IN THE SUPERIOR COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
`CIVIL DIVISION
`
`Filed
`
`D.C. Superior Court
`11/17/2021 20:30PM
`Clerk of the Court
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`MUSLIM ADVOCATES,
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`Plaintiff,
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`V.
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`MARK ZUCKERBERG,etal.,
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`Defendants.
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`
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`Case No.: 2021 CA 001114B
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`Judge Anthony C. Epstein
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`PLAINTIFF MUSLIM ADVOCATES’ OPPOSITION
`TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS UNDER RULE12(b)
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`

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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`Tnntroduction ....... ee ceeceeeeeescecneecnneccnseerscecnacennecesseesnsecasernascnseesseecasenseeeseeessseesasernesesesesssernasenseenseseegs 1
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`Factual background. .0........sececeesceeeeeseesseeeceecseevsneesseecaeesseevsneeeseeesaeeseessreesntecsasessaeesseesatersavenseessees 3
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`ALQUMENL 00... eee eeeeeseeeceeeceseeesneceseevsaeceseessnevsasecsascsaecnseesstersaecsaeesseersieeracectasceteesateraseseeseneesneeeenteres 7
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`I.
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`Muslim Advocates has standing to bringall of its Claims. ........ eee eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee 7
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`A.
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`B.
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`Muslim Advocates has standing to sue under the CPPA, because
`it is a public interest organization as defined by the CPPA......... ee 7
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`Because Muslim Advocates has Article HI standing, it also has
`standing to pursue its CPPA claim as a nonprofit organization
`and hasstanding to bring its commonlaw claims. «0.0.0... esses ene reeeeeeeneee 9
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`Il.
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`Muslim Advocates sufficiently alleges a claim under the CPPA. 0... eee 12
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`A.
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`B.
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`C,
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`Facebook misrepresented its Policy. .........:cseeeeeeeeseeeceneeeeneeeseevaeceseevenereneers 13
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`The GPPA doesnot require claimsto arise out of a consumer
`THANSACTION. 000... eeee eee ceeeeeeeee cece reeecnseeseeesneecaecnseeeseeersseesasenseeenseesneernaserneern 16
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`The CPPA applies to businesses that don’t charge moneyfor
`SCTVICES. oe eeeceeeeeeeeesseenseerseeeeeeeseecaeerseeesseessasensecesneeseerascsesessersnsernasenaeens 17
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`D.
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`The individual defendants are liable under the CPPA. «00.0... eeeeeeeeeeeees 18
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`Ill.
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`IV.
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`Plaintiff sufficiently pled fraud and negligent misrepresentation claims................ 21
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`‘The defendants lack section 230 immunity for the false, oral statements
`Facebook’s executives made offline. ........ ce cece seeseeeseceseerneeneereeseeeseerneonaecnaereeees 24
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`Conclusion 0.0... cee eeceseeseceseceseccseeseevseesecesscsseonsecnsesacesseonsesseonsecnserseessesseessaerseessesaeessesseeaeonaeenaerseers 25
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`

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`INTRODUCTION
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`This case seeks to hold Facebook and its executives accountable for making false and
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`misleading statements in the District of Columbia about what steps Facebook takes to makeits
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`social media platform safer
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`for users.
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`In public testimony to Congress and in private
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`communications to Muslim Advocates, Facebook’s leaders repeatedly stated that Facebook
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`removes hate speech, calls to arms, and similar harmful content that violates the company’s
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`professed standards when it learns ofsuch content. Because those statements were false and deceptive,
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`Muslim Advocates filed this lawsuit, asserting claims of consumerfraud under the D.C. Consumer
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`Protection Procedures Act (GPPA) and common-law fraud and negligent misrepresentation.
