Case 1:22-cv-23753-KMM Document 139 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/14/2023 Page 1 of 20
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
`MIAMI DIVISION
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`Case No. 22-cv-23753-MOORE/BECERRA
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`EDWIN GARRISON, et al., on behalf of
`themselves and all other similarly situated,
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`Plaintiffs,
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`v.
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`SAM BANKMAN-FRIED, et al.,
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`Defendants.
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`/
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`DEFENDANTS STEPHEN CURRY, LARRY DAVID, GOLDEN STATE WARRIORS,
`LLC, SHOHEI OHTANI, AND NAOMI OSAKA’S MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK
`OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION
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`

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`Case 1:22-cv-23753-KMM Document 139 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/14/2023 Page 2 of 20
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`I.
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`II.
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`Page
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`INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 1
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`BACKGROUND ............................................................................................................... 2
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`III.
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`ARGUMENT ..................................................................................................................... 5
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`1.
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`2.
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`3.
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`Legal Standard ....................................................................................................... 5
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`The Court Lacks General Jurisdiction Over Non-Resident Defendants. ............... 6
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`The Court Lacks Specific Jurisdiction Over Non-Resident Defendants. .............. 7
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`a.
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`b.
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`There Is No Specific Jurisdiction Under Florida’s Long-Arm
`Statute. ....................................................................................................... 7
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`Exercising Personal Jurisdiction Does Not Comport with Due
`Process. .................................................................................................... 11
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`IV.
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`CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................ 15
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`I
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`Case 1:22-cv-23753-KMM Document 139 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/14/2023 Page 3 of 20
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`I.
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`INTRODUCTION
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`Defendants Stephen Curry, Larry David, Golden State Warriors, LLC (“GSW”), Shohei
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`Ohtani, and Naomi Osaka (“Non-Resident Defendants”) should be dismissed from this action for
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`lack of personal jurisdiction. Plaintiffs filed this putative class action alleging fraud in connection
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`with the crypto asset exchange FTX, not only against FTX’s former executives—who allegedly
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`committed the fraud—but also against Non-Resident Defendants, who are (1) celebrities who
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`allegedly endorsed FTX, and (2) GSW, which is being sued because FTX’s logo allegedly
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`appeared on GSW’s basketball court. Plaintiffs allege that Non-Resident Defendants’ conduct was
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`somehow deceptive because, for reasons having nothing to do with Non-Resident Defendants,
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`FTX later collapsed. These claims are frivolous and should be dismissed for the reasons set forth
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`in the concurrently filed motion by all of the Movants. But the claims against Non-Resident
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`Defendants must be dismissed regardless because there is no jurisdiction over them.1
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`First, there is no general jurisdiction over Non-Resident Defendants because Plaintiffs do
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`not allege any of them reside in Florida. GSW is a California limited liability company
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`headquartered in California. Larry David, Stephen Curry, and Naomi Osaka are domiciled in
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`California. Shohei Ohtani is a citizen and resident of Japan. These facts make clear that there is no
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`general jurisdiction over Non-Resident Defendants. ECF No. 16 (“FAC”) ¶¶ 36, 37, 40-42.
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`Second, the Court also lacks specific jurisdiction over Non-Resident Defendants. For
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`specific jurisdiction to exist, Plaintiffs’ claims must arise out of acts committed by Non-Resident
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`1 For judicial efficiency, the Court should first address the jurisdictional motion by Non-Resident
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`Defendants “because if jurisdiction is lacking, the Court lacks authority to rule on the other
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`claims.” See Mother Doe I v. Al Maktoum, 632 F. Supp. 2d 1130, 1134 (S.D. Fla. 2007).
