`BEFORE THE
`FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION
`
`Mirant Energy Trading, LLC,
`Mirant Chalk Point, LLC,
`Mirant Mid-Atlantic, LLC, and
`Mirant Potomac River, LLC,
`
`
`Complainants,
`
`
`v.
`
`PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.,
`
`
`Respondent.
`
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`
`Docket No. EL08-8-000
`
`MOTION TO INTERVENE AND
`COMMENTS IN SUPPORT OF COMPLAINT OF
`THE TENASKA FUND ENTITIES
`
`Pursuant to Rules 212 and 214 of the Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Federal
`
`Energy Regulatory Commission (the “Commission”),1 Armstrong Energy Limited Partnership,
`
`LLLP (“Armstrong”), Big Sandy Peaker Plant, LLC (“Big Sandy”), Commonwealth Chesapeake
`
`Company, LLC (“Commonwealth Chesapeake”), Calumet Energy Team, LLC (“CET”), Crete
`
`Energy Venture, LLC (“Crete”), Lincoln Generating Facility, LLC (“Lincoln”), Pleasants
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`Energy, LLC (“Pleasants”), University Park Energy, LLC (“University Park”), and Wolf Hills
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`Energy, LLC (“Wolf Hills”) (collectively, the “Tenaska Fund Entities”) respectfully move to
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`intervene in the above-captioned proceeding and comment in support of the complaint2 filed
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`therein by Mirant Energy Trading, LLC, Mirant Chalk Point, LLC, Mirant Mid-Atlantic, LLC,
`
`and Mirant Potomac River, LLC (together, “Mirant”) against PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.
`
`
`1
`18 C.F.R. §§ 385.212, 385.214 (2007).
`2
`Complaint, Docket No. EL08-9-000 (Nov. 9, 2007) (the “Complaint”).
`
`
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`(“PJM”). As explained in the Complaint, the current rules in the PJM open access transmission
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`tariff (the “PJM OATT”) relating to PJM’s Reliability Pricing Model (“RPM”) will, unless
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`modified as proposed in the Complaint, result in confiscatory rates for capacity procured through
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`the Third Incremental Auction. For the reasons set forth in the Complaint and below, the
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`Commission should grant the Complaint to avoid such an unlawful and unconstitutional result.
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`I.
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`CORRESPONDENCE AND COMMUNICATIONS
`
`All correspondence and communications concerning the above-captioned proceeding
`
`should be addressed to the following persons:
`
`Neil L. Levy
`David G. Tewksbury *
`KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP
`655 Fifteenth Street, NW
`Suite 1200
`Washington, DC 20005
`(202) 879-5000
`(202) 879-5200 (facsimile)
`nlevy@kirkland.com
`dtewksbury@kirkland.com
`
`* Designated for service.
`
`Bradley K. Heisey
`Tenaska Capital Management, LLC
`1044 North 115th Street
`Suite 400
`Omaha, NE 68154
`(402) 938-1663
`(402) 691-9727 (facsimile)
`bheisey@tenaska.com
`
`II.
`
`IDENTITY OF THE TENASKA FUND ENTITIES
`
`A.
`
`Armstrong
`
`Armstrong is a Delaware limited liability limited partnership that owns an approximately
`
`625 MW natural gas- and No. 2 fuel oil-fired generating facility in Armstrong County,
`
`Pennsylvania. This facility is interconnected with the transmission grid controlled by PJM.
`
`Armstrong is an indirect, wholly-owned subsidiary of APT Generation, LLC (“APT
`
`
`
`2
`
`
`
`Generation”), an indirect subsidiary of Tenaska Power Fund, L.P. (“TPF I”) and Warburg Pincus
`
`Private Equity IX, L.P. Armstrong has Commission authorization to sell electric energy,
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`capacity and certain ancillary services at market-based rates.3
`
`B.
`
`Big Sandy
`
`Big Sandy is a Maryland limited liability company that leases and operates an
`
`approximately 300 MW natural gas-fired generation facility located in Wayne County, West
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`Virginia under a sale/leaseback arrangement with a governmental authority of Wayne County,
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`West Virginia. This facility is interconnected with the transmission grid controlled by PJM. Big
`
`Sandy is an indirect, wholly-owned subsidiary of TPF Genco Holdings, LLC (“TPF Genco”),
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`which is, in turn, owned by TPF I and TPF Generation Co-Investment Fund, L.P. Big Sandy has
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`Commission authorization to sell electric energy, capacity and certain ancillary services at
`
`market-based rates.4
`
`C.
`
`Commonwealth Chesapeake
`
`Commonwealth Chesapeake is a Virginia limited liability company that owns and
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`operates a 315 MW simple-cycle, oil-fired generating facility in New Church, Virginia. This
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`facility is interconnected with the transmission grid controlled by PJM. Commonwealth
`
`Chesapeake is an indirect, wholly-owned subsidiary of TPF I. Commonwealth Chesapeake has
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`Commission authorization to sell electric energy, capacity and certain ancillary services at
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`market-based rates.5
`
`
`3
`See Dresden Energy, LLC, et al., 97 FERC ¶ 61,277 (2001) (“Dresden”).
