Case 1:23-cv-03677 Document 1 Filed 12/11/23 Page 1 of 96
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`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
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`HELENA WORLD CHRONICLE, LLC
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`Plaintiff,
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`v.
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`CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
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`JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
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`GOOGLE LLC and ALPHABET INC.,
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`Defendants.
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`COMPLAINT
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`I.
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`INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................. 1
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`II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE ........................................................................................... 5
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`III. PARTIES ................................................................................................................................ 6
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`A. Plaintiff. ............................................................................................................................... 6
`B. Defendants. .......................................................................................................................... 7
`IV. AGENTS AND CO-CONSPIRATORS ............................................................................... 7
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`V. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS ................................................................................................ 8
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`A. Concentration and Dominance of Digital Platforms. ........................................................... 8
`B. The Relevant Markets or Lines of Commerce at Issue. ..................................................... 10
`1. Google Possesses Monopoly Power And A Dominant Position In The General Search
`Market Or Line Of Commerce. ............................................................................................. 10
`2. Google Possesses Monopoly Power And A Dominant Position In The Search
`Advertising Market. ............................................................................................................... 13
`3. Google Possesses Dominant Position In The Line Of Commerce For Digital News And
`Reference Searches. ............................................................................................................... 16
`C. Anticompetitive Conduct ................................................................................................... 22
`1. Acquisitions. ................................................................................................................... 22
`2. Barriers to Entry. ............................................................................................................ 27
`3. Foreclosure Contracts. .................................................................................................... 29
`4. Tying. ............................................................................................................................. 35
`5.
`Introduction And Implementation of Bard. .................................................................... 55
`6.
`Introduction And Implementation of SGE. .................................................................... 68
`7. Changing of Rates in AdSense. ...................................................................................... 75
`8. Spoliation. ...................................................................................................................... 76
`VI. ANTICOMPETITIVE EFFECTS ..................................................................................... 78
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`VII. REGULATORY FINDINGS .............................................................................................. 80
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`VIII. CLASS CERTIFICATION .............................................................................................. 83
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`IX. CAUSES OF ACTION ........................................................................................................ 86
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`X. RELIEF ................................................................................................................................ 91
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`A. DEMAND FOR JUDGMENT ........................................................................................... 91
`B. JURY DEMAND ............................................................................................................... 92
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`Plaintiff Helena World Chronicle, LLC (“HWC”), on behalf of itself and all other publishers
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`of original news and reference websites (“Publishers”),1 brings this Class Action Complaint (the
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`“Complaint”) against Defendants Google LLC and its parent entity, Alphabet, Inc. (collectively,
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`“Google”) for violations of: Sections 1, 2, and 3 of the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 1-3) and
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`Section 7 of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. § 18). Plaintiff seeks treble damages, injunctive relief, and
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`damages pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §§ 15 and 26, as a result and consequence of Defendants’ unlawful
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`conduct. The relevant Class Period extends from November 1, 2019 through the date on which a
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`Class is certified.
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`I.
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`INTRODUCTION
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`1.
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`Google is starving the free press. Every year, it siphons off billions of readers and
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`billions of dollars from Publishers through an anticompetitive scheme that extracts their content,
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`publishes it on Google, and diverts readers and ad revenue. This scheme is part of an unlawful
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`strategy to attract, trap, and maximize users within a “walled garden” that entrenches Google’s
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`monopoly as the world’s largest search engine. Google has coerced Publishers into a Hobson’s
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`choice: surrender their content or disappear from search and lose the single largest source of
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`referral traffic and associated revenue.
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`2.
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`The key to this scheme is Google’s structure and dominance as a digital platform.
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`Digital platforms serve as gatekeepers to online markets by leveraging key barriers to entry: scale,
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`network effects, and switching costs. No platform has greater power than Google. That power now
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`rests on Google’s monopoly over general search services, where it controls nearly 90% of the
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`1 The term “Publishers” as used herein refers to publishers of original news and reference websites that produce and
`publish original, non-fiction content in digital format, including digital newspapers, magazines, blogs, weather
`reports, opinion and editorials, and reference works.
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`market and which it monetizes through search advertising. Google’s search monopoly is at the
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`heart of its dominance as a digital platform. It abuses that dominance to lessen competition in
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`associated and dependent lines of commerce—including digital news and reference publishing.
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`3.