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`In the wake of the Cambridge Analytica scandal and intense pressure from Congress and
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`civil rights groups, F'acebook’s leaders hatched a plan to avoid further regulation, stop consumers
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`from dumping Facebook, and mitigate civil rights leaders’ escalating demands. Starting with
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`Facebook’s CEO Mark Zuckerberg’s April 2018 testimony in the House and Senate, Facebook’s
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`leaders began touting a false claim: that when Facebook learns of harmful content thatviolatesits
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`own community standards—like hate speech and dangerous groups—Facebook removesit. ‘Time
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`after time, Zuckerberg, Facebook’s Chief Operating Officer Sheryl Sandberg, and other company
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`leaders went to Capitol Hill to repeat this falsehood to Congress and Facebook’s consumers. And
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`those leaders made the same misrepresentations in meetings and emails with Muslim Advocates
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`and other civil rights groups. But Facebook’s leaders knew that the statements were false. As
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`Muslim Advocates demonstrates in the complaint, Facebook had a practice of routinely refusing
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`to remove content that clearly violated its community standards after Facebook learned ofit.
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`In one sense, the issues here are familiar—like many other consumer-protection cases, this
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`case involves corporate executives who have madefalse claims aboutthe safety of their products
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`(or, more specifically, the steps they’ve taken to maketheir productssafer) in an effort to boostsales
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`and prevent a loss of customers. But there is also something extraordinary about this case: In
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`moving to dismiss, Facebook andits executives claim that they are abovethe law in novel ways.
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`First, they claim, without citing any precedent or authority, that because Facebook does
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`not charge users moneyforits service, Facebook is exempt from the CPPA’s consumerprotections.
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`But this is wrong. The CPPA covers any sale, lease, or transfer of a good or service. Facebook
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`plainly transfers its services to its users by allowing them to use their apps andsites. But Facebook
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`also sells its services—because a sale does not require an exchange of money,it just requires one to
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`give up property for something of value, and users give up their data in exchange for Facebook’s
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`services. Facebook’s argument would also have far-reaching consequences. Since D.C.’s consumer
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`protection law is one of the strongest in the nation, Facebook and other tech giants that don’t
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`charge moneyfortheir services would be exemptfrom virtually all other consumerprotection laws.
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`Second, Facebook wrongly claims that Section 230 gives Facebook and its executives
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`absolute immunity from civil liability for their executives’ ownfalse oral testimony and statements.
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`But Section 230 immunity only applies to the content of third parties that Facebook publishes
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`online, not oral statements madein reallife. And Section 230 only applies to the statements of third
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`parties online, not the misrepresentations created and spoken by an online platform or its
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`executives. Adopting Facebook’s view of Section 230 would create a special privilege for social-
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`media executives who make false statements about their businesses, exempting them from a
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`century’s worth of laws designed to protect consumers and investors from deception.
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`Facebook makes additional arguments that fare no better. The company challenges
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`Muslim Advocates’ standing, butit does so by failing to note that Article III’s requirements do not
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`apply to Muslim Advocates’ CPPA claim and by asking the court
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`to disregard allegations
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`underlying its common-law claims. Next, to argue that there is no actionable statementoffact, it
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`mischaracterizes Muslim Advocates’ complaint as premised on a broad promise to removeall
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`impropercontent. In reality, as explained, Muslim Advocates alleges that it and the public were
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`misled by Facebook’s narrower statement that it removes contentthat violates its standards when
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`Facebooklearns ofit. Those statements did not merely convey Facebook's “goals,” as it claims, but
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`represented how Facebookoperatesits service. Finally, Facebook argues that Muslim Advocates
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`cannot have “reasonably relied” on Facebook’s statements for purposes of its commonlaw claims.
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`But this argumentis contrary to the allegations of the complaint and, bizarrely, asks this Court to
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`accept that nonprofits like Muslim Advocates should never assume that Facebook’s leaders are
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`telling the truth whenthetestify in Congress or speak privately with them.
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`FACTUAL BACKGROUND
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`Facebook’s Business Model and Community Standards.
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`Facebookis the world’s most heavily used social networking website.! With 200 million
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`users in the United States and nearly three billion users worldwide, some 36%of all humanbeings
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`use Facebook. Amend. Compl.
