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` UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
`BEFORE THE
`FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION
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`Southwest Power Pool ) Docket No. ER25-2296-000
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`COMMENTS OF THE
`CLEAN ENERGY BUYERS ASSOCIATION
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`Pursuant to Rule 211 of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s (“Commission”)
`Rules of Practice and Procedure, 18 C.F.R. § 385.211,1 the Clean Energy Buyer Association
`(“CEBA”) hereby files this Motion to Intervene and submit the following comments on the filing
`by the Southwest Power Pool (“SPP”) to establish the Expedited Resource Adequacy Study
`(ERAS) process.
`On May 22, 2025, SPP filed a proposal to establish the ERAS process to provide a
`framework for a one-time accelerated study of generation projects that are needed to address
`urgent resource adequacy and reliability needs in the near term.
`CEBA is a business trade association that activates energy buyers and partners to advance
`low-cost, reliable, carbon emissions-free global electricity systems. CEBA has over 400
`members, collectively with more than $20 trillion in market capital, including one-fifth of the
`Fortune 500. These members comprise a diversity of commercial, industrial and institutional
`energy customers, including large commercial customers, data centers, and manufacturing
`customers representing some of the largest sources of load growth in this country. Recent reports
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`1 18 C.F.R. § 385.211 (2025).
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`show that total US electricity demand will grow by 35-50% by 2040, requiring more than 1,000
`GW of new generation including renewables, natural gas and energy storage.2 With respect to
`clean energy demand specifically, a recent study by Wood Mackenzie also found that Fortune
`1000 companies need an additional 275 GW of carbon emissions free power by 2035.3 That
`study found the Fortune 1000 could be expected to procure 15.3 GW of new clean energy
`projects in SPP to meet their corporate clean energy commitments.4 This creates an urgent need
`for faster interconnection of new resources to the grid. Failure to meet the moment has
`widespread consequences of stifling our nation’s economic growth and competitiveness, and
`risks increasing costs to consumers. We support the intent behind ERAS and recognize that
`increasing load growth within SPP’s footprint has introduced new challenges to balancing supply
`and demand, particularly given SPP’s extensive queue backlog. As such, the urgency of securing
`adequate capacity in the region is apparent, and we appreciate SPP’s efforts to explore a
`temporary solution for urgent resource adequacy needs.
`However, to meet the needs of new load cost effectively, CEBA’s energy buyers must
`have timely access to diverse, competitive, and affordable generation resources. CEBA is
`concerned that the SPP ERAS proposal grants Load Responsible Entities (LREs), most of which
`are vertically integrated utilities, the unilateral ability to select which resources are submitted to
`SPP for ERAS consideration—without open access protections or any state regulatory review—
`resulting in undue discrimination against competitive generation. We are concerned that SPP
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`2 S&P Global Commodity Insights, US National Power Demand Study Executive Summary, at 2-3 (Mar.
`10, 2025).
`3 Wood MacKenzie, US Corporate Carbon Emissions-Free Demand Outlook, at 4 (Jan. 30, 2025),
`available at: https://cebuyers.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/CEBA_US-Corporate-Carbon-Emissions-
`Free-Demand-Outlook.pdf.
`4 WoodMackenzie, US Corporate Carbon Emissions-Free Demand Outlook, at 5 (Jan. 30, 2025),
`available at https://cebuyers.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/CEBA_US-Corporate-Carbon-Emissions-
`Free-Demand-Outlook.pdf.
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`ERAS framework will undermine open access and enable preferential grid access for utility-
`affiliated generation, elevating the risk of uneconomic resources advancing through the queue,
`locking up transmission capacity, and raising costs for consumers.
