Case 1:25-cv-01107-LLA Document 65 Filed 04/24/25 Page 1 of 65
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`SUSMAN GODFREY LLP,
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` v.
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`EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE
`PRESIDENT, et al.,
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`Plaintiff,
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`Defendants.
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`Civil Action No. 25-cv-1107-LLA
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
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`BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE 775 LAW PROFESSORS IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF’S
`MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DECLARATORY AND PERMANENT
`INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
`
`
`Phillip R. Malone
`559 Nathan Abbott Way
`Stanford, CA 94305
`Telephone: (650) 725-6369
`Fax: (650)-723-4426
`pmalone@law.stanford.edu
`
` Counsel for Amici Curiae
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`

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`Case 1:25-cv-01107-LLA Document 65 Filed 04/24/25 Page 2 of 65
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`IDENTITY AND INTEREST OF AMICI ......................................................................................... 1
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`SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT .......................................................................................................... 1
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`ARGUMENT ...................................................................................................................................... 5
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`I. THE EXECUTIVE ORDER VIOLATES THE FIRST AMENDMENT. ...................................................... 5
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`A. The Executive Order Constitutes Unlawful Viewpoint Discrimination. ................................ 5
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`B. The Order Is Especially Dangerous Insofar as It Seeks to Insulate Government Actors from
`Legal Challenge. ..................................................................................................................... 9
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`C. The Order Places Unconstitutional Conditions on a Speaker’s Access to Government Funds
`and Property. ........................................................................................................................... 9
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`D. The Order Violates the First Amendment’s Petition Clause. ............................................... 10
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`II. THE EXECUTIVE ORDER VIOLATES THE FIFTH AND SIXTH AMENDMENTS. ............................... 12
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`III. THE EXECUTIVE ORDER THREATENS THE RULE OF LAW. ......................................................... 16
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`CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................................. 19
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`Case 1:25-cv-01107-LLA Document 65 Filed 04/24/25 Page 3 of 65
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` TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`Cases
`
`
`New York Times v. United States,
` 403 U.S. 713 (1971) ....................................................................................................................... 7
`
`Agency for International Development v. Alliance for Open Society Inst.,
` 570 U.S. 205 (2013) ...................................................................................................................... 10
`
`Arizona Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett,
` 564 U.S. 721 (2011) ........................................................................................................................ 6
`
`BE & K Const. Co. v. N.L.R.B.,
` 536 U.S. 516 (2002) ...................................................................................................................... 11
`
`Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri,
` 564 U.S. 379 (2011) ...................................................................................................................... 11
`
`Faretta v. California,
` 422 U.S. 806 (1975) ...................................................................................................................... 12
`
`Goldberg v. Kelly,
` 397 U.S. 254 (1970) ................................................................................................................ 14, 15
`
`Holloway v. Arkansas,
` 435 U.S. 475 (1978) ...................................................................................................................... 16
`
`Kaley v. United States,
` 571 U.S. 320 (2014) ...................................................................................................................... 13
`
`Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez,
` 531 U.S. 533 (2001) ...................................................................................................... 9, 10, 16, 17
`
`Luis v. United States,
` 578 U.S. 5 (2016) .......................................................................................................................... 13
`
`Marbury v. Madison,
` 5 U.S. 137 (1803) ............................................................................................................................ 5
`
`McCord v. Bailey,
` 636 F.2d 606 (D.C. Cir. 1980) ...................................................................................................... 14
`
