UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
`BEFORE THE
`FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION
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`Certification of New Interstate
`Natural Gas Facilities
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`Consideration of Greenhouse Gas
`Emissions in Natural Gas Infrastructure
`Project Reviews
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`Docket No. PL18-1-000
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`Docket No. PL21-3-000
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`SUPPLEMENTAL REPLY COMMENTS OF ENBRIDGE GAS PIPELINES
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`Pursuant to Rule 212 of the Rules and Regulations of the Federal Energy
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`Regulatory Commission (“FERC” or the “Commission”)1 and the Order on Draft Policy
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`Statements issued on March 24, 2022 in the above-referenced proceedings,2 Enbridge Gas
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`Pipelines (collectively, “Enbridge” or “Enbridge Gas Pipelines”)3 hereby move for leave
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`to file and submit these supplemental reply comments on the Commission’s Draft Updated
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`Policy Statement on Certification of New Interstate Natural Gas Facilities (“Draft
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`Certificate Policy Statement”)4 and the Draft Interim Policy Statement on the
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`Consideration of Greenhouse Gas (“GHG”) Emissions in Natural Gas Infrastructure
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`Project Reviews (“Draft GHG Policy Statement” and together with the Draft Certificate
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`1 18 C.F.R. § 385.212 (2021).
`2 Order on Draft Policy Statements, 178 FERC ¶ 61,197 (2022).
`3 Enbridge Gas Pipelines include Algonquin Gas Transmission, LLC; Big Sandy Pipeline, LLC; Bobcat Gas
`Storage; East Tennessee Natural Gas, LLC; Egan Hub Storage, LLC; Garden Banks Gas Pipeline, LLC;
`Moss Bluff Hub, LLC; Mississippi Canyon Gas Pipeline, LLC; Rio Bravo Pipeline Company, LLC; Saltville
`Gas Storage Company L.L.C.; and Texas Eastern Transmission, LP. Enbridge Gas Pipelines also include
`natural gas companies in which affiliates of the Enbridge Gas Pipelines own a joint venture interest, including
`Alliance Pipeline L.P.; Gulfstream Natural Gas System, L.L.C.; Maritimes & Northeast Pipeline, L.L.C.;
`Nautilus Pipeline Company, L.L.C.; NEXUS Gas Transmission, LLC; Sabal Trail Transmission, LLC;
`Southeast Supply Header, LLC; and Steckman Ridge, LP.
`4 178 FERC ¶ 61,107 (2022).
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`Policy Statement, the “Draft Policy Statements”).5 While Enbridge filed a Request for
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`Rehearing, in Part, and Clarification, in Part, of the Draft Policy Statements (“Request for
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`Rehearing”)6 prior to the March 24 order as well as initial comments on April 25, 2022 and
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`reply comments on May 25, 2022 in this proceeding,7 Enbridge submits that good cause
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`exists to accept these supplemental reply comments. In reply comments filed on May 25,
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`2022, the Natural Resources Defense Council (“NRDC”) submitted a proposed “climate
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`test” that NRDC suggests the Commission could use as part of its review of certificate
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`applications.8 As discussed in more detail below, NRDC’s “climate test” is simply an
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`expression of blanket, subjective policy opposition to natural gas infrastructure guised in
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`mathematical notation, and the Commission should not (and cannot lawfully) rely on that
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`tool in certificate proceedings. Moreover, NRDC’s unexplained decision to submit the test
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`at the reply comment stage, rather than with initial comments, has the effect of improperly
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`shielding the tool from the adversarial testing or critical scrutiny by other parties in reply
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`comments that would have been intended by the Commission in the procedures it
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`established for these proceedings.
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`These supplemental reply comments address NRDC’s “climate test,” a new policy
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`proposal to which the Enbridge Gas Pipelines have never had the opportunity to respond.
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`5 178 FERC ¶ 61,108 (2022). The Commission has accepted additional reply comments beyond those
`permitted in a rulemaking/policy proceeding where the comments “assisted [the Commission’s]
`understanding.” Revisions to Elec. Reliability Org. Definition of Bulk Elec. Sys. And Rules of Procedure,
`Order No. 773, 141 FERC ¶ 61,236 at n.27 (2012).
`6 Request for Rehearing, in part, and Clarification, in part, of Enbridge Gas Pipelines, Docket Nos. PL18-1-
`002, PL21-3-002 (Mar. 18, 2022) (“Enbridge Request for Rehearing”).
