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`VIA ELECTRONIC FILING
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`February 23, 2022
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`Kimberly D. Bose, Secretary
`Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
`888 First Street, NE
`Washington, DC 20436
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`Re: Docket No. RM22-5-000 – Errata to Comments of Public Interest Organizations
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`Dear Secretary Bose:
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`On February 22, 2022, Earthjustice, Sierra Club, POWER Interfaith, Clean Air Council,
`and Friends of the Earth (“PIOs”) submitted initial comments in response to the Commission’s
`Notice of Inquiry seeking comments on the rate recovery, reporting, and accounting treatment of
`industry association dues and certain civic, political, and related expenses in the above-captioned
`docket.1
`
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`The PIOs submit this errata to correct an inadvertent clerical error in the signature blocks
`within this filing. The errata does not change any of the conclusions or content of the comments
`or exhibits. If you have any questions regarding this errata, please contact the undersigned.
`
`
`Respectfully submitted,
`
`/s/ Rebecca Barker
`Rebecca Barker
`Associate Attorney
`Earthjustice
`50 California St., Suite 500
`San Francisco, CA 94111
`rbarker@earthjustice.org
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`
`
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`1 Comments of Public Interest Organizations (Feb. 22, 2022), Accession No. 20220222-5357; Rate
`Recovery, Reporting, and Acct. Treatment of Industry Ass’n Dues and Certain Civic, Pol., and Related
`Expenses, 177 FERC ¶ 61,180 (Dec. 16, 2021).
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`C A L I F O R N I A O F F I C E 5 0 C A L I F O R N I A S T R E E T , S U I T E 5 0 0 , S A N F R A N C I S C O , C A 9 4 1 1 1
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`T : 4 1 5 . 2 1 7 . 2 0 0 0 C A O F F I C E @ E A R T H J U S T I C E . O R G W W W . E A R T H J U S T I C E . O R G
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`

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`UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
`BEFORE THE
`FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION
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`Rate Recovery, Reporting, and Accounting
`Treatment of Industry Association Dues and
`Certain Civic, Political, and Related Expenses
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`Docket No. RM22-5-000
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`CORRECTED COMMENTS OF PUBLIC INTEREST ORGANIZATIONS
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`FEBRUARY 22, 2022
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................... 1
`QUESTION 1.................................................................................................................................. 3
`QUESTION 2.................................................................................................................................. 3
`QUESTION 3.................................................................................................................................. 3
`QUESTION 4.................................................................................................................................. 4
`QUESTION 5.................................................................................................................................. 5
`QUESTION 6.................................................................................................................................. 7
`QUESTION 7................................................................................................................................ 14
`QUESTION 8................................................................................................................................ 14
`QUESTION 9................................................................................................................................ 15
`QUESTION 10.............................................................................................................................. 15
`QUESTION 11.............................................................................................................................. 15
`QUESTION 12.............................................................................................................................. 16
`A. Promotional and Political Advertising ............................................................................... 16
`B. Legal Expenses .................................................................................................................. 20
`QUESTION 13.............................................................................................................................. 21
`QUESTION 14.............................................................................................................................. 24
`QUESTION 15.............................................................................................................................. 25
`QUESTION 16.............................................................................................................................. 29
`QUESTION 17.............................................................................................................................. 32
`A. Federal and state legislative advocacy ............................................................................... 34
`B. Local legislative advocacy ................................................................................................. 38
`C. Regulatory advocacy .......................................................................................................... 40
`D. Model building code and appliance standard advocacy .................................................... 44
`QUESTION 18.............................................................................................................................. 46
`QUESTION 19.............................................................................................................................. 46
`QUESTION 20.............................................................................................................................. 46
`QUESTION 21.............................................................................................................................. 54
`QUESTION 22.............................................................................................................................. 55
`CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................. 60
`i
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`INTRODUCTION
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`On December 16, 2021, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) issued a
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`Notice of Inquiry (“NOI”) seeking comments on the rate recovery, reporting, and accounting
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`treatment of industry association dues and certain civic, political, and related expenses.
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`Pursuant to Rule 211 of the Commission’s Rules of Practice and Procedure and the NOI,
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`Earthjustice, Sierra Club, Clean Air Council, POWER Interfaith, and Friends of the Earth
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`(collectively, “Public Interest Organizations”) timely file these comments.1 Public Interest
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`Organizations commend the Commission for undertaking an examination of these issues,
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`which are critical to protection of consumers and the integrity of the regulatory process. The
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`Commission’s questions probe many issues that have evaded public scrutiny; we look forward
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`to reviewing the submissions and filing reply comments.