`Mount Healthy City School District Board of Education v. Doyle,
` 429 U.S. 274 (1977) ................................................................................................................ 11, 12
`
`
`NAACP v. Button,
`
`
`iii
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`

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`Case 1:25-cv-01107-LLA Document 65 Filed 04/24/25 Page 4 of 65
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` 371 U.S. 415 (1963) ...................................................................................................................... 14
`
`Nader v. Democratic National Comm.,
` 567 F.3d 692, 696 (D.C. Cir. 2009) .............................................................................................. 11
`
`Nat’l Rifle Ass’n v. Vullo,
` 602 U.S. 175 (2024) .................................................................................................................... 2, 5
`
`Powell v. Alabama,
` 287 U.S. 45 (1932) .................................................................................................................... 2, 13
`
`Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Virginia State Bar,
` 377 U.S. 1 (1964) .......................................................................................................................... 14
`
`Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia,
` 515 U.S. 819 (1995) .............................................................................................................. 5, 6, 10
`
`Strickland v. Washington,
` 466 U.S. 668 (1984) ...................................................................................................................... 14
`
`Tennessee v. Lane,
` 541 U.S. 509 (2004) ...................................................................................................................... 11
`
`Trump v. Hawaii,
` 585 U.S. 667 (2018) ........................................................................................................................ 6
`
`United Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar Ass’n,
` 389 U.S. 217 (1967) ...................................................................................................................... 14
`
`United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez,
` 548 U.S. 140 (2006). ............................................................................................................... 13, 14
`
`Wood v. Georgia,
` 450 U.S. 261 (1981) ...................................................................................................................... 14
`
`
`Other Authorities
`
`AM. BAR ASS’N, MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT R. 1.2(b) ............................................................. 6
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`AM. BAR ASS’N, MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT R. 1.7(a) ........................................................... 15
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`Exec. Order No. 14230, 90 Fed. Reg. 11,781 (Mar. 6, 2025) ......................................................... 3, 7
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`Exec. Order No. 14237, 90 Fed. Reg. 13,039 (Mar. 14, 2025) ....................................................... 3, 7
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`Exec. Order No. 14244, 90 Fed. Reg. 13,685 (Mar. 21, 2025) ....................................................... 3, 8
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`Exec. Order No. 14246, 90 Fed. Reg. 13,997 (Mar. 25. 2025) ....................................................... 3, 7
`
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`iv
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`Case 1:25-cv-01107-LLA Document 65 Filed 04/24/25 Page 5 of 65
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`Exec. Order No. 14250, 90 Fed. Reg. 14,549 (Mar. 27, 2025) ....................................................... 3, 7
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`Exec. Order No. 14263, 90 Fed. Reg. 15,615 (April 9, 2025) ................................................... passim
`
`Ali Abbas Ahmadi, Trump Rescinds Order Targeting Law Firm After It Makes $40m Promise,
`BBC (Mar. 21, 2025) ...................................................................................................................... 4
`
`
`Sam Baker, Law Firms Pledge Almost $1 Billion in Free Work to Trump,
` AXIOS (Apr. 12, 2025) ................................................................................................................. 4, 8
`
`J.M. Beattie, Scales of Justice: Defense Counsel and the English Criminal Trial in the Eighteenth
`and Nineteenth Centuries, 9 L. & HIST. REV. 221, 223 (1991) .............................................. 12, 13
`
`
`Michael Birnbaum, Law Firms Refuse to Represent Trump Opponents in the Wake of His Attacks,
`WASH. POST (Mar. 25, 2025) .......................................................................................................... 8
`
`
`Matthew Goldstein, Five More Big Law Firms Reach Deals with Trump, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 11,
`2025) .............................................................................................................................................. 4
`
`
`Hon. J. Michael Luttig, Address to the Am. Bar Ass’n Annual Meeting of the Nat’l Conf. of State
`Bar Leaders (Aug. 4, 2023) ........................................................................................................... 17
`
`
`Erin Mulvaney & C. Ryan Barber, Fear of Trump Has Elite Law Firms in Retreat, WALL ST. J.
`(Mar. 9, 2025) ............................................................................................................................. 3, 7
`
`
`Katelyn Polantz, The Chilling Effect of Trump’s War Against the Legal Establishment, CNN (Mar.