`7 Comments of Enbridge Gas Pipelines, Docket Nos. PL18-1-000, PL21-3-000 (Apr. 25, 2022) (“Enbridge
`Initial Comments”); Reply Comments of Enbridge Gas Pipelines, Docket Nos. PL18-1-000, PL21-3-000
`(May 25, 2022) (“Enbridge Reply Comments”).
`8 See Reply Comments of NRDC, Docket No. PL21-3-000 (May 25, 2022) (“NRDC Reply Comments”).
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`Accordingly, Enbridge submits that good cause exists for the Commission to accept these
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`supplemental reply comments as part of the record in this proceeding.
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`In support hereof, Enbridge shows as follows:
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`I.
`INTRODUCTION AND EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
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`NRDC refers to its “climate test” as “a science-based decision support tool . . . for
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`use in determining a project’s carbon emissions significance.”9 No part of that statement
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`is accurate. What NRDC has proposed is, at bottom, a raw policy decision to adopt
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`NRDC’s preferred climate goals, and its preferred national (even global) energy-policy
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`pathway for achieving those goals. The NGA does not authorize FERC to select climate
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`policy goals, such as the ones chosen by NRDC, for the entire nation (or globe); nor has
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`any branch of the government with the legitimate authority to set climate policy, such as
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`Congress, determined that the U.S. should abide by the “1.5℃” or “net-zero 2050” policy
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`goals on which NRDC’s “climate test” is grounded. Similarly, FERC has not been
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`delegated the authority to set national energy policy, let alone global energy policy. Yet
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`NRDC’s “climate tool” effectively encodes a particular set of policy preferences about how
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`the nation (and the world) should reach NRDC’s preferred climate-policy goals—
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`essentially, by not approving any new natural gas (or other fossil fuel) infrastructure.
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`Congress did not give the Commission the authority to establish such a policy; on the
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`contrary, it instructed the Commission to make plentiful supplies of natural gas available
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`to end-users at the lowest prices consistent with maintenance of adequate service.10
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`9 NRDC Reply Comments, Exhibit A at 1.
`10 See Enbridge Initial Comments at 22-24.
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`In addition, NRDC’s tool fails by its own terms: at a basic conceptual level, the tool
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`fails to measure the significance of GHG emissions or climate effects in any cognizable
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`sense. The “emissions significance” the tool purports to calculate bears no relationship to
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`the concept of “significance” that is relevant to FERC’s environmental reviews under the
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`National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”), the purpose of which is to identify and
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`assess physical effects on the environment that would result from a project, not to set globe-
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`spanning climate- and energy-policy goals or to assess how well projects supposedly mesh
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`with those goals. NRDC’s tool thus fails to achieve its purported purpose.
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`Indeed, it is telling that NRDC’s effort to develop a supposedly “scientific” and
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`“objective” method for determining the significance of GHG emissions has yielded a
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`transparently policy-infused “tool” that would require the Commission to adopt numerical
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`global climate goals at the very first stage of its analysis.11 In other words, the development
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`of this tool inadvertently demonstrates what Enbridge and others have long argued: any
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`approach to “significance” that strays beyond assessing the actual physical climate effects
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`causally attributable to a discrete project would be nothing more than a policy-driven
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`judgment about national (and indeed global) climate and energy policy issues that Congress
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`never assigned to the Commission.12
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`11 NRDC’s manuscript repeatedly invokes terms like “scientific[]” and “objective,” but the mere assertion
`that its tool is “scientific” or “objective” does not make it so. See, e.g., NRDC Reply Comments, Exhibit A
`at 4-5. As in the case of the Social Cost of GHGs, the only sense in which NRDC’s tool is “scientific” is that
`it uses, as one input among many, science-based (if highly uncertain) estimates of the particular amount of
`warming that would result from certain level of global GHG emissions. Cf. Enbridge Reply Comments at
`78-79. That does not make the tool itself, which is based almost entirely on naked policy judgment and
`speculative (as well as often implausible) economic forecasting, “scientific” or “objective.” The selection
`and design of the tool itself, notably including the selection of the target “climate goal,” is predicated on an
`exercise of pure policy judgment untethered from any scientific or objective assessment of what effect a
`project, or project-associated GHG emissions, will have on the physical environment.
`12 See, e.g., Enbridge Initial Comments at 71-78.
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`II.
`COMMENTS
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`A.