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`Google maintains its search monopoly and abuses it dominance through various
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`tying arrangements that lock in and exploit Publishers as input suppliers; through foreclosure
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`contracts that block rival search engines, and through more than 260 mergers and acquisitions that
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`enable it to entrench and enlarge its dominant position.
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`4.
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`First, Google attracts users through unlawful tying arrangements, where it
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`misappropriates Publishers’ content and re-publishes it on Google’s platform. The tying product
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`is Google’s general search service. The tied product is digital news and reference content published
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`on Google Search through its patented question-and-answer technologies. Google launched this
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`tying scheme in 2012 through its WebAnswers project. In 2023, it amplified this scheme using
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`generative artificial intelligence (“GAI”) (in the form of its Bard chatbot, which provides answers
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`to a user’s questions in natural language) and its Search Generative Experience (“SGE”), which
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`responds to a user’s search by directing him or her to its own summary of what other websites say.
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`Google has repeatedly abused its dominance to force Publishers to supply the inputs for this tying
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`arrangement: their content. It falsely told Publishers that its modifications to Google Search would
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`increase their referral traffic and revenue, but the truth was the opposite. As one of Google’s AI
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`engineers recently admitted: “Direct answers reduce search referral traffic” and “[p]ressure”
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`Publishers to “develop alternative revenue streams.”2
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`5.
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`Second, Google traps users through a series of exclusionary agreements with
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`Apple, Samsung and other mobile device manufacturers and browser developers. These
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`2 Marc Najork, Generative Information Retrieval, ACM Digital Library (July 24, 2023),
`https://dl.acm.org/doi/abs/10.1145/3539618.3591871.
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`foreclosure contracts secure Google Search as the default search engine on the vast majority of
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`mobile devices and desktop computers. In 2002, Google and Apple entered into an anticompetitive
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`agreement where Google has in recent years paid Apple an estimated $18 billion a year to make
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`Google Search the default search engine in Safari, Apple’s web browser. As part of this restraint
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`on trade, Google currently pays Apple 36% of its search revenue over the Safari browser. Google
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`has made similar agreements with Samsung, the manufacturer of mobile devices running Google’s
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`Android operating system. Coupled with Google’s bundling Google Search with its own products,
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`including the Google Chrome browser, these agreements protect and maintain Google’s nearly
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`90% market share in general search services.
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`6.
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`Third, Google maximizes this anticompetitive scheme through more than 260
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`mergers and acquisitions, enabling it to abuse and extend its dominance in, among others, four key
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`areas: digital display advertising, digital content, mobile operating systems, and AI. For example,
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`Google’s acquisition of DoubleClick in 2008 enabled it to dominate digital display advertising on
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`Publishers’ websites. Google’s acquisition of Android in 2005 enabled it to foreclose competition
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`in search and cement its position as the default search engine on mobile devices. Google’s
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`acquisition of YouTube in 2006 gave it the largest trove of video content on the internet and
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`allowed it to engage in self-preferencing of YouTube over other Publishers’ content. Google’s
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`acquisition of DeepMind Technologies in 2014—and its 2023 merger of DeepMind with Google’s
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`own AI research lab Google Brain—is enabling it to protect its search monopoly from potentially
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`disruptive GAI technology.
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`7.
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` The anticompetitive effects of Google’s scheme cause profound harm in its
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`monopoly markets to digital news and reference Publishers—and ultimately to the marketplace of
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`ideas. Google has created a zero-click world in which users remain in its ecosystem and are
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`siphoned away from Publishers. Already, 69% of all Google searches result in zero click-through
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`traffic. Since roughly 80% of all Google searches are for informational content (i.e., news and
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`reference content), billions of consumers are now getting their news from Google. With an
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`estimated audience of 69.6 billion information-consumers per month, Google.com is far and away
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`the largest publisher of online news and reference content.
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`8.
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`Google does not produce this content; Publishers do. But they are forced to compete
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`on an unlevel playing field against their own products. The result is a staggering harm to
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`competition, to consumers, to labor and to a democratic free press.
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`9.
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`Publishers’ costs rose and their revenue fell from roughly $50 billion in 2005 to
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`$20 billion in 2022. Since 2005, America has lost more than a fourth of its newspapers (2,500) and
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`is expected to lose a third by 2025.3 Only one publisher of encyclopedias—World Book—remains
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`in print. Seventy million Americans now live in news deserts, with little to no local news coverage.4
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`Newspaper employment has declined by 70% from 2005-22. Fewer reporters mean less original
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`reporting. Fewer editors and fact checkers mean fewer safeguards against misinformation.