`11, 2025) ......................................................................................................................................... 8
`
`
`Michael S. Schmidt & Matthew Goldstein, Head of Paul, Weiss Says Firm Would Not Have
`Survived Without Deal with Trump, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 23, 2025) .............................................. 7, 8
`
`
`Eugene Scalia, John Adams, Legal Representation, and the “Cancel Culture,” 44 HARV. J. L. &
`PUB. POL’Y 333, 334 (2021) ............................................................................................... 6, 16, 17
`
`
`Mike Scarcella & David Thomas, Judge Blocks Most of Trump Order against Susman Godfrey,
`Laments Law Firms ‘Capitulating’, REUTERS (Apr. 15, 2025) ...................................................... 3
`
`
`Trump Threatens Long Prison Sentences for Those Who ‘Cheat’ in the Election if He Wins, PBS
`NEWS (Sept. 8, 2024) .................................................................................................................. 2, 3
`
`
`ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 301 (Henry Reeve trans., 2002) (1835) ........ 16
`
`Presidential Memorandum, Suspension of Security Clearances and Evaluation of Government
`Contracts (Feb. 25, 2025) ................................................................................................................ 7
`
`
`Presential Memorandum, Preventing Abuses of the Legal System and the Federal Court
`
`(March 22, 2025) ............................................................................................................................ 3
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`Case 1:25-cv-01107-LLA Document 65 Filed 04/24/25 Page 6 of 65
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`IDENTITY AND INTEREST OF AMICI
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`Amici 775 law professors submit this brief in support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary
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`Judgment and Declaratory and Permanent Injunctive Relief (the “Motion”) to emphasize the threat
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`that the President’s Executive Order (the “Order”)1 presents to the independence and integrity of
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`the legal profession, the rights of clients to seek redress in the courts, and, by extension, the rule
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`of law. As experts in constitutional law, legal ethics, and the history of the legal profession, among
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`other fields, we have a significant interest in ensuring that the principles of free speech, freedom
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`of association, the right to petition the government, and the right to counsel are upheld. As
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`educators, amici have an interest in fostering the next generation of attorneys, and in preparing
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`them to zealously represent clients and causes without fear of reprisal. Many of the amici recently
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`filed similar briefs in Perkins Coie LLP v. U.S. Department of Justice, et al., Case No. 1:25-cv-
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`00716 (D.D.C.); Jenner & Block v U.S. Department of Justice, et al., Case No. 1:25-cv-00916-
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`JDB (D.D.C.); and Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale & Dorr v. U.S. Department of Justice, et al.,
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`Case No. 1:25-cv-00917-RJL (D.D.C). Susman Godfrey has consented to the filing of this brief
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`and the Government has indicated it does not object to its filing. This brief is accompanied by
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`amici’s motion for leave to file.2 A list of amici is provided in Appendix A.
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`SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
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`The President’s Order is a self-declared act of retribution that targets a law firm for
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`
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`1 Throughout this brief, “Executive Order” or “Order” refers to Executive Order No. 14263,
`codified at 90 Fed. Reg. 15,615 (April 9, 2025) titled “Addressing Risks from Susman Godfrey,”
`as well as the accompanying Fact Sheet titled “Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump Addresses
`Risks from Susman Godfrey” of the same date.
`2 Amici law professors state that no counsel for a party has authored this brief in whole or in part
`and that no person or entity, other than amici law professors or their counsel, has made a monetary
`contribution to the preparation or submission of this brief.
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`1
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`Case 1:25-cv-01107-LLA Document 65 Filed 04/24/25 Page 7 of 65
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`representing clients and causes the President disfavors.3 In inflicting this retribution, the Order
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`contradicts centuries of precedent safeguarding free speech, the right of association, and the right
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`to petition. These precedents establish that the First Amendment “prohibits government officials
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`from ‘relying on the threat of invoking legal sanctions and other means of coercion . . . to achieve
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`the suppression’ of disfavored speech.” Nat’l Rifle Ass’n v. Vullo, 602 U.S. 175, 176 (2024)
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`(quoting Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 67 (1963)). Targeting Susman Godfrey for
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`representing clients and espousing views the President dislikes is viewpoint discrimination, plain
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`and simple.
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`The Order violates the Fifth and Sixth Amendments as well. The Fifth and Sixth
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`Amendments were designed to check executive power and to ensure a meaningful way to assert
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`rights before a judicial authority. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 61, 64–65 (1932). Forcing
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`lawyers to bend to the preferences of federal officials robs clients of their right to counsel and
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`introduces the very type of government interference in the administration of justice the Founders
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`acted to prevent.4
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`Finally, the Order threatens the rule of law. If the Order stands, it will be open season on
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`lawyers who have dared to take on clients or causes the President or other officials don’t like. This
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`is no hypothetical threat. In the run-up to the election, the President posted on Truth Social that
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`“WHEN I WIN, those people that CHEATED will be prosecuted to the fullest extent of the
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`Law . . . . Please beware that this legal exposure extends to Lawyers . . . .” Trump Threatens Long
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`3 This brief focuses on the sections of the Order for which the Court has enjoined enforcement—
`namely, Sections 1, 3, and 5.
