to say that his is unfair and to generate lots of
`anger and rage that led to January 6.
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`See H’ng T., Trump v. Thompson, No. 21-cv-002769 (Nov. 4, 2021).
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`22.
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`Further, through its Members, the House Committee has embraced the role of an
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`inquisitorial tribunal seeking evidence of criminal activity. By way of example, on December
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`23, 2021, Chairman Thompson told The Washington Post the Select Committee was
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`investigating whether President Trump’s actions on January 6, 2021, “warrant[s] a [criminal]
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`referral.”1 Similarly, Rep. Elaine Luria (D-VA 2nd Dis.) told CNN: “[T]hat’s exactly why
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`we’re conducting this investigation to find out all the facts, . . . and . . . hold people accountable
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`who are responsible.”2 And Rep. Liz Cheney (R-WY At-Large) told Rolling Stone: “We must
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`know what happened here at the Capitol. We must also know what happened every minute of
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`1 Tom Hamburger, Jacqueline Alemany, Josh Dawsey, and Matt Zapotosky, Thompson Says Jan. 6 Committee
`Focused on Turmp’s Hours of Silence During Attack, Weighing Criminal Referrals, The Washington Post (Dec. 23,
`2021), available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/january-6-thompson-trump/2021/12/23/36318a92-
`6384-11ec-a7e8-3a8455b71fad_story.html.
`2 Zachary Cohen and Annie Grayer, January 6 Committee Says it Would Make Criminal Referrals if ‘Appropriate,’
`but that Could be a Long Way Off, CNN (Dec. 21, 2021), available at
`https://www.cnn.com/2021/12/21/politics/january-6-committee-criminal-referrals/index.html.
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`Page 7
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`Case 1:22-cv-00018 Document 1 Filed 01/05/22 Page 8 of 11
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`that day in the White House—every phone call, every conversation, every meeting leading up to,
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`during, and after the attack.”3
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`23.
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`Accordingly, lacking any “valid legislative purpose” to seek the subscriber
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`information as well as connection records and records of session times and durations sought by
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`its December 15, 2021 subpoena to Defendant Verizon, the Select Committee’s subpoena is
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`unenforceable and this Court should issue an Order holding the subpoena ultra vires, unlawful,
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`and unenforceable.
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`COUNT II
`(Declaratory Relief Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201)
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`24.
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`Plaintiff repeats, realleges, and incorporates the allegations in paragraphs 1
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`through 22 as if se forth herein.
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`25.
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`Subject to specifically enumerated exceptions not applicable here, the Stored
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`Communications Act provides that “a person or entity providing electronic communication
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`service to the public shall not knowingly divulge to any person or entity the contents of a
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`communication while in electronic storage to that service.” 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(1).
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`26.
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`Similarly, the Telecommunications Act of 1996 protects the confidentiality of
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`“customer proprietary network information,” which includes, inter alia, phone logs and location
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`information, “[e]xcept as provided by law or with approval of a customer.” 47 U.S.C. § 222.
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`27.
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`The subscriber information as well as connection records and records of session
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`times and durations sought by the Select Committee’s December 15, 2021, subpoena to
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`Defendant Verizon necessarily seeks the “contents of a communication while in electronic
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`storage,” or, in the alternative, because neither Plaintiff nor any law authorize the disclosure of
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`3 Peter Wade, Cheney: Investigate Trump’s ‘Every Call, Every Conversation, Every Meeting’ on Jan. 6, Rolling
`Stone (July 27, 2021), available at https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-news/cheney-investigate-trump-
`capitol-attack-communications-1203084/.
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`Page 8
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`Case 1:22-cv-00018 Document 1 Filed 01/05/22 Page 9 of 11
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`these records, the Select Committee’s December 15, 2021 subpoena is unenforceable and this
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`Court should issue an Order holding the subpoena ultra vires, unlawful, and unenforceable.
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`COUNT III
`(Injunctive Relief Pursuant to Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure)
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`28.
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`Plaintiff repeats, realleges, and incorporates the allegations in paragraphs 1
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`through 26 as if set forth herein.
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`29.
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`Because the Select Committee’s December 15, 2021 subpoena to Verizon is ultra
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`vires, unlawful, and unenforceable, in that it lacks any “valid legislative purpose” to seek the
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`subscriber information as well as connection records and records of session times and durations,
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`or is otherwise precluded from disclosing such records, Plaintiff is likely to succeed on the merits
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`of this action.
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`30.
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`Should this Court not prevent the disclosure of Plaintiff’s subscriber information
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`as well as connection records and records of session times and durations, Plaintiff is likely to
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`suffer irreparable harm.
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`31.
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`The balance of the equities weigh in Plaintiff’s favor and the public interest favors
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`against disclosure so as to prevent the unwarranted intrusion into the affairs of the public absent
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`the requisite “valid legislative purpose” of any Congressional subpoena.
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`32.
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`Accordingly, this Court should issue an Order enjoining Defendant Verizon from
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`producing Plaintiff’s records pursuant to the Select Committee’s December 15, 2021, subpoena.
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`WHEREFORE, Plaintiff asks the Court to Order the following relief:
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`PRAYER FOR RELIEF
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`a.
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`A declaratory judgment holding that the Select Committee’s December 15, 2021
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`subpoena is ultra vires, unlawful, and unenforceable;
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`Page 9
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`Case 1:22-cv-00018 Document 1 Filed 01/05/22 Page 10 of 11
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`b.
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`An injunction prohibiting Defendant Verizon from providing Plaintiff’s records to
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`the Select Committee pursuant to its December 15, 2021 subpoena; and
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`c.
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`Any and all other relief that the court deems just and proper.
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`[SIGNATURE ON NEXT PAGE]
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`Page 10
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`Case 1:22-cv-00018 Document 1 Filed 01/05/22 Page 11 of 11
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`Dated: January 5, 2021
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`Respectfully submitted,
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`/s/ Stanley E. Woodward, Jr.
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`Stan M. Brand (D.C. Bar No. 213082)
`Stanley E. Woodward, Jr. (D.C. Bar No. 997320)
`BRAND WOODWARD, ATTORNEYS AT LAW
`1808 Park Road NW
`Washington, DC 20010
`202-996-7447 (telephone)
`202-996-0113 (facsimile)
`Stanley@BrandWoodwardLaw.com
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`Counsel for Plaintiff
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`Page 11
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