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`Consumers face a loss of quality and choice in the marketplace of ideas. And America faces the
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`potential collapse of a vital pillar of democracy.
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`10.
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`Plaintiff HWC owns and publishes two weekly local papers in Arkansas. It cannot
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`afford to sacrifice the referral traffic it receives from Google. But it also cannot afford to sustain
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`competitive injury under Google’s search monopoly and abuse of dominance. The antitrust laws
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`were designed to prevent a monopolist, or a structure achieved in part, through merger and
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`acquisition, from harming competition by abusing its monopoly or dominance. Plaintiff invokes
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`3 Penny Abernathy, The State of Local News: The 2022 Report, Northwestern Local News Initiative (June 29, 2022),
`https://localnewsinitiative.northwestern.edu/research/state-of-local-news/report/.
` Id.
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`the Sherman Act and Clayton Act to seek classwide monetary and injunctive relief to restore and
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`ensure competition for digital news and reference publishing, protect Publishers, and set up
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`guardrails to preserve a free marketplace of ideas in the new era of artificial intelligence.
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`JURISDICTION AND VENUE
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`11.
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`This Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Section 4 of the Sherman Act,
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`15 U.S.C. § 4, and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1337(a).
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`12.
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`This Court has personal jurisdiction over each Defendant because Defendants do
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`extensive business within this District — including by providing the monopolized services to class
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`members and consumers within this this district—and this action arises out of Defendants’ contacts
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`within this District.
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`13.
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` Venue is proper in this Judicial District pursuant to Sections 4 and 12 of the
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`Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 15 and 22), and 28 U.S.C. § 1391, because: (a) each Defendant transacts
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`business and is found within this District; (b) a substantial part of the events giving rise to the
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`alleged claims occurred in this District; and (c) a substantial portion of the affected interstate trade
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`and commerce was carried out in this District. Each Defendant has transacted business, maintained
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`substantial contacts, and/or committed overt acts in furtherance of the illegal scheme and
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`conspiracy throughout the United States, including in this District. Defendants’ conduct has had
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`the intended and foreseeable effect of causing injury to persons residing in, located in, or doing
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`business throughout the United States, including in this District.
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`14.
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`Defendants’ conduct affects interstate trade and commerce. Defendants’ conduct
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`has a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect on commerce within the United States.
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`II.
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`JURISDICTION AND VENUE
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`15. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Section 4 of the Sherman Act,
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`15 U.S.C. § 4, and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1337(a).
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`16. This Court has personal jurisdiction over each Defendant because Defendants do
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`extensive business within this District — including by providing the monopolized services to class
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`members and consumers within this this district—and this action arises out of Defendants’ contacts
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`within this District.
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`17.
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` Venue is proper in this Judicial District pursuant to Sections 4 and 12 of the Clayton
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`Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 15 and 22), and 28 U.S.C. § 1391, because: (a) each Defendant transacts business
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`and is found within this District; (b) a substantial part of the events giving rise to the alleged claims
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`occurred in this District; and (c) a substantial portion of the affected interstate trade and commerce
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`was carried out in this District. Each Defendant has transacted business, maintained substantial
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`contacts, and/or committed overt acts in furtherance of the illegal scheme and conspiracy
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`throughout the United States, including in this District. Defendants’ conduct has had the intended
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`and foreseeable effect of causing injury to persons residing in, located in, or doing business
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`throughout the United States, including in this District.
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`18. Defendants’ conduct affects interstate trade and commerce. Defendants’ conduct has
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`a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect on commerce within the United States.
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`A. Plaintiff.
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`III.
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`PARTIES
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`19.
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`Plaintiff HWC is a Publisher. It owns two newspapers: Helena World and Monroe
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`County Argus, the latter of which was acquired in 2022. Both newspapers are available in print
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`and digital media and both deliver news and information to subscribers and online readers. Helena
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`World is printed out of Helena, Arkansas. Over the past 365 days, Helena World (online) has
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`averaged 1530 visitors per website per month with 402 referred from Google Search per month. The
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`Monroe County Argus is printed in Brinkley, Arkansas. It has been in circulation since 1875 and
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`now is also available online. The online version of Monroe County Argus likewise receives visits
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`referred from Google Search. HWC’s original works have been scraped and reproduced for the
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`purpose of training Google’s GAI products including Bard and SGE, and Bard has since plagiarized
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`an article from Helena World. On a daily basis, HWC’s original works continue to be scraped and
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`reproduced as inputs by Google’s GAI search product and are plagiarized on a regular basis as
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`Artificial Intelligence (“AI”)-generated news summaries and extracts.