`4 The Order violates the Constitution in multiple ways and poses a grave threat to the American
`justice system. This brief focuses on several of those violations; namely, the manner by which it
`violates the First Amendment, Fifth Amendment, Sixth Amendment, and the manner by which it
`threatens the rule of law.
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`2
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`Case 1:25-cv-01107-LLA Document 65 Filed 04/24/25 Page 8 of 65
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`Prison Sentences for Those Who ‘Cheat’ in the Election if He Wins, PBS NEWS (Sept. 8, 2024).
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`More recently, the President pledged before issuing a similar Executive Order targeting law firm
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`Perkins Coie that it was merely among the first of “a lot of law firms that we’re going to be going
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`after.” Erin Mulvaney & C. Ryan Barber, Fear of Trump Has Elite Law Firms in Retreat, WALL
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`ST. J. (Mar. 9, 2025) (quoting President Trump). Indeed, in addition to the Order at issue here, the
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`President has issued four more Executive Orders targeting Perkins Coie; Paul, Weiss, Rifkind,
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`Wharton & Garrison; WilmerHale; and Jenner & Block, all leading law firms. See Exec. Order
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`No. 14230, 90 Fed. Reg. 11,781 (Mar. 6, 2025) (targeting Perkins Coie); Exec. Order No. 14237,
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`90 Fed. Reg. 13,039 (Mar. 14, 2025) (targeting Paul Weiss); Exec. Order No. 14250, 90 Fed. Reg.
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`14,459 (Mar. 27, 2025) (targeting WilmerHale); Exec. Order No. 14246, 90 Fed. Reg. 13,997
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`(Mar. 25, 2025) (targeting Jenner & Block).5 In addition to Susman Godfrey, three firms have
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`filed lawsuits challenging to the President’s orders. Mike Scarcella & David Thomas, Judge Blocks
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`Most of Trump Order against Susman Godfrey, Laments Law Firms ‘Capitulating’, REUTERS (Apr.
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`15, 2025) (noting Perkins Coie, Jenner & Block, and WilmerHale filed lawsuits). In each of those
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`four cases, a court has determined that the firm is likely to establish that the order at issue is
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`unconstitutional, thus granting the firm’s request to temporarily enjoin some of the subject order’s
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`
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`5 In addition, the President issued a March 22, 2025 memorandum, titled “Preventing Abuses of
`the Legal System and the Federal Court,” which directs the Attorney General to, among other
`things, “seek sanctions against attorneys and law firms who engage in frivolous, unreasonable, and
`vexatious litigation against the United States” and “review conduct by attorneys or their law firms
`in litigation against the federal government” in order to identify any misconduct that might warrant
`further disciplinary action. Presidential Memorandum, Preventing Abuses of the Legal System and
`the Federal Court (Mar. 22, 2025). In different circumstances, a directive to identify and address
`ethical misconduct among attorneys might be a reasonable exercise of Presidential authority. But,
`considered alongside his Executive Orders targeting the previously mentioned firms, his decision
`to deploy governmental resources toward heightened scrutiny of lawyers who challenge his
`administration warrants concern.
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`3
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`Case 1:25-cv-01107-LLA Document 65 Filed 04/24/25 Page 9 of 65
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`mandates. Id. (noting courts have issued temporary restraining orders in those firms’ challenges).
