Case 6:21-cv-01947-PGB-EJK Document 2 Filed 11/18/21 Page 1 of 32 PageID 24
`
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
`ORI,ANDO DIVISION
`
`OPS INTERNATIONAL, INC., d/b/A
`OLYMPIA PHARMACY. a Florida
`corporation,
`
`Plaintiff.
`
`CASE NO.:
`
`CONFIDENCE EKEANYANWU and
`KENECHUKWU OKORO.
`
`Defendants.
`
`VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTTVE RELIEF AND DAMAGES
`
`Plaintiff. OPS INTERNATIONAL. INC. d/b/a OL\"A4PIA PHARMACY
`
`('OPS"), by and through counsel, hereby sues Defendants, CONFIDENCE
`
`EKEANYANWU ("Ekeanyanwu") and KENECHUKWU OKORO ("Okoro"),
`
`and alleges as follows:
`
`NATURE OF ACTION
`1. This is an action by OPS against Ekeanyanwu and Okoro for
`
`vi.olations of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act ('CFAA"), 18 U.S.C. $ 1030 el
`
`seq., the Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, 18 U.S.C. S 1836(b), Florida's
`
`Uniform Trade Secrets Act - Chapter 688, Florida Statutes, as well as breach
`
`ofduty ofloyalty, breach offiduciary duty, and fraud
`2. Specifrcally, OPS seeks to: (a) enjoin Ekeanyanwu and Okoro from
`
`
`
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
`ORI,ANDO DIVISION
`
`OPS INTERNATIONAL, INC., d/b/A
`OLYMPIA PHARMACY. a Florida
`corporation,
`
`Plaintiff.
`
`CASE NO.:
`
`CONFIDENCE EKEANYANWU and
`KENECHUKWU OKORO.
`
`Defendants.
`
`VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTTVE RELIEF AND DAMAGES
`
`Plaintiff. OPS INTERNATIONAL. INC. d/b/a OL\"A4PIA PHARMACY
`
`('OPS"), by and through counsel, hereby sues Defendants, CONFIDENCE
`
`EKEANYANWU ("Ekeanyanwu") and KENECHUKWU OKORO ("Okoro"),
`
`and alleges as follows:
`
`NATURE OF ACTION
`1. This is an action by OPS against Ekeanyanwu and Okoro for
`
`vi.olations of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act ('CFAA"), 18 U.S.C. $ 1030 el
`
`seq., the Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, 18 U.S.C. S 1836(b), Florida's
`
`Uniform Trade Secrets Act - Chapter 688, Florida Statutes, as well as breach
`
`ofduty ofloyalty, breach offiduciary duty, and fraud
`2. Specifrcally, OPS seeks to: (a) enjoin Ekeanyanwu and Okoro from
`
`
`
`Case 6:21-cv-01947-PGB-EJK Document 2 Filed 11/18/21 Page 2 of 32 PageID 25
`
`using or disclosing any of OPS'business, client or prospective client, pricing,
`
`financial, operations, marketing, or contract information, forms, or models that
`
`are not made readily available to the public, ft) compel them to return OPS'
`
`confidential and proprietary information, including OPS' trade secrets, that
`
`they accessed, obtained and/or retained in violation ofthe OPS'computer and
`confidentiality policies applicable to Ekeanyanwu and Okoro, and the
`
`Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, and in violation of the federal Defend Trade
`
`Secrets Act and Florida's Uniform Trade Secrets Act, (c) to enjoin them
`
`contacting, soliciting,
`
`or
`
`accepting business from any current, former or
`
`prospective customer or vendor of OPS over the multi-year period prior to the
`
`cessation of their employment with OPS, (d) to compel Ekeanyanwu to abide
`
`by her legal and fiduciary obligations to OPS, and (e) for such other
`
`preliminary and permanent injunctive relief as the Court deems appropriate.
`
`Finally, the action seeks damages resulting from the wrongdoing and
`
`fraudulent actions ofthe Ekeanyanwu and Okoro.
`3. This action, along with the incorporated request for both
`
`preliminary and permanent injunctive relief, is necessary to protect OPS, and
`
`its clients, vendors and employees, from the potential use or disclosure of
`
`information, including confidential, proprietary and trade secret and, at times,
`
`personal information, that Ekeanyanwu and Okoro wrongfully obtained from
`
`OPS' protected computer systems and that concern OPS, its clients and
`
`2
`
`
`
`Case 6:21-cv-01947-PGB-EJK Document 2 Filed 11/18/21 Page 3 of 32 PageID 26
`
`potential clients, its business and its employees. Despite having been educated
`
`about OPS' policies protecting such information and agreeing to honor those
`
`policies, Ekeanyanwu and Okoro illegally accessed and/or downloaded and
`
`otherwise copied and transferred, information of value from OPS' computer
`
`systems in the weeks and days before their employment ceased, and they are
`
`now in a position to wrongfully use or disclose that information unless they are
`
`enjoined from doing so. Ekeanyanwu and Okoro are in a position to wrongfully
`
`use. disclose or otherwise benefit from that information and from violation of
`
`their legal obligations to OPS unless it they are enjoined from doing so.