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`Adoption of NRDC’s “climate test” would be a significant policy decision beyond
`FERC’s authority.
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`The Commission cannot use NRDC’s “climate test” because the very first step in
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`the analysis NRDC proffers is the selection of a nationwide (or even global) climate
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`policy—a policy decision of “vast economic and political significance”13 that the
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`Commission has not been authorized to make. Indeed, by its very terms, NRDC’s “climate
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`test” purports to assess whether “projects . . . are consistent with [a] specified climate
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`goal.”14 Needless to say, the resulting “tool” and the “significance” verdicts it produces
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`hinge entirely on the climate goal used as an input to the formula—regardless of how much
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`mathematical or set-theory notation NRDC uses to express its policy-laden judgments.
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`And where the input is a climate goal that requires massive reductions in GHG emissions
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`in a very short period of time (particularly when combined with pessimistic assumptions
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`about the retirement of existing high-emitting energy infrastructure), the unsurprising
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`output of the tool is that virtually no project that results in incremental emissions qualifies
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`as less than significant, no matter how limited the project scope from a traditional
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`perspective, e.g., a project with limited environmental impacts in other ways, such as a
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`mere interconnect with a gas consumer. NRDC’s supporting paper acknowledges as much
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`when it notes that “it is quite unlikely that building a new standard pipeline could be
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`considered consistent with [NRDC’s chosen] climate goals,” at least where “consistency”
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`13 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Dep’t of Lab., 142 S. Ct. 661, 665 (2022) (citation omitted).
`14 NRDC Reply Comments, Exhibit A at 5 (emphasis added). In fact, NRDC’s tool provides an extremely
`poor measure of “consistency” with climate goals—a further problem discussed below. See infra Part II.B.
`Far from offering a meaningful assessment of whether individual projects are consistent with a chosen climate
`goal, NRDC’s tool simply expresses a blanket policy preference against any and all new natural gas
`infrastructure, communicated through mathematical notion.
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`is defined according to NRDC’s selected metrics.15 The Commission need look no further
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`to see that NRDC’s “climate tool” is nothing but an invitation to improperly adopt NRDC’s
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`preferred climate- and energy-policy goals. It is not FERC’s role, nor is it within FERC’s
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`authority, to make such far-reaching policy regarding U.S. climate goals.
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`The structure of NRDC’s formulae confirms the inherently policy-laden nature of
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`NRDC’s supposedly “objective” test. At its highest level, NRDC’s “climate test”
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`compares the GHG (really carbon dioxide) “emissions impact” of a project to the “energy
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`contribution” of the project.16 The “emissions impact” is not actually an estimate of the
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`impact of the project’s emissions in any physical sense; rather, it is intended to reflect the
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`share of what NRDC calls “total remaining emissions for climate goal” taken up by the
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`lifecycle emissions of a project (including downstream combustion of gas transported by
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`the pipeline).17 These “remaining emissions” are calculated by taking “budgeted
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`emissions”—those that reflect achievement of the stated climate policy goal18—and
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`subtracting “committed emissions,”19 i.e., those “emissions resulting from the continued
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`operation of existing energy infrastructure.”20 In other words, NRDC selects an aggressive
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`15 NRDC Reply Comments, Exhibit A at 16.
`16 Id. at 6.
`17 Id.
`18 See NRDC Reply Comments, Exhibit B at SI-4. The referenced carbon “budget” apparently refers to U.S.
`emissions, not global emissions, see id. at SI-23 to SI-24—even though it is combined global GHG emissions,
`not U.S. GHG emissions alone, that cause actual climatological changes. As NRDC admits—in supposedly
`“[t]echnical” “[c]aveats” buried in its appendices—“[d]efining national climate budget” (i.e., share of the
`total world “budget” allocated to the U.S.) “is a subjective determination” and “[t]here is considerable, valid
`debate” about what the U.S.’s “share” should be, even among those who endorse a given global climate
`target. Id. at SI-13. Needless to say, such allocative questions are hardly matters to be brushed under the
`rug—e.g., by consigning them to “technical” appendices. Accord Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., 178 FERC
`¶ 61,199 at P 11 (2022) (Christie, Comm’r, dissenting) (noting widespread and ongoing installation of new
`coal generation capacity by other countries).
`19 NRDC Reply Comments, Exhibit A at 6.
`20 NRDC Reply Comments, Exhibit B at SI-4.