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`1
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`Defendants in or directed at the forum. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct.,
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`141 S. Ct. 1017, 1028 (2021). But Plaintiffs allege no connection between Florida and the alleged
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`wrongdoing by Non-Resident Defendants, nor could they. Plaintiffs allege they were harmed
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`because FTX’s logo allegedly was displayed at Chase Center in California; Larry David, Stephen
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`Curry, and Naomi Osaka appeared in ads that are not alleged to have been filmed in, negotiated
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`in, or targeted at Florida; and Shohei Ohtani is not alleged to have made any statements promoting
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`FTX. Plaintiffs’ own pleading thus establishes this Court lacks specific jurisdiction over Non-
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`Resident Defendants, so they should be dismissed from this action.
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`II.
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`BACKGROUND
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`Non-Resident Defendants respectfully refer the Court to the motion to dismiss concurrently
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`filed by the Movants and focus here on Plaintiffs’ jurisdictional allegations.
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`Stephen Curry. Mr. Curry is a professional basketball player for the Golden State Warriors
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`who lives in California. ¶ 36. Plaintiffs mention Mr. Curry in only six paragraphs (¶¶ 193, 195,
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`218-221), not one of which mentions any connection to Florida. Plaintiffs allege that Mr. Curry
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`(1) appeared in an ad for FTX in which he repeatedly denies being an expert in cryptocurrency,
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`and (2) was quoted in an FTX press release. ¶¶ 219-221. Nowhere do Plaintiffs allege that Mr.
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`Curry’s conduct occurred within or was specifically directed toward Florida—because it was not.
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`Curry Decl. ¶¶ 2-8. Mr. Curry did not negotiate or sign any contract in Florida nor did he film or
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`travel to Florida in any capacity in connection with his contract. Id. ¶¶ 3-7; Ex. B.
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`Larry David. Mr. David is a comedian, writer, actor, and TV producer who lives in Los
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`Angeles, California. ¶¶ 42, 231; David Decl. ¶ 2. In February 2022, Mr. David appeared in a single
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`FTX commercial during Super Bowl LVI. ¶ 231; David Decl. ¶¶ 3, 11, Ex. A. Unsurprisingly for
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`a nationally broadcast commercial, the ad did not mention Florida or target Florida residents in
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`2
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`any way.2 Mr. David did not negotiate his agreement with FTX in Florida, did not film the ad in
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`Florida, and did not appear in Florida on behalf of FTX at any point. David Decl. ¶¶ 3, 6, 8-10,
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`Ex. A. Indeed, Mr. David has not even travelled to Florida in the past 10 years. Id. ¶ 8.
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`GSW. GSW is a California limited liability company with its principal place of business
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`in San Francisco, California. ¶ 37; Ex. A (listing San Francisco, CA address).3 GSW owns the
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`Golden State Warriors, a professional basketball team that plays in the NBA. ¶ 37. The team’s
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`home court venue is Chase Center, which is located in San Francisco, California. Id.; see RJN.
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`Plaintiffs’ only allegations about GSW are that it entered into a business relationship with FTX in
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`2022 consisting of: (1) the “unveiling of the FTX logo on the court at the Chase Center” in 2022,
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`(2) “dropp[ing] NFTs on FTX.us beginning in early 2022,” and (3) “in-arena signage at Chase
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`Center, and virtual floor signage at Warriors games.” ¶¶ 37, 222-223.
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`Shohei Ohtani. Mr. Ohtani is a citizen and resident of Japan4 who is a professional
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`baseball player for the Japanese national baseball team in Tokyo, Japan and the Los Angeles
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`2 The ad Mr. David appeared in (and which the FAC incorporates by reference, ¶ 232), may be
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`viewed here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hWMnbJJpeZc; see Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor
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`Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007) (courts must consider documents incorporated into
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`the complaint by reference).
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`3 Citations in the form of “¶ __” or “¶¶ __” refer to the paragraphs of the FAC. Unless otherwise
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`noted, all emphasis is added, and all internal quotation marks and citations are omitted. “Ex.” refers
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`to exhibits attached to the concurrently filed request for judicial notice (“RJN”).
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`4 Plaintiffs incorrectly allege Mr. Ohtani is a “citizen and resident of the State of California.” ¶ 40;
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`compare Ohtani Decl. ¶ 2. But regardless, it is undisputed that he does not reside in Florida.
