Case 0:20-cv-60971-RAR Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/18/2020 Page 1 of 21
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`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
`FORT LAUDERDALE DIVISION
`
`
`Case No.:
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`ALEXIA PREDDY, individually and on
`behalf of all others similarly situated,
`
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`
`
`v.
`
`
`ADT, LLC d/b/a ADT SECURITY
`SERVICES, a Delaware limited liability
`company,
`
`
`Defendant.
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`
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`CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
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`
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`Plaintiff Alexia Preddy (“Plaintiff”) brings this Class Action Complaint and Demand for
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`Jury Trial against Defendant ADT, LLC d/b/a ADT Security Services (“Defendant” or “ADT”),
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`based on its intentional and negligent tortious acts in providing security services to its customers
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`with remote-viewing capabilities. Plaintiff alleges as follows upon personal knowledge as to
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`herself and to her own acts and experiences, and, as to all other matters upon information and
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`belief.
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`NATURE OF THE ACTION
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`1.
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`In April of 2020, Alexia Preddy’s mother received a terrifying phone call from
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`ADT: the technician who had installed their indoor security camera system had granted himself
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`remote access—three years prior when Ms. Preddy was a teenager—and had used that access
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`nearly one hundred times to spy on her and other household members in their most private and
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`intimate moments.
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`2.
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`And Ms. Preddy was not the only one. She soon found out that hundreds of
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`households had experienced the same staggering invasion of privacy over at least a seven-year
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`period. At fault for this breach of trust: ADT’s unsecure and unmonitored “security” services.
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`3.
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`While ADT boasts that it has been protecting people for over 145 years and holds
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`itself out as “#1 in smart home security,” it failed to even secure its own systems from massive
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`and ongoing intrusions into its customers’ private lives.
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`4.
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`ADT failed to provide the security services its customers relied on by leaving
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`large vulnerabilities in the ADT Pulse application and, as a result, compromised the safety and
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`security of its customers’ homes and family members. The ADT vulnerability allowed any one
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`of its technicians to grant themselves (or for them to grant anyone else for that matter) access to a
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`customer’s ADT Pulse application and control every aspect of the customers’ home security
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`systems—including surreptitiously opening locks and viewing security camera footage.
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`5.
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`In a frantic effort to mitigate and hide its actions, ADT began a campaign to call
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`all affected account holders and secure a release and confidentially agreement in exchange for a
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`monetary payment representing a fraction of the value of their claims. This effort, directed by
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`lawyers but carried out by customer service representatives, failed to determine whether
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`individuals were represented by counsel, and attempted to mislead them into believing that the
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`release would cover account holders and non-account holders in the household alike.
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`6.
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`Beyond the now-known technician who accessed Plaintiff’s home, potentially
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`countless other unknown individuals have been accessing customer’s ADT Pulse accounts and
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`surreptitiously viewing their camera footage, for years, all around the country.
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`7.
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`The mental and emotional impact this revelation has had on every person
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`receiving these calls from ADT is immeasurable. Moments once believed to be private and
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`inside the sanctity of the home are now voyeuristic entertainment for a third party. And worse,
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`those moments could have been captured, shared with others, or even posted to the internet.
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`ADT’s failure to protect its customers irreparably destroyed their sense of security, safety,
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`intimacy, and well-being.
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`PARTIES
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`8.
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`9.
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`Plaintiff Alexia Preddy is a natural person and a citizen of the State of Texas.
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`Defendant ADT, LLC is a limited liability company organized and existing under
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`the laws of Delaware with its principal place of business located at 1501 Yamato Road, Boca
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`Raton, Florida 33431.
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`JURISDICTION AND VENUE
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`10.
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`This Court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2),
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`because (i) at least one member of the Class is a citizen of a different state than the Defendant,
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`(ii) the amount in controversy exceeds $5,000,000, exclusive of interests and costs, and (iii) none
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`of the exceptions under that subsection apply in this action.
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`11.
