Case 1:25-cv-00429-TSC Document 45 Filed 02/24/25 Page 1 of 14
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`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
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`STATE OF NEW MEXICO, et al.,
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`Plaintiffs,
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`C.A. No. 1:25-cv-00429
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`PLAINTIFF STATES’ MOTION FOR
`EXPEDITED DISCOVERY
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`ELON MUSK, et al.,
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`v.
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`Defendants.
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`INTRODUCTION
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`Plaintiff States seek an order from this Court granting expedited discovery so that they may
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`confirm what investigative reporting has already indicated: Defendants Elon Musk and the
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`Department of Government Efficiency (“DOGE”) are directing actions within federal agencies
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`that have profoundly harmed the States and will continue to harm them. Defendants assert that
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`Mr. Musk is merely an advisor to the President, with no authority to direct agency action and no
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`role at DOGE. The public record refutes that implausible assertion. But only Defendants possess
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`the documents and information that Plaintiffs need to confirm public reporting and identify which
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`agencies Defendants will target next so Plaintiffs can seek preliminary relief and mitigate further
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`harm.
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`In light of the Plaintiff States’ forthcoming motion for a preliminary injunction, the limited
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`and targeted discovery that Plaintiffs seek, the comparably low burden of production for
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`Defendants, and the strength of Plaintiffs’ merits case, this District’s caselaw strongly supports
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`granting expedited discovery.
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`1
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`Case 1:25-cv-00429-TSC Document 45 Filed 02/24/25 Page 2 of 14
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`I.
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`This Court’s TRO Order
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`BACKGROUND
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`Plaintiff States filed their complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief on February 13,
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`2025, ECF No. 2, and their application for a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) the following
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`morning, ECF No. 6. On February 18, 2025, this Court found that “Plaintiffs raise a colorable
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`Appointments Clause claim with serious implications” and “legitimately call into question what
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`appears to be the unchecked authority of an unelected individual and an entity that was not created
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`by Congress and over which it has no oversight.” ECF No. 29 at 8-9.
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`This Court declined to grant a TRO on the record before it, however, finding that Plaintiffs
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`had not established irreparable injury sufficient to support emergency relief. Id. at 6. In particular,
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`this Court found that “[i]t remains ‘uncertain’ when and how the catalog of state programs that
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`Plaintiffs identify will suffer,” and that Plaintiffs had not “adequately linked Defendants’ actions
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`[regarding past and future mass terminations] to imminent harm to Plaintiff States.” Id. at 6, 8.
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`The Court also found that it could not rely exclusively on “widespread media reports that DOGE
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`has taken or will soon take certain actions, such as mass terminations” in order to find irreparable
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`harm. Id. at 7.
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`Plaintiffs continue to conduct extensive factual investigation through information available
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`in the public domain in an effort to streamline discovery and fact development in this case. See
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`generally Compl., ECF No. 2; Pls.’ Suppl. Notice, ECF No. 19-2. But “DOGE’s unpredictable
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`actions have resulted in considerable uncertainty and confusion for Plaintiffs and many of their
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`agencies and residents.” ECF No. 29 at 6. Concrete information about when, where, and how
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`Defendants will conduct mass layoffs, freeze funding, cancel contracts, or access and use sensitive
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`data next is solely within Defendants’ possession.
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`Case 1:25-cv-00429-TSC Document 45 Filed 02/24/25 Page 3 of 14
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`II.
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`Plaintiffs’ Requested Discovery
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`This Court cautioned “that the requested discovery must be limited and narrowly tailored
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`to the preliminary injunction.” ECF No. 36 at 1. Plaintiffs therefore seek limited written and
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`document discovery, attached as Exhibit A to this motion, and two depositions that will be noticed
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`based on Defendants’ responses and production. Specifically, the documents and information that
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`Plaintiffs seek are intended to confirm public reporting about Defendants’ conduct, show
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`Defendants’ future plans, and illustrate the nature and scope of the unconstitutional and unlawful
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`authority that Defendants are exercising and will continue to imminently exercise.
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`Requests for Production (5). Plaintiffs seek DOGE planning, implementation, and
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`operational documents regarding the conduct that is harming and will imminently harm Plaintiff
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`States.
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`Interrogatories (6). Plaintiffs seek information regarding the organization and structure
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`of DOGE, the nature of Defendants’ authority, and where, when, and how Defendants have
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`exercised that authority.
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`Requests for Admission (6). Plaintiffs seek admissions to verify certain evidence in the
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`public domain and confirm Defendants’ positions about the actions they have taken.