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`3
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`Angels in Anaheim, California. Ohtani Decl. ¶¶ 2, 3. From his home in Tokyo, Mr. Ohtani entered
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`into an agreement that allowed Bahamas-based FTX to license his name, image, and likeness to
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`promote FTX to Japanese customers in the Japanese market. Ohtani Decl. ¶¶ 8, 11; ¶ 226 n.138.
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`The FAC’s only allegation concerning Mr. Ohtani confirms this: FTX issued a press release from
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`the Bahamas indicating that Mr. Ohtani would serve as an international “global ambassador” for
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`FTX. Id. Critically, Mr. Ohtani made no statement in the press release, id., and the FAC does not
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`allege Mr. Ohtani ever made any statement endorsing FTX at all. This makes sense, because Mr.
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`Ohtani does not make public statements in English and never took any affirmative steps to promote
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`FTX in or directed at Florida. Ohtani Decl. ¶¶ 12, 18.
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`Naomi Osaka. Ms. Osaka is a “professional tennis player” and “a citizen and resident of
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`Beverly Hills, California.” ¶ 41. Plaintiffs allege that Ms. Osaka tweeted a “glitzy” FTX ad to
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`followers of her Twitter account. ¶ 228. Plaintiffs do not allege the ad mentions Florida or targets
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`any Florida resident. According to Plaintiffs, Ms. Osaka “wore the FTX logo on the kit she wore
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`at tournaments,” with one of those tournaments taking place in Miami in 2022. ¶ 227. Plaintiffs do
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`not allege their claims in any way arise out of or relate to the letters “FTX” appearing on Ms.
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`Osaka’s kit at that one 2022 tournament. See id.
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`Aside from alleging that all of the Non-Resident Defendants reside outside of and are not
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`citizens of Florida (¶¶ 36, 37, 40-42), Plaintiffs do not plead any specific facts about any of them
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`that could possibly establish jurisdiction. They merely assert the following insufficient boilerplate
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`allegation about all defendants (including Florida-resident defendants) without differentiation:
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`This Court has personal jurisdiction against Defendants because they conduct
`substantial and not isolated business in Florida, and/or have otherwise intentionally
`availed themselves of the Florida consumer market through the promotion,
`marketing, and sale of FTX’s YBAs in Florida, which constitutes committing a
`tortious act within the state of Florida. Defendants have also marketed and
`participated and/or assisted in the sale of FTX’s unregistered securities to consumers
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`4
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`in Florida. Further, Defendants have engaged in a conspiracy in which some of the
`co-conspirators—including some who are Defendants in this action—committed
`overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy in the State of Florida. This purposeful
`availment renders the exercise of jurisdiction by this Court over Defendants
`permissible under traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. ¶ 50.
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`III. ARGUMENT
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`Not one of the Non-Resident Defendants is a citizen of Florida nor have Plaintiffs alleged
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`any facts to show that any one of them engaged in relevant conduct within or specifically directed
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`toward Florida. Plaintiffs bear the burden of alleging facts sufficient to make a prima facie showing
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`that Non-Resident Defendants are subject to personal jurisdiction in Florida. United Techs. Corp.
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`v. Mazer, 556 F.3d 1260, 1274 (11th Cir. 2009). “[V]ague and conclusory allegations … are
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`insufficient to establish a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction.” Snow v. DirecTV, Inc., 450
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`F.3d 1314, 1318 (11th Cir. 2006). Plaintiffs have not carried—and cannot carry—their burden.
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`1.
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`Legal Standard
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`In ruling on motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, courts evaluate
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`“(1) whether personal jurisdiction exists over the nonresident defendant[s] under Florida’s long-
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`arm statute, and (2) if so, whether the exercise of jurisdiction would violate the Due Process Clause
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`of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.” Prunty v. Arnold & Itkin LLP, 753 F.