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`This Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendant because Defendant conducts
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`business in Florida and has its headquarters in this District.
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`12.
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`Venue is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) because Defendant maintains its
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`headquarters and conducts significant business in this District.
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`COMMON FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
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`I.
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`ADT Promises Safety and Security to Consumers.
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`13.
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`ADT is a home security company that touts its longstanding expertise in security,
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`and claims to have been providing security services since the 19th century. According to ADT, it
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`has “been helping protect homes longer than any other company in the business.” ADT provides
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`3
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`residential security systems and monitoring plans that purportedly “protect what matters most in
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`your life.” In short, ADT promises that it is “fully committed to your security.”1
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`14.
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`ADT markets and sells a comprehensive security system package that includes the
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`hardware necessary to operate a home security system, the monitoring services that detect home
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`intrusions and alert the police, and the security system installation.
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`15.
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`ADT offers various tiers of its home security systems at different price points.
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`The basic tier, for example, features security monitoring equipment with 24/7 alarm monitoring
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`while the highest tier home security package includes various convenience and home automation
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`features.
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`16.
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`One of the highest tier home security packages is ADT Pulse. ADT Pulse allows
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`consumers to “check on your home - even if you’re away” by giving them remote access to
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`control their home security system from a mobile application or a web browser portal.
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`Specifically, consumers can arm and disarm their home security systems, remotely lock and
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`unlock doors, view live camera footage, and control various smart home devices like a
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`thermostat and lights. See Figure 1, showing a screenshot of ADT’s marketing materials for ADT
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`Pulse.2
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`1
`| In-Home Consultation, Installation, Repairs, Customer Support,
`ADT Services
`https://www.adt.com/services (last visited May 7, 2020).
`2
`ADT
`Pulse®
`| Official ADT
`Smart Home Automation
`https://www.adt.com/pulse (last visited May 7, 2020).
`4
`
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`System,
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`(Figure 1.)
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`17.
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`Consumers must purchase various smart devices from ADT to reap the benefits of
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`the ADT Pulse service and all the advertised remote accessibility features. ADT touts that its
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`smart home features are not only more convenient to consumers, but they provide “smarter
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`security.” For example, ADT claims that the purchase of its smart locks for use with the ADT
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`Pulse system will result in a “whole new level of security and convenience….” as shown in
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`Figure 2.
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`5
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`(Figure 2.)
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`18. Most importantly, ADT encourages consumers to purchase video cameras for
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`both outdoor and indoor use to “keep an eye on the things you value most.”3 The indoor
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`cameras, according to ADT, are specifically intended to “check in on your kids” and can be set
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`up to stream and capture video clips of events “like when your kids get home from school.”4
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`19.
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`Consumers use the ADT Pulse mobile application to “check any or all of your
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`ADT home security cameras” and to “look in on your family and your pets any time with live-
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`streaming video.” Furthermore, consumers are able view stored video clips from their security
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`cameras on their phones via the ADT Pulse mobile application.5
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`20.
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`To use the ADT Pulse smart home features—like remotely viewing security
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`camera footage, disarming a security system, or unlocking smart locks—consumers must login to
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`the ADT Pulse mobile application or the ADT Pulse web browser portal by using their username
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`and password. Anyone with valid login credentials, like a family member, can access and control
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`the security system remotely.
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`21.
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`In order for the ADT Pulse system to function correctly, an ADT technician needs
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`to perform the system installation and configuration.
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`22.
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`Each new security system installation comes with a “worry-free professional
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`installation” where “high-trained ADT technicians will set-up your ADT security system so you
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`don’t have to.”6 ADT technicians will also test the security system and assist the consumer in
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`
`3
`Wireless Home Security Cameras & Video Surveillance Cameras
`https://www.adt.com/security-cameras (last visited May 7, 2020).
`4
`Shop ADT® Indoor Home Security Cameras | ADT, https://www.adt.com/indoor-
`security-camera (last visited May 7, 2020).