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`Trade associations like the Edison Electric Institute (“EEI”) and American Gas
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`Association (“AGA”) act in the interests of their corporate members, which are often contrary
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`to the interests of those members’ captive ratepayers. However, captive ratepayers are
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`currently footing the bill for the lion’s share of EEI and AGA’s activities, even though they are
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`unregulated entities whose expenditures escape regulators’ scrutiny. Under the status quo,
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`ratepayers often bear the cost of trade associations’ policy advocacy, including costs of
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`political activity that a utility would book to a shareholder-funded account if the utility were
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`conducting the same advocacy itself.
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`To ensure just and reasonable rates, the Commission should revise the Uniform System
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`of Accounts (“USofA”) to require utilities using the USofA to book trade association dues in
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`1 18 C.F.R. § 385.211; Rate Recovery, Reporting, and Acct. Treatment of Industry Ass’n Dues and
`Certain Civic, Pol., and Related Expenses, 177 FERC ¶ 61,180 (Dec. 16, 2021) (NOI setting comment
`due date at 5:00 pm Eastern time on February 22, 2022) (“NOI”).
`1
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`an account that is presumptively not recoverable from ratepayers. FERC should also clarify
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`the impact of moving trade association dues to a presumptively below-the-line account by
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`providing guidance on what the utilities would need to show to establish that recovery is
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`appropriate. Public Interest Organizations recommend that FERC recognize the following
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`specific categories of expenses as being inappropriate for ratepayer recovery: the political and
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`civic activity that a utility would be required to book to Account 426.4, donations, promotional
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`advertising, and legal advocacy. This guidance could help avoid burdensome re-litigation of
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`these issues and improper recovery of the costs of the associations’ diverse political activities.
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`In addition, FERC should require annual disclosures of a utility’s donations to
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`charitable, social and community welfare organizations. These donations sometimes serve as a
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`policy advocacy tool and in many jurisdictions ratepayers have no transparency regarding
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`them. Although we are unaware of any circumstances under which it would be appropriate for
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`utilities to recover their donations from ratepayers, any recovery of donations without
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`transparency is a threat to just and reasonable rates.
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`2
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`QUESTION 1
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` The CBD Petition, in an example it argues is emblematic of practices among other
`industry associations, asserts that during the period when the EEI budget was
`subject to audits by the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners
`(NARUC), "EEI was spending up to 50% of its income on advocacy and lobbying
`efforts." The Solar Energy Industries Association contends that in at least one
`instance, an investor owned utility's EEI invoice noted only 7% of its membership
`dues related to influencing legislation. The investor-owned utility therefore recorded
`93% of its EEI dues to Account 930.2.
`(a)
`For the three most recent fiscal years, what are the annual dues charged to
`individual utilities for their membership in each industry association for
`which utilities seek recovery in rates?
`(b) What percentage of industry association dues did industry association
`utility members classify and book as operating and nonoperating for the
`three most recent fiscal years?
`(c) What percentage of EEI dues did members classify as operating and
`nonoperating in the last three years subject to a NARUC audit? What are
`the reasons for any difference between these amounts and the percentages
`in question 1?
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`No comments at this time.
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`QUESTION 2
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`What methodologies do industry associations use to apportion industry association
`operating budgets into dues among member companies? To what extent are industry
`association expenses assigned and apportioned based on member classes or sectors
`and/or directly assigned to specific members, and if so, what are the bases for such
`assignment/apportionment and/or direct assignment?
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`No comments at this time.
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`QUESTION 3
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`What internal controls and accounting methodologies are used by industry
`associations to track their costs generally and specifically to determine how costs are
`billed to members? In addition:
`(a) What cost categories are used in budgetary and accounting processes
`internal to industry associations to account for industry association dues?
`What were the budgets by cost category for the three most recent fiscal
`years?
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`(c)
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`(b) What processes do industry associations use to derive and inform utilities
`of their categorization of programs to allow the utilities to apportion their
`dues among various accounting classifications?
`How do industry associations derive and inform all jurisdictional
`companies of the portion of the total invoice payments associated with
`lobbying, public outreach on legislative and regulatory issues, and other
`categories of costs not recovered through rates?
`To what extent is information of any such methodologies or the underlying
`budgetary information shared with industry association members?