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`B. Defendants.
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`20. Defendant Google LLC is a limited liability company organized and existing under the
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`laws of the State of Delaware, with its principal place of business in Mountain View, California.
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`Google LLC is an online advertising company providing internet-related products, including various
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`online advertising technologies, directly and through subsidiaries and business units that it owns and
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`controls.
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`21. Defendant Alphabet Inc. is a publicly traded company incorporated and existing under
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`the laws of the State of Delaware and headquartered in Mountain View, California. Alphabet Inc.
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`was created as a holding company for Google in late 2015, and Alphabet controls Google’s day-to-
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`day operations. Virtually all of Alphabet Inc.’s revenue comes from Google LLC. Since December
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`2019, Alphabet and Google have had the same Chief Executive Officer (Sundar Pichai (“Pichai”)).
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`As a result of Alphabet Inc.’s operational control, Google LLC is Alphabet Inc’s alter ego.
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`22. Google LLC and Alphabet Inc. are referred to herein collectively as “Google.”
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`IV. AGENTS AND CO-CONSPIRATORS
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`23.
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`The unlawful acts of Defendants set forth in this class action complaint were
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`authorized, ordered, or performed by the Defendants’ respective officers, agents, employees,
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`representatives, or shareholders while actively engaged in the management, direction, or control of
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`the Defendants’ businesses or affairs. The Defendants’ agents operated under the explicit and apparent
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`authority of their principals. Each Defendant, and its subsidiaries, affiliates, and agents operated as a
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`single unified entity.
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`24. Various persons and/or firms not named as Defendants may have participated as co-
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`conspirators in the violations alleged herein and may have performed acts and made statements in
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`furtherance thereof. Each acted as the principal, agent, or joint venture of, or for other Defendants
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`with respect to the acts, violations, and common course of conduct alleged herein.
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`V.
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`FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
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`A. Concentration and Dominance of Digital Platforms.
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`25. Today’s digital economy is highly concentrated in the hands of a few firms that
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`dominate online markets and lines of commerce. These “digital platforms” operate as essential
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`mediation services, control key channels of distribution, and act as gatekeepers between consumers,
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`Publishers, and advertisers.
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`26. On October 30, 2023, President Joe Biden issued an Executive Order on the
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`development and use of AI in the United States.5 One of the points that he emphasized was the need
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`to “promote competition in AI and related technologies, as well as in other markets. Such actions
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`include addressing risks arising from concentrated control of key inputs, taking steps to stop
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`unlawful collusion and prevent dominant firms from disadvantaging competitors….”6 (Emphases
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`added). As the House Antitrust Subcommittee’s 2020 Report concluded, “dominant platforms are
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`able to exploit their gatekeeper power to dictate terms and extract concessions that no one would
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`5 The White House, Executive Order on the Safe, Secure, and Trustworthy Development and Use of Artificial
`Intelligence, 88 Fed. Reg. 75191 (Oct. 30, 2023), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-
`actions/2023/10/30/executive-order-on-the-safe-secure-and-trustworthy-development-and-use-of-artificial-
`intelligence/.
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` Id.
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`reasonably consent to in a competitive market.”7
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`27. The Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) recently expressed similar concerns, saying
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`that the use of GAI raises significant competition issues by, for example, “further entrenching the
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`market power” of dominant firms.8 There is no precedent in the United States economy for the power
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`of today’s digital platforms. And there is no digital platform with a greater sphere of influence than
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`Google. This lawsuit is intended to address such a failure of competition that exists now with respect
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`to the digital news and reference publishing aspect of Google’s platform.
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`28.
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`In 2020, the Antitrust Division of the United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”)
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`and various state attorneys general sued Google for antitrust violations. See United States v.
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`Google LLC., No. 1:20-cv-03010-APM (D.D.C.) (“DC DOJ Case”). Many of the Google internal
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`documents referenced throughout this Complaint have been used publicly at that trial, which ended
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`on November 16, 2023.9
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`29.
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`In analyzing Google’s unlawful maintenance of monopoly power and abuse of its
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`dominant position in the market (or line of commerce under Section 7 of the Clayton Act) for internet
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`general searches and the market (or line of commerce) for advertising searches, Google’s conduct
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`must be viewed holistically over the last two decades.