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`climate policy (“global warming limited to 1.5°C with low- or no-overshoot” or “net-zero
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`CO2 emissions by 2050”),21 calculates the amount of GHG emissions consistent with
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`reaching that goal (including a subjective determination of the U.S.’s share of those GHG
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`emissions), and then figures out how much “spare” emissions are available assuming
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`existing energy infrastructure continues to operate through the end of its lifespan. NRDC’s
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`tool then divides the project’s supposed “emissions impact” by the fraction of predicted
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`“unmet fossil energy demand” satisfied by the “total energy supplied” by the project.22 If
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`the resulting number is less than or equal to 1, the project is deemed “consistent with the
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`specified climate goal”; otherwise, it is deemed “inconsistent.”23
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`By design, this tool revolves around a national (or global) “climate goal”—for
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`example, there is no way to calculate an emissions “budget” except by reference to such a
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`goal. But the U.S. has no law or binding policy regarding GHG emissions and energy
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`production. Certainly, there is no established cap on the emissions “budgeted” for future
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`U.S. energy needs, as the “climate test” presumes.24 Absent a legitimate legal directive
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`regarding GHG emissions and energy production, NRDC goes looking for a policy and
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`finds a pair that fits its agenda – “global warming limited to 1.5℃ [over pre-industrial
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`levels] with low- or no-overshoot, as modeled for the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
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`Change (IPCC)’s Special Report on 1.5℃ of warming” and “net-zero CO2 emissions by
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`21 NRDC Reply Comments, Exhibit A at 8.
`22 Id. at 6.
`23 Id. at 5-7.
`24 NRDC refers in the passing to the Paris Agreement. Id. at 3. “The purpose in the [Paris Agreement] is to
`hold the GHG-induced increase in global average temperature to well below 2º Celsius and to try to limit it
`to 1.5ºC.” Jane A. Leggett, Cong. Rsch. Serv., IF11746, United States Rejoins the Paris Agreement on
`Climate Change: Options for Congress at 2 (updated Feb. 25, 2021), https://bit.ly/3NH96yi. But “[a]ll [Paris
`Agreement] emissions targets are voluntary and nonbinding.” Id. at 1.
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`2050, as modeled for Princeton University’s New Zero America study.”25 But while
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`NRDC may support these goals, the Commission is not authorized to adopt them on behalf
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`of the entire nation. The NGA does not authorize the Commission to adopt national climate
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`or energy policy at all.
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`The Commission is “a ‘creature of statute,’ having ‘no constitutional or common
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`law existence or authority, but only those authorities conferred upon it by Congress.’”26
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`As the Supreme Court has made clear, the Natural Gas Act (“NGA”) is designed “to
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`promote the development, transportation, and sale at reasonable rates of natural gas,”27 and
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`it gives the Commission regulatory authority over only one segment of the natural gas
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`supply chain. As Enbridge has discussed previously, FERC is not an agency with a
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`mandate to regulate national or global environmental issues, or to set nationwide policy
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`regarding GHG emissions or the mix of electric generation sources. Furthermore, the
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`Commission lacks jurisdiction over upstream and downstream emissions sources,28 both
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`of which are included in the emissions calculations used by NRDC’s “climate test.” The
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`Commission accordingly has no statutory authority to adopt NRDC’s preferred national or
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`global climate goals, or to assess individual projects based on their purported consistency
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`with those goals.
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`Throughout this proceeding, Enbridge has emphasized that (1) under the major
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`questions doctrine, Congress must “speak clearly” if it wishes to authorize “an agency to
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`25 NRDC Reply Comments, Exhibit A at 8.
`26 Atl. City Elec. Co. v. FERC, 295 F.3d 1, 8 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (quoting Michigan v. EPA, 268 F.3d 1075,
`1081 (D.C. Cir. 2001)).
`27 Draft Certificate Policy Statement at P 39 (Christie, Comm’r, dissenting); see also NAACP v. FPC, 425
`U.S. 662, 669-70 (1976) (confirming that the purpose of the NGA is to promote the development of “plentiful
`supplies of . . . natural gas at reasonable prices”).
`28 See Enbridge Initial Comments at 22-32.