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`(d)
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`The internal controls and accounting methodologies used by industry associations are
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`not generally transparent to the public or state regulators. However, evidence exists that
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`industry associations do not always track their costs in ways that would enable state regulators
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`to determine what percentage of claimed costs are allowable. For example, a 2021 order from
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`the Kentucky Public Service Commission (“KPSC”), denied recovery of dues paid by a utility
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`to the EEI based in part on a letter from EEI noting that “EEI does not separately account for
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`activities that could be described as ‘regulatory advocacy, and public relations.’”2 The KPSC
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`noted that it had explicitly denied recovery of “regulatory advocacy and public relations” cost
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`categories in the past, and without an accounting of how those expenses contributed to overall
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`dues included in the utility’s revenue requirement, denial of recovery for all the dues was
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`appropriate. This example suggests that more detailed accounting of costs, or more
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`transparency regarding this accounting, is required to justify recovery of any trade association
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`fees or dues.
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`QUESTION 4
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`To what extent do industry associations provide utilities with estimated itemized
`expenses in dues invoices? To what extent do the associations conduct reviews or
`other activities to determine and evaluate the actual level of cost incurred related to
`influencing legislation and lobbying expenses, and compare such actual levels to the
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`2 Order at 25–26, Case No. 2020-00349 (KPSC June 30, 2021),
`http://psc.ky.gov/pscscf/2020%20Cases/2020-00349/20210630_PSC_ORDER.pdf.
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`estimated percentages of such activities provided to jurisdictional companies? What
`is the frequency and scope of such reviews or activities and how were the results
`used? Please identify and explain any substantial impediments to, or industry
`association concerns with, providing utilities detailed information on the percentage
`of the association's charges attributable to civic, political, public outreach on
`legislative and regulatory issues, and similar activities.
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`No comments at this time.
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`QUESTION 5
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`For industry associations, what is the nature of the activities and associated costs that
`fall into the following categories, and for each item, what percentage of the associated
`costs is classified as operating expense by the utility members:
`(a)
`Engineering or reliability standards development;
`(b)
`Legislative affairs including: (i) political contributions; (ii) following
`legislative events and informing members; (iii) preparation and research in
`connection with correspondence with legislators, their staff, or legislative
`committees; and (iv) correspondence with legislators, their staff, or
`legislative committees;
`Financial support of other organizations (list organizations with
`corresponding contributions);
`Public information or outreach related to: (i) safety; (ii) promotion of
`utilities; (iii) existing or potential state or federal environmental regulations
`and/or laws; (iv) proceedings at FERC or before other administrative
`agencies; or (iv) other subjects
`(describe each element with corresponding expenditures);
`Training for: (i) employee safety; (ii) accounting; (iv) planning; (v);
`reliability/resilience; (vi) market participation; and (vii) other (describe
`each element with corresponding expenditure);
`Regulatory affairs including: (i) participation in regulatory proceedings
`including listing each proceeding and its primary issue(s); (ii) research
`conducted for regulatory proceedings; (iii) following regulatory
`proceedings; (iv) informing members of regulatory proceedings;
`(g) Meetings/conferences (to the extent not covered in the other categories
`listed here);
`Administrative costs including rents and other overhead; and
`Other (describe each element with corresponding expenditure).
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`(c)
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`(d)
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`(e)
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`(f)
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`(h)
`(i)
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`These comments focus on AGA as case study for the many strategies trade associations
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`deploy to influence policy, within almost all of the cost categories listed in this question. It is
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`important to note that other trade associations also use the same advocacy tools.
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`Information related to the nature and extent of trade associations’ spending on the
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`following categories is included in response to other questions in this NOI:
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`- Legislative affairs – Response to Question 17;
`- Financial support for other organizations – Responses to Questions 17 & 20;
`- Public information and outreach – Responses to Questions 12 & 17;
`- Training – Responses to Questions 17 & 20;
`- Regulatory affairs – Response to Question 17; and
`- Meetings/conferences – Response to Question 20.
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`Information related to an additional category of expenditure—specifically, legal costs—is
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`included in response to Question 12.
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`Though these comments focus on the associations’ activities to influence policy, the
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`presumption against ratepayer recovery should extend to all areas of association activity. For
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`example, AGA’s payments for first-class air travel for its chairman should not be
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`presumptively recoverable, regardless of whether the chairman is traveling for lobbying
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`purposes.3
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`As a general matter, FERC should also recognize that interdepartmental coordination
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`on policy campaigns can make it impossible to isolate the role of any particular department in
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`advancing a trade association’s goals. For example, in a March 2020 AGA leadership call,
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`AGA Vice President of Advocacy and Outreach Sue Forrester explained that the association
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`has an interdepartmental working group specifically devoted to fighting deep decarbonization
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`policies in the residential sector, such as bans on gas line extensions: “we have an
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`3 See AGA, Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) Form 990, Schedule J at 3 (2017) (“The chairman of the
`board of directors and spouse are authorized for first class travel.”),
`https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/5676895-American-Gas-Association-AGA-2017-Form-
`990.html#document/p37.
