UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
`BEFORE THE
`FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION
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`Docket No. EL21-7-000
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`Cricket Valley Energy Center, LLC
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`Empire Generating Company, LLC
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`v.
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`New York Independent System Operator, Inc.
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`REQUEST FOR LEAVE TO ANSWER AND ANSWER
`OF THE NEW YORK INDEPENDENT SYSTEM OPERATOR, INC
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`In accordance, with Rules 212 and 213 of the Commission’s Rules of Practice and
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`Procedure, the New York Independent System Operator, Inc. (“NYISO”) respectfully submits
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`this request for leave to answer and answer. This filing responds to the Motion for Leave to
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`Answer and Answer that the Complainants1 filed on November 24, 2020 (the “CVEC Answer”).
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`The filings in this proceeding overwhelmingly oppose the Complaint2 and almost
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`unanimously ask the Commission to reject its requested relief. As discussed below, the CVEC
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`Answer fails to address the arguments set forth in the NYISO Answer3 and in other pleadings.
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`The NYISO and other parties demonstrated that the Complaint wholly failed to: (i) meet its
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`burden of proof under the Federal Power Act (“FPA”); or (ii) justify ignoring regional
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`differences based on the “standard solution” concept or any other rationale. The CVEC Answer
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`does nothing to remedy these flaws. It also mischaracterizes a key point in the NYISO Answer
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`1 The Complainants are Cricket Valley Energy Center, LLC (“CVEC”) and Empire Generating
`Company, LLC.
`2 Complaint and Request for Fast Track Processing, October 14, 2020 (“Complaint”).
`3 Answer of the New York Independent System Operator, Inc., November 18, 2020 (“NYISO
`Answer”).
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`and falsely insinuates that the NYISO did not faithfully administer its buyer-side market power
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`mitigation measures (the “BSM Rules”) in the past. Finally, there is even less justification now
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`for the CVEC Answer’s request for expedited Commission action than there was at the time that
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`the Complaint was filed. This answer therefore renews the NYISO Answer’s request that the
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`Complaint be denied in its entirety.
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`I.
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`REQUEST FOR LEAVE TO ANSWER
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`The Commission has discretion to accept answers to answers when they help to clarify
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`complex issues or to facilitate the resolution of a proceeding.4 Allowing the NYISO to respond
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`to the CVEC Answer5 is necessary to correct its mischaracterization of record evidence, the
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`applicable legal standards, and the NYISO’s past approach to the BSM Rules. The NYISO’s
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`corrections and clarifications will assist the Commission in resolving the issues in this
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`proceeding.
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`II.
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`
`ANSWER
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`A.
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`The CVEC Answer Does Not Remedy the Complaint’s Failure to Satisfy the
`FPA’s Burden of Proof
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`The NYISO Answer demonstrated in detail that the Complaint did not meet its burden of
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`proof under the FPA. The Complaint proposed to overturn the currently-effective, Commission-
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`approved BSM Rules based on claims regarding the price impacts of Zero Emission Credits
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`4 See e.g., New York Independent System Operator Inc., 133 FERC ¶ 61,178 at P 11 (2011)
`(allowing answers to answers and protests “because they have provided information that have assisted
`[the Commission] in [its] decision-making process”); Morgan Stanley Capital Group, Inc. v. New York
`Independent System Operator, Inc., 93 FERC ¶ 61,017 at 61,036 (2000) (accepting an answer that was
`“helpful in the development of the record . . . .”)
`5 In order to keep the focus on the most important issues in this case, the NYISO is not seeking
`leave to respond to any other filing in this proceeding. The NYISO’s silence with respect to assertions in
`the CVEC Answer, or in any other filing, that are not addressed herein should not be construed as
`agreement or acquiescence.
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`2
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`(“ZECs”) in the Rest-of-State (“ROS”) region and the potential future entry of state-supported
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`renewables. The NYISO explained that Complainants’ arguments were overstated on their
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`individual merits and, more generally, had nothing to do with most aspects of the BSM Rules.