`
`PARTIES
`4. OPS is a Florida corporation that operates a compounding
`
`pharmacy and FDA Outsourcing Facility. OPS maintains its principal place of
`
`business at 6700 Conroy Road, Suite 155, Orlando, Florida 32835.
`5. Defendant, Ekeanyanwu was employed by OPS at its Quality and
`
`Regulatory Manager from December 1,2014, until her termination on July 15,
`
`2021. Ekeanyanwu's last known residential address is 10622 Emerald Chase
`Drive, Orlando, Florida 32836-5877. At the time of her termination
`
`Ekeanyanwu worked out ofOPS'corporate headquarters in Orlando, Florida.
`6. Okoro was also employed by OPS from January 15, 2018, until his
`
`termination on July 15,2021. He was hired as a supply clerk in the Iogistics
`
`department and was later promoted to Supply Chain and Data Manager.
`
`-)
`
`
`
`Case 6:21-cv-01947-PGB-EJK Document 2 Filed 11/18/21 Page 4 of 32 PageID 27
`
`Okoro is the husband of Ekeanyanwu and his Iast known residential address
`
`is 10622 Emerald Chase Drive. Orlando. Florida 32836-5877. He worked out
`
`of a different OPS facility, located at 4600 L.B. McCloud Rd. Orlando, Florida
`
`328t1,-6454.
`
`JURISDICTION AND \IENUE
`
`7 .
`
`This Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this lawsuit
`
`under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S. C. $ 1030(9), which gives
`
`OPS civil remedies for Ekeanvanwu and Okoro's violations of the CFAA. Thus.
`
`this Court has original federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S. C. $
`
`1331.
`
`8. This Court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over all related
`
`state law claims under 28 U.S.C. S 1367. Declaratory and other relief is
`
`authorized by the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, as amended, 28 U.S.C.
`
`$S 2201 and2202.
`9. Venue is proper in this district pursuant to 28 U.S.C. $ 1391(b)
`because a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claims
`
`herein occurred in this district, or a substantial part ofthe property that is the
`
`subject of the action is situated in this judicial district. Venue also lies in this
`
`district pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1391G)(3) because Ekeanyanwu and Okoro
`
`reside in this district.
`
`4
`
`
`
`Case 6:21-cv-01947-PGB-EJK Document 2 Filed 11/18/21 Page 5 of 32 PageID 28
`
`GENERAL ALLEGATIONS
`
`OPS'Business
`
`10. For over a decade, OPS has been engaged in the business of
`
`providing pharmaceutical and related services to patients and physicians
`
`across the country.
`11. OPS provides an array of services in its highly-regulated and
`
`competitive industry. As a compounding pharmacy, OPS compounds patient-
`
`specific prescribed medications. As a FDA Outsourcing Facility, OPS provides
`
`compounded medications for use in doctors' offices, clinics and hospitals
`12. When OPS began operating as a FDA Outsourcing Facility in2014,
`it decided to create the specialized position of Quality and Regulatory
`
`Manager. The position would primarily be responsible for quality oversight of
`
`all aspects of pharmaceutical compounding, developing Standard Operating
`
`Procedures for OPS to ensure quality and regulatory compliance, interfacing
`
`with regulators and facilitating the exchange of information, and ensuring
`compliance with Current Good Manufacturing Practices on the FDA
`
`Outsourcing Facility side ofthe business
`13. Ekeanyanwu was hired by OPS for the position of Quality and
`Regulatory Manager and commenced working in that role on December 1,
`
`20t4.
`
`14. As OPS' Quality and Regulatory Manager, Ekeanyanwu's
`
`5
`
`
`
`Case 6:21-cv-01947-PGB-EJK Document 2 Filed 11/18/21 Page 6 of 32 PageID 29
`
`responsibilities included ensuring the company's products met quality
`
`standards for distribution to the market and overseeing the development,
`
`testing, manufacturing, marketing and distribution of all products.
`
`15. In order to function in her role, Ekeanyanwu was given access to
`
`all of OPS' software systems, formulas, physicians and patient databases,
`
`marketing strategies, vendor information and contracts, compliance
`
`information, and other confidential and proprietary information.