`5
`Supra note 3.
`6
`ADT® | Compare Home Security System Packages | 2020, https://www.adt.com/compare
`(last visited May 7, 2020)
`6
`
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`| ADT,
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`connecting their smart phone to the ADT security system for use with ADT Pulse, as shown in
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`Figure 3.
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`(Figure 3.)
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`23.
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`ADT further promotes its security services by stating that its technicians are what
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`sets it apart from the competitors in being able to earn its customers’ trust and protect the most
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`important people in their lives. According to its website: “Our people are dedicated to taking care
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`of the people and property you value most in your life. Our customers trust us to help protect
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`those things that cannot be replaced.” See Figure 4, showing a screenshot from ADT’s website.7
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`7
`the Best Home Security and Customer Service
`Why ADT has
`https://www.adt.com/security-benefits (last visited May 7, 2020).
`7
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`| ADT,
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`II.
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`(Figure 4.)
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`ADT Failed to Detect a Seven-Year-Long Breach of its Systems That, at the Very Least,
`Resulted in an ADT Employee Improperly Accessing Customers’ Accounts.
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`24.
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`Unfortunately for all of ADT’s Pulse customers, a vulnerability in the Pulse
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`security system completely obliterates all of ADT’s promises of security and protection.
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`25.
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`On or around April 24, 2020, ADT began to contact some of its customers to
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`inform them that a vulnerability in the ADT Pulse system had allowed unauthorized users to
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`access customers’ ADT Pulse accounts as if they were a regular user. In other words, an
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`unauthorized user could remotely arm and disarm security systems, access smart home devices,
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`and view security camera footage, including footage from indoor cameras designed to, among
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`other things, protect customers’ children.
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`26.
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`In fact, ADT’s investigation revealed that at least one ADT employee in the
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`Dallas-Fort Worth Texas area, named Telesforo Aviles, had access to more than 200 different
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`customers’ ADT Pulse accounts for the last seven years. According to an ADT spokesperson, the
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`ADT technician was able to add—and in fact did add—his own personal email address to
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`customers’ accounts, allowing him to remotely login to customers’ accounts using his own,
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`unauthorized credentials.
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`27.
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`This type of access could only occur because ADT failed to implement adequate
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`procedures that would prevent non-household members from adding non-household email
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`addresses. Similarly, ADT failed to monitor consumers’ accounts and promptly alert them any
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`time a new email was added to their accounts. Countless checks could have been in place to
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`prevent or at least stop this conduct. Instead, this breach came to light only by luck and
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`happenstance: a customer, reporting a technical issue, inadvertently revealed the unwanted third-
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`party access. But for that event, ADT would be unaware of this invasive conduct and it would
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`continue unabated to this day (likely expanding to new households).
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`28.
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`As such, countless other ADT technicians and/or employees could have taken
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`advantage of ADT’s lax security and granted themselves unfettered access to other customer
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`accounts—entirely unbeknownst to both the customers and to ADT.
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`29.
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`Although ADT claims it has implemented procedures to prevent similar incidents
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`in the future, it is already too late for an unknown number of consumers whose accounts and
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`security camera footage have already been accessed and potentially exploited.
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`FACTS SPECIFIC TO PLAINTIFF PREDDY
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`30. Ms. Preddy’s household has been a long-time ADT security customer. In 2017,
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`Ms. Preddy’s mother received an offer from ADT to upgrade her account to the ADT Pulse
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`system which included installing security cameras in their home. ADT represented to Ms. Preddy
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`and her mother that this upgrade would enhance their personal security.
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`31. Ms. Preddy, only a teenager at the time, had reservations about installing security
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`cameras inside of the home, however. When her mother expressed those reservations to ADT, it
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`reassured them both that the security system was perfectly safe.
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`32.
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`Indeed, Ms. Preddy
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`relied on ADT’s
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`representations,
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`including both
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`representations by ADT representatives and ADT’s representations on its website, about the
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`ADT Pulse system’s safety and security and accepted ADT’s upgrade offer in September 2017.