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`30. The facts set forth below summarize Google’s monopoly power and dominance within
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`7 Subcommittee on Antitrust, Commercial and Administrative Law of the Committee on the Judiciary, Investigation
`of Competition In Digital Markets, Majority Staff Report. at 11 (2020) (“House Subcommittee Report”).
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` 8
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` FTC, In Comment Submitted to U.S. Copyright Office, FTC Raises AI-related Competition and Consumer
`Protection Issues (Nov. 7, 2023), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-
`releases/2023/11/InCommentSubmittedtoUSCopyrightOfficeFTCRaisesAIrelatedCompetitionandConsumerProtecti
`onIssuesStressingThatItWillUseItsAuthoritytoProtectCompetitionandConsumersinAIMarkets.
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` 9
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` Although the DC DOJ Case did not include any extensive analysis of Google’s more recent conduct regarding
`Bard and SGE, and does not focus on Publishers, the trial was replete with expert testimony on some of the same
`dominant market power that is at issue here and underscores the fact that abuse of that market power can have
`devastating anticompetitive impact in the digital world.
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`the markets or lines of commerce at issue. That power and dominance was created in part through
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`key acquisitions of other companies; contracts with device manufacturers like Apple and Samsung
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`that excluded or foreclosed competing search engines from gaining a foothold; a 2016 contract
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`between Google and Apple that prevented the latter from developing any competing search engine
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`of its own; the years-long effort by Google to contain users seeking news and reference content in
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`its “walled garden” ecosystem; the misappropriation of Publishers’ web content; the rushed rollout
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`of Bard in 2023 in order to stifle competition from Microsoft; the introduction of SGE; and Google’s
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`decision this year to modify its AdSense terms in a way that disadvantages Publishers.10 Google’s
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`abuse of its monopoly power or dominance has harmed Publishers in both the United States and
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`abroad. Each of these topics is discussed separately in the sections that follow.
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`B. The Relevant Markets or Lines of Commerce at Issue.
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`1. Google Possesses Monopoly Power And A Dominant Position In The
`General Search Market Or Line Of Commerce.
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`31. Google was launched in 1998 as an internet search engine, serving search results
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`linking to third-party websites in response to users’ queries.11 Google’s key feature was the algorithm
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`PageRank, which ranked the relevance of a webpage to a given search query by examining how
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`many other webpages linked to that page. By 2000, Google had become the largest search engine in
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`the world.12 Its “ten blue links” became the gateway to the web for billions of users. The brand name
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`“Google” became a verb synonymous with internet search itself. When Google was in its infancy,
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`observers questioned how Google could monetize what appeared to be a free internet search
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`10 Google AdSense is a program designed for website publishers who want to display specific text, video or image
`advertising on pages of their website and make money when visitors to the site see or click on ads.
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`11 Google Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1), at 1 (Apr. 29, 2004),
`https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1288776/000119312504073639/ds1.htm.
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`12 House Subcommittee Report at 174.
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`service. The answer was advertising. Google adopted a triple-product business model:
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`• Google Search gives users access to online content;
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`• Google collects user attention and data; and
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`• Google sells audience attention and data to advertiser13
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`To become the behemoth that it is today, Google needed to maximize three key things: content,
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`users, and advertising. It did this by leveraging key barriers to entry to acquire and maintain a
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`monopoly in the market for general search services and entrench itself as a dominant digital
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`platform.
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`32. The general search services market (or line of commerce for Clayton Act purposes)
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`consists of “general search engines, which are ‘one-stop shops’ consumers can use to search the
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`internet for answers to a wide range of queries.”14 General search engines can answer all types of
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`queries and return a wide range of results.
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`33. By contrast, what are referred to as “vertical search engines” are limited to specific
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`topics. For example, a search on Google for “sore throat treatment” returns a range of results, from
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`medical products to the latest scientific information and tips on treatment. However, a search on
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`Amazon—a vertical search service provider—only returns results for medical products. Consumers
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`would not find a vertical search a suitable substitute for general search.
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`34. The relevant geographic scope of the general search market is the United States.
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`Google provides users in the United States a distinct website that differs from those provided by
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`Google in other countries.
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`13 See Carlos Diaz Ruiz, Disinformation on digital media platforms: A market-shaping approach, New Media &
`Society 9-10 (Oct. 30, 2023), https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/14614448231207644.
