Filed
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`D.C. Superior Court
`12/22/2022 17:37PM
`Clerk of the Court
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`SUPERIOR COURT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
`Criminal Division—Felony Branch
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`UNITED STATES
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`v.
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`HARRY TUCKER
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`Case No. 2022 CF2 1977
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`Hon. Neal Kravitz
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`MOTION TO SUPPRESS TANGIBLE EVIDENCE AND STATEMENTS AND
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`MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPOR THEREOF
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`Harry Tucker through undersigned counsel, respectfully asks this Court, pursuant to the
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`Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States and local evidentiary rules,
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`to suppress any tangible evidence, observations and statements allegedly obtained from Mr.
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`Tucker during the course of his unlawful stop and arrest on April 8, 2022. Mr. Tucker respectfully
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`requests a pretrial hearing on this motion.
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`In support of this motion, undersigned counselstates:
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`1. On April 8, 2022, two officers occupying a markerpolice car go up to Mr. Tucker
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`and repeatedly say “don’t move”. Mr. Tucker submits to this show ofauthority.
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`2. Mr. Tuckeris then stopped and seized by two officers, grabbed from behind and
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`pinned against the car.
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`3. While Mr. Tuckeris being grabbed by officers and surroundedonall sides, officers
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`place Mr. Tucker into handcuffs. Officers then go inside of Mr. Tucker’s front jacket
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`pocket, conducting an impropersearch.
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`4. Mr. Tuckeris questioned on scene while in handcuffs. At no point was Mr. Tucker
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`given Miranda warningsor any other information abouthis rights on scene.
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`MEMORANDUMOFPOINTS AND AUTHORITIES
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`I.
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`MR. TUCKER WAS SEIZED WITHOUT REASONABLE ARTICULABLE
`SUSPICION OR PROBABLE CAUSE; ACCORDINGLY, ALL TANGIBLE
`EVIDENCE MUST BE SUPPRESSED.
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`An encounter implicates the Fourth Amendmentright to be secure against unreasonable
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`searches and seizures wheneveran officer, “by means of physical force or show of authority, has
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`in some way restrained the liberty” of a person. Zerry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n. 16 (1968). A
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`seizure occurs when,in light of “all of the circumstances surrounding the encounter...the police
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`would have communicated to a reasonable person that the person was not free to decline the
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`officers’ request or otherwise terminate the encounter.” Sharp v. United States, 132 A.3d 161, 166
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`(D.C. 2016) (quoting Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 439 (1991)) (holding that the defendant
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`was seized “in the absence of any sign that a reasonable person in these circumstances would
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`believe officer was giving him a genuine choice to decline the request”); Zow/es v. United States,
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`115 A.3d 1222, 1231 (D.C. 2015).
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`Warrantless searches and seizures are presumptively unlawful. See Burton v. United States,
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`657 A.2d 741, 745 (D.C. 1994). To conduct a warrantless search, officers must either have
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`probable cause for an arrest, or an exigency must exist. Judd v. United States, 190 F.2d 649, 651
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`(1951). “Probable cause exists where a reasonable police officer considering the total
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`circumstances confronting him and drawing from his experience would be warranted in the belief
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`that an offense has been or is being committed.” Ellison v. United States, 238 A.3d 944, 950 (D.C.
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`2020) (quotation marks omitted). The probable cause threshold is significantly higher than the
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`“reasonable articulatable suspicion” standard. See e.g., McFerguson v. United States, 770 A.2d 66,
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`73-74 (D.C. 2001).
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`For an investigatory stop to pass muster under 7erry and its progeny, the police must
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`demonstrate a reasonable “articulable suspicion” that the person they are stopping is involved in
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`criminal activity. Inre 7\L.L., 729 A.2d 334, 339 (D.C. 1999) (quoting Matter ofA.S., 614 A.2d
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`534, 537 (D.C. 1992)). The police officer’s suspicions must be “particularized as to the person
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`stopped.” /d. at 340. Accordingly, "a description applicable to large numbers of people,” without
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`more, cannot “justify the seizure of an individual." U.S. v. Turner, 699 A.2d 1125, 1128-29 (D.C.
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`1997).
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`Importantly,
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`in the context of investigatory stops, the “demand for specificity in the
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`information upon which police action is predicated is the central teaching of this Court’s Fourth
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`amendmentjurisprudence.” /d. To meet the reasonable articulable suspicion standard, an officer’s
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`“gut feeling” or “hunch of criminal activity” will not suffice. Brown v. United States, 590 A.2d
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`1008, 1014 (D.C. 1991); Pleasant-Bey v. United States, 988 A.2d 496, 498 (D.C. 2010). Nor will
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`conclusory explanations, and nor will a subjective good faith belief in the propriety of a stop. See
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`Maye v. United States, 260 A.3d 638, 645 (D.C. 2021); Prigden v. United States, 134 A.3d 297,
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`301 (D.C. 2016).