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`(“AC”) § 10. Facebook’s main apps—Facebook, Instagram,
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`Messenger, and WhatsApp—allow billions of people to communicate with each other. /d JJ 11—
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`17. Instead of chargingits users moneyfor its services, Facebook requiresits users to be monitored
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`and give Facebooktheir personal data. /d. JJ 19-21. Facebook and advertisers, in turn, use this
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`data to target users with paid ads. Jd. § 22. Facebook makesnearly all its revenue when advertisers
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`pay it to show their ads to people when they use Facebook. /d. § 23. It’s a profitable business: In
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`2020, Facebook earned $86 billion in revenues and $29 billion in profit. Jd. § 31.
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`At the heart of Facebook’s business is a paradox. The more time people spend on
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`Facebook’s apps the more money it makes, and incendiary content—including anti-Muslim hate
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`speech and groups—causesusers to spend moretime on Facebook./d. J] 27-29, 46. But the public
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`' All references to “Facebook” in this opposition include the individual Defendants, Mark
`Zuckerberg, Sheryl K. Sandberg, Joel Kaplan, and Kevin Martin, unless otherwise specified.
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`perception that Facebooktolerates this harmful content could harm its bottom line by driving away
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`users and advertisers and exposingit to greater regulation. Jd. JJ 29-30, 46.
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`To avoid this paradox, Facebook has adopted “Community Standards” that identify with
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`great specificity the types of content that users are not allowed to post on Facebook’s apps. ‘This
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`includes content such as “hate speech,” “violence and incitement,” “dangerous individuals and
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`organizations,” and “bullying and harassment.” Jd. | 38-45. These definitions are given sharp
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`edges. For example, Facebook defines hate speech as “a direct attack against people” based on a
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`“protected characteristic” such asreligion, “including dehumanizing speech, harmful stereotypes,
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`statements of inferiority, expressions of contempt, disgust or dismissal,” which includes comparing
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`a religious group to “[f]ilth, bacteria, disease and feces.” Jd. § 39. It further defines dangerous
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`organizations as those that “proclaim a violent mission or are engaged in violence.” /d. J 42.
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`Facebook encouragesusers to report violations of the Community Standardsso that it can remove
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`violating content. /d. | 49.
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`Facebook’s Misrepresentations About Removing Content That
`Violates its Community Standards When it Learns of the Content.
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`For several years, Facebook and its corporate leadership have engaged in a coordinated
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`campaign to convinceusers that its products are safe, to increase the use of Facebook, to prevent
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`more governmentregulation, and to discourage non-profit leaders from calling for boycotts and
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`greater regulation. /d.52-53. To these ends, Facebook’s leaders have routinely made false,
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`misleading, and deceptive statements to Congress,
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`its consumers, and civil rights groups like
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`Muslim Advocates: that when Facebook learns of content that violates its Community Standards,
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`policies, or other articulated standards, it removesit. /d. J] 53-75. In making these statements,
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`Facebook’s leaders were clear that Facebook does not removeall content on Facebookthat violates
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`its standards—only content that Facebookidentifies or learns about from others. For example:
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`e
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`e
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`e
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`e
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`e
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`Facebook’s GEO Mark Zuckerberg told the Senate Commerce Committee in 2018:
`“Whenwefind things that violate our Standards, we remove them.” Jd. | 59.
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`Facebook’s COO Sheryl Sandbergtold the Senate Intelligence Committee in 2018: “when
`wefind content that violates ourpolicies, we will take it down.” Jd. § 61.
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`Facebook’s Head of Cybersecurity Policy Nathaniel Gleicher told the House Intelligence
`Committee in 2020: “weidentify” “[g]roups that promote violence,” and “we remove them
`from the platform whenever we see it.” Id. J 62 (emphasis added).
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`told the Senate
`Facebook’s Head of Global Policy Management Monika Bickert
`Commerce Committee in 2018: “We also remove any content that praises or supports
`terrorists or their actions whenever we become awareofit,” zd. § 65. And she told the same
`Committee: “When wefind contentthat violates our standards we removeit.” /d. 4 66.
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`Facebook’s VP of Public Policy Neil Potts told the House Judiciary Committee in 2019:
`“When we become aware of [white nationalist] pages we will remove them.” Jd. §| 70.