`CEBA believes prioritizing reforms that resolve the existing generator interconnection
`queue backlog remains the most critical and effective solution to ensure resource adequacy. We
`support SPP’s efforts to integrate its transmission and interconnection processes and explore a
`novel “entry fee model” under the Consolidated Planning Process (CPP) and urge SPP to keep
`those efforts on track to ensure we see improvements to SPP’s traditional queue in a timely
`manner. Resolving the current backlog for the interconnection queue would unlock about
`145 GW of new, low-cost clean energy resources that could be brought to the grid.5
`I. Introduction: CEBA Recognizes LRE’s Underlying Resource Adequacy Concern
`but Disagrees with the Discriminatory Criteria
`SPP’s resource adequacy shortfall is the nexus of queue delays, increases in resource
`adequacy requirements, and significant load growth. SPP’s short-term generator delays are in
`part the result of regular delays in its Definitive Interconnection System Impact Study (DISIS).
`Despite significant backlog clearing, SPP’s queue consistently takes between 2 and 3 years
`before GIAs are able to be executed. Moreover, each DISIS study is contingent upon the prior,
`meaning that a delay in one, or an error which could cause it to need to be re-run, has
`implications for each successive study. Such was the case when SPP did not conduct tariff-
`defined studies on five clusters beginning with the 2017 DSIS and continuing through 2020.
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`5 Lawrence Berkeley National Lab, Queued Up: 2024 Edition, at pg. 9 (April 2024), available at
`https://emp.lbl.gov/sites/default/files/2024-04/Queued%20Up%202024%20Edition_R2.pdf
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`In addition to slow generation interconnection, there have also been significant changes
`in SPP’s RA requirements in recent years. Following Winter Storm Uri, SPP passed significant
`reforms shifting away from a 15% annual planning reserve margin to seasonal winter and
`summer planning reserve requirements. Despite LRE concerns, SPP subsequently increased
`those reserves from 15% year-round to 16% in the summer and 36% in the winter of 2026, a
`significant step up in a comparatively short amount of time.
`These two policy dynamics by themselves are significant; however, they may have been
`manageable in other years where load growth was relatively flat. Now, SPP’s LRE’s are faced
`with the added pressure of significant load growth across the SPP footprint, both increasing their
`RA requirements and driving the need to interconnect new resources quickly.
`Recognizing the need for reform in its planning and interconnection process, SPP started
`developing the Consolidated Planning Process (CPP) in 2021. The process seeks to harmonize
`the generation interconnection, transmission planning, and load forecasting, which all play a
`significant role in determining resource adequacy. However, the development and
`implementation of the CPP has been slow.
`The fraught existing DISIS process coupled with slow CPP implementation led
`stakeholders to pursue a one-time, expedited DISIS study, ERAS, in an attempt to relieve some
`of the near-term resource adequacy shortfall. To differentiate the one-off study and bypass the
`delays which plague the current process, SPP needed to reduce the modeling complexity by
`imposing eligibility criteria to limit the number of resources and prioritizing those that were most
`likely to interconnect. Stakeholders proposed and adopted language restricting the resources
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`selected to those being brought forward by LREs. In doing so, SPP cut out any other type of
`market participant from bringing forward resources.
`SPP justified these proposed actions on two principles. First, on the flawed logic that
`LREs carry the PRM obligation and therefore are the only harmed entities. Second, SPP stated
`that this policy would not set precedent as it was only a one-off study. CEBA disagrees with
`SPP’s justifications.
`First, LRE’s may be the entity responsible for the load obligation under the SPP tariff;
`however, all end-use consumers are harmed by resource adequacy shortfalls. The penalty costs
`from failing to meet PRM requirements are passed down to end-use ratepayers like CEBA
`members. To address this, many CEBA members are capable of bringing their own resources in
`open access markets to meet their own obligations. SPP’s criteria prevent this, limiting market
`access.
`Additionally, though SPP does not intend to repeat the ERAS process, there is no clear
`end to the nexus of issues that have put the RTO in this predicament. The CPP will likely not
`solve all of the issues overnight, load will still likely continue to grow, and PRM requirements
`could get more stringent, providing the same conditions for which SPP justified ERAS. A new
`tariff filing, striking the limited use case in the preamble of the proposed Attachment AW
`6, could
`be adopted and non-LRE's would have limited ability to prevent it.