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`Depositions (2). Plaintiffs seek two depositions, which Plaintiffs will notice based on the
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`written and document discovery, to obtain testimonial evidence regarding Defendants’ unlawful
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`conduct and plans and the resulting harms.
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`These requests are targeted to seek only facts that will inform consideration of Plaintiffs’
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`forthcoming motion. Accordingly, Plaintiffs ask this Court to (a) order Defendants to produce the
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`documents requested in Plaintiffs’ Requests for Production within 7 days of any Court order
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`authorizing such discovery; (b) order Defendants to respond to Plaintiffs’ Interrogatories and
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`Requests for Admission within 7 days of any Court order authorizing such discovery; and (c) to
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`Case 1:25-cv-00429-TSC Document 45 Filed 02/24/25 Page 4 of 14
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`authorize Plaintiffs to take two depositions no later than April 4, 2025, unless this Court
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`subsequently extends that deadline for good cause.
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`LEGAL STANDARD
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`Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26, this Court has broad discretion to “dictate the
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`sequence of discovery.” Watts v. S.E.C., 482 F.3d 501, 507 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (citation omitted).
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`Expedited discovery can be “appropriate in some cases, such as those involving requests for a
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`preliminary injunction.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(d) advisory committee’s note to 1993 amendment.
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`Courts generally evaluate requests for expedited discovery under a reasonableness test that
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`considers “all of the surrounding circumstances,” including five factors: “(1) whether a preliminary
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`injunction is pending; (2) the breadth of the discovery requests; (3) the purpose for requesting the
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`expedited discovery; (4) the burden on the defendants to comply with the requests; and (5) how
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`far in advance of the typical discovery process the request was made.” Guttenberg v. Emery, 26
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`F. Supp. 3d 88, 97-98 (D.D.C. 2014) (citation omitted).1
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`These factors “provide ‘guidelines for the exercise of the Court’s discretion,’” but “[c]ourts
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`are not limited to these factors.” Attkisson v. Holder, 113 F. Supp. 3d 156, 162 (D.D.C. 2015)
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`(citation omitted).
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`1 Plaintiffs do not discuss the alternative Notaro standard because, as this Court has previously
`concluded, “the reasonableness test is the appropriate standard when a plaintiff seeks expedited
`discovery in order to support a preliminary injunction motion because the Notaro test overlaps
`with [the] preliminary injunction standard.” Afghan & Iraqi Allies Under Serious Threat v.
`Pompeo, No. 18-cv-01388 (TSC), 2019 WL 9598404, at *2 (D.D.C. Jan. 30, 2019); see also
`Guttenberg, 26 F. Supp. 3d at 97 (stating that “recent cases have rejected the Notaro test in favor
`of a reasonableness test, particularly in cases where the expedited discovery is related to a motion
`for a preliminary injunction”); St. Louis Grp., Inc. v. Metals & Additives Corp., 275 F.R.D. 236,
`240 (S.D. Tex. 2011) (citing cases holding same and noting additional reasoning).
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`Case 1:25-cv-00429-TSC Document 45 Filed 02/24/25 Page 5 of 14
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`ARGUMENT
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`The five reasonableness factors and the overall circumstances of this case support granting
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`the limited expedited discovery that Plaintiffs seek here.
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`I.
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`Plaintiffs are preparing a preliminary injunction motion, and expedited discovery
`will support that motion.
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`The first and third factors (pendency of a PI motion and purpose) support Plaintiffs’
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`request. Plaintiffs will file their preliminary injunction motion by April 11, 2025, see ECF No.
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`36, and the purpose of Plaintiffs’ discrete discovery is to support that motion.
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`To start, the procedural history here—Plaintiffs’ forthcoming motion and prior efforts to
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`obtain a TRO—preclude any suggestion that the instant discovery request is “a thinly veiled
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`attempt to circumvent the normal litigation process.” In re Fannie Mae Derivative Litig., 227
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`F.R.D. 142, 143 (D.D.C. 2005); see Guttenberg, 26 F. Supp 3d at 98-99 (noting that months-long
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`delay in seeking expedited discovery “demonstrated lack of urgency”). Plaintiffs have moved
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`promptly and seek to conclude their requested discovery by April 4—a week before the deadline
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`for Plaintiffs’ preliminary injunction motion. Therefore, Plaintiffs’ request is demonstrably urgent
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`and not intended to cause, nor will it cause, any delay in the current briefing schedule. To the
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`contrary, Plaintiffs have every interest in preserving the briefing schedule.