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`Facebook’s leaders repeated the sameclaim in other congressional testimony,see zd. J] 56—
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`70, which was drafted, approved, and directed by Kevin Martin and Joel Kaplan,
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`two of
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`Facebook’s highest ranking public policy officials. /d. YJ 5-6, 71. They repeated the same claim in
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`their media remarks. See, eg., wd. § 77. And they did the same through dozens of meetings and
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`emails with civil rights groups like Muslim Advocates in which Zuckerberg, Sandberg and Martin
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`all participated. Jd. J] 72-76, 79-80. Facebook’s leaders courted these civil rights groups because,
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`as Facebooktold financial regulators, their criticism could negatively affect its business. /d. § 80.
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`But these statements were false and misleading. Both before and after they were made
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`Facebook had a practice of routinely and affirmatively deciding not to remove content that clearly
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`violated Facebook’s standards even when Facebook became aware of it, especially anti-Muslim content.
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`Id. § 96. And Facebook’s leaders knew this when they madethose statements. /d ¥] 90-93.
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`For example, from 2017 to 2019, Professor Megan Squire routinely reported to Facebook
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`specific, clear violations of its community standards—such as content encouraging people to kill
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`worshipers of Allah, calling Islam a disease, saying death to Islam, groupscalling for purging Islam,
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`a group named “Islam is pureevil,” and a groupcalled “Islam is a Gancer”—butFacebookrefused
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`to remove that violative content. /d. §| 106-17. In these cases, it is without question that the
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`Community Standards barred the content that Facebook declined to remove. See id.; see also J] 39,
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`42 (setting forth Facebook’s standards for hate speech and dangerous organizations).
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`Likewise, in 2020 after the ‘Tech Transparency Project identified over 100 American white
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`supremacist groups active on Facebook, again Facebook did not remove those hate groups. Jd. J
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`128. The sameyear, Facebook’s lawyers, in conducting a civil rights audit, highlighted Facebook’s
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`failure to remove anti-Muslim contentthat violated its standards and found that Facebook’s failure
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`to enforceits standards created an atmosphere “where Muslimsfeel under siege on Facebook.” Jd.
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`4§ 127, 141. And for years Donald Trump wasallowed to routinely flout Facebook’s standards
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`without Facebook taking any action to remove posts it knew violatedits standards. /d. 9 151-56.
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`In some cases, Facebook's failure to remove such violative content has turned deadly, like
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`whenit refused to removea call to arms by a militia group—despite 455 user reports flagging the
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`violation—whichresulted in the death of two peaceful protesters in Kenosha. Jd. 9] 147-50.
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`Shortly after the present complaint wasfiled the Wall Street Journal reported—based on
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`Facebook’s internal documents—that for years Facebook has operated a secret program called
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`“cross check” or “XCheck” in which Facebook has not enforced its community standards or
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`policies against “high profile users,’ “including celebrities, politicians and journalists.” Jeff
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`Horowitz, Facebook Says Its Rules Apply to All. Company Documents Reveal a Secret Elite That’s Exempt, Wall
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`Street Journal
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`(Sept. 13, 2021), https://perma.cc/A8CH-RFAV. Under this program that
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`“shield[ed] millions of users from the company’s normal enforcementprocess,” Facebook would
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`not remove (or take much longer to remove) content that violates its standards, even when
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`Facebook was aware ofit, and it would not apply the sanctions it publicly claimed to apply to
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`violators. 1d. Facebook’s 2019 internal review of XCheck observed that its non-enforcementofits
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`standards was “not publicly defensible,” because “[w]e’re not actually doing what we say we do
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`publicly,” and “[u]nlike the rest of our community, these people can violate our standards without
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`any consequences.” /d. (quoting Facebook’s 2019 internal review). Facebook’s senior leaders were
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`well aware of the XCheck program. Indeed, in somecases to removeviolative content from elite
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`users’ accounts required the personal approval of Zuckerberg or Sandberg.Jd.
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`Muslim Advocates’ Legal Claims.