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`But some firms have chosen not to challenge the President’s actions. Paul Weiss caved to
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`the President’s pressure, donating what the President described as “$40 million in pro bono legal
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`services over the course of President Trump’s term to support the Administration’s initiatives” in
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`exchange for the Order’s revocation. Ali Abbas Ahmadi, Trump Rescinds Order Targeting Law
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`Firm After It Makes $40m Promise, BBC (Mar. 21, 2025) (quoting the President’s Truth Social
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`post); see also Exec. Order No. 14244, 90 Fed. Reg. 13,685 (Mar. 21, 2025) (revoking Executive
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`Order targeting Paul Weiss). Nine other law firms have jointly promised to donate nearly $1 billion
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`in uncompensated legal services to causes the President supports in order stave off similar
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`executive orders. Matthew Goldstein, Five More Big Law Firms Reach Deals with Trump, N.Y.
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`TIMES (Apr. 11, 2025); Sam Baker, Law Firms Pledge Almost $1 Billion in Free Work to Trump,
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`AXIOS (Apr. 12, 2025).6
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`The impact of the Order reverberates far beyond the particular firm that is targeted. Going
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`forward, a lawyer or law firm that is asked to represent a client on a matter that is likely to trigger
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`the President’s ire will have to weigh whether they are willing to be placed on the President’s
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`target list—and lose the business such a placement entails. They must also ask whether taking on
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`a client of this sort, and whether zealously advocating on that client’s behalf, will hurt other
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`existing clients to whom ethical duties are owed. The Executive branch has no constitutional
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`authority to use executive orders as a cudgel to beat the American legal system into submission.
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`
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`6 Those firms are Skadden, Arps, Meagher & Flom ($100 million); Willkie Farr & Gallagher
`($100 million); Milbank ($100 million); Latham & Watkins ($125 million); Simpson Thacher &
`Bartlett ($125 million); Kirkland & Ellis ($125 million); A&O Shearman ($125 million); and
`Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft ($100 million). See Baker, supra. Together with Paul Weiss,
`those firms have promise to donated a combined total of $940 million in uncompensated legal
`services to the President’s favored causes. Id.
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`4
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`Case 1:25-cv-01107-LLA Document 65 Filed 04/24/25 Page 10 of 65
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`Beyond the impact on clients and lawyers, orders of this type threaten the integrity of the
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`judicial process, including the core role of judicial review. That anchor of our constitutional system
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`cannot function when one person—regardless of his position—is empowered to threaten and
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`punish lawyers for zealously representing their clients in court. “The Government of the United
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`States has been emphatically termed a government of laws, and not of men.” Marbury v. Madison,
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`5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803). Let it not “cease to deserve this high appellation.” Id.
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`Amici urge the Court to grant Susman Godfrey’s Motion.
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`I.
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`The Executive Order Violates the First Amendment.
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`ARGUMENT
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`The Order violates the First Amendment in at least four ways. First, the Order singles out
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`a speaker and discriminates against it because of its views. Second, the Order unconstitutionally
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`controls the speech and associational freedoms of lawyers engaged in legal work against the
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`government. Third, the Order imposes unconstitutional conditions on a firm’s access to
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`government funding and property. Fourth, the Order violates the Petition Clause.
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`A. The Executive Order Constitutes Unlawful Viewpoint Discrimination.
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`“At the heart of the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause is the recognition that
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`viewpoint discrimination is uniquely harmful to a free and democratic society.” Vullo, 602 U.S. at
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`187. Indeed, while the Supreme Court has long expressed deep skepticism toward all content-
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`based speech restrictions, it has reserved its highest opprobrium for those based on viewpoint. As
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`the Court has explained: “It is axiomatic that the government may not regulate speech based on its
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`substantive content or the message it conveys.” Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ.
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`of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828 (1995). When the government rests its regulation on “particular views
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`taken by speakers on a subject, the violation of the First Amendment is all the more blatant.” Id.
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`5
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`at 829.