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`Specifically, Complainants made no showing that the NYISO’s established Part A and Part B
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`Exemption Tests, the Competitive Entry Exemption (“CEE”),6 Renewable Exemption,7 or the
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`still-evolving Self Supply Exemption were no longer just and reasonable.8 They also did not
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`demonstrate that: (i) the NYISO’s existing methodology for creating New Capacity Zones,
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`within which the BSM Rules would automatically apply, was inadequate;9 (ii) the Complaint was
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`not an impermissible collateral attack on numerous orders addressing the BSM Rules;10 (iii) the
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`Complaint was consistent with directly applicable Commission and judicial precedent;11 and (iv)
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`the Complaint was consistent with cooperative federalism concerns, particularly in a single state
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`region.12 Multiple other filings strongly opposed the Complaint. 13 Several of them included
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`6 The Shanker Supplemental Affidavit reiterates that Complainants’ Clean MOPR proposal would
`include some form of competitive exemption. By contrast, the CVEC Answer does not address the
`NYISO Answer’s point that there are differences between the NYISO’s CEE and PJM’s version and that
`the Complaint had not offered any justification for changing the NYISO CEE. See NYISO Answer at 29-
`30.
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`7 Capitalized terms that are not otherwise defined herein shall have the meaning specified in the
`NYISO’s Market Administration and Control Area Services Tariff.
`8 See NYISO Answer at 28-31.
`9 Id. at 31-33.
`10 Id. at 33-35.
`11 Id. at 35-38.
`12 Id. at 38-40.
`13 See, e.g., Protest of Exelon Corporation (“Exelon Protest”) at 4-13, Protest of the Clean
`Energy Parties at 33-34 (“Clean Energy Parties”); Protest of the American Public Power Association and
`The New York Association of Public Power (“APPA/NYAPP Protest”) at 6-8 (highlighting the
`Complaint’s failure to show that the NYISO’s Self-Supply Exemption is unjust and unreasonable and
`making same point regarding the Renewable Exemption and the Part A and Part B Exemption Tests.);
`Comments of the Institute for Policy Integrity at New York University School of Law at 2-3 (“Policy
`Integrity Protest”); Indicated New York Transmission Owners’ Protest at 15-16 (“New York TO
`Protest”); Protest of the New York State Public Service Commission, New York State Energy and
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`3
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`additional arguments backed by expert testimony of their own.14 No other party argued that
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`Complainants satisfied their burden of proof.
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`The CVEC Answer makes almost no effort to remedy the Complaint’s deficiencies or to
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`engage the substance of the various objections raised against it. Instead, the CVEC Answer tries
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`to wave away the well-supported arguments by mischaracterizing them as “noise”15 that
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`“rehash”16 points that were supposedly already resolved by the PJM “MOPR Orders.”17 In fact,
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`the NYISO and other parties clearly identified the Complaint’s fundamental flaws. One party
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`has already filed an answer highlighting that the CVEC Answer incorrectly claimed that its
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`argument was a “rehash” of one that it previously made in the MOPR Order proceedings.18
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`Another has refuted the CVEC Answer’s inaccurate assertion that expert testimony opposing the
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`Complaint constituted an “admission”19 that somehow endorsed it.20
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`Research Development Authority, Utility Intervention Unit of the New York State Department of State,
`City of New York, Municipal Electric Utilities Association of New York, and Multiple Intervenors (“NYS
`Protest”) at 3-4.
`14 See, e.g., Clean Energy Parties at Appendix A, Written Testimony of Dr. Kathleen Spees and
`Dr. Samuel A. Newell; New York TO Protest at Attachment 1, Affidavit of Michael D. Cadwalader; NYS
`Protest at Attachment A, Declaration of Adam B. Evans, and Attachment B, Affidavit of Marc D.
`Montavalo; NY TO Protest at Attachment I, Affidavit of Michael D. Cadwalader.
`15 See CVEC Answer at 7.
`16 Id. at 3.