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`App’x 731, 734 (11th Cir. 2018) (alteration in original). “Both parts [of the test] must be satisfied
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`for a court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-resident.” PeopleShare, LLC v. Vogler, 601
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`F. Supp. 3d 1276, 1280 (S.D. Fla. 2022).
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`Personal jurisdiction under the Florida long-arm statute and the Due Process Clause can be
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`either general or specific. See Fla. Stat. § 48.193(1)-(2); Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Super. Ct. of
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`Cal., San Francisco Cnty., 582 U.S. 255, 262 (2017). General jurisdiction permits the exercise of
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`jurisdiction regardless of whether a plaintiff’s claims arise from the defendant’s contacts with the
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`forum. See Fla. Stat. § 48.193(2); Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S.
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`5
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`408, 415–16 (1984). Specific jurisdiction exists only if the claims fall within one of the enumerated
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`categories of the Florida long-arm statute (see Fla. Stat. § 48.193(1)) and directly arise out of or
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`relate to the defendant’s contacts with Florida (see Bristol-Myers Squibb, 582 U.S. at 262). “[T]he
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`Florida long-arm statute ‘must be strictly construed’ and ‘any doubts about applicability of the
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`statute must be resolved in favor of the defendant and against a conclusion that personal
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`jurisdiction exists.’” In re Takata Airbag Prod. Liab. Litig., 396 F. Supp. 3d 1101, 1140 (S.D. Fla.
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`2019). And even if the long-arm statute is satisfied, the court must also determine whether the
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`defendant has sufficient “minimum contacts” with Florida, such that the exercise of jurisdiction
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`would not offend “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Int’l Shoe Co. v. State
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`of Wash., Office of Unemployment Comp. & Placement, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
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`2.
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`The Court Lacks General Jurisdiction Over Non-Resident Defendants.
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`Non-Resident Defendants are not subject to this Court’s general jurisdiction. “For an
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`individual, the paradigm forum for the exercise of general jurisdiction is the individual’s
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`domicile.” Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 137 (2014). For a business entity like GSW,
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`general jurisdiction exists in the forum where the business is “at home,” which typically is solely
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`where it is incorporated or where its “principal place of business” is located. Id.
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`GSW. This Court does not have general jurisdiction over GSW because GSW is only “at
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`home” in California. See Daimler, 571 U.S. at 137. GSW is an LLC “operating and existing under
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`the laws of the State of California,” ¶ 37, and is located in San Francisco, Ex. A. GSW therefore
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`is only “at home” in California and is not subject to general jurisdiction in Florida.5
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`5 That the Warriors occasionally play in Florida does not change this conclusion. See Manton v.
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`Cal. Sports, Inc., 493 F. Supp. 496, 497-498 (N.D. Ga. 1980) (no personal jurisdiction over Los
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`6
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`The Individual Non-Resident Defendants. The Court likewise does not have general
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`jurisdiction over California residents Mr. Curry, Mr. David, or Ms. Osaka, ¶¶ 36, 41, 42, or
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`Japanese resident Mr. Ohtani, Ohtani Decl. ¶ 2, supra n.4, because they are not domiciled in
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`Florida. See Bristol-Myers Squibb, 582 U.S. at 262.
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`Plaintiffs’ boilerplate allegations do not support any other result. The entirely conclusory
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`allegation that this “Court has personal jurisdiction against Defendants because they conduct
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`substantial and not isolated business in Florida,” ¶ 50, lacks any factual support and cannot
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`establish a prima facie case of general jurisdiction over Non-Resident Defendants. See Snow, 450
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`F.3d at 1318; Castillo v. Allegro Resort Mktg., 603 F. App’x 913, 916 (11th Cir. 2015).
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`3.
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`The Court Lacks Specific Jurisdiction Over Non-Resident Defendants.
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`Specific jurisdiction also does not exist as to Non-Resident Defendants. As detailed below,
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`Plaintiffs fail to plead facts showing either that Non-Resident Defendants are subject to jurisdiction
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`under Florida’s long-arm statute or that jurisdiction would comply with the due process clause of
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`the U.S. Constitution, both of which they must do for specific jurisdiction to exist.