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`In the complaint, Muslim Advocates alleges that,
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`through the false and misleading
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`statements described above, Facebook and its executives violated the CPPA,
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`including by
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`misrepresenting the same fact that has a tendency to mislead (z.e., that Facebook removes content
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`that violates its standards whenit learns ofit), by misrepresenting that Facebook’s services had
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`characteristics, benefits, standards, and qualities it did not have(z.¢., that it had the samepractice),
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`andfailing to state a material fact the failure of which tends to mislead (¢., that Facebook had a
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`practice of not removing violative content whenit learns ofit). Jd. YJ 186-92. Muslim Advocates
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`also alleges that the Defendants committed commonlawfraud and negligent misrepresentation by
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`making the same misrepresentations. /d. 4 199-213.
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`ARGUMENT
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`I.
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`Muslim Advocateshas standingto bring all of its claims.
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`A.
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`Muslim Advocates has standing to sue under the CPPA, because
`it is a public interest organization as defined by the CPPA.
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`D.C. Courts are not “bound by the requirements of Article HI.” D.C. v. Walters, 319 A.2d
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`332, 338 (D.C. 1974). While D.C. Courts usually follow Article HI as a prudential matter, the D.C.
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`Council can abrogate that limitation. See Grayson v. AT@T Corp., 15 A.3d 219, 259 (D.C. 2011). In
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`2012, the Council did that for certain nonprofits to sue under the GPPA. Under D.C. Code § 28-
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`3905(k)(1)(D), an entity that satisfies a three-part test may sue even without Article III standing:
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`(1) it must be a public interest organization, D.C. Code § 28-3905(k)(1)\(D)(a); (2) it must
`identify “a consumeror a class of consumers” that could bring suit in their own right, zd.;
`and (3) it must have a “sufficient nexus” to those consumers’ interests “to adequately”
`represent them, zd. § (k)(1)(D)(a1).
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`Animal Legal Def: Fund v. Hormel Foods Corp., 258 A.3d 174, 185 (D.C. 2021).
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`Muslim Advocates easily meets these three requirements. First, it is a “public interest
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`organization,” which is defined by the CPPA to mean “a nonprofit organization that is organized
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`and operating, in wholeorin part, for the purpose of promotinginterests or rights of consumers.”
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`D.C, Code § 28-3901 (a)(15); see AC 49] 183-84(alleging that Muslim Advocatesis a “publicinterest
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`organization”).? An entity qualifies as a “public interest organization” so long as even a
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`“subsidiary” purpose of the group is to assist people in their capacities as consumers. See Hormel,
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`285 A. 2d at 185 (“While ALDF’s primary mission is to ‘protect the lives and advancetheinterest
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`of animals,’ providing consumers with accurate information about how their meatis sourced is one
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`of its subsidiary purposes.”). Muslim Advocates devotes significant resources to ensuring that
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`consumers—“namely, Muslim consumers,” AC § 184—can access social media without enduring
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`bias and hate. See zd. 9] 2, 173, 179.° This readily demonstrates that Muslim Advocates operates
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`“in part” to “promot|[e] [the] interests .
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`.
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`. of consumers.” D.C. Code § 28-3901 (a)(15).
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`* In stating that “Muslim Advocates does not bring this Count on behalf of a class of consumers or
`seek to represent a class of consumers,” Paragraph 183 was intended to clarify that Muslim
`Advocates does not seek to certify a Rule 23 class, not to disavow its pursuit of this case on behalf
`of the znderests of consumersor a group of them. Indeed,the “public interest organization” standing
`provision, which Muslim Advocatesallegedit satisfies in the prior sentence, applies only when an
`organization sues on behalf of a consumer or class of consumers. Thus, Muslim Advocates’
`invocation of § 28-3905(k)\(1)(D) would have madelittle sense if it sought to disclaim suing on behalf
`of the interests of those consumers. In any event, the Declaration of Eric Niang, attached to Muslim
`Advocates’ opposition to Facebook’s special motion to dismiss, makes clear that the group seeksto
`pursue the case on behalf of the interests of consumers. Niang Decl. § 14.