`17 Calpine Corp. v. PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 163 FERC ¶ 61,236 (2018) (the “2018 MOPR
`Order”); 169 FERC ¶ 61,239 (2019) (the “2018 MOPR Order”); 171 FERC ¶ 61,034 (2020) (“2018
`MOPR Rehearing Order”); 171 FERC ¶ 61,035 (2020) (“2019 MOPR Rehearing Order”); 173 FERC
`¶ 61,061 (2020) (“October 2020 MOPR Compliance Order”) (collectively the “MOPR Orders”).
`18 See Motion for Leave to Respond and Limited Response of the Institute for Policy Integrity at
`New York University School of Law at 3-4 (December 1, 2020).
`19 See CVEC Answer at 8 (“[A]s Dr. Shanker explains, the testimony of Exelon’s experts
`confirms that there is ‘a material price suppressive effect and substantial cost shifting from consumers to
`suppliers under the current rules . . . .’”)
`20 See Motion for Leave to Answer and Answer of Exelon Corporation at 5 (December 3, 2020)
`(“Exelon Answer”) (“Dr. Shanker claims that Exelon’s experts have confirmed that the current policy
`materially suppresses prices and shifts costs from customers to producers. Not so. As Exelon’s
`Patterson/Schnitzer Declaration explained, current prices are at the competitive level because they reflect
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`4
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`The Shanker Supplemental Affidavit makes a limited attempt to counter the NYISO’s
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`and independent MMU’s explanation that Dr. Shanker’s price suppression analysis was
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`overstated and one-sided. Dr. Shanker claims that retirements driven by state policies are not
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`fully offsetting state actions that support existing generation.21 He also suggests that the NYISO
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`Answer only responded to his ZEC analysis and did not account for his claims regarding
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`expected future renewable entry.
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`Neither of Dr. Shanker’s objections has merit. His ZEC price impact argument would
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`effectively require the NYISO to prove that exiting resources will offset every MW of resources
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`supported by state subsidies. But as the NYISO Answer explained, applicable precedent does
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`not require such precision. Instead, the Commission requires a balancing of the risks of under-
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`and over-mitigation that allows for some limited amount of potential suppression.22 The Part A
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`Exemption Test and the Renewable Exemption are existing examples of mechanisms that allow
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`limited uneconomic entry to occur without mitigation when market conditions allow. These
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`exemptions permit this new entry to occur without causing significant price suppression. The
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`the amounts that clean resources need from the capacity market after accounting for the legitimate
`compensation they receive for their environmental attributes—a positive externality that the state is free
`to compensate as the regulator of those attributes and generation facilities.”) (Internal footnote omitted).
`The NYISO does not believe that Exelon’s arguments against the Complaint could plausibly be construed
`as supporting it. Of course, even if Exelon had made “an admission,” it would hardly be dispositive in
`this case given the evidence presented by the independent MMU and NYISO that Dr. Shanker’s price
`suppression analysis is wrong.
`21 See Shanker Supplemental Affidavit at PP 18-19.
`22 See, e.g., NextEra Energy Resources, LLC v. FERC, 898 F.3d 14 at 21 (D.C. Cir. 2018)
`(upholding the Commission’s acceptance of the renewable resources exemption and finding that the
`Commission reasonably balanced the potential for limited price suppression against competing interests);
`New York State Public Service Commission, et al. v. New York Independent System Operator, Inc.,
`154 FERC ¶ 61,088 at P 31 (2016) (reiterating the importance of balancing “the need to mitigate the
`exercise of buyer-side market power to ensure just and reasonable ICAP market prices with the risk of
`over-mitigating new entrants.”); Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, Inc. v. New York Independent
`System Operator, Inc., 150 FERC ¶ 61,139 at P 4 (2015); New York Independent System Operator, Inc.,
`143 FERC ¶ 61,217 at P 77 (2013) (noting that the BSM Rules must “appropriately balance the need for
`mitigation of buyer-side market power against the risk of over-mitigation.”)