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`The government cannot show that the police officers who approached Mr. Tucker had
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`reasonable articulable suspicion or probable cause to detain him. Nor was there reasonable
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`articulable suspicion to warrant an investigative detention of Mr. Tucker. See Terry, 392 U.S. at
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`30; Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971); Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334 (2000).
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`The government also cannot show that the police officers had reasonable articulable suspicion or
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`probable cause to search Mr. Tucker. Jerry, 392 U.S. at 30; Maye, 260 A.3d at 646, Torres v.
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`Madrid, 141 S. Ct. 989 (2021); See Minnesota vy. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 113 S. Ct. 2130, 124
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`L. Ed. 2d 334(1993). Thus, the evidence recovered from the unlawful seizure and search of Mr.
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`Tucker must be suppressed. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961); Wong Sun v. United
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`States, 371 U.S. 471, 487-88 (1963).
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`I.
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`MR. TUCKER’S STATEMENTS MUST BE SUPPRESSED AS A VIOLATION
`OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT.
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`Wherethe police interrogate an individual whois in their custody, they mustfirst warn the
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`individual, “[p]rior to any questioning .
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`.
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`. that he has a right to remainsilent, that any statement
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`he does make may be usedas evidence against him, and that he has the right to an attorney, either
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`retained or appointed.” Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). Statements by an accused
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`may be used as evidence against him only when the warnings have been properly given and the
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`accused has executed a knowing andintelligent waiver of his rights. /d. at 479. The warnings
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`themselves mustbe stated in a sufficiently clear and accurate fashion so as to “reasonably convey
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`to a suspect his rights.” Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 203 (1989) (internal quotation and
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`brackets omitted). “If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during
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`questioning, that he wishes to remainsilent, the interrogation must cease.” Miranda, 384 U.S. at
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`473-74. “If the individual states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease until an
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`attorney is present.” /d. at 474. The government bears the burden of demonstrating that its agents
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`gave the warnings andthat the respondent executed a valid waiver. /d. at 479.
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`In this case, when Mr. Tucker wasseizedat the scene, he was in custody. See /DB v. North
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`Carolina, 564 US. 261, 270-71 (2011); Broom v. United States, 118 A.3d 207, 212 (D.C. 2015)
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`(providing factors relevant to the custody analysis}: Morton v. United States, 125 A.3d 683, 684
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`(D.C. 2015). Prior to reading Mr. Tuckerhis rights as required by Miranda,the officers on scene
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`made statements to Mr. Tucker that they knew mightelicit incriminating responses. See Rhode
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`Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-01 (1980). Because the officers engaged in a custodial
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`interrogation prior to advising Mr. Tucker of his rights under Miranda, any statements that Mr.
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`

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`Tucker allegedly made in response were obtained in violation of Mr. Tucker’s rights under the
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`Fifth Amendmentand must be suppressed. See fawaras v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 481-32 (1981).
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`Additionally, any statements made by Mr. Tucker prior to being Afirancdized were made
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`involuntarily and were the product of coercive police activity. Colorado v. Connelly, A79 US. 187,
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`167 (1986). The burden is on the government to prove by a preponderance ofthe evidence that a
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`defendant's statements were made “freely, voluntarily, and without compulsion or inducement of
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`any sort.” Havnes v. Washingion, 373 US. 503, 513 (1963) (citations and quotations omitted}. The
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`totality of the circumstances here shows that Mr. Tucker’s statements were involuntary and thus
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`the Court must find the statements inadmissible for any andall purposesat trial.
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`WHEREFORE,for the reasons contained herein and any others that may appear to the
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`Court at a hearing on this motion, Mr. Tucker respectfully requests that the Court grant this Motion
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`and suppress any tangible evidence and statements obtained from him.
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`Respectfully submitted,
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`(ode
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`Varsha Govindaraju (Bar No. 1741026)
`Counsel for Mr. Tucker
`The Public Defender Service for D.C.
`633 Indiana Avenue, NW
`Hudson, D.C. 20004
`Phone: 202-824-2480
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`

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`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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`I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing filing has been served by e-filing upon the United
`States Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia on December 22, 2022.
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`Nose
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`
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`Varsha Govindaraju (Bar No. 1741026)
`Counsel for Mr. Tucker
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`SUPERIOR COURT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
`Criminal Division—Felony Branch
`
`UNITED STATES
`
`v.
`
`HARRY TUCKER
`
`Case No. 2022 CF2 1977
`
`Hon. Neal Kravitz
`
`ORDER
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`The Court, upon consideration of Mr. Tucker’s Motion to Suppress Tangible Evidence and
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`Statements, hereby
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`ORDERSthat all tangible evidence and statements be suppressedas a part of this case.
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`SO ORDEREDthis
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`day of
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`, 2022.
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`
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`Judge Neal Kravitz
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`Associate Judge
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`Copies To:
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`Varsha Govindaraju
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`Counsel for Mr. Tucker
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`Jacqueline Yarbo
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`AUSA
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`