`Non-LRE stakeholders repeatedly raised this concern throughout the voting process;
`however, SPP’s voting body does not provide a strong avenue for non-LREs. Notably, ERAS
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`6 Southwest Power Pool, Inc., Submission of Tariff Revisions to Implement the Expedited Resource Adequacy
`Study, Docket No. ER25-2296-000 (filed May 25, 2025) (“ERAS Proposal”).
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`received no support from large consumers like CEBA members, independent power producers,
`or public interest groups, and nearly full support from vertically integrated utilities.7
`II. ERAS eligibility requirements are unduly discriminatory against competitive
`generation, with a broad precedential effect of undermining FERC’s principle of
`open access.
`CEBA’s members, as end-use customers, are committed to the principle of open access,
`which underpins competitive wholesale markets and ensures access to a competitive mix of
`generation resources. We firmly believe that non-discriminatory grid access for all generation
`sources, including third-party competitive generation, fosters competitive pressure that drives
`technological innovation and resource diversity. This, in turn, helps lower costs for end-use
`customers. CEBA is concerned that SPP’s proposed ERAS will erode open access to the grid by
`imposing unduly discriminatory barriers that prevent Independent Power Producers (IPPs) from
`direct participation in ERAS thereby allowing for preferential treatment of load-responsible
`entities (LREs) with self-built generation.
`Under the proposed ERAS framework, only LREs may submit resources to SPP for
`consideration in ERAS. Competitive generation resources from IPPs are excluded from
`eligibility for direct submission into ERAS. Under this approach, IPPs are effectively barred
`from ERAS participation unless they are first selected by an LRE, giving LREs full control over
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`7 See, Sw Power Pool, Inc., Board of Directors/Members Committee Meeting Minutes, at P 4 (May 6,
`2025), available at https://www.spp.org/documents/73856/2025-05-06%20bod%20mc%20minutes.pdf;
`and Sw Power Pool, Inc., Markets and Operations Policy Committee Meeting Minutes and Ballots, at P
`27 (Apr. 15, 2025), available at
`https://spp.org/documents/73691/mopc%20meeting%20minutes%20and%20ballots%20combined_20250
`415.pdf
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`which resources can access ERAS enabling preferential access for utility-affiliated generation
`and denying IPPs grid access on the same or comparable basis.
`This structure is inconsistent with FERC’s principle of open access and long-standing
`Commission concerns that vertically integrated utilities have both the incentive and ability to
`favor their own generation.8 As established in Order No. 888,9 FERC found that “[a]n open
`access tariff that is not unduly discriminatory or anticompetitive should offer third parties access
`on the same or comparable basis, and under the same or comparable terms and conditions, as the
`transmission provider's uses of its system”
`10 with ongoing recognition that open access
`requirements specific to the generator interconnection process is a “critical component of open
`access transmission service.”11 We believe that open access is not only a foundational principle
`of wholesale competition but also a critical safeguard against utility self-dealing that drives up
`costs for consumers. The ERAS proposal circumvents these protections. By giving LREs
`exclusive submission rights and by excluding competitive generators from direct access to
`ERAS, the proposal effectively permits LREs to access preferential queue access, secure
`interconnection agreements, and tie up transmission capacity without a comparable opportunity
`for IPPs. This is a textbook case of undue discrimination in violation of FERC’s open access
`principles.
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`8 See, e.g., Xcel Energy Operating Cos., 106 FERC ¶ 61,260, at P 23 (2004); see also Am. Clean Power
`Ass’n v. FERC, 54 F.4th 728 (2022) (citing Ameren Services Co. v. FERC, 880 F.3d 578 (2018))
`(“Ameren emphasized that ‘if the transmission owners still owned integrated generation facilities, that
`would present a competitive motive’ to discriminate in favor of their own facilities.”)