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`5
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`recent CASPR Rehearing Order confirmed that arrangements that recognize how exiting
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`resources can offset the impact of state support are still valid.23 Dr. Shanker’s approach would
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`also compel the NYISO to act as though state supported resources provide no capacity even
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`though they would in fact provide substantial amounts. As the NYISO and others have noted,
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`doing so would result in artificial capacity price increases. 24
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`Similarly, the NYISO Answer did not ignore the Complaint’s reference to New York
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`State’s ambitious goals that 9,000 MW of offshore wind and 6,000 MW of land-based
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`renewables enter the NYISO-administered capacity market over the next decade and a half. The
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`NYISO Answer discussed how the NYISO’s newly accepted Renewable Exemption formula,25
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`expected improvements to the NYISO’s computation of capacity requirements,26 and other
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`market enhancements27 should ameliorate any concern that a future influx of renewable entrants
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`would cause unmitigated price suppression. 28 It should also be noted that 9,000 MW of future
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`offshore wind would provide NYISO with far less than 9,000 MW of capacity given the
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`intermittent nature of the resource. By emphasizing the maximum output of future offshore and
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`23 See ISO New England Inc., 173 FERC ¶ 61,161 at PP 43-51 (2020) (“CASPR Rehearing
`Order”). See also CASPR Rehearing Order at P 121 (“[I]n originally accepting the [ISO-NE] renewables
`exemption, the Commission anticipated that any price suppressive effects would be balanced by a load
`increase. In the Renewables Exemption Remand Rehearing Order, the Commission recognized that this
`load increase had not materialized, but also relied on Dr. Ethier’s testimony regarding the substantial
`amount of anticipated retirements to determine that retirements would offset the renewable exemption’s
`price suppressive effects. The NextEra court affirmed this analysis.”) (Internal footnotes omitted);
`CASPR Rehearing Order at n. 155; citing NextEra 898 F.3d at 21.
`24 See NYISO Answer at 33-35 and n. 103; Exelon Answer at 5-6.
`25 See NYISO Answer at 29.
`26 Id. at 18-19.
`27 Id. at 29.
`28 For example, New York State’s Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act
`(“CLCPA”), S.B. 6599, 2019 Leg., 242nd Sess. (N.Y. 2019) (codified as Ch. 106, L. 2019), requires the
`procurement of 9,000 MW of offshore wind by 2035. This is hardly an immediate threat to the capacity
`market that would justify expanding the BSM Rules in 2020 or 2021.
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`6
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`land-based wind generation, Dr. Shanker substantially exaggerates how much capacity those
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`resources will ultimately provide and thereby overstates the potential of their entry to suppress
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`capacity prices.
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`B.
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`The CVEC Answer Fails to Rebut the Overwhelming Record Evidence that
`Regional Differences Between NYISO and PJM Justify Their Continuing to
`Have Different Capacity Market Power Mitigation Rules
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`The CVEC Answer repeats the Complaint’s insistence that “there is no difference
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`between the circumstances presented by the Complaint and those addressed by the Commission
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`in the PJM MOPR Orders that would justify a different result here.”29 It also once again tries to
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`justify overriding relevant regional differences by pointing to the “standard solution” language in
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`the original CASPR Order.
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`The NYISO and other parties have demonstrated that there are significant regional
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`differences between the NYISO and PJM that should prevent the Commission from expanding
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`the scope of the BSM Rules at this time. The NYISO emphasized that, unlike in the MOPR
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`Orders, neither the NYISO nor the MMU favored expanded mitigation at this time.30 The
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`NYISO also pointed out that New York’s status as a single state entity was an important
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`distinction because New York State’s policy decisions cannot have the kind of problematic
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`interstate impacts that state decisions can have in the multistate PJM region.31 Numerous parties
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`supported the NYISO’s position.32 No other party supported the Complainants’ radical assertion
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`29 CVEC Answer at 5.
`30 See, e.g., NYISO Answer at 2, 11, 24.
`31 Id. at 25-26.