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`33.
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`Shortly thereafter, an ADT technician installed the ADT Pulse system, including
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`an indoor security camera with a wide-angle view inside Ms. Preddy’s home.
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`34.
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`On April 24, 2020, a phone call from ADT destroyed whatever security and safety
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`its security system promised. ADT called Ms. Preddy’s mother to explain that one of its
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`technicians had gained access to her account and had been watching her and Ms. Preddy.
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`According to ADT, at least one of its technicians accessed her home security cameras on
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`approximately 73 different occasions.
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`35.
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`In an email later that day, ADT Chief Customer Officer Jamie Haenggi described
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`it as “a difficult message to hear.” Difficult is, of course, woefully inadequate to truly describe
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`Plaintiff’s loss of security, loss of safety, humiliation, and anger.
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`36.
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`Based upon the cameras’ wide-angle lens and placement, the ADT’s employee
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`had an opportunity to watch at least the following events:
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`a. Ms. Preddy nude;
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`b. Ms. Preddy in various states of undress;
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`c. Ms. Preddy getting ready for bed; and
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`d. Moments of physical intimacy.
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`37.
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`Immediately after the call, Ms. Preddy’s mother disconnected the ADT camera in
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`their home. Ms. Preddy expended significant time addressing the current and future
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`consequences of the exposure enabled by ADT, including, but not limited to, removing ADT
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`security hardware, and researching additional surveillance and security devices and services.
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`10
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`38.
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`Prior to April 24, 2020, Ms. Preddy and her mother never received any call, text,
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`email, or notification of any kind informing them that another user was added to the ADT Pulse
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`account or that a third-party user accessed the ADT Pulse account.
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`CLASS ALLEGATIONS
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`39.
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`Class Definition: Plaintiff Alexia Preddy brings this action on behalf of herself
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`and a class of similarly situated individuals defined as follows:
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`All individuals in the United States who (1) reside in a household with an ADT Pulse
`security system, but are not the account holder; (2) where that security system was
`remotely accessed by an employee or agent of Defendant ADT without authorization
`from the account holder.
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`The following people are excluded from the Class: (1) any Judge or Magistrate presiding over
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`this action and the members of their family; (2) Defendant, Defendant’s subsidiaries, parents,
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`successors, predecessors, and any entity in which the Defendant or its parents have a controlling
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`interest and their current or former employees, officers, and directors; (3) persons who properly
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`execute and file a timely request for exclusion from the Class; (4) persons whose claims in this
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`matter have been finally adjudicated by a court of law on the merits; (5) Plaintiff’s counsel and
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`Defendant’s counsel; and (6) the legal representatives, successors, and assigns of any such
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`excluded persons.
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`40.
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`Numerosity: The exact number of members of the Class is unknown and is not
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`available to Plaintiff at this time, but individual joinder in this case is impracticable. The Class
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`likely consist of hundreds of individuals. Members of the Class can be easily identified through
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`Defendant’s records.
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`41.
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`Commonality: There are many questions of law and fact common to the claims
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`of Plaintiff and the other members of the Class, and those questions predominate over any
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`questions that may affect individual members of the Class. Common questions for the Class
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`include but are not limited to the following:
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`a. Whether Defendant’s conduct constitutes negligence;
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`b. Whether Defendant’s conduct constitutes gross negligence;
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`c. Whether Defendant’s conduct constitutes an intrusion upon seclusion;
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`d. Whether Defendant’s conduct constitutes negligent hiring, supervision and
`retention; and,
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`e. Whether Defendant’s conduct constitutes intentional infliction of emotional
`distress.
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`Typicality: Plaintiff’s claims are typical of other members of the Class, in that
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`42.
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`Plaintiff and the members of the Class sustained damages arising out of Defendant’s uniform
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`wrongful conduct.
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`43.