`3 Although the complaint focuses on Muslim Advocates’ work on behalf of consumers of social
`media, its consumer-oriented work goes much further. One of its core projects is “Corporate
`Accountability,” which seeks to ensure that corporations pursue “business models [that are] hate
`free” for the benefit of minority—and,in particular, Muslim—consumers. Muslim Advocates, Key
`Issue: Corporate Accountability, https://perma.cc/ PW3V-FRRX(last visited Nov. 8, 2021).
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`

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`Second, an individual consumer could sue under the CPPAforrelief from the Defendants’
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`false and misleading statements. While the CPPA only requires that “a consumer could bring an
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`action,” zd.;
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`see D.C. Code § 28-3905(k)(1)(D)q), Muslim Advocates specifically alleges that
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`Facebook misled numerous consumers in D.C.—potentially hundreds of thousands—in violation
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`of the CPPA. AC §§ 190-92. To be sure, the Defendants argue (without merit) that Muslim
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`Advocates has notstated a viable CPPAclaim. But those arguments go to the merits, not standing.
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`Third, Muslim Advocates has a “sufficient nexus” to the interests of consumers misled by
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`Facebook’s misrepresentations to adequately represent them. ‘The “nexus” requirement “functions
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`to ensure that an ‘organization has a sufficient stake in the action’ to pursue ‘it with the requisite
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`zeal and concreteness.” Hormel, 258 A.3d at 187. That Muslim Advocateswill prosecute this action
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`with “zeal” cannot be doubted. For years it has worked to eradicate hate speech from Facebook’s
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`platforms and educate the public on the extent of the problem,all on behalf of the consumersit
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`represents here. See AC § 2, 175, 179, 207. In its only decision on this type of standing, the Court
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`of Appeals held that a nonprofit met the nexus standard by alleging it “devoted ‘substantial’
`399
`ce
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`‘resources
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`to counteract
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`the [defendants] misinformation,
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`educating consumers,” and
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`“advocating for stronger standards.” Hormel, 258 A.3d at 189. The allegations here are no different.
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`B.
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`Because Muslim AdvocateshasArticle III standing, it also has
`standing to pursue its CPPA claim as a nonprofit organization
`and hasstandingto bring its common law claims.
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`Even if Muslim Advocates does not qualify as a “public interest organization” itstill has
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`standing to sue under the CPPA, D.C. Code § 28-3905(k)(1)(C), because it is a “nonprofit
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`organization,” see AC § 183 (Muslim Advocatesis “not organized or operated for profit”); D.C.
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`Code § 28-390 1(a)(15) (defining “nonprofit organization” under the CPPA), andit has Article HI
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`standing, as described below. See Hormel, 258 A.3d at 182 & n.5 (holding “nonprofit organization”
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`standing requires a showingofArticle III standing). And since Muslim Advocates has Article II
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`standing,it has standing to pursue its common law fraud and negligent misrepresentation claims.
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`Muslim Advocates amply alleges Article III standing. It alleges that the Defendants’ false
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`statements induced it to provide Facebook valuable services that Muslim Advocates otherwise
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`would have withheld. This included harnessing its expertise to give Facebookinsight into American
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`Muslim communities; to respond to Facebook’s requests for advice on its community standards;
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`and to educate Facebook on how “militias, white nationalists, and other anti-Muslim hate groups
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`proliferat[e] on the platform.” AC 9 166-69. This work consumed hundreds of Muslim
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`Advocates’ staff hours, zd. § 169, and it was, in essence, a free consulting service that Facebook
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`obtained by makingits misleading statements.
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`Muslim Advocates’ standing here is thus straightforward:it lost something ofvalue in staff
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`time (injury-in-fact) as a direct result of the Defendants’ misleading statements (causation). And the
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`damages that Muslim Advocates seeks, see AC at 63, would remedy that injury by compensating
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`Muslim Advocatesforits services (redressability).
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`The Defendants do not dispute that Muslim Advocates alleges an injury in fact by giving
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`Facebookits valuable services for free,t and they make no argumentchallenging redressability.°
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`They instead argue that Muslim Advocates’ injury is not traceable to the Defendants’ statements
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`* Nor could they. Courts routinely entertain claims that a plaintiff was fraudulently induced to
`donate money, Wilding v. DNCServs. Corp., 941 F.3d 1116, 1127 (1th Cir. 2019); Dell’Aquila v.