`16. As OPS' Supply Chain and Data Manager, Okoro had access and
`
`was responsible for ordering and tracking the inventory ofraw chemicals used
`
`by OPS to compound medications, as well as its pharmaceutical supplies.
`
`Efforts bv OPS to Protect its Confidential Proprietarv Business
`Information and Svstems and Trade Secrets
`
`l7 . Employees. including Ekeanyanwu and Okoro, were acutely arvare
`
`of the highly confidential and proprietary information and trade secrets that
`
`would be encountered at OPS.
`18. By way of example, the OPS Employee Handbook that employees,
`
`including Ekeanyanwu and Okoro, received stated the following:
`Employees agree that they are subject to tOPS'l policies
`prohibiting the nonbusiness use or dissemination of [OPS']
`confidential business information. Employees will take all
`appropriate steps to safeguard [OPS'] confidential business
`information, including segregating it from personal papers and
`documents, not allowing nonemployees to access such information,
`and keeping such information in locked drawers or file cabinets
`when not in use. Employees wiII maintain confidential
`
`6
`
`
`
`Case 6:21-cv-01947-PGB-EJK Document 2 Filed 11/18/21 Page 7 of 32 PageID 30
`
`information, including, but not limited to, information regarding
`[OPS'] products or services, processing, marketing and sales client
`lists, client email addresses and mailing addresses, client data,
`orders memoranda, notes, records, technical data, sketches,
`designs, plans, drawings, trade secrets, research and development
`data, experimental work, proposals, new product and/or service
`developments, project reports, sources of supply and material,
`operating and cost data, and corporate financial information.
`19. The Employee Handbook also informed that disclosing confidential
`information was unacceptable and could lead to termination, as could
`
`unauthorized use of [OPS] intellectual property, such as audio and video tapes,
`
`print materials and software
`20. Further emphasizing confidentiality, the Employee Handbook
`
`advised of the following policy:
`
`During the course of work, employees may become aware of
`confidential information about OPS International's business,
`including but not limited to information regarding [OPS] finances,
`pricing, products and new product development, software and
`computer programs, marketing strategies, suppliers and
`customers and potential customers. Employees also may become
`aware of similar confidential information belonging to [OPS']
`clients. It is extremely important that all such information remain
`confidential, and particularly not be disclosed to OPS
`International Inc.'s competitors. Any employee who properly
`copies, removes (whether physically or electronicaliy), uses or
`discloses coniidential information to anyone outside [OPS] may be
`subject to disciplinary action up to and including termination.
`21. Employees, including Ekeanyanwu and Okoro, were required to
`
`return all of OPS' confidential and proprietary information pursuant to the
`
`Employee Handbook and knew of this obligation from the following policy:
`
`7
`
`
`
`Case 6:21-cv-01947-PGB-EJK Document 2 Filed 11/18/21 Page 8 of 32 PageID 31
`
`All [OPS] property inc]uding, but not limited to, keys, security
`cards, parking passes, laptop computers, fax machines, uniforms,
`etc., must be returned at separation. Employees must return all
`of [OPS'] Confidential Information upon separation.
`22. OPS also advised through the Employee Handbook that employees
`
`did not have any expectation of privacy if they stored personal information on
`
`their OPS equipment such as cell phones, desktop and laptop computers, as
`
`follows:
`
`[OPS'] communication and computer systems are intended
`primarily for business purposes; however limited personal usage
`is permitted if it does not hinder performance of job duties or
`violated any other [OPS] policy. This includes the voice mail, email
`and Internet systems. Users have no legitimate expectation of
`privacy in regard to their use of [OPS'] systems.
`
`OPS . . . may access the voice mail and e-mail systems and obtain
`the communications within the systems, including past voice mail
`and e-mail messages, without notice to useers of the system, in the
`ordinary course of business when [OPS] deems it appropriate to do
`so. The reasons for which the Company may obtain such access
`include, but are not limited to: maintaining the system; preventing
`or investing allegations of system abuse or misuse; assuring
`compliance with software copyright laws; complying with legal and
`regulatory requests for information; and ensuring that [OPS']
`operations continue appropriately during the employee's absence.
`23. Ekeanyanwu and Okoro executed formal acknowledgment that
`
`they had reviewed the Employee Handbook and understood the provisions set
`
`forth therein.
`24. Ekeanyanwu and Okoro's responsibility to maintain the
`
`confidential nature of OPS' proprietary information stemmed from another
`
`tt
`
`
`
`Case 6:21-cv-01947-PGB-EJK Document 2 Filed 11/18/21 Page 9 of 32 PageID 32
`
`aspect separate and apart from being employed by OPS. As OPS' Quality and
`
`Regulatory Manager, Ekeanyanwu owed a fiduciary obligation to OPS. Okoro,
`
`the Supply Chain and Data Manager, also owed frduciary obligations to OPS.