`4
`See Constellation Power Source, Docket Nos. ER01-556-000, et al. (Jan. 19, 2001) (unreported)
`(“CPS”).
`5
`See Commonwealth Chesapeake Co., LLC, 85 FERC ¶ 61,404 (1998).
`
`
`
`3
`
`
`
`D.
`
`CET
`
`CET is a Delaware limited liability company that owns and operates a 300 MW simple-
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`cycle, natural gas-fired generating facility in Chicago, Illinois. This facility is interconnected
`
`with the transmission grid controlled by PJM. CET is a wholly-owned subsidiary of TPF
`
`Calumet, LLC, which is, in turn, owned by TPF I and Calumet Co-Investment Fund, L.P. CET
`
`has Commission authorization to sell electric energy, capacity and certain ancillary services at
`
`market-based rates.6
`
`E.
`
`Crete
`
`Crete is a Delaware limited liability company that owns an approximately 315 MW
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`natural gas-fired electric generation facility in Crete, Illinois. This facility is interconnected with
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`the transmission grid controlled by PJM. Crete is an indirect, wholly-owned subsidiary of TPF
`
`II, L.P. (“TPF II”). Crete has Commission authorization to sell electric energy, capacity and
`
`certain ancillary services at market-based rates.7
`
`F.
`
`Lincoln
`
`Lincoln is a Delaware limited liability company that owns an approximately 672 MW
`
`natural gas-fired electric generation facility located in Manhattan, Illinois. This facility is
`
`interconnected with the transmission grid controlled by PJM. Lincoln is an indirect, wholly-
`
`owned subsidiary of TPF II. Lincoln has Commission authorization to sell electric energy,
`
`capacity and certain ancillary services at market-based rates.8
`
`
`6
`See Calumet Energy Team, LLC, Docket No. ER01-389-000 (Dec. 12, 2000) (unreported letter
`order).
`7
`8
`
`See Crete Energy Venture, LLC, Docket No. ER02-963-000 (Mar. 15, 2001) (unreported).
`See Gleason Power I, LLC, et al., 90 FERC ¶ 61,252 (2000).
`
`
`
`4
`
`
`
`G.
`
`Pleasants
`
`Pleasants is a Delaware limited liability company that owns an approximately 313 MW
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`natural gas- and No. 2 fuel oil-fired generating facility in Pleasants County, West Virginia. This
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`facility is interconnected with the transmission grid controlled by PJM. Pleasants is an indirect,
`
`wholly-owned subsidiary of APT Generation. Pleasants has Commission authorization to sell
`
`electric energy, capacity and certain ancillary services at market-based rates.9
`
`H.
`
`University Park
`
`University Park is a Maryland limited liability company that owns and operates an
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`approximately 300 MW natural gas-fired peaking facility located approximately 30 miles south
`
`of Chicago, Illinois. This facility is interconnected with the transmission grid controlled by PJM.
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`University Park is an indirect, wholly-owned subsidiary of TPF Genco. University Park has
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`Commission authorization to sell electric energy, capacity and certain ancillary services at
`
`market-based rates.10
`
`I.
`
`Wolf Hills
`
`Wolf Hills is a Maryland limited liability company that owns and operates an
`
`approximately 250 MW natural gas-fired generation facility located in Washington County,
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`Virginia. This facility is interconnected with the transmission grid controlled by PJM. Wolf
`
`Hills is an indirect, wholly-owned subsidiary of TPF Genco. Wolf Hills has Commission
`
`authorization to sell electric energy, capacity and certain ancillary services at market-based
`
`rates.11
`
`
`9
`See Dresden.
`10
`See CPS.
`11
`See id.
`
`
`
`5
`
`
`
`III.
`
`THE COMPLAINT
`
`The Complaint asks that the Commission exercise its authority under Section 206 of the
`
`Federal Power Act (the “FPA”)12 to modify the definition of “Opportunity Cost” in Section
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`6.7(d)(ii) of the PJM Tariff for purposes of the Third Incremental Auction such that it will be
`
`defined as the higher of the documented price for exports or the Daily Deficiency Rate that
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`Capacity Market Sellers will incur if they are unable to meet their capacity obligations.13 As
`
`explained in the Complaint, there are three aspects of the existing RPM rules that will result in
`
`bid caps based on the Avoidable Cost Rate (the “ACR”): (1) Capacity Market Sellers will be
`
`required to offer additional capacity for a given Delivery Year that has become available since
`
`the Base Residual Auction (the “BRA”) as a result of updated EFORd determinations into
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`Incremental Auctions and cannot retain any such capacity as a hedge against penalties for failure
`
`to deliver during the Delivery Year; (2) prices in the Third Incremental Auction will be based
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`solely on Sell Offers of Capacity Market Sellers with additional capacity and Buy Bids of buyers
`
`needing replacement capacity; and (3) Market Seller Offer Caps in the Third Incremental
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`Auction will be ACR-based because the current definition of Opportunity Cost does not reflect
`
`the actual opportunity costs of supplying additional capacity offered into the Third Incremental
`
`Auction.14 As PJM management recognized during the stakeholder process, the combined effect
`
`of these rules will allow buyers to exert market power and to force low auction prices.15
`
`
`12
`16 U.S.C. § 824e (2000) (amended 2005).