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`14 Mem. Op. at 2, United States, et al. v. Google LLC, No. 1:20cv03010 (D.D.C. Oct. 6, 2023), ECF No. 728 at 6
`(“SJ Op.”).
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`35. By any reasonable assessment, Google possesses monopoly power in the United States
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`market (or line of commerce pursuant to Section 7 of the Clayton Act) for general searches. According
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`to the website Statcounter: 15
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`36. As shown above, Google’s share of this market or line of commerce has been consistently
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`just below 90%. By contrast, Microsoft Corporation’s (“Microsoft”) market share, through Bing, which
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`incorporated the ChatGPT chatbot discussed below, has been consistently minimal in recent years. In
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`fact, according to one source, Microsoft’s market share for Bing declined in 2023, relative to 2022.16 In
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`denying summary judgment for the defense, the court in the DC DOJ Case emphasized Google’s
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`dominance of the general search services market: “[t]here are other search engines, of course: Microsoft’s
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`15 Statcounter: Global Stats, Search Engine Market Share United States of America, Nov. 2022 – Nov. 2023,
`https://gs.statcounter.com/search-engine-market-share/all/united-states-of-america (last accessed Oct. 29, 2023).
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`16 Danny Goodwin, The new Bing has failed to take any market share from Google after six months, Search Engine
`Land (Aug. 17, 2023), https://searchengineland.com/new-bing-google-market-share-six-months-430840.
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`12
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`Case 1:23-cv-03677 Document 1 Filed 12/11/23 Page 16 of 96
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`Bing, Yahoo!, and DuckDuckGo, to name a few. But their market penetration pales in comparison to
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`Google’s. In 2020, Google’s share of the U.S. general search services market was nearly 90%, and even
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`higher on mobile devices. The market share of Google's closest competitor, Bing, was roughly 6%.”17
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`37. Michael Whinston (“Whinston”), a Professor at the Massachusetts Institute of
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`Technology who testified as an expert for the government in the DC DOJ Case, stated that if one
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`considered searches conducted through mobile phones, Google’s market share was just under
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`95%.18He also said that there were high barriers to entry that allowed Google to sustain its market
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`power over a long period of time. These included fixed and sunk costs of operation, Google’s brand
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`recognition, the scale of its operations, and its control of access points through contracts with device
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`makers, which will be described below.19
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`2. Google Possesses Monopoly Power And A Dominant Position In The
`Search Advertising Market.
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`38. Google also has monopoly power and a dominant position in the search advertising
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`market.20 Whinston estimated that as of 2021, Google has approximately 74% share of that market
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`as of 2020.21 Reports in 2023 variously indicate that Google has a 79.8% or 71% share of the
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`17 SJ Op. at 2. The Court further observed that “because of its large market share in general search services, Google
`also holds a superior market position in various search-related advertising market.” Id.
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`18 Trial Tr., United States, et al. v. Google LLC, No. 1:20cv03010 (D.D.C. Oct. 6, 2023) (Day 18) at 4762:25-
`4763:2.
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`19 Id. at 4764:12-4765:3, 4766:2-9, 4766:13-15; 4767:7-10, 15:16.
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`20 Whinston also identified what was essentially a submarket of general search consisting of general text advertising
`searches, in which Google had roughly the same market share as it does in the general search market. Id. at 4777:10-
`13. That will not be discussed in this Complaint because it part of the broader market or line of commerce for
`advertising searches generally.
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`21 Id. at 4779:15.
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`Case 1:23-cv-03677 Document 1 Filed 12/11/23 Page 17 of 96
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`advertising search market in the United States.22 More than 80% of businesses worldwide rely on
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`Google ad campaigns.23 This power and position in the search advertising market is driven in part
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`by Google’s control over the general search market.
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`39. Google’s dominance in the search advertising market bears upon Plaintiff’s claims
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`involving and Google’s recent change in how it compensates Publishers for AdSense traffic, which
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`is described in detail below. Its dominance is also a factor in its ability to engage in self-preferencing
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`tying conduct.
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`40.
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`In 2000, Google branched out from search to digital advertising, launching AdWords,
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`its ad buying platform for such advertising. This service enabled businesses to purchase keyword
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`advertising that would appear on Google’s Search Engine Results Page (“SERP”). This launch
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`marked the first step in Google’s transformation of its SERP—the world’s por