`
`25. Although Ekeanyanwu had some compliance background,
`
`throughout her employment at OPS, she was provided substantial and
`
`extraordinarily specialized training on compounding medications, as well as
`the management, financial, marketing and regulatory aspects of a
`
`compounding pharmacy and FDA Outsourcing Facility.
`26. OPS provided Ekeanyanwu and Okoro ongoing management and
`
`leadership training throughout their employment as they both became a more
`
`integral part of OPS.
`27. OPS provided Ekeanyanwu and Okoro, as senior level managers.
`
`with substantial confidential and proprietary resources developed by OPS
`
`through significant time, effort and expense. This valuable confidential
`
`business information and trade secret information included operations
`
`guidelines and/or manuals, processes and procedures, pricing, financial
`
`models, and other business planning and marketing strategies, confidential
`
`current and prospective physician, patient and clinic preferences, needs and
`
`requirements, and compliance and risk management processes and
`
`procedures. As a result of its high quality compounding services delivered by
`
`the utilization of these resources, OPS enjoys substantial goodwill in its
`
`9
`
`
`
`Case 6:21-cv-01947-PGB-EJK Document 2 Filed 11/18/21 Page 10 of 32 PageID 33
`
`industry associated with its ongoing business practices.
`28. Ekeanyanwu and Okoro, because of their respective positions and
`
`the level of trust that OPS placed in them, had access to for use in the course
`
`ofher work for OPS confidential. proprietary and trade secret information and
`
`other valuable information developed and belonging to OPS, much of which
`
`was maintained or communicated through OPS' computer systems and
`
`proglams
`
`Efforts by Ekeanyanwu and Okoro to Steal from OPS and Personally
`Gain from OPS' Goodwill and Proprietary Information
`29. On or around July 7, 2021, OPS learned that Ekeanyanwu and
`
`Okoro were stealing from and defrauding OPS for their personal financial gain.
`30. Specifically, while employed by OPS, Ekeanyanwu and Okoro were
`
`fraudulently invoicing OPS for supplies and then paying the fraudulent
`
`invoices with OPS' funds ("Fraudulent Invoicing Scheme").
`31. The Fraudulent Invoicing Scheme was run by Ekeanyanwu and
`Okoro using a shell company created to carry out the fraud. The shell
`
`company, Uttermedsales, LLC ("Uttermedsales"), a Florida limited liability
`
`company, was created in the name of Okoro.
`32. The Fraudulent Invoicing Scheme involved Ekeanyanwu and
`Okoro creating false invoices from Uttermedsales to OPS for supplies
`
`Ekeanyanwu and Okoro would then pay the fraudulent Uttermedsales invoices
`
`10
`
`
`
`Case 6:21-cv-01947-PGB-EJK Document 2 Filed 11/18/21 Page 11 of 32 PageID 34
`
`using OPS funds.
`
`33. Suspicion of the Fraudulent Invoicing Scheme began when one
`
`such Uttermedsales invoice was discovered by OPS on July 7,2021. A true and
`
`correct copy ofthe invoice is attached hereto as Exhibit "A."
`
`34. In addition to the Fraudulent Invoicing Scheme, Ekeanyanwu and
`
`Okoro carried out another fraudulent scheme wherein they altered and
`
`disseminated OPS' marketing materials to misrepresent
`
`relationship
`
`between OPS and another entity, Careplus Compounding, Inc. ("Careplus"), as
`
`another avenue for Ekeanyanwu and Okoro's personal financial gain
`
`("Fraudulent Marketing Scheme").
`35. Ekeanyanwu and Okoro implemented the Fraudulent Marketing
`
`Scheme to deceptively market and sell OPS'medications to third parties, while
`
`pocketing the revenue from the deceptive sales.
`36. Ekeanyanwu had created a Florida limited liability company in
`
`her own name, P.I.C. Healthcare-Industry Solutions, LLC ("PIC"), which is
`
`Iisted on the marketing materials.
`37. A friend of Ekeanyanwu, Akin Bakare ("Bakare"), created
`
`Careplus in early 2019, with Ekeanyanwu serving as its President. One ofthe
`
`Uttermedsales invoices (Exhibit "A") used in the Fraudulent Invoicing Scheme
`
`identifies Uttermedsales as a subsidiarv of Careplus.