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`exercise powers of vast economic and political significance”;29 (2) issues of national/global
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`climate and energy policy are clearly matters of “vast” significance;30 (3) Congress plainly
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`did not authorize the Commission to resolve or regulate such issues under the NGA;31 and
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`(4) the Commission cannot integrate upstream and downstream GHG emissions into its
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`consideration of Section 7 certificate applications without arrogating authority over such
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`matters. NRDC’s submission starkly proves the point. NRDC invites the Commission to
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`unilaterally select a “climate goal” for the entire nation, if not the entire world, without
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`congressional authorization. That includes not only the top-line emissions “budget,” but
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`also enormously consequential policy decisions about how the nation should meet its
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`energy needs, within the selected emissions budget, from an energy-policy standpoint.32
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`In so doing, NRDC inadvertently highlights the degree to which the Commission’s new
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`proposed GHG-related policies violate the major questions doctrine. NRDC, like other
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`commenters supporting the Commission’s proposed GHG-related policies,33 may disagree
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`with Congress’ judgment that natural gas should be made available for “any . . . use” at
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`“the lowest possible reasonable rate consistent with the maintenance of adequate service
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`29 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 142 S. Ct. at 665 (citation omitted).
`30 See, e.g., Enbridge Initial Comments at 19-21.
`31 See id. at 22-32.
`32 Notably, NRDC’s tool is carefully structured to support a decarbonization pathway in which development
`of new fossil fuel infrastructure is disfavored (if not halted outright) across the board, even though NRDC’s
`own sources show that this is not the only route to the climate/emissions end-goals it prefers, such as net-
`zero emissions by 2050. This topic is addressed further in Part II.B below.
`33 Numerous commenters who support the Commission’s new proposed GHG-related policies openly urge
`the Commission to systematically disfavor natural gas infrastructure development, in direct contradiction to
`Congress’ manifest intent under the NGA. See Reply Comments of the Interstate Natural Gas Association
`of America at 23-24, Docket Nos. PL18-1-000, PL21-3-000 (May 25, 2022) (quoting and summarizing these
`parties’ comments). This is another clear sign that the Commission’s new assertion of authority over
`upstream and downstream GHG emissions represents precisely the kind of improper “legislative ‘work-
`around’” the major questions doctrine “guards against.” Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 142 S. Ct. at 668-69
`(Gorsuch, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
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`in the public interest.”34 But the major questions doctrine dictates that parties seeking such
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`profound changes in national climate and energy policy must bring their arguments to “the
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`people’s elected representatives” in Congress—not the Commission.35
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`B.
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`NRDC’s “climate test” is irrational and flawed on its own terms.
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`Even apart from its threshold reliance on improper climate-policy goals that the
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`Commission has no authority to adopt or pursue under the NGA, NRDC’s tool is deeply
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`flawed. The tool is ostensibly designed to assess “consistency” with NRDC’s proffered
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`climate goals, but it does not measure “consistency” in any normal sense of the word. No
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`single project is inconsistent with (i.e., would make it impossible to meet) NRDC’s chosen
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`climate goals, and NRDC does not contend otherwise.36 Nor is there a single plan or
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`pathway for reaching these climate goals, even among their proponents. For example, the
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`Princeton Net-Zero America study (from which NRDC’s article draws some of its data)
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`outlines five radically different approaches to reaching net-zero emissions by 2050. Some
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`of those pathways involve a large continued role for natural gas and some do not; some
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`involve massively increased dependence on nuclear energy and some involve the total
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`elimination of nuclear power by 2050; most involve considerable (though widely varying)
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`levels of geologic sequestration.37 Absent the selection of a specific pathway that sets all
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`of these innumerable variables in stone—something that is clearly beyond the
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`
`34 Atl. Ref. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 360 U.S. 378, 388 & n.7 (1959) (quoting 52 Stat. 825 (1938)).
`35 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 142 S. Ct. at 668 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
`36 As a trivial example, GHG emissions associated with any given project could be offset by making
`corresponding conversions to zero-emissions sources elsewhere, or through carbon sequestration. For
`example, the Princeton Net-Zero America research (on which NRDC itself relies) includes decarbonization
`pathways making quite extensive use of geologic sequestration. See Net-Zero America: Potential Pathways,
`Infrastructure, and Impacts, Princeton University, https://bit.ly/3aYoQyz (last visited June 12, 2022).
`37 See id. The different pathways can be examined by exploring the tabular data provided at the Net-Zero
`America study’s website (available under the “Explore the Data” header).
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`Commission’s power, and that NRDC itself does not purport to do—it makes no sense to
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`declare a single project “consistent” or “inconsistent” with the chosen end-goal (1.5℃ of
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`warming or net-zero emissions by 2050).