`32 See, e.g., Exelon Protest at 2 (“[NYISO] is a single-state RTO, operating wholly within a state
`that has made a statutory commitment to supporting the entry of large quantities of carbon-free capacity
`over the next decade. Thus, the Commission’s concerns in the PJM Orders about the interstate effects of
`state subsidy programs---that one state’s subsidy programs would impair the price signals relied upon by
`other states to ensure resource adequacy in a multi-state region---is entirely absent here.”); APPA/NYAPP
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`7
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`that regional differences should be ignored in this proceeding. Even IPPNY and EPSA
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`acknowledge that regional differences between the NYISO and PJM justify different approaches
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`in the two regions.33
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`The NYISO Answer and other parties have already explained the faults in Complainant’s
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`interpretation of the “standard solution” concept.34 Just a few weeks ago, the CASPR Rehearing
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`Order underscored the point. That ruling found that the Commission’s February 2020 ruling
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`regarding the NYISO’s Self-Supply Exemption was not binding on ISO-NE.35 The fact that the
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`CASPR Rehearing Order continues the Commission’s long-established policy of respecting
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`regional differences means that the original CASPR Order cannot plausibly be an excuse for
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`ignoring them. The CVEC Answer’s assertion that mitigation should be the same in NYISO and
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`PJM because the same economic principles apply to both36 is effectively an attempt to use the
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`“standard solution” concept to establish a “standard market design” for capacity market power
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`mitigation.
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`The CASPR Rehearing Order also referenced earlier Commission rulings that legitimate
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`regional differences could reflect both “particular system characteristics” and “stakeholder input”
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`Protest at 5; New York TO Protest at 21-22; NYS Protest, Attachment A, Declaration of Adam B. Evans,
`at P 10.
`33 See Comments of Independent Power Producers of New York, Inc. at 3-4; Comments of the
`Electric Power Supply Association at 3. The NYISO disagrees with IPPNY and EPSA to the extent that
`they assume that price suppression necessitates near-term action in the NYISO. However, the NYISO
`agrees with them to the extent that they acknowledge that a Clean MOPR is not the right remedy in the
`NYISO context. The NYISO also agrees that carbon pricing could be a significant market improvement
`that could help to better harmonize the NYISO-administered markets with New York State’s
`environmental mandates.
`34 See NYISO Answer at 9-10.
`35 CASPR Rehearing Order at P 37.
`36 Id.
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`8
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`in different regions.37 The near unanimous opposition by New York stakeholders to the
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`Complaint is thus yet another regional difference that militates against granting it.
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`PJM itself, the IMM, supplier associations, individual suppliers, a number of utilities, and
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`other parties supported the actions taken by the Commission in the MOPR Orders. Although
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`neither proposal in PJM’s Section 205 filing achieved two-thirds super-majority stakeholder
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`support both “jump ball” options also had significant backing. Several PJM state regulators that
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`ultimately opposed the MOPR Orders supported one of those options and thus endorsed some
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`type of action to address the price suppression issues identified by PJM.
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`In the instant proceeding, by contrast, only Beal Bank, a non-market participant, supports
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`the Complaint.38 New York State, New York City, the New York State Transmission Owners,
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`New York’s large industrial customers, clean energy interests, Exelon, public power interests,
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`and academics are all united in opposition. Even IPPNY and EPSA favor carbon pricing over
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`the Complaint’s proposed remedy.
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`Finally, the CVEC Answer questions the MMU’s view, which the NYISO shares, that the
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`use of prompt capacity auctions instead of a forward capacity market, would make a Clean
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`MOPR inappropriate for the NYISO.39 Dr. Shanker suggests that Dr. Patton is wrong because a
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`Clean MOPR would include an exemption for facilities that “do not receive actionable
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`subsidies.”40 He suggests that competitive entrants will always know whether they would be
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`37 Id. at P 37 and n. 99.
`38 The Protest of Complaint by Advanced Energy Management Alliance (“AEMA Protest”) states
`(at 3) that it “does not disagree” with Complainants that there “may” be price suppression issues in the
`NYISO but does not support Complainants’ requested relief and instead favors collaborative stakeholder
`discussions led by the NYISO.”)
`39 See CVEC Answer at 6; Shanker Supplemental Affidavit at PP 14-15.
`40 Shanker Supplemental Affidavit at P 15.
`40 Id.