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`Adequate Representation: Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and
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`protect the interests of the Class and have retained counsel competent and experienced in
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`complex class actions. Plaintiff has no interest antagonistic to those of the Class, and Defendant
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`has no defenses unique to Plaintiff.
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`44.
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`Predominance and Superiority: This case is also appropriate for class
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`certification because class proceedings are superior to all other available methods for the fair and
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`efficient adjudication of this controversy because joinder of all parties is impracticable. The
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`damages suffered by the individual members of the Class will likely be relatively small,
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`especially given the burden and expense of individual prosecution of the complex litigation
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`necessitated by Defendant’s actions. Thus, it would be virtually impossible for the individual
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`members of the Class to obtain effective relief from Defendant’s misconduct. Even if members
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`of the Class could sustain such individual litigation, it would still not be preferable to a class
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`action because individual litigation would increase the delay and expense to all parties due to the
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`complex legal and factual controversies presented in this Complaint. By contrast, a class action
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`presents far fewer management difficulties and provides the benefits of single adjudication,
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`economies of scale, and comprehensive supervision by a single Court. Economies of time, effort,
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`and expense will be fostered, and uniformity of decisions ensured.
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`FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
`Negligence
`(On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)
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`Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein.
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`Defendant ADT had full knowledge of the purpose for which its security cameras
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`45.
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`46.
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`were being used and the sensitivity of the people and things the cameras were designed to secure
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`and protect—that which “matters most” to their clients. Defendant also knew the types of harm
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`that Plaintiff and the members of the Class could and would suffer if the integrity of the security
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`system was compromised.
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`47.
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`Defendant had a duty to exercise reasonable care in ensuring that all ADT
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`security systems were secure, safe to use, and inviolable by unauthorized parties. This duty
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`includes, among other things, ensuring that reasonable and proper protocols and safeguards are
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`in place so that consumers’ security cameras are not easily compromised by unauthorized users.
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`48.
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`Defendant ADT, by and through its agents, employees, and independent
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`contractors, was negligent in its acts and/or omissions by, amongst other things, allowing
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`technicians to create authorized user accounts, and by failing to discover that its employees could
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`make and did make themselves authorized users gaining unauthorized access to Plaintiff’s home
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`ADT Pulse system, thereby allowing surreptitious videos and images to be viewed and taken of
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`Plaintiff in their home.
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`49.
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`Plaintiff and the members of the Class were the foreseeable and probable victims
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`of any inadequate security practices and procedures. Defendant knew of or should have known
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`of the inherent risks of allowing ADT cameras to be set up and used without adequate security
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`protocols and safeguards.
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`50.
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`Defendant ADT further knew or should have known that: (1) the surreptitious
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`recordings of Plaintiff contained private and confidential information about Plaintiff; (2) Plaintiff
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`had a reasonable expectation of privacy in being partially and fully naked, engaging in
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`consensual intimate activity, and having private conversations in a private home; (3) the
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`recordings were taken without Plaintiff’s knowledge or consent; (4) the surreptitious recordings
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`would reveal private and personal things about Plaintiff which Defendant had no right or
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`authorization to view, use, disseminate, or disclose; (5) and the viewing of these private acts and
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`occasions constitutes a substantial violation of Plaintiff’s right of privacy.
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`51.
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`Beyond ordinary negligence, Defendant ADT was grossly negligent because the
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`acts and omissions of Defendant ADT and its employees and agents were more than momentary
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`thoughtlessness or inadvertence. Rather the conduct, when viewed objectively from the
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`standpoint of Defendant ADT at the time of these events, involved an extreme degree of risk,
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`considering the probability and magnitude of the potential harm to Plaintiff. Moreover,
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`Defendant ADT had subjective knowledge of the risk of employees gaining unauthorized access
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`to clients cameras, but failed to disclose to Plaintiff the vulnerability of their monitoring systems
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`and the ability of ADT employees to monitor and observe their home without their consent, and
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`acted with conscious indifference to the rights, safety, and welfare of their clients.