`38. The Fraudulent Marketing Scheme involved Ekeanyanwu and
`
`1l
`
`
`
`Case 6:21-cv-01947-PGB-EJK Document 2 Filed 11/18/21 Page 12 of 32 PageID 35
`
`Okoro altering OPS' marketing materials to misrepresent a relationship
`
`between Careplus and OPS, with the OPS contact information also changed to
`
`the contact information for PIC ("Fraudulent Marketing Materials"). A true
`
`and correct copy of one example of the Fraudulent Marketing Materials is
`
`attached hereto as Exhibit "8."
`39. Ekeanyanwu and Okoro used the Fraudulent Marketing Materials
`
`to deceptively market and sell OPS' medications and raw material to third
`
`parties, while pocketing the revenue from the deceptive sales.
`40. Ekeanyanwu and Okoro also used PIC in other ways to generate
`
`revenue and misappropriate money from OPS ("Consulting and Fraudulent
`
`Sales Scheme").
`47. As one aspect of the Consulting and Fraudulent Sales Scheme,
`
`Ekeanyanwu entered into Consulting Agreements with competitors of OPS for
`
`the provision ofthe same compliance and regulatory services that Ekeanyanwu
`
`was providing to OPS, and utilizing the proprietary information and trade
`
`secrets obtained from OPS
`42. An example of one of the Consulting Agreements that
`Ekeanyanwu entered into is attached hereto as Exhibit "C." A copy of audit
`
`results of Ekeanyanwu's audit of Pure Pharmaceuticals, a competitor of OPS,
`
`is attached hereto as Exhibit "D."
`43. Ekeanyanwu's provision of these consulting services occurred
`
`t2
`
`
`
`Case 6:21-cv-01947-PGB-EJK Document 2 Filed 11/18/21 Page 13 of 32 PageID 36
`
`without OPS'knowledge and during Ekeanyanwu's employment with OPS.
`44. Ekeanyanwu would have been unable to provide these consulting
`
`services without access and utilization of OPS' confidential and proprietary
`
`information and trade secrets over the years and the goodwill that OPS had
`
`garnered in the compounding industry.
`45. The other aspect ofthe Consulting and Fraudulent Sales Scheme
`
`is far more disturbing than Ekeanyanwu moonlighting with OPS' competitors.
`46. Ekeanyanwu and Okoro, using the trust garnered from the
`
`goodwill of OPS and the confidential and proprietary information they
`
`obtained from OPS, illegally sold pharmaceuticals to OPS' competitors.
`47 . By way of example, following Ekeanyanwu's inspection of Pure
`
`Pharmaceuticals in January 2021, Ekeanyanwu's company, PIC, illegally sold
`
`HCG to Pure Pharmaceuticals that Ekeanyanwu and Okoro had stolen from
`
`OPS. A true and correct copy of an invoice for $9,500.00 showing the illegal
`
`sale by PIC is attached hereto as Exhibit "E."
`48. Ekeanyanwu also fraudulently diverted OPS funds to Bakare for
`
`his part in the fraudulent schemes as the owner of Careplus. A true and corect
`
`copy ofan unauthorized payment of$14,881.62 from OPS to Bakare is attached
`
`hereto as Exhibit "F."
`49. All ofthe above acts by Ekeanyanwu and Okoro involved interstate
`
`colnmerce.
`
`r3
`
`
`
`Case 6:21-cv-01947-PGB-EJK Document 2 Filed 11/18/21 Page 14 of 32 PageID 37
`
`OPS' Discovery of Misconduct and Subsequent Investisation
`50. On July 7, 2027, OPS discovered a billing irregularity that led to
`
`its investigation of Ekeanyanwu and Okoro.
`
`51. After a representative of OPS saw the Uttermedsales invoice and
`did not recognize the name, it was discovered that OPS had been paying
`
`Uttermedsales' invoices by way ofthe OPS corporate credit card.
`52. Further diligence revealed that Okoro actually owned
`
`Uttermedsales, which caused suspicion to arise that Ekeanyanwu and Okoro
`
`were misappropriating OPS' funds for their personal financial gain.
`53. OPS determined that a full investigation of Ekeanyanwu and
`
`Okoro needed to occur. OPS communicated to Ekeanyanwu and Okoro that
`
`they would be suspended pending the results ofthe investigation.
`54. At the time of the communication to Ekeanyanwu and Okoro of
`
`OPS'investigation, Ekeanyanwu and Okoro had both thier OPS laptops and
`
`cell phones and were advised that they should cease using OPS' computer
`
`system immediately and throughout the term of their suspension.
`55. The investigation included a review ofthe computer files accessed
`
`by Ekeanyanwu and Okoro on OPS'network server in the weeks and months
`
`prior, as well as the emails of Ekeanyanwu.