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`NRDC’s “consistency” metric is thus not a measure of consistency at all; rather, it
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`is more akin to a measure of the carbon efficiency of the energy product transported or
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`consumed by a project, considered in relation to benchmarks derived from assumptions
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`about overall macro-level GHG emissions and energy demand over the ensuing decades.
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`(The de facto efficiency target is the carbon emissions per unit of energy that results from
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`dividing “total remaining emissions for climate goal” by “total unmet fossil energy demand
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`under climate goal.”)38 But many of the choices used to construct NRDC’s equations are
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`unexplained and largely inexplicable; similarly, NRDC never attempts to explain why its
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`chosen metric would be relevant to the Commission’s decisionmaking.
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`For example, NRDC’s tool appears to assume all existing fossil infrastructure will
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`run through the end of its lifespan rather than being retired early, an assumption that sharply
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`limits available “remaining emissions” for new projects and (by NRDC’s own admission)
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`makes it virtually impossible to fit meaningful new natural gas infrastructure into the
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`available “budget.”39 Yet NRDC never defends this assumption, and the very article from
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`which NRDC derives its “committed emissions” data cautions that “[t]he trajectory of
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`future emissions” it depicts “represents a scenario in which existing (and proposed)
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`emitting infrastructure ‘ages out,’” which is “not . . . realistic” because, among other things,
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`“technological trends and climate-energy policies . . . may lead to early retirement of
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`
`38 See generally NRDC Reply Comments, Exhibit A at 6.
`39 See id. at 14.
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`existing fossil-fuel power plants in some regions.”40 Such unrealistic assumptions
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`essentially rig the game against new natural gas infrastructure by evidently assuming away
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`the possibility—indeed, the demonstrable reality—that new natural gas infrastructure can
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`and will enable the early retirement of higher-emitting existing sources such as coal-fired
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`power plants, notably by providing backstop power that makes it feasible to deploy
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`intermittent renewable sources without compromising the reliability of the electric grid.41
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`NRDC’s tool also treats all “fossil energy” as an interchangeable abstract quantity,
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`unrelated to real-world facts about the energy system. The tacit assumption of NRDC’s
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`equations is that projects should be judged by how far they would go toward meeting some
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`abstract, undifferentiated “unmet fossil energy demand” assumed to exist in a scenario
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`where the world reaches a particular climate goal. Thus, if a project “supplies” a relatively
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`small slice of total “unmet fossil energy demand” across the entire energy system, its
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`emissions are deemed more “significant” (regardless of the absolute scale of those
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`emissions).42
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`40 Dan Tong et al., Committed Emissions from Existing Energy Infrastructure Jeopardize 1.5 ºC Climate
`Target, 572 Nature 373, 376-77 (2019); cf. NRDC Reply Comments, Exhibit A at 8 & n.17 (noting that “data
`for committed emissions . . . came from Tong et al.”); NRDC Reply Comments, Exhibit B at SI-12 & n.15
`(“Committed emissions from energy infrastructure assets were reported as time series data for the U.S. and
`other 2018-2070 from Tong et al.”).
`41 The EIA data cited by NRDC shows that coal use, as a percentage of U.S. electricity generation, has been
`in decline since 2007. Natural gas is now the single greatest source of electric power in the U.S., and
`renewable energy is on track to pass nuclear power and then coal in the near future. U.S. Energy Info.
`Admin., April 2019 Monthly Energy Review at 124 (Apr. 25, 2019), https://bit.ly/3xvoQ0z. As described by
`PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. and the Midcontinent Independent System Operator, Inc. in their joint
`comments, natural gas is critical as a backstop to renewable power. Natural gas, including the addition of
`new gas-fired generation, is necessary to “meet ramping requirements and ensure system balance, given the
`intermittent nature of increasing weather-dependent renewable generation” and “to support resource
`adequacy during tight operating periods.” Reply Comments of PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. and
`Midcontinent Independent System Operator, Inc., Docket Nos. PL18-1-000 and PL21-3-000 at 2-3 (May 25,
`2022). In other words, contrary to the assumptions embedded in NRDC’s “climate test,” natural gas is a key
`component in any future reduction in U.S. GHG emissions. Id. at 3.
`42 Cf. NRDC Reply Comments, Exhibit B at SI-12 (reasoning that there is “less . . . need for [a] proposed
`project” if “existing energy system operations” are available to serve generalized fossil fuel demand).