`LaPierre, 491 F. Supp. 3d 320, 325 (M.D. Tenn. 2020), often without a standing challenge. See
`Illinots, ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Assocs., Inc., 538 U.S. 600, 606 (2003). While Muslim Advocates
`gave labor, not money,its labor has value. See Ludwig G Robinson, PLLCv. BiotechPharma, LLC, 186
`A.3d 105, 116 (D.C. 2018) (explaining how to measure damagesfor plaintiff misled into to giving
`services).
`° They briefly reference “redressability,” but their argument focuses solely on traceability. In any
`event, money damagesfor the value of Muslim Advocates’ services clearly would redress its injury.
`See AC at 63 (seekingrestitution and damages). As it “performedservices for which it has not been
`paid, and throughthis action it seeks to redress its economicloss directly,” it “clearly has standing
`in the Article III sense.” City ofRevere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 243 (1983). The injury is
`also “redressable by the award of [CPPA] statutory damages.” Parr v. Ebrahimian, 70 F. Supp. 3d
`123, 136 (D.D.C. 2014); see AC at 63 (seeking statutory damages).
`
`10
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`because Muslim Advocates gave Facebookthe services before and after the misleading statements
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`at issue. Mot. at 9. According to Facebook, this means that Muslim Advocates’ services must have
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`been induced by something other than Facebook’s statements. But as Facebook acknowledges,
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`Muslim Advocates hasalleged thatit continued to provide services—whenit otherwise would have
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`stopped—basedon a string of more recent, and repeated, misrepresentations from 2018 to 2020
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`that are the subject of the complaint in this case. See Mot. at 9 (citing AC J 166); see also AC J 171.
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`The complaint explains that “Muslim Advocates continued to provide these services
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`because of Facebook’s repeated representations—both in private overtures and in public and
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`highly scrutinized forums such as Congress—about whataction Facebook hadtaken in the past
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`and would take in the future,’ AC § 171 (emphasis added), and gives many examples of post-2018
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`misrepresentations.
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`Jd. §§ 56-88. They included assurances from Facebook’s GOO Sheryl
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`Sandberg that “‘We will remove anything that violates our Community Standards,” id § 74
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`(quoting May 1, 2019 email), and promises about new standards it would enforce—ones Muslim
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`Advocates cares deeply about, such as “‘remov[ing] content that encourages people to bring
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`weaponsto an event,” zd. § 73 (quoting Facebook Public Policy Director’s March 26, 2019 email).
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`Thus, while Muslim Advocates’ earliest services may have depended on a willingness to
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`engage irrespective of Facebook’s conduct,it has alleged this is not true for services it gave from
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`mid-2018 forward. For those services, each successive misrepresentation allowed Facebook to
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`string Muslim Advocates along even longer—increasing its harms, not obviating them.
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`In a related argument, Facebook contends that Muslim Advocates cannot demonstrate
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`reliance because Muslim Advocates knew “that Facebook did not removeall third-party content.”
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`Mot. at 10. This argument is based on a false premise. Muslim Advocates’ claims rest on
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`Facebook’s assertion that it removesviolative contentthat ts brought to the company’s attention, not “all”
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`1]
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`

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`content that exists on the platform.® See, eg., AC JJ 57-59, 61, 65, 70, 188.
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`Facebook evidently believes that Muslim Advocates should have known that Facebook’s
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`ownleaders werenottelling the truth (which, bizarrely, assumes that national civil rights leaders
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`must know that Sheryl Sandberg and other Facebookleaders boldly lie to them). But “on a motion
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`to dismiss for want of standing,” Muslim Advocates’ allegations must be “accept[ed] as true” and
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`construed in its favor. Grayson, 15 A.3d at 232. Facebook’s motion does no more than urge the
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`Court to disregard those well-pleaded facts demonstrating reliance. Indeed, it would not even be
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`properto resolve this factual dispute in the pending anti-SLAPP motion. See Competitive Enter. Inst.