`56. The results of the investigation by OPS revealed the Fraudulent
`
`Invoicing Scheme, the Praudulent Marketing Scheme and the Consulting and
`
`t4
`
`
`
`Case 6:21-cv-01947-PGB-EJK Document 2 Filed 11/18/21 Page 15 of 32 PageID 38
`
`Fraudulent Sales Scheme.
`
`57. The evidence from the investigation reasonably suggests that
`
`Ekeanyanwu and Okoro were carrying out sophisticated and ongoing schemes
`
`to misappropriate funds from OPS, disseminate the confidential and
`
`proprietary information and trade secrets of OPS that OPS had closely
`
`guarded, as well as illegally sold OPS' pharmaceuticals to third parties.
`58. All of these actions were carried out by Ekeanyanwu and Okoro
`
`using valuable and confidential files and data from OPS' computer system,
`
`without authorization or in excess of her authorized access to those filed in
`
`protected OPS databases prior to her suspension from OPS.
`59. These improper and illegal actions by Ekeanyanwu and Okoro
`
`were undertaken by exploiting their positions of trust at OPS for their own
`
`personal financial gain.
`60. Ekeanyanwu and Okoro were ultimately terminated by OPS for
`
`their misconduct.
`61. In the meantime, OPS made arrangements to retrieve OPS'
`
`laptops from Ekeanyanwu and Okoro, both of which contained substantial
`
`amounts of confidential and proprietary information of which Ekeanyanwu
`
`and Okoro was privy.
`62. When OPS retrieved its laptops and from Ekeanyanwu and Okoro,
`
`all data had been deleted.
`
`l5
`
`
`
`Case 6:21-cv-01947-PGB-EJK Document 2 Filed 11/18/21 Page 16 of 32 PageID 39
`
`63. Additionally, when OPS retrieved the business phone number that
`
`was assigned to the cell phone for Ekeanyanwu, calls came in to arrange to pay
`
`Ekeanyanwu for services rendered by PIC in the Consulting and Fraudulent
`
`Sales Scheme.
`
`64. OPS spent substantial time and effort trying to recover the data
`
`from the laptops that were retrieved from Ekeanyanwu and Okoro.
`65. When OPS' efforts proved largely unsuccessful, OPS hrred Digital
`
`Davinci, and outside IT company to recover the filed that had been deleted
`
`from their OPS laptops
`66. OPS paid Digrtal Davinci in excess of $5,500 for its services in
`
`attempting to recover the files that were deleted from the laptops.
`67. The forensic investigation of the laptops by Digrtal Davinci was
`
`necessary to recover the valuable information that had been deleted and to
`
`assess the files and data to determine the damage of loss to OPS from the
`
`Fraudulent Invoice Scheme, the Fraudulent Marketing Scheme and the
`
`Consultant and Fraudulent Sales Scheme.
`68. Upon information and belief, since her termination from OPS,
`
`Ekeanyanwu has been actively contacting OPS'vendors and interfering with
`
`OPS' relationships with them.
`
`69. In addition, upon information and belief, Ekeanyanwu and Okoro
`
`are utilizing the confidential and proprietary information that they obtained
`
`l6
`
`
`
`Case 6:21-cv-01947-PGB-EJK Document 2 Filed 11/18/21 Page 17 of 32 PageID 40
`
`at OPS for Careplus and PIC to directly compete against OPS.
`
`70. Ekeanyanwu and Okoro have accessed information and data from
`
`OPS' computer systems, and have utilized and disclosed, valuable confidential
`
`trade secret information of OPS in the conduct of business in competition with
`
`OPS, in violation of law
`
`71,. Ekeanyanwu and Okoro's laptop computer, and OPS' databases
`
`accessed by Ekeanyanwu and Okoro, clearly involved interstate commerce and
`
`communications
`72. Upon information and belief, Ekeanyanwu and Okoro have in their
`
`possession, custody and control valuable trade secrets of OPS acquired during
`
`their employment with OPS, which has not been returned to OPS.
`73. As a result ofthe acts of Ekeanvanwu and Okoro described herein,
`OPS has been damaged including, but not limited to, the money
`
`misappropriated from OPS, the damage to OPS' goodwill in its industry, the
`
`inventory of OPS that was stolen and illegally sold to third parties, and the
`
`damage resulting from their interference with OPS' business relationships.
`
`Further, the continued use of OPS' confrdential and proprietary trade secret
`
`information by Ekeanyanwu and Okoro to directly compete with OPS is an
`
`ongoing harm OPS suffers.
`74. OPS has retained the undersigned law firm to prosecute this action
`
`and is obligated to pay the fees and costs incurred in such prosecution.