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`a.
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`There Is No Specific Jurisdiction Under Florida’s Long-Arm Statute.
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`“Florida’s long-arm statute subjects to the jurisdiction of Florida [] courts anyone who
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`personally or through an agent engages in any of nine enumerated acts, as long as the cause of
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`action arises from that act.” SkyHop Techs., Inc. v. Narra, 58 F.4th 1211, 1223 (11th Cir. 2023).
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`Plaintiffs appear to allege Non-Resident Defendants are subject to the Court’s long-arm
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`jurisdiction because they “committ[ed] a tortious act within the state of Florida.” ¶ 50; see Fla.
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`Angeles Lakers in Georgia); Senne v. Kansas City Royals Baseball Corp., 105 F. Supp. 3d 981,
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`1018 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (baseball franchise not “at home” in California even though it “regular[ly]
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`travel[ed]” and had “employees who were based” there).
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`7
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`Stat. § 48.193(1)(a)(2). This unsupported, conclusory allegation fails to establish jurisdiction over
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`Non-Resident Defendants because Plaintiffs neither allege a tortious act nor connexity to Florida.
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`No tortious act. Plaintiffs allege that all Defendants, as an undifferentiated group
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`including FTX insiders like Sam Bankman-Fried, engaged in “the promotion, marketing, and sale
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`of FTX’s YBAs in Florida, which constitutes committing a tortious act within the state of Florida.”
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`¶ 50. This does not plead specific jurisdiction over Non-Resident Defendants for two reasons.
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`First, this allegation “indiscriminately lumps” all Defendants together, and thus fails to satisfy
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`Plaintiffs’ obligation to plead jurisdictional facts as to each defendant. Flava Works, Inc. v. Roje
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`on Holiday Inc., 2012 WL 1535684, at *5 (S.D. Fla. May 1, 2012) (a plaintiff “must establish
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`personal jurisdiction over each individual Defendant based on that Defendant’s activities in and
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`contacts with Florida”); see also Atmos Nation LLC v. Alibaba Grp. Holding Ltd., 2017 WL
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`11680202, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 26, 2017) (Moore, J.) (dismissing complaint where plaintiff “does
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`not distinguish between [] Defendants in addressing personal jurisdiction”).
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`Second, and more fundamentally, this allegation fails because it is entirely conclusory.
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`Plaintiffs plead no facts showing that Non-Resident Defendants engaged in “the promotion,
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`marketing, and sale of FTX’s YBAs in Florida.” ¶ 50. GSW is only alleged to have displayed
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`FTX’s logo in California. ¶¶ 222-223. Mr. Curry, Mr. David, and Ms. Osaka appeared in ads for
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`FTX, none of which said anything about YBAs or were targeted at Florida. ¶¶ 219, 228-232.6 And
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`6 Ms. Osaka also allegedly wore an FTX logo at one tournament in Miami. ¶ 227. This is not
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`sufficient to establish specific jurisdiction over her in Florida. See Goldstein v. Johnson & Johnson,
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`2019 WL 289290, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 21, 2019) (Moore, J.) (rejecting plaintiff’s “contention that
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`the use of a company’s brand name or logo within a particular state by itself constitutes sufficient
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`8
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`the only allegation concerning Mr. Ohtani is tied to a press release (issued from the Bahamas by
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`FTX, ¶ 226 n.138) that announced he would serve as an international “global ambassador”—which
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`necessarily excludes promotion of FTX in Florida because FTX’s international platform is not
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`available to U.S. residents. ¶¶ 174, 226 n.138. Critically, the FAC does not allege Mr. Ohtani made
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`any such statement.
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`None of this pleads that these defendants said or did anything regarding YBAs (as opposed
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`to FTX generally), let alone that they engaged in any act in Florida that could establish jurisdiction.