`13
`See Complaint at 14.
`14
`See id. at 15-16.
`15
`See id. at 17.
`
`
`
`6
`
`
`
`The discrete change proposed in the Complaint is intended to ensure that the definition of
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`“Opportunity Cost” reflects Capacity Market Sellers’ actual opportunity costs. As explained in
`
`the Complaint, the opportunity cost to Capacity Market Sellers who are precluded from retaining
`
`“new” capacity for use as a physical hedge is equal to the Daily Deficiency Rate (which a
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`Capacity Market Seller would be required to pay if it failed to deliver during the Delivery
`
`Year).16
`
`IV.
`
`MOTION TO INTERVENE
`
`Each of the Tenaska Fund Entities owns or leases electric generating assets in the PJM
`
`region. As such, each of the Tenaska Fund Entities will be directly affected by the outcome of
`
`this proceeding. No other party can adequately represent the Tenaska Fund Entities in this
`
`proceeding, and unless each of the Tenaska Fund Entities is permitted to intervene and
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`participate fully, the Tenaska Fund Entities may be bound or adversely affected by a
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`Commission order issued herein without an opportunity to have their views heard and
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`considered. Thus, each of the Tenaska Fund Entities’ intervention, and their participation as
`
`parties in this proceeding, is in the public interest.
`
`V.
`
`COMMENTS
`
`The Tenaska Fund Entities support the Complaint. Without a change like that proposed
`
`in the Complaint, Capacity Market Sellers will be forced to supply capacity at rates well below
`
`their actual opportunity costs and could easily face the circumstance in which they would be
`
`paying Daily Deficiency Rates well in excess of what they are being paid for capacity with
`
`
`16
`See id. at 19.
`
`
`
`7
`
`
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`which they could have avoided incurring such rates. The Commission has recognized that
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`requiring a generator “to offer capacity at a price less than its net risk-adjusted going forward and
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`opportunity costs . . . raise[s] the possibility of confiscatory ratemaking, a result that is unjust and
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`unreasonable.”17 It is black letter law that confiscatory rates are unlawful under Section 205 of
`
`the FPA18 and unconstitutional under the Fifth (or, in the case of state regulation, the Fourteenth)
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`Amendment to the United States Constitution.19
`
`The Complaint proposes a simple and elegant means of preventing the imposition of
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`confiscatory rates in a manner that results in minimal changes to the overall package of RPM
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`rules and the PJM OATT. The Commission can and should grant the Complaint on an expedited
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`basis to ensure that the needed tariff changes are in place before the Third Incremental Auction
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`scheduled to occur on January 7, 2008.
`
`
`17
`ISO New England, Inc., 120 FERC ¶ 61,087 at P 52 (2007).
`18
`16 U.S.C. § 824d (2000).
`19
`See Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299, 310 (1989); FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co.,
`320 U.S. 591, 603, 605 (1944); Bluefield Water Works & Improvement Co. v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 262
`U.S. 679, 692-93 (1923).
`
`
`
`8
`
`
`
`VI.
`
`CONCLUSION
`
`WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, the Tenaska Fund Entities respectfully
`
`request that the Commission (1) grant their motions to intervene with full rights as parties to
`
`participate in all stages of the proceeding as might be ordered by the Commission; (2) grant the
`
`Complaint for the reasons set forth therein and herein; and (3) grant the Tenaska Fund Entities
`
`such other further relief as may be required to protect their interests.
`
`Respectfully submitted,
`
`ARMSTRONG ENERGY LIMITED PARTNERSHIP,
`LLLP
`BIG SANDY PEAKER PLANT, LLC
`COMMONWEALTH CHESAPEAKE COMPANY, LLC
`CALUMET ENERGY TEAM, LLC
`CRETE ENERGY VENTURE, LLC
`LINCOLN GENERATING FACILITY, LLC
`PLEASANTS ENERGY, LLC
`UNIVERSITY PARK ENERGY, LLC
`WOLF HILLS ENERGY, LLC
`
`
`
`
`
`By:
`
`
`
`
`
`/s/
`
`Neil L. Levy
`David G. Tewksbury
`KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP
`655 Fifteenth Street, NW
`Suite 1200
`Washington, DC 20005
`
`Counsel for
`Armstrong Energy Limited Partnership, LLLP,
`Big Sandy Peaker Plant, LLC, Commonwealth
`Chesapeake Company, LLC, Calumet Energy
`Team, LLC, Crete Energy Venture, LLC, Lincoln
`Generating Facility, LLC, Pleasants Energy, LLC,
`University Park Energy, LLC, and Wolf Hills
`Energy, LLC
`
`Dated: November 29, 2007
`
`
`
`9
`
`
`
`
`
`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
`
`I hereby certify that I have this day served the foregoing document on each person
`
`designated on the official service list compiled by the Secretary of the Federal Energy
`
`Regulatory Commission in this proceeding.
`
`Dated at Washington DC, this 29th day of November, 2007.
`
`
`/s/
`
`David G. Tewksbury
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`