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`interdepartmental working group that includes our comms group, our federal and state affairs
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`folks, our legal department, our code department, our analysis and market analysis group. And
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`so we’re meeting regularly to continue moving our strategy forward, make tweaks necessary,
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`get social media up where we need to have it but we are again trying to match what the
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`environmentalists are showing us....”4 This example illustrates how even technical staff that
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`work in parts of AGA like the code department, analysis and market analysis group are
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`deploying their expertise for political purposes.
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`QUESTION 6
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`What mechanisms currently exist for stakeholders to examine the costs and activities
`of industry associations?
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`In most states, parties to a utility’s general rate case can request discovery from the
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`utility relating to any of the expenses for which it is seeking recovery. Thus, at a baseline
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`level, discovery in state rate proceedings is currently the best avenue for stakeholders to
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`examine the costs and activities of industry associations for whose dues any given utility is
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`seeking recovery. Unfortunately, this avenue is extremely limited, for a couple of principal
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`reasons.
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`First, industry associations are not subject directly to discovery in rate proceedings. As
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`a result, the only entity from which public advocates can request information is the utility
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`applying for recovery of the dues. Utilities usually do not have the full information from
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`industry associations about how their dues are spent. As a result, requests for information on
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`the specific spending activities of industry associations will often be met with responses that
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`4 Full Transcript: AGA Leadership Conference Call March 31, 2020, Energy and Pol’y Inst. (hosting
`the call transcript, original audio, and presentation slides for AGA call) (“AGA March 2020 Leadership
`Conference Call”), https://www.energyandpolicy.org/full-transcript-aga-leadership-conference-call-
`march-31st-2020/.
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`amount to stonewalling. For instance, trade associations often will prepare “invoices” that
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`identify some small portion of their activities as relating to “lobbying” or “political” activities,
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`but do not offer any information on how this was calculated. Instead, state commissions are
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`often inclined to take on faith that the industry associations have appropriately separated their
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`expenses into those that are recoverable from ratepayers and those that are not.
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`There have been multiple occasions where commissions have relied upon the
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`associations’ invoices as the utilities’ justification for rate recovery. For instance, in its 2018
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`rate proceeding, DTE Electric Company (“DTE”) requested $1,269,000, as an above-the-line
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`expense for membership dues to EEI.5 DTE relied exclusively upon EEI’s invoice to
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`determine the amount of funds to be recoverable from ratepayers: DTE did not provide any
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`additional information proving that the membership dues paid by DTE went to activities that
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`directly benefited ratepayers. In the absence of proof showing the EEI dues benefited
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`ratepayers and were just and reasonable, consumer and environmental advocates recommended
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`that the full dues amount be considered a below-the-line expense;6 and the Administrative Law
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`Judge in that case agreed, recommending that the dues be disallowed.7 However, the Michigan
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`Public Service Commission approved the dues because allowing membership dues was
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`“consistent” with past practices, and because advocates could not provide specific evidence
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`that EEI’s invoices had improperly included nonrecoverable amounts.8
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`5 Comments of Pub. Interest Orgs., at Table A: Associational Dues State Examples, Docket No. RM21-
`15-000 (Apr. 26, 2021) (“Comments of PIOs”), Accession No. 20210426-5310.
`6 Direct Testimony of Karl R. Rábago on Behalf of Natural Resources Defense Council, Michigan
`Environmental Council, and Sierra Club, In the Matter of the Application of DTE Elec. Co., Case No.
`U-20162 (Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm’n Nov. 7, 2018).
`7 Notice of Proposal for Decision, at 174, Case No. U-20162 (Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm’n Mar. 6, 2019).
`8 Order, Case No. U-20162 (Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm’n May 2, 2019).