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`There are no allegations that Non-Resident Defendants “directed their [alleged] advertising and
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`marketing … toward the Florida Plaintiffs” in this action, as required. See Takata, 396 F. Supp. 3d
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`at 1141; see also GolTV, Inc. v. Fox Sports Latin Am. Ltd., 277 F. Supp. 3d 1301, 1315 (S.D. Fla.
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`2017) (foreign soccer league had not directed any conduct towards Florida where league had
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`licensed away its broadcast rights, and thus, could not control where games were broadcast).
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`Accordingly, Non-Resident Defendants should be dismissed from this action because Plaintiffs’
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`“vague and conclusory allegations … are insufficient to establish a prima facie case of personal
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`jurisdiction.” Takata, 396 F. Supp. 3d at 1142.
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`Plaintiffs’ conclusory allegations that Non-Resident Defendants were part of an actionable
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`conspiracy likewise fail to establish jurisdiction. ¶ 50. To plead jurisdiction under this theory,
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`Plaintiffs were required to “allege viable facts from which the inference could reasonably be drawn
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`that [Non-Resident Defendants were] part of a conspiracy either engineered in Florida or pursuant
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`contacts with that state for personal jurisdiction purposes”); see also Burger King Corp. v.
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`Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985) (a defendant cannot be “haled into a jurisdiction solely as a
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`result of ‘random,’ ‘fortuitous,’ or ‘attenuated’ contacts.”).
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`to which a tortious act in furtherance was committed in Florida.” Mazer, 556 F.3d at 1283. As set
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`forth in the Movants’ Motion, Plaintiffs have failed to do so. For instance, Plaintiffs do not even
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`allege that Non-Resident Defendants entered into an agreement with FTX (or anybody else) to do
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`something unlawful in Florida. Regardless, no conspiracy could have been “engineered in Florida”
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`because FTX did not even plan to move to Miami until late September 2022—after entering the
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`alleged business agreements with Non-Resident Defendants. ¶¶ 121 & n.36, 221 & n.132 (2021),
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`222 (“early 2022”), 226 & n.138 (2021), 227 & n.140 (spring 2022), 231 (Feb. 2022); David Decl.
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`¶ 3, Ex. A; Curry Decl. ¶ 3. Because Plaintiffs “failed to plead with specificity any facts supporting
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`the existence of a conspiracy,” there is no specific jurisdiction over Non-Resident Defendants.
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`Washington v. Fla. Dep’t of Child. & Families, 595 F. Supp. 2d 1291, 1295 (M.D. Fla. 2009) (no
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`jurisdiction based on “vague and conclusory allegations regarding a conspiracy”).
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`No connexity. Plaintiffs also fail to establish the “connexity” requirement, which requires
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`that their “cause of action arise[] from [the tortious] act.” SkyHop Techs., 58 F.4th at 1223; see id.
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`at 1227-28 (“Establishing one of the Florida long-arm statute’s enumerated acts alone is not
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`enough …. The long-arm statute also imposes a connexity requirement”). Plaintiffs do not allege
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`that they purchased YBAs in Florida, or that they even viewed or relied on Non-Resident
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`Defendants’ alleged FTX promotions in doing so. It is not enough for Plaintiffs to allege that Non-
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`Resident Defendants engaged in “nationwide, undifferentiated, []marketing campaign[s]” without
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`explaining how Plaintiffs’ alleged harm arose out of that conduct. See, e.g., Don King Prods., Inc.
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`v. Mosley, 2016 WL 3950930, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 27, 2016); Paws Aboard, LLC v. DiDonato,
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`2012 WL 1252763, *3-4 (M.D. Fla. April 13, 2012) (statements on website insufficient to confer
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`jurisdiction where plaintiff failed to allege that the statements were read by anyone in Florida).
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`Nor is the fact that FTX planned to move to Florida after the alleged promotions by Non-Resident
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`10
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`Defendants, supra 10, relevant; where FTX is located has nothing to do with whether Plaintiffs’
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`claims against Non-Resident Defendants arise out of alleged torts committed by them in Florida.