`9 Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory Transmission Services by
`Public Utilities; Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public Utilities and Transmitting Utilities, Order No. 888,
`FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,036 (1996) (“Order No. 888”).
`10 Order No. 888, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,036 at 31,647.
`11 Standardization of Generator Interconnection Agreements & Procs., Order No. 2003, 104 FERC ¶
`61,103, at PP 9, 12 (2003) (Order No. 2003).
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`FERC has consistently upheld and applied the principle of open access, permitting
`expedited or priority access to the queue only under narrowly defined circumstances.12 Most
`recently, in rejecting MISO’s Expedited Resource Addition Study, the Commission found that
`MISO did not ensure the proposal was ”aligned with FERC’s open access principles in an
`objective and transparent manner.“13 Similarly, FERC rejected MISO’s proposed exemptions to
`its queue cap, reaffirming that grid access must be offered on an equal or comparable basis.14
`We are concerned that approval of the SPP ERAS would represent a departure from this
`precedent and would significantly undermine the protections otherwise provided by FERC’s
`continued adherence to open access principles. A shift in precedent would prevent third parties’
`grid access on the same or comparable basis, which will reduce competitive pressures, stifle
`technology innovation, and reduce available generation options all increasing costs for end-use
`customers. CEBA understands the need to expedite grid access to meet growing demand.
`However, this must be achieved in a manner that preserves open access and maintains FERC’s
`established precedent that ensures non-discriminatory grid access to protect consumers from
`increasing costs.
`III. Lack of state regulatory oversight creates further potential for undue discrimination
`against competitive generation, preventing cost-effective generation and increasing
`costs for consumers.
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`12 See, e.g., Midcontinent Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., 186 FERC ¶ 61,054, at P 177 (2024), Xcel Energy
`Operating Cos., 106 FERC ¶ 61,260, at P 23 (2004).
`13 Midcontinent Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., 191 FERC ¶ 61,131, at P 203 (2024).
`14 Midcontinent Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., 186 FERC ¶ 61,054, at P 176 (2024) (”MISO’s proposal to
`include unbounded cap exemptions in its generator interconnection procedures is inconsistent with the
`requirement that MISO must offer access to the generator interconnection process on the same or
`comparable basis”).
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`Compounding concerns surrounding the lack of open access and undue discrimination,
`the SPP’s ERAS process also excludes any role for state regulators to review or validate ERAS
`resource submissions by LSEs. In the case of extraordinary measures, such as a one-time queue-
`jumping process in vertically integrated regions, a strong role for state regulators, who have
`authority over resource adequacy, is necessary to serve as a check and balance in the absence of
`open access.
`Unfortunately, SPP’s ERAS process allows LREs to determine resource adequacy need
`and select resources for ERAS without state regulatory oversight. Moreover, SPP itself performs
`no independent validation of ERAS submissions, deferring all decisions regarding both need and
`resource solutions to the LREs. We are concerned that this lack of state regulatory review will
`allow for self-dealing among vertically integrated LREs, preventing opportunities for the
`selection of more cost-effective generation resources and driving up costs for consumers.
`The importance of the state regulatory review was recently highlighted by Commissioner
`Lindsay See in her remarks on the FERC Order rejecting MISO’s ERAS proposal stating that in
`vertically integrated regions, she “would be skeptical if a proposal like ERAS didn’t give the
`States a leading role.” She emphasized that it is “the States that assess need when it comes to
`resource adequacy questions in their borders.” Yet in SPP ERAS, state regulators have no role
`whatsoever in validating an LRE’s identification of resource adequacy need or reviewing an
`LRE resource submission into ERAS. This stands in contrast to the MISO ERAS proposal where
`states regulators were at least required to provide notification that a proposed ERAS project
`“should be considered for the ERAS process.”15 Even with the inclusion of this, albeit limited
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`15 Midcontinent Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., 191 FERC ¶ 61,131, at PP 10, 31, 85 (2024). See also,
`Midcontinent Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., 191 FERC ¶ 61,131 (See, Comm’r, concurring at 6).