`
`t7
`
`
`
`Case 6:21-cv-01947-PGB-EJK Document 2 Filed 11/18/21 Page 18 of 32 PageID 41
`
`CAUSES OF ACTION
`
`Count I
`Violation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act 18 U.S.C. $ 1080
`(Against Ekeanyanwu and Okoro)
`75. This is a cause of action against Ekeanyanwu and Okoro for
`
`violation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act ("CFAA"), 18 U.S.C. S 1030.
`76. OPS incorporates paragraphs 1 through 74 ofthis Complaint as if
`
`fully set forth herein.
`77. Ekeanyanwu and Okoro,
`
`ln advance of and following her
`suspension form OPS, in her personal capacity, intentionally accessed, by
`
`means of conduct involving interstate communication, OPS' computer systems
`
`without authorization or exceeding her authorization.
`78. By means of her conduct in accessing OPS' computer systems
`
`without authorization or in excess of her authorization, Ekeanyanwu and
`
`Okoro obtained information from protected a OPS computer and databases in
`
`violation of the CFAA, 18 U.S.C. $ 1030(a)(2)(C).
`79. Ekeanyanwu and Okoro, knowingly and with the intent to defraud
`
`and cover up evidence of the fraudulent conduct of Ekeanyanwu and Okoro
`
`during the investigation, also accessed OPS' computer systems without
`
`authorization or in excess oftheir authorization including, without Iimitation,
`
`her wrongdoing of obtaining OPS' valuable business information including
`
`confidential, proprietary, and trade secret information, by dishonest methods
`
`l8
`
`
`
`Case 6:21-cv-01947-PGB-EJK Document 2 Filed 11/18/21 Page 19 of 32 PageID 42
`
`in violation of the CFAA, 18 U.S.C. $ 1030(a)(a).
`80. As a result of Ekeanyanwu and Okoro's misconduct and their
`violations of the CFAA, OPS has suffered damage or loss in an amount
`
`exceeding $5,000 and is entitled to an award of damages under section 1030(g)
`
`of the CFAA for Ekeanyanwu and Okoro's multiple violations of the CFAA.
`81. By reason of Ekeanyanwu's violations of the CFAA, and the
`
`damages caused and threatened by her misconduct, OPS is entitled to damages
`
`and injunctive reliefunder section 1030(g) ofthe CFAA
`82. In addition to the damages OPS has suffered, Ekeanyanwu's
`
`accessing and ongoing possession of OPS' valuable business information,
`
`including its confidential, proprietary, and trade secret information, oftained
`
`in violation of the CFAA, and use and disclosure of such information which
`
`employed by OPS, poses a real, present and significant threat of authorized
`
`disclosure and use of this information and the diversion of physicians, clinics
`
`and clients and prospective physicians, clinics, and clients with which OPS
`
`either has been 1n negotiation with or enjoys advantageous business
`
`relationships to OPS' competitor, Careplus, as well as PIC.
`83. The further violation by Ekeanyanwu and Okoro oftheir legal and
`frduciarv obligations by the use or disclosure of OPS' valuable business
`
`information, including OPS' confidential, proprietary and trade secret
`
`information, obtained in violation of the CFAA, including without limitation,
`
`19
`
`
`
`Case 6:21-cv-01947-PGB-EJK Document 2 Filed 11/18/21 Page 20 of 32 PageID 43
`
`Ekeanyanwu and Okoro's disclosure of that information to Careplus and PIC,
`
`and its agents or employees, poses an imminent threat of irreparable inj ury to
`
`OPS. Such injury includes, but is not limited to, the utilization and disclosure
`
`of this information.
`
`84. OPS has no adequate remedy at law for Ekeanyanwu and Okoro's
`
`accessing and ongoing possession of OPS' valuable information in violation of
`
`the CFAA.
`
`WHEREFORE, OPS demands judgment against Ekeanyanwu and
`
`Okoro for actual damages, attorneys'fees, costs and such other relief, including
`
`preliminary and permanent injunctive reliet as the Court deems necessary
`
`and proper.
`
`Count II
`Violation of the Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016 - f 8 U.S.C. S 1836(b)
`(Against Ekeanyanwu and Okoro)
`85. This is a cause of action against Ekeanyanwu and Okoro for
`
`violation of the Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016 ('DTSA"), 18 U.S.C. S 1836(b).
`86. OPS incorporates paragraphs l through 74 ofthis Complaint as if
`
`fully set forth herein.