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`9
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`eligible for an exemption in advance and that this should dispel any issues regarding investor
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`uncertainty. Dr. Shanker’s expectation is inconsistent with the NYISO’s experience
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`administering its existing CEE. It is often unclear whether an applicant has contractual
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`arrangements that might make it ineligible for a CEE at the time that it enters the market. This
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`uncertainty may be part of the reason why relatively few resources have sought a CEE in the
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`NYISO. The same would be true if a Clean MOPR were imposed on New York. In addition, a
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`Clean MOPR would presumably include some form of unit-specific exemption. Entrants could
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`not know in advance whether they would be eligible for such an exemption. Dr. Patton’s
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`concerns about grafting a Clean MOPR on to the NYISO’s prompt auction-based systems are
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`therefore valid notwithstanding Dr. Shanker’s theory.
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`C.
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`It Is the Complainants, Not the NYISO, that Ask the Commission to Act
`Arbitrarily and Capriciously
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`The CVEC Answer mischaracterizes the NYISO Answer as asking the Commission to
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`show “mindless deference” to the NYISO’s “preference” that a Clean MOPR not be imposed on
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`New York.41 Complainants allege that it would be arbitrary and capricious for the Commission
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`to do so.42
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`To be clear, the NYISO Answer did not suggest that the Complaint should be denied
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`simply because the NYISO “preferred” that outcome. The NYISO pointed out that the MOPR
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`Orders, and then-Chairman Chatterjee’s statements, established that PJM’s and its IMM’s
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`support for expanded mitigation were key factors underlying the Commission’s decision to
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`impose a Clean MOPR on the PJM region. The fact that the NYISO and MMU oppose
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`41 CVEC Answer at 5 and n. 17.
`42 Id.
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`10
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`expanded mitigation therefore warrants serious consideration. Several other parties have made
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`the same point.43
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`It is, therefore, the Complainants, not the NYISO, that are asking the Commission to act
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`arbitrarily and capriciously. Complainants would have the Commission ignore the record in this
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`proceeding, and decades of precedent, based on a simplistic and exaggerated interpretation of the
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`CASPR Order’s “standard solution” language. The Complaint’s invocation of the “standard
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`solution” language is insufficient to justify overturning the BSM Rules. The CVEC Answer’s
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`recitation of the phrase is likewise not enough to dispose of the arguments advanced by the
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`NYISO and other parties. If the Commission were to do as the CVEC Answer proposes, it
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`would not be engaging in reasoned decision-making.
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`D.
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`There Is No Basis for the CVEC Answer’s Allegation that the NYISO Is Not
`Committed to Effective Mitigation
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`The CVEC Answer asserts that deferring to the NYISO’s view that expanded mitigation
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`is unnecessary in New York at this time would be “particularly unwarranted here, given
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`NYISO’s history of resistance to effective offer floor mitigation.”44 Complainants cite the
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`Commission’s rulings in the Astoria Generating Co., L.P. v. New York Independent System
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`Operator, Inc. cases as purported support for their claim.
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`There is no basis for Complainants’ insinuation that the NYISO has not faithfully
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`implemented its tariff. The Astoria cases involved a complaint concerning the application of the
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`original version of the BSM Rules. That version contained a number of ambiguities that no
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`longer exist. The Commission denied certain allegations related to the NYISO’s interpretation of
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`highly technical tariff provisions and granted others. It never questioned the NYISO’s
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`43 See, e.g., New York TO Protest at 16; NYS Protest at 19; APPA/NYAPP Protest at 5.
`44 CVEC Answer at n. 17.
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`11
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`independence or impartiality, even though some parties had contended that the NYISO had a
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`“systematic bias” in favor of granting exemptions under the BSM Rules.45 Complainants have
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`not even attempted to produce evidence, beyond their citation to the Astoria cases, of bias by the
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`NYISO. They have overlooked various cases in which the NYISO opposed attempts to create
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`new exemptions under the BSM Rules that the NYISO viewed as inconsistent with Commission
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`precedent.46 Finally, Complainants overlook the fact that the NYISO’s MMU also opposes
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`expanding the BSM Rules in this proceeding.
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`E.