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`Thus, there is “no basis to exercise specific jurisdiction … under the Florida long-arm
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`statute,” and “the Court need not determine whether exercising specific jurisdiction … would
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`comport with due process.” Takata, 396 F. Supp. 3d at 1142–43.
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`b.
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`Exercising Personal Jurisdiction Does Not Comport with Due Process.
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`The Motion should be granted for the independent reason that “exercising jurisdiction
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`over [Non-Resident Defendants] would violate the due process clause.” Goldstein, 2019 WL
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`289290, at *2. Courts apply a three-part test when evaluating whether the exercise of personal
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`jurisdiction over a defendant comports with due process: “(1) whether the plaintiff’s claims arise
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`out of or relate to at least one of the defendant’s contacts with the forum; (2) whether the
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`nonresident defendant purposefully availed himself of the privilege of conducting activities within
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`the forum state, thus invoking the benefit of the forum state’s laws; and (3) whether the exercise
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`of personal jurisdiction comports with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Louis
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`Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Mosseri, 736 F.3d 1339, 1355 (11th Cir. 2013). Plaintiffs have the burden
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`to establish the first two factors, referred to as the “minimum contacts” test, after which the burden
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`shifts to the defendant to establish the third. Id. at 1358. Plaintiffs fail to meet their burden.
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`The first prong of the due process test “focus[es] on the direct causal relationship between
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`the defendant, the forum, and the litigation.” Id. at 1355–56. Importantly, a “plaintiff cannot be
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`the only link between the defendant and the forum”; “it is the defendant’s conduct that must form
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`the necessary connection with the forum.” Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 277, 285 (2014).
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`Plaintiffs fail to satisfy this prong for the same reason that they fail to satisfy Florida’s long-arm
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`statute: there is no connection between their claims and Non-Resident Defendants’ alleged conduct
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`in or contacts with Florida. Supra 7-11. Indeed, Plaintiffs’ alleged harm is the loss of assets due to
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`Case 1:22-cv-23753-KMM Document 139 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/14/2023 Page 14 of 20
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`FTX’s collapse. ¶ 6. But Plaintiffs have not alleged that the Non-Resident Defendants had any
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`“involvement with the operation of or control over the [FTX platform]” or “process[ed], service[d],
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`or [created the purportedly flawed services]” FTX provided. Atmos Nation LLC v. Alibaba Grp.
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`Hld. Ltd., 2016 WL 1028332, at *4-5 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 15, 2016) (Moore, J.) (holding Court lacked
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`jurisdiction). The claims against Non-Resident Defendants thus should be dismissed for lack of
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`personal jurisdiction for this reason alone. See Montes v. Capitol Recs., Inc., 2003 WL 23163127,
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`at *3 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 31, 2003) (no minimum contacts where defendant had no agents or offices in
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`Florida, placed their marketing in the stream of commerce without intentional direction at the
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`Florida market, and the claim did not arise out of defendant’s sales of products in Florida).
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`On the second prong, Plaintiffs fail to plead that Non-Resident Defendants purposefully
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`availed themselves of Florida. To show “purposeful availment,” a plaintiff must show a
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`“defendant’s contacts with the forum … (1) are related to the plaintiff’s cause of action; (2) involve
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`some act by which the defendant purposefully availed himself of the privileges of doing business
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`within the forum; and (3) are such that the defendant should reasonably anticipate being haled into
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`court in the forum.” Louis Vuitton, 736 F.3d at 1357. A defendant’s contacts with the forum must
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`have been its “own choice and not random, isolated, or fortuitous,” and “must show that the
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`defendant deliberately ‘reached out beyond’ its home.” Ford Motor Co., 141 S. Ct. at 1025.