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`Plaintiffs’ proposed requests illustrate that the purpose is to support Plaintiffs’ forthcoming
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`motion and further crystallize the issues and scope of relief. For example, Plaintiffs seek
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`information regarding Defendants’ recent and ongoing conduct, as well as their near-future plans,
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`so that Plaintiffs can show which of their state agencies and instrumentalities face imminent
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`irreparable harm due to Defendants’ actions. See Tracfone Wireless, Inc. v. Adams, 304 F.R.D.
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`672, 673 (S.D. Fla. 2015) (finding “expedited discovery [was] warranted so that [plaintiff could]
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`mitigate any additional irreparable harm caused by Defendants’ ongoing alleged scheme”); see
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`Case 1:25-cv-00429-TSC Document 45 Filed 02/24/25 Page 6 of 14
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`also Twentieth Cen. Fox Film Corp. v. Mow Trading Corp., 749 F. Supp. 473, 475 (S.D.N.Y.
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`1990) (allowing expedited discovery that could “lead to evidence of continuing infringement …
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`[and] discovery of future plans to infringe”). Plaintiffs also seek limited discovery to show that
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`Elon Musk has acted as an officer of the United States and that DOGE has acted in excess of its
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`statutory authority.
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`This limited discovery is necessary for Plaintiffs to confirm public reporting about DOGE
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`orders and actions and to understand Defendants’ imminent plans. That information is otherwise
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`unavailable to Plaintiffs, and in light of the Court’s TRO ruling, that unavailability is a significant
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`obstacle to much-needed preliminary relief. See ELargo Holdings, LLC v. Doe-68.105.146.38,
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`318 F.R.D. 58, 63-64 (M.D. La. 2016) (“The Court finds that [plaintiff] has shown a pressing and
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`legitimate need for the expedited discovery because it has no other way of identifying the actual
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`infringer and prosecuting the claims raised in this litigation.”).
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`Further, the discovery that Plaintiffs seek about Defendants’ undisclosed but imminent
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`plans will refine the issues and parties’ arguments, especially with respect to the concerns the Court
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`expressed when considering Plaintiffs’ application for an emergency TRO, and aid the Court in
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`crafting appropriate relief. See KPM Analytics N. Am. v. Blue Sun Scientific, LLC, 540 F. Supp.
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`3d 145, 146 (D. Mass. 2021) (finding that “expedited discovery would provide a more fulsome
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`record to consider the preliminary injunction and—should [the plaintiff] prevail and obtain a
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`preliminary injunction—enable the Court to design an equitable remedy that will prevent
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`irreparable harm while the case is litigated”).
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`II.
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`Plaintiffs’ discovery requests are tailored to the preliminary injunction stage and will
`minimally burden Defendants.
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`Although Plaintiffs’ request comes early in the case under the fifth factor, the second and
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`fourth factors (breadth and burden, respectively) firmly support granting expedited discovery here.
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`As explained above, Plaintiffs’ proposed discovery is narrowly targeted at essential facts
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`related to likelihood of success on the merits and imminent and irreparable harm due to
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`Defendants’ unlawful conduct. And, given the limited scope of the requested discovery, the
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`burden on Defendants is minimal—especially when weighed against the third factor, which
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`reflects Plaintiffs’ need for the information and inability to obtain it elsewhere. See Fed. R. Civ.
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`P. 26(b)(1) (establishing general rule that inquiries into “burden” should consider “likely benefit”);
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`see also ELargo Holdings, 318 F.R.D. at 63 (noting that “[g]ood cause generally exists ‘where the
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`need for expedited discovery outweighs the prejudice to the responding party’” (citation omitted)).
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`Notably, Plaintiffs seek no emails, text messages, or other electronic communications at
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`this stage, meaning Defendants will not need to sort through such exchanges for relevance or
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`possible privilege. The documents that Plaintiffs do seek—planning, implementation, and
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`organizational documents—are readily available to Defendants and do not implicate the same
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`privilege concerns. Moreover, Plaintiffs’ request does not require searching through a sprawling
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`agency with thousands of employees and decades of potentially relevant history. The newly
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`renamed and reorganized DOGE entities are barely four weeks old, which places significant
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`guardrails on the quantity of responsive documents and information. Even if responsive
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`documents include some information created before DOGE was officially reorganized and fully
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`operational, discovery will be both finite and manageable for Defendants.
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`III.
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`Plaintiffs’ request is otherwise reasonable under the circumstances.
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`In addition to the above factors, the totality of the circumstances of this case supports
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`Plaintiffs’ limited request.