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`Similarly, in 2018 before the New York Public Service Commission (“NYPSC”),
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`Orange and Rockland Utilities (“O&R”) requested recovery of $262,382 in membership dues
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`to EEI and AGA.9 In the course of defending these expenditures as recoverable, O&R refused
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`NYPSC staff’s discovery request to provide more information regarding these associations’
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`budgets. Instead, the only justification O&R provided for requiring customers to pay for the
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`EEI and AGA membership dues was unverified information from the associations’ invoicing
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`clerks.10 Again a consumer advocate sought to disallow these expenses, noting that “[w]ithout
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`transparency of spending data, it is difficult to fully understand how EEI and AGA spend
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`ratepayer funds.”11 And again, the NYPSC allowed the dues based off of the invoices, not
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`wanting to upset the balance of a proposed settlement in that case.12
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`This also happened in the California Public Utility Commission (“CPUC”) proceeding
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`involving San Diego Gas & Electric’s (“SDG&E”) request for EEI dues of $732,000.13 The
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`CPUC took on faith an invoice from EEI to the SDG&E identifying only 13% of its activities
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`as being related to lobbying, even though the CPUC had previously “disallowed recovery of
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`43.3 percent of EEI dues based on data audited by the National Association of Regulatory
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`Utility Commissioners.”14 In the absence of more detailed data regarding the remaining 87%
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`of EEI’s invoiced activities, the public advocate’s challenge in that case was denied based on
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`9 Comments of PIOs at Table A: Associational Dues State Examples.
`10 Direct Testimony of Karl R. Rábago on Behalf of Pace Energy and Climate Center, Proceeding on
`Motion of the Commission as to the Rates, Charges, Rules and Regulations of Orange and Rockland
`Utilities, Inc. for Electric Service, Case No. 18-G-0068 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n May 25, 2018)
`11 Id. at 61:6–7.
`12 Order Adopting Terms of Joint Proposal and Establishing Electric and Gas Rate Plans, at 77 n.166,
`Case No. 18-G-0068 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n March 14, 2019).
`13 Comments of PIOs at Table A: Associational Dues State Examples.
`14 Decision Addressing the Test Year 2019 General Rate Case of SDG&E and Southern California Gas
`Co., at 556–557, A.17-10-007 (CPUC Sept. 26, 2019),
`https://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/Published/G000/M315/K278/315278414.pdf.
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`the “best evidence” rule. This last case illustrates clearly the gap between the information
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`public advocates can reasonably collect through discovery, and the quality of evidence state
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`commissions often expect in order to disallow further recovery of industry associational dues.
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`Second, rate cases often proceed in a rapid manner, addressing a huge number and
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`complexity of topics in a matter of months, and it is not always feasible for public advocates to
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`push for more comprehensive accounting of associational dues. Even where a utility does
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`provide a timely response to any discovery requests, getting more than the prepared
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`stonewalled responses described above will generally requires: a) sending a letter to the utility
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`requesting additional information beyond what they originally provided; b) meeting with utility
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`attorneys to confer on the request; c) potentially filing a motion to compel the presentation of
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`additional information, and completing that briefing; d) awaiting a ruling from the relevant
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`commission or administrative law judge; and e) fielding any number of objections along the
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`way from the utility, industry association, or both. In one example, public advocates in a
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`KPSC review of Louisville Gas and Electric Company’s (“LG&E”) rate proceeding requested
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`detailed information of how EEI spent membership dues that came to it from LG&E, and in its
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`response LG&E shared a series of back-and-forth emails in which EEI admitted that because it
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`is not required under the Internal Revenue Code (“IRC”) to track its spending in more detail, it
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`did not do so.15 Thus, the public advocates in that case were not able to access the detailed
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`information that would have allowed the KPSC to review thoroughly the expenditures.
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`Fortunately, that case was resolved with the KPSC continuing to place the burden on the
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`LG&E to justify its expenses: because it could not do so, the KPSC disallowed all recovery of
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`15 LG&E Response to Joint Suppl. Data Reqs. of the Attorney General and KIUC to Question No. 42,
`Attach. 2, at 3–4, Case No. 2020-00350 (Feb. 5, 2021), https://psc.ky.gov/pscecf/2020-
`00350/rick.lovekamp%40lge-ku.com/02192021010947/03-AG-KIUC_DR2_LGE_Responses-
`Vol_1_of_2%28Q42-Q82%29.pdf.
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`the LG&E’s dues to EEI.16 This is a perfect example of how powerful shifting the burden of
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`proof can be for public advocates seeking to prevent undue charges to ratepayers.