`87. OPS' confidential and proprietary trade secrets as described
`
`herein include its compounding formulas and methods for creating specialty
`compounded medications, techniques and processes for compounding
`
`medications on a patient-specific basis and on a larger scale bases for hospitals,
`
`20
`
`
`
`Case 6:21-cv-01947-PGB-EJK Document 2 Filed 11/18/21 Page 21 of 32 PageID 44
`
`doctors' offices and clinics which ensuring quality guidelines are met,
`
`regulatory guidelines and policies that have developed for FDA Outsourcing
`
`Facilities in the few years since the FDA regulations have been estabiished,
`
`frnancial, marketing and business information and strategies for a multi-
`
`faceted business such as OPS to leverage both aspects ofthe business model in
`
`separate but related sectors of compounding.
`88. These trade secrets are integral to OPS'success as hybrid business
`
`that operates both a compounding pharmacy and FDA Outsourcing Facility
`89. OPS is the only FDA Outsourcing Facility in Central Florida and
`
`is able to conduct business nationwide from its Orlando location by shipping
`
`medications across state lines to patients, clients, physicians, clinics and
`
`hospitals. As a result, OPS'trade secrets are used and were developed for OPS'
`
`goods and services which are used and intended to be used in interstate
`
`commerce.
`90. OPS'trade secrets derive independent economic value from not
`
`being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means
`
`by, competitors of OPS, like Careplus, and PIC, who can obtain economic value
`
`from the use or disclosure ofthe trade secrets.
`91. If OPS' trade secrets as described herein were disseminated to its
`
`competing compounding pharmacies, they could expand their operations to
`
`directly compete with OPS' service line as a FDA Outsourcing Facility.
`
`2t
`
`
`
`Case 6:21-cv-01947-PGB-EJK Document 2 Filed 11/18/21 Page 22 of 32 PageID 45
`
`92. OPS has continually undertaken more than reasonable efforts to
`
`maintain the secrecy of its protectable trade secrets described herein.
`93. When Ekeanyanwu and Okoro were provided access to OPS'trade
`
`secrets, they were employed by OPS in positions of trust and with knowledge
`
`of the policies enacted to protect the confidentiality of the trade secrets.
`94. As such, Ekeanyanwu and Okoro acquired OPS' trade secrets
`
`under circumstances that gave rise to a duty to maintain the secrecy of said
`
`trade secrets
`95. As described herein, under the DTSA, Ekeanyanwu and Okoro
`
`misappropriated OPS'trade secrets through acquisition of said trade secrets
`
`as defrned by 18 U.S.C. 1939(5XA).
`96. Also pursuant to the DTSA, Ekeanyanwu separately
`
`misappropriated OPS' trade secrets through disclosure defrned by 18 U.S.C.
`
`1939(5)(B)(ii), because, at the time she disclosed the trade secrets to Careplus
`
`and PIC, she knew she had a duty to maintain the secrecy ofthe trade secrets
`
`and limit their use
`97 . As a result of the misappropriation of OPS' trade secrets, OPS has
`
`been damaged as described herein and is seeking to recover its damages under
`
`DTSA, 18 U.S.C. S 1836O)(3)(i)(I)
`98. OPS' trade secrets were willfully and maliciously misappropriated
`by Ekeanyanwu and Okoro under the DTSA, such that OPS seeks an
`
`22
`
`
`
`Case 6:21-cv-01947-PGB-EJK Document 2 Filed 11/18/21 Page 23 of 32 PageID 46
`
`exemplary award of damages under the DTSA, 18 U.S.C. g 1836(c).
`
`WHEREFORE, OPS demands judgment
Accessing this document will incur an additional charge of $.
After purchase, you can access this document again without charge.
Accept $ Charge
Still Working On It
This document is taking longer than usual to download. This can happen if we need to contact the court directly to obtain the document and their servers are running slowly.
Give it another minute or two to complete, and then try the refresh button.
A few More Minutes ... Still Working
It can take up to 5 minutes for us to download a document if the court servers are running slowly.
Thank you for your continued patience.
This document could not be displayed.
We could not find this document within its docket. Please go back to the docket page and check the link. If that does not work, go back to the docket and refresh it to pull the newest information.
Your account does not support viewing this document.
You need a Paid Account to view this document. Click here to change your account type.
Your account does not support viewing this document.
Set your membership
status to view this document.
With a Docket Alarm membership, you'll
get a whole lot more, including:
- Up-to-date information for this case.
- Email alerts whenever there is an update.
- Full text search for other cases.
- Get email alerts whenever a new case matches your search.
One Moment Please
The filing “” is large (MB) and is being downloaded.
Please refresh this page in a few minutes to see if the filing has been downloaded. The filing will also be emailed to you when the download completes.
Your document is on its way!
If you do not receive the document in five minutes, contact support at support@docketalarm.com.
Sealed Document
We are unable to display this document, it may be under a court ordered seal.
If you have proper credentials to access the file, you may proceed directly to the court's system using your government issued username and password.
Access Government Site