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`Since January 20, 2025, there has been significant uncertainty about what exactly DOGE
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`is doing. Defendants have “rapidly taken steps to fundamentally reshape the Executive Branch”
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`in unprecedented ways and at an unprecedented speed. ECF No. 29 at 8. As this Court recognized,
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`Case 1:25-cv-00429-TSC Document 45 Filed 02/24/25 Page 8 of 14
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`“Defendants concede that there is no apparent ‘source of legal authority granting’ Musk or DOGE
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`‘the power to order personnel actions’ at federal agencies but do not deny that Defendants are
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`taking such actions,” ECF No. 29 at 2, and the same is true for ordering contracting actions.
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`Plaintiffs have worked diligently to exhaust publicly available information as to the specific
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`personnel and contracting actions ordered by Musk and DOGE, and they will continue to do so.
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`But due to the opaque and fast-moving nature of DOGE’s operations, significant pertinent
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`information is exclusively in Defendants’ possession. Plaintiffs’ proposed discovery is thus
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`necessary to determine the scope of DOGE’s contracting and personnel actions, its decisions with
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`respect to federal funding, and its access to sensitive state data, as well as the corresponding harm
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`to Plaintiffs caused by those DOGE actions and access.
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`Plaintiffs have drawn their discovery requests to target only what they need now to
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`establish likelihood of success on the merits and irreparable harm as a result of Defendants’
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`unlawful conduct. Nothing more. Those requests and proposed timeframes for responses and
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`depositions are reasonable under the circumstances here, and they are well within the mainstream
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`of expedited discovery that courts grant. See, e.g., KPM Analytics, 540 F. Supp. 3d at 147
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`(allowing ten requests for production and three depositions, including one Rule 30(b)(6)
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`deposition); Adams, 304 F.R.D. at 673 (ordering “written discovery responses within fourteen (14)
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`calendar days of receiving [the plaintiff’s] discovery requests and that Defendants then be required
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`to appear for deposition within seven (7) calendar days of providing the written discovery
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`responses”); N. Atl. Operating Co., Inc. v. Evergreen Distribs., LLC, 293 F.R.D. 363, 371, 374
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`(E.D.N.Y. 2013) (allowing ten days to respond to seven document requests that were “quite
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`detailed” and permitting seven depositions); R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co. v. Marino, 505 F. Supp.
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`Case 1:25-cv-00429-TSC Document 45 Filed 02/24/25 Page 9 of 14
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`3d 194, 210 (W.D.N.Y. 2020) (ordering responses to requests for production within 14 days and
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`authorizing deposition).
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`CONCLUSION
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`Plaintiffs respectfully ask this Court to grant them leave to serve the attached discovery
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`requests. Plaintiffs further ask this Court to order that: (a) Defendants shall produce the documents
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`requested in Plaintiffs’ Requests for Production within 7 days of this Court’s order; (b) Defendants
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`shall respond to Plaintiffs’ Requests for Admission and Interrogatories within 7 days of the Court’s
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`order; and (c) Plaintiffs may take up to two depositions, which shall occur no later than April 4,
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`2025, unless the Court subsequently extends that deadline for good cause.
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`Dated: February 24, 2025
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`Respectfully submitted,
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`KRISTIN K. MAYES
`Attorney General for the State of Arizona
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`By: /s/ Joshua Bendor
`Joshua Bendor
`D.D.C. Bar ID 031908
`Solicitor General
`Daniel Clayton Barr
`Chief Deputy Attorney General
`2005 North Central Avenue
`Phoenix, AZ 85004
`(602) 542-3333
`Joshua.Bendor@azag.gov
`Daniel.Barr@azag.gov
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`Attorneys for the State of Arizona
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`RAÚL TORREZ
`Attorney General of the State of New Mexico
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`Anjana Samant
`D.D.C. Bar ID 4267019
`Deputy Counsel
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`Case 1:25-cv-00429-TSC Document 45 Filed 02/24/25 Page 10 of 14
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`James Grayson
`Chief Deputy Attorney General
`Steven Perfrement
`Assistant Attorney General