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`52.
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`Defendant’s own actions and inactions created a foreseeable risk of harm to
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`Plaintiff and the members of the Class. Defendant’s misconduct included, but was not limited to,
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`its failure to sell security systems with a sufficiently robust security protocols to prevent
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`unauthorized users from gaining access to the cameras, and failing to inform Plaintiff and the
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`members of the Class when unknown individuals added their email addresses to customer
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`accounts.
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`53.
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`Defendant was in a position to protect against the harm suffered by Plaintiff and
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`the members of the Class and had a duty to do so.
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`54.
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`Defendant, through its actions, unlawfully breached its duty to Plaintiff and the
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`members of the Class by failing to ensure their cameras and set up procedures were sufficiently
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`robust to protect against unauthorized use.
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`55.
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`As a result of Defendant’s negligence, Plaintiff and the members of the Class
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`have suffered and will continue to suffer damages and injury including, but not limited to: mental
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`anguish and suffering in the form of anxiety, stress, loss of security, fear, loss of safety,
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`humiliation, and anger.
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`56.
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`Further, because Defendant’s acts and omissions resulted from gross negligence,
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`exemplary damages should be awarded against Defendant in an amount to be determined by the
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`jury in this case. Moreover, exemplary damages should be awarded without limitation, as set
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`forth in TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 41.008(c).
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`SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
`Intrusion Upon Seclusion
`(On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)
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`Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein.
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`Defendant intentionally intruded upon Plaintiff’s and each of the Class members’
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`57.
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`58.
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`seclusion, permitting unauthorized access to their private security camera footage.
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`59.
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`Defendant’s facilitation and failure to stop such access is highly offensive to a
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`reasonable person as it reveals intimate private details about Plaintiff and each of the Class
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`memers and the activities they participate in inside the privacy of their own homes.
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`60.
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`Defendant’s intrusion upon the Plaintiff’s and the Class members’ seclusion
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`caused Plaintiff and the Class members mental anguish and suffering in the form of anxiety,
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`stress, loss of security, fear, loss of safety, humiliation, and anger.
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`THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
`Negligent Hiring, Supervision and Retention
`(On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)
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`Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein.
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`At all relevant times, Telesforo Aviles was ADT’s employee and/or agent.
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`
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`61.
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`62.
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`63. Whenever in this Complaint it is alleged that Defendant did any act or thing, it is
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`meant that each of Defendant’s officers, agents, servants, employees, or representatives did such
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`act and/or that at the time such act was done, it was done with the full authorization or
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`ratification of the Defendant, or was done in the normal and routine course and scope of
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`employment of each of Defendant’s officers, agents, servants, employees, or representatives.
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`64.
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`ADT had the opportunity and duty to screen its employees, including Aviles, to
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`ensure they were fit to perform the duties asked of them.
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`65.
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`ADT knew or should have known Aviles was incompetent or unfit. Nonetheless,
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`ADT made the reckless decision to hire and retain Aviles as a technician.
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`66.
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`ADT and its agents, servants, and employees, who were at all times acting in the
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`course and scope of their employment, were guilty of negligence toward Plaintiff. Defendant
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`ADT is further liable for the negligent acts of their agents, servants, or employees, including
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`Case 0:20-cv-60971-RAR Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/18/2020 Page 17 of 21
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`Aviles, under the legal doctrine of respondeat superior. At all relevant times, Aviles was an agent
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`apparent or ostensible agent of Defendant ADT.
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`67.