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`The Order’s viewpoint discrimination is clear on its face. It rebukes Susman Godfrey for
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`what the Order calls “weaponiz[ing] the American legal system,” Order § 1, and for representing
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`causes the administration dislikes, including, in the Order’s words funding groups that “inject”
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`into the military “political and racial ideology.” Id. It also castigates Susman Godfrey for
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`advancing specific views through its litigation. Id. (criticizing Susman Godfrey for litigating cases
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`involving election laws). In doing so, it punishes Susman Godfrey for advancing the viewpoints
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`of its clients, despite the well-established premise that an attorney’s decision to represent a client
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`“does not constitute an endorsement of the client’s political, economic, social or moral views or
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`activities.” AM. BAR ASS’N, MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(b).7
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`When a governmental action burdens speech because of its content, the action is reviewed
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`pursuant to strict scrutiny, “which requires the Government to prove that the restriction furthers a
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`compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.” Arizona Free Enter. Club’s
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`Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 564 U.S. 721, 734 (2011) (quoting Citizens United v. Fed. Election
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`Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010)).
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`The President’s Order targeting his political opponents cannot survive strict scrutiny. To
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`begin, discriminating against one’s political enemies is not a permissible purpose. Indeed, an act
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`that “seem[s] ‘inexplicable by anything but animus’” cannot survive even rationality review.
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`Trump v. Hawaii, 585 U.S. 667, 706 (2018) (quoting Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996)).
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`7 See also Eugene Scalia, John Adams, Legal Representation, and the “Cancel Culture,” 44 HARV.
`J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 333, 337 (2021) (“[I]ndependence of the lawyer from his client is integral to
`the freedom and autonomy that are among the privileges of private practice, and it is essential to
`lawyers’ effective performance of their role in our system of justice.”).
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`6
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`Case 1:25-cv-01107-LLA Document 65 Filed 04/24/25 Page 12 of 65
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`Nor can the Order be justified by the President’s invocation of “the authority vested in me as
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`President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America.” Order, pmbl. The
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`President is, by his oath of office (and by the Constitution), bound by the dictates of the Bill of
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`Rights, and has no unilateral power to single out and punish speakers based on nebulous criteria
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`of his own making.8
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`Today, Susman Godfrey, like the other targeted firms, has fallen into the President’s
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`disfavor. Tomorrow, it could be any one of us whose speech the President unilaterally deems
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`antithetical to “the interests of the United States” because that person or organization has chosen
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`to litigate against him. Order § 5.
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`The threat is far from hypothetical. As noted at the outset, the President has vowed to “go[]
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`after . . . a lot of law firms.” Mulvaney & Barber, supra (quoting President Trump). Indeed, the
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`President has already targeted five other law firms through separate executive actions. Exec. Order
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`No. 14230, 90 Fed. Reg. 11,781 (Mar. 6, 2025) (targeting Perkins Coie); Exec. Order No. 14237,
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`90 Fed. Reg. 13,039 (Mar. 14, 2025) (targeting Paul Weiss); Exec. Order No. 14246, 90 Fed. Reg.
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`13,997 (Mar. 25. 2025) (targeting Jenner & Block); Exec. Order No. 14250, 90 Fed. Reg. 14,459
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`(Mar. 27, 2025) (targeting WilmerHale); Executive Order, Presidential Memorandum, Suspension
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`of Security Clearances and Evaluation of Government Contracts (Feb. 25, 2025) (targeting
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`Covington & Burling LLP).
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`To the extent the President expected that these orders would cause the firms in question to
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`bend to his will, he has been proven correct: Paul Weiss, facing a potential exodus of clients and
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`
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`8 In New York Times v. United States, Justice Black observed that the government’s power in this
`area is particularly weak when “[t]he Government does not even attempt to rely on any act of
`Congress.” 403 U.S. 713, 718 (1971) (Black, J., concurring).
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`7
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`Case 1:25-cv-01107-LLA Document 65 Filed 04/24/25 Page 13 of 65
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`an inability to “survive a protracted dispute with the administration,” agreed to donate the
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`equivalent of $40 million in uncompensated legal services toward causes consistent with the
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`President’s agenda. See Michael S. Schmidt & Matthew Goldstein, Head of Paul, Weiss Says Firm
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`Would Not Have Survived Without Deal with Trump, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 23, 2025) (quoting Paul
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`Weiss Chairman Brad Karp). In exchange, the President revoked the relevant Executive Order.
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`Id.; see also Exec. Order No. 14244, 90 Fed. Reg. 13,685 (Mar. 21, 2025) (revoking Executive
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`Order targeting Paul Weiss, citing the firm’s decision to donate its legal services).