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`form of state review, FERC rejected the MISO proposal, finding that “MISO has not
`demonstrated that the proposed Tariff language is tailored to ensure that only those resources
`capable of addressing identified near-term resource adequacy or reliability needs are eligible for
`expedited study through the ERAS process.”16
`Additionally, Commissioner See raised concerns regarding the lack of transparency on how
`resources would be selected by states under MISO ERAS, including the lack of explanation
`regarding the factors considered or how alternative projects would be compared.17 In the case of
`SPP ERAS, where LREs have the exclusive ability to submit resources into ERAS, SPP’s
`proposal similarly lacks objective criteria for resource selection. LREs need only attest that a
`resource adequacy need cannot be met cost-effectively by existing or queued resources—but
`there is no requirement to show how this determination was made, nor any requirement to
`consider or disclose alternative options. The lack of transparency and objective criteria
`eliminates any practical check on LRE discretion and elevates the risk of uneconomic resources
`advancing through the queue, locking up transmission capacity and potentially raising costs for
`consumers. Together, these findings should serve as a clear indication that SPP’s omission of
`state regulatory review of resource adequacy need or resource submission to ERAS, particularly
`in the absence of open access, would be inconsistent with FERC precedent.
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`16 Midcontinent Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., 191 FERC ¶ 61,131, at P 202 (2024)
`17 Midcontinent Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., 191 FERC ¶ 61,131 (See, Comm’r, concurring at 6).
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`IV. A well-functioning queue is the most effective, long-term solution to address
`resource needs and SPP must prioritize holistic reforms to its queue process.
`CEBA believes that resolving the existing generator interconnection queue backlog
`remains the most effective solution to deliver shovel-ready projects, including carbon emissions-
`free generation projects that customers are seeking, that support resource adequacy. Resolving
`the current backlog for the interconnection queue would have the consequential impact of
`unlocking more than 145 GW of new clean energy resources in the queue at a time of
`unprecedented load growth.18 We agree with Commissioner Rosner that temporary solutions,
`such as ERAS, are “not a substitute for a well-functioning interconnection process that allows all
`resources to connect to the grid quickly and efficiently.”19 We commend SPP on its recent
`announcements with Hitachi to speed queue processing with automation techniques and look
`forward to seeing the results of those efforts.20 Additionally, we appreciate the effort underway
`in SPP to establish an integrated interconnection and transmission planning process and explore
`a novel “entry fee model” under the Consolidated Planning Process. We urge SPP to keep those
`efforts on track to ensure we see improvements to SPP’s traditional queue in a timely manner.
`V. Conclusion
`Thank you for the attention to these comments. Specifically, we believe Commission
`guidance should encourage SPP to make ERAS consistent with open access by allowing direct
`participation by all resource providers that can meet verified resource adequacy shortfalls and
`establishing an appropriate role for state regulator review.
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`18 Lawrence Berkeley National Lab, Queued Up: 2024 Edition, at pg. 9 (April 2024), available at
`https://emp.lbl.gov/sites/default/files/2024-04/Queued%20Up%202024%20Edition_R2.pdf
`19 PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 190 FERC ¶ 61,084 (2025) (Phillips and Rosner, Comm’r, concurring at
`P 7).
`20 Southwest Power Pool, SPP Partners with Hitachi to Develop Advanced AI Solution, Press Release (Jun 5, 2025)
`available at https://www.spp.org/news-list/spp-partners-with-hitachi-to-develop-advanced-ai-solution/.
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`Respectfully submitted,
`/s/ Bryn Baker
`Bryn Baker
`Senior Director, US Policy
`Clean Energy Buyers Association
`1501 M St, NW, Ste 900
`Washington, DC 20005
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`Dated June 12, 2025
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