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`Beyond its conclusory group pleading allegation, ¶ 50, the FAC is silent about Non-
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`Resident Defendants’ “purposeful availment” of Florida. Plaintiffs do not plead that Non-Resident
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`Defendants directed their activities at Florida or had any non-“random, isolated, or fortuitous”
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`contact with Florida such that they should have anticipated being brought into this Court. Ford
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`Motor Co., 141 S. Ct. at 1025; see Gen. Cigar Holdings, Inc. v. Altadis, S.A., 205 F. Supp. 2d
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`1335, 1347 (S.D. Fla.) (company not subject to jurisdiction where executive attended meetings in
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`Case 1:22-cv-23753-KMM Document 139 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/14/2023 Page 15 of 20
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`Florida because “Florida was [not] the focal point of the alleged illegal activity”). Rather,
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`Plaintiffs’ theory appears to be that maybe a Florida resident could have viewed or heard the
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`images of, or statements made by, Non-Resident Defendants if somebody broadcast them into
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`Florida. Clearly, that speculative theory is insufficient. But even assuming Plaintiffs had alleged
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`such a broadcast, that would not be enough because it is well-established that promotions made
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`“to anyone and everyone who had [] access [to the ad] and cared to see [it]” are insufficient to
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`establish minimum contacts. FVD-USA, LLC v. Fabiani, 2007 WL 9684283, at *6 (S.D. Fla. July
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`27, 2007); see Don King Prods., Inc., 2016 WL 3950930, at *6 (granting motion to dismiss where
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`“the only potential contact [defendant] ha[d] with Florida [was] that it engaged in a national online
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`advertising campaign.”); Zamora Radio, LLC v. Last.fm LTD., 2011 WL 2580401, at *7 (S.D. Fla.
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`June 29, 2011) (“[S]ubject[ing] [defendant] to jurisdiction in a particular forum just for offering
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`national and un-targeted advertising” would “set a troubling precedent.”); Miami Breakers Soccer
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`Club, Inc. v. Women’s United Soccer Ass’n, 140 F. Supp. 2d 1325, 1329 (S.D. Fla. 2001) (sports
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`team’s use of logo on website insufficient to confer personal jurisdiction). This same rationale
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`applies here. Non-Resident Defendants must be dismissed from this case because Plaintiffs fail to
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`plead, and cannot plead, purposeful availment.
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`Finally, even assuming Plaintiffs could meet their burden on the first two prongs (they
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`have not and cannot), the Court should not exercise personal jurisdiction over Non-Resident
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`Defendants because doing so would offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.
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`In conducting this analysis, courts consider: “(1) the burden on the defendant; (2) the forum’s
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`interest in adjudicating the dispute; (3) the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining convenient and effective
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`relief; and (4) the judicial system’s interest in resolving the dispute.” Louis Vuitton, 736 F.3d at
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`1358. These factors weigh heavily against the exercise of personal jurisdiction here.
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`Case 1:22-cv-23753-KMM Document 139 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/14/2023 Page 16 of 20
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`First, Non-Resident Defendants are burdened by defending these claims in Florida
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`because they are not “at home” here. For example, in Response Reward Sys., L.C. v. Meijer, Inc.,
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`the court declined to exercise jurisdiction over a Michigan-based corporation because the burden
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`of litigating in Florida “would be substantial” where the corporation had “no offices, employees,
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`or documents located in” Florida and it “would have to bear the cost of transporting its documents
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`and witnesses” to Florida. 189 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 1339 (M.D. Fla. 2002); see also Wiegering v.
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`Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mass., Inc., 2017 WL 1294907, at *9 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 2, 2017)
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`(“Defendant will be burdened by litigating in this forum because all of its business operations are
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`located in Massachusetts.”); Green v. USF & G Corp., 772 F. Supp. 1258, 1259, 1263 (S.D. Fla.
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`1991) (no jurisdiction over Maryland residents who “would be greatly burdened if they were made
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`to travel to Florida to defend against th[e] action” where they had “no ties to the state of Florida,”
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`including no “office, agents, or assets in Florida”). The same is true for Non-Resident Defendants,
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`so this factor weighs against exercising jurisdiction. See supra 2-4.
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`Second, Plaintiffs have failed to plead, and cannot plead, that Florida has a greater interest
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`in the adjudication of