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`To stave off similar orders, other major firms have preemptively capitulated to the
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`President. Eight other firms—including Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom; Latham &
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`Watkins; Kirkland & Ellis, all of which are ranked in the top ten firms nationwide in terms of gross
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`revenues and industry prestige9—have donated a combined $900 million in legal services toward
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`causes the President backs to avoid being subjected to analogous executive action. See Baker,
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`supra. As the President himself has said, “They’re all bending and saying, ‘Sir, thank you very
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`much.’” Katelyn Polantz, The Chilling Effect of Trump’s War Against the Legal Establishment,
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`CNN (Mar. 11, 2025) (quoting the President).
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`The chilling impact of the President’s actions is not limited to the firms the President has
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`targeted; it has cast a shadow over the legal profession at large. Firms across the country are
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`declining to represent clients and causes the President disfavors. See Michael Birnbaum, Law
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`Firms Refuse to Represent Trump Opponents in the Wake of His Attacks, WASH. POST (Mar. 25,
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`2025) (reporting that potential clients seeking representation in actions adverse to the President
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`9 See 2025 Am Law 100, THE AMERICAN LAWYER (Apr. 15, 2025) (ranking firms by gross
`revenues, among other metrics); 2025 Vault Law 100, VAULT (last visiting Apr. 18, 2025)
`(ranking the most prestigious law firms based on the assessments of lawyers at peer firms).
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`8
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`Case 1:25-cv-01107-LLA Document 65 Filed 04/24/25 Page 14 of 65
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`have had difficulty finding representation); Polantz, supra (reporting on the “chilling” effect of the
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`President’s executive actions toward law firms). Lawyers have been cowed into submission,
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`incentivized to stay quiet, toe the line, and cave to the President’s demands—lest they and their
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`clients be punished.
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`B. The Order Is Especially Dangerous Insofar as It Seeks to Insulate
`Government Actors from Legal Challenge.
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`Although viewpoint discrimination is hardly ever tolerated, it is especially dangerous when
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`governmental officials wield it to insulate themselves from legal scrutiny. The Supreme Court
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`expressed just this concern in Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533 (2001). In
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`Velazquez, the Court invalidated a federal statute that prohibited Legal Services Corporation
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`(LSC)-funded attorneys from challenging federal or state welfare laws. Id. at 537–49. The
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`restriction, said the Court, impermissibly “distort[ed] the legal system by altering the traditional
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`role of attorneys” as zealous advocates for their clients. Id. at 544. And, to make matters worse, it
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`“insulate[d] the Government’s interpretation of the Constitution from judicial challenge,” id. at
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`548, thus implicating “central First Amendment concerns,” id. at 547.
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`The Order in this case is considerably more troubling than the statute invalidated in
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`Velazquez. Through this Order, the President has arrogated to himself the power to single out
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`lawyers and law firms who cross him, simply by declaring their legal work, past or present,
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`contrary to the national interest. See Order § 5. If the Order is allowed to stand, the zealous
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`advocacy that is the hallmark of a functioning court system will be chilled in dramatic ways, as
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`lawyers tiptoe fearfully away from disfavored views and clients.
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`C. The Order Places Unconstitutional Conditions on a Speaker’s Access to
`Government Funds and Property.
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`The Order seeks to punish Susman Godfrey in numerous ways, including terminating its
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`Case 1:25-cv-01107-LLA Document 65 Filed 04/24/25 Page 15 of 65
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`government contracts, Order § 3(b); threatening the contracts of those who do business with them,
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`id. §§ 3(a), 3(b); precluding every single firm employee from working for a federal agency in the
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`future (absent a waiver), id. § 5(b); and limiting firm lawyers’ access to federal government
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`buildings (potentially including courthouses), id. § 5(a). These provisions run afoul of well-
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`established limitations on the government’s power to condition benefits on the viewpoint of a
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`recipient.
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`Indeed, Velazquez itself involved a condition on government funding of lawyers’ work.
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`The statutory prohibition on LSC-funded lawyers’ constitutional arguments applied only to certain
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`congressionally funded legal services (namely, constitutional challenges to welfare laws).
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`Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 537–39. The Cou