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`v. Mann, 150 A.3d 1213, 1236 (D.C. 2016) (explaining that factual disputes where a jury could
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`weigh the evidence differently should not be resolved in an anti-SLAPP motion).
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`II. Muslim Advocatessufficiently alleges a claim under the CPPA.
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`The CPPA “establishes an enforceable right to truthful information from merchants about
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`consumergoodsandservices that are or would be purchased,leased, or received in the District of
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`Columbia.” D.C. Code § 28-3901 (c). To advance this expansive aim, the CPPA makesit unlawful
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`to engage in a wide range of “unfair or deceptive trade practice[s].” D.C. Code § 28-3904,
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`including falsely representing that consumerservices have a “benefit” they do not actually have
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`and making any “misrepresent[ation] as to a material fact which has a tendency to mislead.” Jd. §§
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`28-3904(b), (e).7
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`® To the extent Facebook meansto contendit is not “plausible” that Muslim Advocates relied on
`its misrepresentations, this Court should reject this factual argument. See, ¢.g., McCall v. D.C. Hous.
`Auth., 126 A.3d 701, 704 (D.C. 2015) (to defeat a motion to dismiss facts must state a claim thatis
`“plausible on its face”). ‘The statements at issue here were made to Congress—in a context where
`a false statement could lead to criminal prosecution, 18 U.S.C. § 1001—orby top executives of
`one of the biggest companies in the world directly to Muslim Advocates. It is eminently plausible
`to rely on those weighty statements. That is confirmed by the declaration of Madihha Ahussain in
`opposition to the Anti-SLAPP motion, which attests, under penalty of perjury, to such reliance.
`7 Facebook’s false statements also violate other CPPA prohibitions—including a bar on misleading
`omissions and misrepresenting the quality of services. D.C. Code §§ 28-3904(a), (f. As a plaintiff
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`12
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`Muslim Advocates’ claim easily states a violation of these prohibitions. The Defendants
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`falsely portrayed howsafeits services are by misrepresenting to consumers how Facebook manages
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`the servicesit gives them. In particular,its leaders asserted in high-profile Congressional hearings
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`(livestreamedto its users) that Facebook removes certain harmful content from its platform when
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`the companylearns ofit. As detailed above,see supra at 4-6, that falsely portrayed the benefits and
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`costs of a service used by hundreds of thousands of D.C. residents to communicate with friends
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`and family. AC §] 162; D.C. Code § 28-390 l(a}(2), (7) (defining “consumer” and “services” to mean,
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`together, “services ofall types” that are “use[d] for personal, household, or family purposes’). ‘They
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`thus misrepresented to consumers that Facebook’s services had a “benefit’—an enforced
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`mechanism for removing harmful content—they in practice lacked, D.C. Code § 28-3904(b), as
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`well as made material misrepresentations on what content Facebook removes. Jd. § 28-3904(e).°
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`To avoid this straightforward analysis Facebook makes four arguments. But all of them
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`mischaracterize the claims or urge the Court to impose extratextual requirements on CPPAclaims.
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`A.
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`Facebook misrepresented its policy.
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`Facebookfirst contends that Muslim Advocates has notalleged that Facebook madea false
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`or misleading statement of fact. Mot. at 16. In making this argument, Facebook does notassert
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`that whatit said was true, only that it was not an actionable representation. That is wrong.
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`As an initial matter, Facebook incorrectly describes Muslim Advocates’ claim as being
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`based on Facebookasserting that it removes “all content” that violates the community standards.
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`only needs to prove a violation of a single provision to establish a defendant’s liability, Muslim
`Advocates does not address these other provisions. And Facebook doesnot separately attack them.
`8 Facebook does not challenge, in either of its motions, that the misrepresentations at issue are
`“material.” Nor could it. A statementis material if a “reasonable person” would belikely to attach
`significance to it. Anderson v. Fones, 606 A.2d 185, 188 (D.C. 1992). Facebook’s, Congress’s, and the
`public’s frequent attention to Facebook’s community standards demonstrates that a reasonable
`consumer would take into account Facebook’s statements about how it enforces thos