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`There Is Even Less Justification for the Complainants to Seek Expedited
`Commission Action Than When the Complaint Was Filed
`
`
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`Finally, the CVEC Answer repeats the Complaint’s assertion that there is “no reason why
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`the Commission cannot move expeditiously to grant the Complaint” in order to quickly stop the
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`“continuing harm to unsubsidized suppliers that continues to accrue” that is supposedly
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`occurring now under the BSM Rules.47
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`
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`It is now even clearer than it was when the Complaint was filed that there is no reason to
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`rush to make a ruling in this case. As discussed above, the Complainants have not met their
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`burden of proof and the Commission should not be taking any action beyond denying the
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`Complaint. But even if the Commission were to conclude that some changes should be made,
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`the NYISO,48 and other parties,49 have shown that the Complainants did not establish that
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`45 See, e.g., Confidential Supplemental Answer of the New York Independent System Operator,
`Inc., Docket No. EL11-50-000 (September 8, 2011) (refuting allegations that NYISO had a “systematic
`bias” in favor of exempting entrants under the BSM Rules.)
`46 See, e.g., Answer of the New York Independent System Operator, Inc., Docket No. EL19-86-
`000 (August 19, 2019) (opposing the creation of an energy storage exemption under the BSM Rules
`because the NYISO believed that it had not been shown to be consistent with Commission precedent.)
`47 See CVEC Answer at 8.
`48 See NYISO Answer at 40-43.
`49 See, e.g., Clean Energy Parties at 40, Exelon Protest at 3.
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`12
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`claimed defects in the BSM Rules were the cause of their claimed financial hardships. IPPNY
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`and EPSA also did not join in Complainants call for expedited relief.50 Furthermore, the NYISO
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`also explained that even if a Clean MOPR were justified there would be no practicable way to
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`implement it in the NYISO in “several months” as the Complaint imagines.51
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`There is thus no reason for the Commission to seek to make expedited changes in this
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`proceeding. Instead, given the critical importance and substantial implications of the legal and
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`economic issues at stake, should the Commission consider any directives to modify the NYISO’s
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`BSM Rules, it should move deliberately. It would reduce uncertainty, and increase the
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`likelihood of a legally durable outcome, if this case were decided by the full Commission
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`(including its newest members). Any Commission directives should be aimed at allowing the
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`NYISO-administered markets to continue to send appropriate investment signals while
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`preserving reliability as they evolve in response to New York State’s environmental mandates.
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`The Commission should allow the NYISO and stakeholders to work collaboratively to address
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`the clean energy transition, as most parties in this proceeding prefer.52
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`50 IPPNY and EPSA both preferred that the Commission implement carbon pricing, a major
`market design change that would take time to implement.
`51 See NYISO Answer at 46.
`52 See, e.g., AEMA Protest at 3; Exelon Protest at 29; Clean Energy Parties at 48-49; New York
`TO Protest at 3.
`
`13
`
`

`

`III. CONCLUSION
`
`
`
`In conclusion, the NYISO respectfully requests that the Commission accept this answer.
`
`The NYISO renews its request that the Commission deny the Complaint in its entirety, take no
`
`further action, and initiate no new proceedings in response to the Complaint.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`December 9, 2020
`
`cc:
`
`Jignasa Gadani
`Jette Gebhart
`Leanne Khammal
`Kurt Longo
`John C. Miller
`David Morenoff
`Larry Parkinson
`Douglas Roe
`Frank Swigonski
`Eric Vandenberg
`Gary Will
`
`Respectfully submitted,
`
`/s/ Ted J. Murphy
`Ted J. Murphy
` Counsel for the
`New York Independent System Operator, Inc.
`tmurphy@huntonak.com
`
`
`
`14
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`

`

`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
`
`I hereby certify that I have this day served the foregoing document upon each person
`
`designated on the official service list compiled by the Secretary in this proceeding in accordance
`
`with the requirements of Rule 2010 of the Rules of Practice and Procedure, 18 C.F.R. §385.2010.
`
`Dated at Rensselaer, NY this 9th day of December 2020.
`
`
`
` /s/ Joy A. Zimberlin
`
`Joy A. Zimberlin
`New York Independent System Operator, Inc.
`10 Krey Blvd.
`Rensselaer, NY 12144
`(518) 356-6207
`
`
`
`