`Malina Simard-Halm
`Assistant Attorney General
`New Mexico Department of Justice
`408 Galisteo Street
`Santa Fe, NM 87501
`jgrayson@nmdoj.gov
`asamant@nmdoj.gov
`sperfrement@nmdoj.gov
`msimard-halm@nmdoj.gov
`(505) 270-4332
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`Attorneys for the State of New Mexico
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`DANA NESSEL
`Attorney General, State of Michigan
` 
`Jason Evans
`Assistant Attorney General
`Joseph Potchen
`Deputy Attorney General
`Linus Banghart-Linn*
`Chief Legal Counsel
`Michigan Department of Attorney General
`525 W. Ottawa St
`Lansing, MI 48933
`(517) 335-7632
`evansj@michigan.gov
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`Attorneys for the People of the State of Michigan
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`ROB BONTA
`Attorney General for the State of California
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`Nicholas R. Green
`Deputy Attorney General
`Thomas S. Patterson*
`Senior Assistant Attorney General
`Mark R. Beckington*
`John D. Echeverria*
`Supervising Deputy Attorneys General
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`Case 1:25-cv-00429-TSC Document 45 Filed 02/24/25 Page 11 of 14
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`Maria F. Buxton*
`Michael E. Cohen*
`Deputy Attorneys General
`California Attorney General’s Office
`455 Golden Gate Avenue
`Suite 11000
`San Francisco, CA 94102
`(415) 510–4400
`nicholas.green@doj.ca.gov
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`Counsel for the State of California
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`WILLIAM TONG
`Attorney General for the State of Connecticut
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`Timothy Holzman
`Assistant Attorney General
`165 Capitol Ave
`Hartford, CT 06106
`(860) 808-5020
`Michael.Skold@ct.gov
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`Attorneys for the State of Connecticut
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`ANNE E. LOPEZ
`Attorney General for the State of Hawai’i
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`Kalikoʻonālani D. Fernandes
`Solicitor General
`David D. Day
`Special Assistant to the Attorney General
`425 Queen Street
`Honolulu, HI 96813
`(808) 586-1360
`kaliko.d.fernandes@hawaii.gov
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`Attorneys for the State of Hawaiʻi
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`ANTHONY G. BROWN
`Attorney General for the State of Maryland
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`Adam D. Kirschner
`Senior Assistant Attorney General
`200 Saint Paul Place, 20th Floor
`11
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`Case 1:25-cv-00429-TSC Document 45 Filed 02/24/25 Page 12 of 14
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`Baltimore, MD 21202
`(410) 576-6424
`AKirschner@oag.state.md.us
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`Attorneys for the State of Maryland
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`ANDREA JOY CAMPBELL
`Attorney General of Massachusetts
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`Gerard J. Cedrone
`D.D.C. Bar ID MA0019)
`Deputy State Solicitor
`Massachusetts Office of the Attorney General
`One Ashburton Place, 20th Floor
`Boston, MA 02108
`(617) 963-2282
`gerard.cedrone@mass.gov
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`Attorneys for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts
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`KEITH ELLISON
`Attorney General for the State of Minnesota
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`Liz Kramer**
`Solicitor General
`445 Minnesota Street, Suite 600
`St. Paul, MN 55101
`(651) 757-1010
`liz.kramer@ag.state.mn.us
`
`
`Attorneys for the State of Minnesota
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`AARON D. FORD
`Attorney General for the State of Nevada
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`Heidi Parry Stern
`D.D.C. Bar ID 8873
`Solicitor General
`Office of the Nevada Attorney General
`1 State of Nevada Way, Suite 100
`Las Vegas, NV 89119
`HStern@ag.nv.gov
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`Attorneys for the State of Nevada
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`DAN RAYFIELD
`Attorney General for the State of Oregon
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`Brian S. Marshall
`D.D.C. Bar ID 501670
`Senior Assistant Attorney General
`100 SW Market Street
`Portland, OR 97201
`(971) 673-1880
`brian.s.marshall@doj.oregon.gov
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`
`Counsel for the State of Oregon
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`PETER F. NERONHA
`Attorney General for the State of Rhode Island
`
`
`Jeff Kidd
`Special Assistant Attorney General
`150 South Main Street
`Providence, RI 02903
`(401) 274-4400
`jkidd@riag.ri.gov
`
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`Attorneys for the State of Rhode Island
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`CHARITY R. CLARK
`Attorney General for the State of Vermont
`
`
`Ryan P. Kane
`Deputy Solicitor General
`109 State Street
`Montpelier, VT 05609
`(802) 828-2153
`ryan.kane@vermont.gov
`
`
`Attorneys for the State of Vermont
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`NICHOLAS W. BROWN
`Attorney General for the State of Washington
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`Kelsey Endres
`Assistant Attorney General
`Emma Grunberg*
`Deputy Solicitor General
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`Case 1:25-cv-00429-TSC Document 45 Filed 02/24/25 Page 14 of 14
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`800 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2000
`Seattle, WA 98104
`(206) 464-7744
`kelsey.endres@atg.wa.gov
`emma.grunberg@atg.wa.gov
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`Attorneys for the State of Washington
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` *
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` Pro Hac Vice Motion Forthcoming
`** Pro Hac Vice Motion Pending
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`14
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