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`ADT’s negligence was a proximate cause of Plaintiff’s and Class members’
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`injuries and damages, including, but not limited to, Defendant ADT’s negligence in:
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`a. Failing to perform due diligence in contacting Aviles’s prior employers;
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`b. Failing to adequately evaluate Aviles’s mental state prior to hiring;
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`c. Any and all actions and omissions as may be proven at trial;
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`d. Negligently hiring Aviles in a position allowing him to have access to sensitive
`client information;
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`e. Negligently allowing Aviles to access sensitive client information when
`Defendant ADT knew, or in the exercise of ordinary care should have known, that
`Aviles was unfit;
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`f. Negligently retaining Aviles in its employ in a position that provided him with
`access to sensitive client information;
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`g. Negligently and inadequately supervising its employees;
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`h. Failing to create and/or enforce safety rules, polices, and procedures governing
`employee conduct regarding access to clients’ cameras and other sensitive
`information;
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`i. Failing to warn Plaintiff of the inappropriate and substandard hiring and
`retention, training, and supervision of their employees; and
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`j. Negligently allowing the ADT employee to accomplish the tort upon Plaintiff
`by the existence of his agency relationship with Defendant ADT.
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`68.
`
`These actions and omissions of ADT singularly, or in combination with others,
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`proximately caused damages to Plaintiff and the Class, including mental anguish and suffering in
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`the form of anxiety, stress, loss of security, fear, loss of safety, humiliation, and anger.
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`FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION
`Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
`(On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)
`
`69.
`
`Plaintiff incorporates the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.
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`Case 0:20-cv-60971-RAR Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/18/2020 Page 18 of 21
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`70.
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`At all times herein, ADT’s employee acted intentionally, maliciously, and without
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`justification, to gain unauthorized access to Plaintiff’s private camera, potentially including
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`video of Plaintiff partially and fully naked, and engaging in intimate and other private activities,
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`when ADT’s employee knew or should have known that Plaintiff would suffer severe emotional
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`distress as a result.
`
`71.
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`The conduct by ADT’s employee was intentional and malicious and done for the
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`purpose of causing, or was known by Aviles to be likely to cause, Plaintiff to suffer severe
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`emotional distress, and was done with the wanton and reckless disregard of the consequences to
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`Plaintiff.
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`72.
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`Defendant ADT had a duty to exercise reasonable and ordinary care and caution
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`in and about the management, maintenance, supervision, control and operation of its systems and
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`each of their employees, agents, and independent contractors, all to the benefit of clients and
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`persons like Plaintiff.
`
`73.
`
`Defendant ADT, by and through its agents, employees, and independent
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`contractors, was reckless in its acts and/or omissions by, amongst other things, allowing
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`technicians to create authorized user accounts, and by failing to discover that Aviles made
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`himself an authorized user and gained unauthorized access to Plaintiff’s home camera, thereby
`
`allowing surreptitious videos and images to be viewed and taken of Plaintiff in the privacy of her
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`home.
`
`74.
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`Defendant ADT knew or should have known that: (1) the surreptitious recordings
`
`of Plaintiff contained private and confidential information about Plaintiff; (2) Plaintiff had a
`
`reasonable expectation of privacy in being partially and fully naked and engaging in consensual
`
`intimate activity, and having private conversations, in a private home; (3) the recordings were
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`taken without Plaintiff’s knowledge or consent; (4) the surreptitious recordings would reveal
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`private and personal things about Plaintiff which Defendant had no right or authorization to
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`view, use, disseminate, or disclose; (5) and the viewing of these private acts and occasions
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`constitutes a substantial and outrageous violation of Plaintiff’s right to privacy.
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`75.
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`These acts were done intentionally or with a conscious and/or reckless disregard
`
`of Plaintiff’s rights, and with the intent to vex, injure or annoy, such as to constitute oppression,
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`fraud or malice. ADT acted outrageously and beyond all reasonable bounds of decency, and
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`intentionally inflicted severe emotional distress upon Plaintiff, to her detriment.
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`76.
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`As a direct and proximate result of ADT’s aforementioned acts and omissions,
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`Plaintiff suffered, emotional injury, mental damage, loss, harm, anxiety, embarrassment,
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`humiliation, shame, and severe emotional distress in an amount subject to proof. These damages
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`are continuing in nature and will be suffered in the future.
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`PRAYER FOR RELIE