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`But this “energy contribution” criterion bears no relationship to the purposes for
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`which projects are developed and the standards by which the Commission assesses them.
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`The purpose of a new natural gas infrastructure project is not to pour undifferentiated
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`“fossil energy” into an abstract system-wide total, but to serve concrete market needs for
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`natural gas. Whether a given project is needed—and, for that matter, whether it will
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`advance or impede GHG reduction goals in comparison to a scenario in which it is not
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`approved—has precisely nothing to do with aggregate system-wide levels of general “fossil
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`fuel energy” supply or demand. Consider, for example, a project designed to serve local
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`distribution companies (“LDCs”) on the East Coast that are currently facing capacity
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`constraints and where market data suggests that these LDCs’ customers would turn to
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`higher-emitting fuel oil in the absence of additional natural gas supplies.43 It would be
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`highly counterintuitive to suggest that this project’s merits (whether judged from a market-
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`need standpoint, a climate-policy standpoint, or otherwise) depend on how much coal-fired
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`electric generation capacity exists in Texas, or the demand for coal-fired electric generation
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`in Texas under a hypothetical “climate scenario.”44 Yet NRDC’s equations have precisely
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`that implication, and NRDC makes no effort to justify such strange logic. Given that the
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`relevance of NRDC’s chosen metrics to real-world decisionmaking (even decisionmaking
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`intended to optimize GHG emissions reductions) is by no means apparent, it is difficult to
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`43 Cf. Iroquois Gas Transmission Sys., L.P., 178 FERC ¶ 61,200 at P 56 (2022) (concluding that proposed
`project would reduce GHG emissions by displacing fuel oil usage).
`44 Put another way, if a decisionmaker were presented with a proposal to build a new natural gas infrastructure
`project and tasked with making a decision that would optimize climate-policy outcomes (even at the expense
`of other values), it is far from apparent why it would make sense to look to the project’s consistency with an
`abstract system-wide carbon efficiency target, rather than more intuitively relevant metrics, such as whether
`the energy needs met by the particular project would otherwise be satisfied through higher-emitting fuels.
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`13
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`avoid the suspicion that NRDC deliberately selected metrics that would virtually guarantee
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`“significance” verdicts that advance its anti-natural-gas agenda.45
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`In short, even if the Commission could ignore Congress’ clear directive to
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`“encourage the orderly development of plentiful supplies of . . . natural gas at reasonable
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`prices”46 and replace it with a mandate to advance NRDC’s preferred climate goals, NRDC
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`fails to explain why the calculations it proposes would be “useful[] . . . to the
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`decisionmaking process” in FERC’s project-level infrastructure reviews.47 All told,
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`NRDC’s climate tool amounts to nothing more than a plea for the Commission to
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`improperly adopt NRDC’s preferred climate goals, then assess proposed projects using a
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`metric that bears no apparent connection to whether those individual projects would
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`actually promote or inhibit GHG emissions reductions—but that conveniently disfavors
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`approval of new projects in virtually all cases, as NRDC candidly admits.48
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`C.
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`NRDC’s “climate test” does not facilitate “significance determinations” within
`NEPA’s meaning.
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`As explained above, NRDC’s “climate tool” improperly invites the Commission to
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`adopt national climate- and energy-policy goals, and fails on its own terms to provide a
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`45 To be sure, there is no straightforward connection between “significance” metrics and the Commission’s
`substantive decisions to grant, deny, or condition certificates of public convenience and necessity. A
`determination that a project’s GHG emissions are “significant” would normally be made in a NEPA
`document and would have no inherent relevance to the Commission’s substantive decisionmaking under the
`NGA. Accord Draft GHG Policy Statement at P 108 (recognizing that “NEPA does not preclude the
`Commission from approving a project with significant adverse impacts”); cf. Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., 178
`FERC ¶ 61,199 at P 3 (Phillips & Christie, Comm’rs, concurring) (explaining that “an undue focus on
`drawing a bright line between ‘significance’ and ‘insignificance’ would appear to elevate form over
`substance”). Be that as it may, NRDC’s goal in proposing its “climate test” is apparent: it hopes FERC will
`ultimately determine that the climate impacts of natural gas projects are so significant (perhaps by being
`purportedly “inconsistent” with certain climate goals) as to render those projects not within the public
`convenience and necessity, thereby advancing NRDC’s anti-natural-gas policy agenda.
`46 NAACP, 425 U.S. at 6