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`Third, although they are significant in an absolute sense, industry association dues are
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`usually dwarfed by the overall recovery utilities are seeking from state commissions to serve
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`their ratepayers, and as a result the issue of industry associational dues is often not addressed
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`fully in its own right. Sometimes this occurs in the context of a “compromise” or “estimate”
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`decision by a state commission. In Wisconsin Electric Power Company and Wisconsin Gas’s
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`2019 rate case, for instance, the Wisconsin Public Service Commission (“WI PSC”) was
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`willing to rely on an incomplete audit and a “historical recovery percentage authorized for
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`various dues and memberships” to determine the amount of association dues recoverable,17
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`over the objection of an environmental advocate that had argued that “the percentages applied
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`ha[d] no evidentiary basis connecting them to any ratepayer benefits.”18 And this suboptimal
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`treatment of industry association dues can be quite explicit: the Commission in Wisconsin also
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`declined to impose any restriction on recovery for dues to industry associations whose amounts
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`fell below what the WI PSC called the “materiality threshold.”19 In other words, the WI PSC
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`refused even to consider several industry association dues issues because they were simply so
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`small compared to Wisconsin Electric Power Company and Wisconsin Gas’s overall recovery.
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`Even more concerningly (and occurring more often), when utilities come in with
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`presumptive recovery for associational dues, they tend to get swept by default into any joint
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`proposals by utilities and intervening parties. In such cases, commissions do not even always
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`16 Order, Case No. 2020-00350 (KPSC June 30, 2021), https://psc.ky.gov/pscscf/2020%20Cases/2020-
`00350//20210630_PSC_ORDER.pdf.
`17 Final Decision at 56, Docket No. 5-UR-109 (WI PSC Dec. 19, 2019) (“WI PSC Dec 2019 Final
`Decision”), PSC REF# 381305, https://apps.psc.wi.gov/ERF/ERFview/viewdoc.aspx?docid=381305.
`18 Sierra Club’s Initial Posthearing Br. ¶ 25, Docket No. 5-UR-109 (WI PSC Oct. 18, 2019).
`19 WI PSC Dec 2019 Final Decision at 55–58.
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`engage in questions raised by advocates, thereby effectively adhering blindly to industry
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`accounting. For instance, in Consolidated Edison’s (“ConEd”) 2019 rate case, a consumer
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`advocate challenged Consolidated Edison’s recovery of $1,623,470 in dues to EEI and AGA,20
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`arguing that ConEd’s reliance on invoices as justification for charging ratepayers was
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`problematic because there had been no verification that the invoices from the associations were
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`true and correct. The NYPSC did not even address this issue in its final order, instead fully
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`approving a joint proposal that made no discernible changes to ConEd’s recovery of dues.
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`The difficulty public advocates have faced in collecting useful discovery relating to
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`utilities’ associational dues is problematic because utilities have largely (but not exclusively,
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`per the example above) succeeded in shifting the burden to other parties to disprove the
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`reasonableness of recovering their full trade association dues (minus the portion designated as
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`meeting the Internal Revenue Code’s definition of lobbying), even in states with policies
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`limiting ratepayer recovery of these expenses. The Wisconsin case is a prime example of this:
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`part of the basis for the WI PSC’s decision was that the advocate challenging recovery of these
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`dues had failed to present evidence to back its claim that customers received no benefit from
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`association expenditures.21
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`Furthermore, even when public advocates can successfully raise the issue of
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`associational dues, they must do so again and again whenever utilities come in or commissions
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`may not take up the issue. For example, the New Mexico Public Regulation Commission’s
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`(“NM PRC”) rules limit utilities to recovering the portion of trade association dues that
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`20 Direct Testimony of Karl R. Rábago on Behalf of Pace Energy and Climate Center, Case Nos. 19-E-
`0065 & 19-G-006 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n May 24, 2019).
`21 WI PSC Dec 2019 Final Decision at 57.
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`contribute to its employees’ professional education and standing.22 Thus, Southwestern Public
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`Service Company’s (“SPS”) 2017 rate case ran into difficulties when it sought to fully recover
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`its EEI and other industry association dues without showing that some portion of these dues
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`were related to professional education and standing. The NM PRC disallowed these costs after
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`the state Attorney General and staff litigated this issue, noting that it is not the NM PRC’s job
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`to sift through the SPS’s payments to groups like EEI, the National Petroleum Council, and the
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`Denver Coal Club to identify properly recoverable costs.23 However, in El Paso Electric
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`Company’s (“EPE”) most recent rate case in New Mexico, no party challenged the company’s
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`request to recover dues to EEI, various chambers of commerce, and other industry associations,
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`and so they were recovered. EPE’s application noted that it was no