`
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
`
`CASE NO. 19-81160-CIV-SMITH
`
`APPLE INC.,
`Plaintiff,
`
`v.
`CORELLIUM, LLC,
`Defendant.
`_______________________/
`ORDER ON THE PARTIES’ MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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`Plaintiff, Apple Inc. (“Apple”) designs and manufactures mobile communication devices,
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`
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`personal computers, and media devices, and sells a variety of related software, services,
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`accessories, and third-party digital content and applications. iOS is Apple’s mobile operating
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`system (or “OS”) for certain devices like the iPhone. iOS is publicly available online for free
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`download from Apple’s servers as part of a packaged file. Around 2016 or 2017, Apple removed
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`encryption from the kernel, which is the core of the operating system that has complete control
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`over all system resources.
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`In 2017, Defendant, Corellium, LLC (“Corellium”) began developing a commercial
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`product (“the Corellium Product”) that permits users to create tailored, virtual models of iPhones,
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`using iOS files loaded by the user. (The Corellium Product also virtualizes Android, the mobile
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`operating system used by Google, but the Android aspects of the Corellium Product are not issue
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`in this case.) With its relatively limited functionality, among other things, the Corellium Product
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`does not virtualize the Apple App Store, and users cannot make phone calls or use camera––
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`features of interest to the average customer buying an iPhone off the shelf. According to testimony
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`of developers of the Corellium Product, the product is intended to provide an environment in which
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`technology security researchers can conduct research with features of interest to those researchers.
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`Still, there is no evidence that the Corellium Product, like other technology, cannot be used for
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`unintended purposes, or that Corellium can control how users utilize any Corellium Product
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`installed on their premises.
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`Starting in January 2018, Apple and Corellium began engaging in acquisition talks which,
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`if successful, would have allowed Apple to acquire Corellium (including its people and the
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`Corellium Product). During the acquisition process, there were several in-person meetings and
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`calls between the companies. The Corellium Product was demonstrated (“demo’ed”) to Apple and
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`there was technical due diligence. In the summer of 2018, the potential deal fell apart and Apple
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`did not acquire Corellium.
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`On August 15, 2019, Apple filed this lawsuit alleging that Corellium infringed Apple’s
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`copyrights in iOS and circumvented its security measures in violation of the federal Digital
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`Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”). Corellium denies that it has violated the DMCA or
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`Apple’s copyrights. Corellium further argues that even if it used Apple’s copyrighted work, such
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`use constitutes “fair use” and, therefore, is legally permissible. Apple filed a Motion for Partial
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`Summary Judgment [DE 470] and Corellium filed a Motion for Summary Judgment [DE 464].
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`For the reasons explained below, on the copyright claim, the Court finds that Corellium’s use of
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`iOS constitutes fair use, and a genuine dispute of material facts precludes summary judgment on
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`the DMCA claim. Thus, Corellium’s motion is granted in part and denied in part, and Apple’s
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`motion is denied.1
`
`
`1 To the extent the parties agree on the facts and the facts as stated are supported by the evidence,
`the Court may cite to the parties’ Statements of Material Facts (“SOF”). Regarding declarations,
`under the law of this Circuit, “[w]hen a party has given clear answers to unambiguous questions
`which negate the existence of any genuine issue of material fact [for summary judgment], that
`party cannot thereafter create such an issue with an affidavit that merely contradicts, without
`explanation, previously given clear testimony. Such an affidavit would be a sham.” McCormick v.
`City of Fort Lauderdale, 333 F.3d 1234, 1240 (11th Cir. 2003) (internal citation omitted).
`2
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`Case 9:19-cv-81160-RS Document 784 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/29/2020 Page 3 of 38
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`BACKGROUND
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`A. iOS: APPLE’S OPERATING SYSTEM
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`An operating system is a program that manages the resources of the computer, allocating
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`those resources to other programs as needed. It manages the computer’s most basic functions,
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`including the user’s interaction with the device. iOS is Apple’s operating system for its iPhone,
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`iPod Touch, and until September 25, 2019, iPad. (Andrews Decl. [DE 470-4] ¶ 4.) The iPhone
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`was introduced in 2007. It is one of the world’s first “smartphones” and remains one of the most
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`popular consumer electronic devices in the world. (Andrews Decl. ¶ 3.) For the iPhone, among
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`other things, the ability to make phone calls, send text messages, take photos, and download apps
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`from Apple’s App Store are important features of iOS. (Def.’s SOF [DE 472] ¶ 3.)
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`iOS does not include hardware or some components of the secure boot chain (discussed
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`below), like Boot ROM, which are built directly into the physical device. (Def.’s SOF ¶ 4.)
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`However, iOS encompasses default software applications, underlying graphics, images, and files
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`that help create the iOS displays, and graphical user interface (“GUI”) elements installed on
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`Apple’s mobile devices. (Andrews Decl. ¶ 6.) Generally, GUI is a visual way of interacting with
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`a computer using items such as icons and menus.2 iOS also encompasses the source code and
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`object code representing the processes managing the execution of applications and utilization of
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`device resources.3 (Andrews Decl. ¶ 6.)
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`Additionally, the Court does not consider evidence that has been stricken pursuant to the Court’s
`August 24, 2020 Order [DE 658] and the parties’ related Joint Stipulation [DE 722]. Lastly,
`citations to the record primarily reflect sealed versions of the document, not the publicly available
`copies.
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` https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/graphical%20user%20interface.
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` Regarding source code and object code:
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`3
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` 2
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` 3
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`Case 9:19-cv-81160-RS Document 784 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/29/2020 Page 4 of 38
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`iOS includes open and partially open source code; it includes code that was not written by
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`Apple. (Marineau-Mes Dep. [DE 472-4] 37:6-14.) This includes: (1) open source code that Apple
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`uses under license (e.g., Secure Socket Layer); (2) components for which Apple is the primary
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`owner (e.g., WebKit); and (3) aspects where Apple contributes some of the code (e.g., the kernel).
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`(Andrews Dep. [DE 472-3] 91:22-93:13, 100:20-23; Marineau-Mes Dep. 37:6- 40:11 (other open
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`source components of iOS are the compiler and Swift).) Likewise, iOS’ Darwin, which is part of
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`the kernel, stems from research dating back thirty to forty years––long before Apple developed the
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`iPhone. (Marineau-Mes Dep. 37:6-40:6.) For these open source components, Apple is key
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`contributor to the code bases and, in many cases, invented the code and chose to make it available
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`in open source. (Marineau-Mes Dep. 39:23-40:7.)
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`
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`Computers come down to one basic premise: They operate with a series of on and
`off switches, using two digits in the binary (base 2) number system—0 (for off) and
`1 (for on). All data and instructions input to or contained in computers therefore
`must be reduced to . . . 1 and 0 . . . . Some highly skilled human beings can reduce
`data and instructions to strings of 1’s and 0’s and thus program computers to
`perform complex tasks by inputting commands and data in that form. But it would
`be inconvenient, inefficient and, for most people, probably impossible to do so. In
`consequence, computer science has developed programming languages. These
`languages, like other written languages, employ symbols and syntax to convey
`meaning. The text of programs written in these languages is referred to as source
`code. And whether directly or through the medium of another program, the sets of
`instructions written in programming languages—the source code—ultimately are
`translated into machine “readable” strings of 1’s and 0’s, known in the computer
`world as object code, which typically are executable by the computer . . . . All code
`is human readable. As source code is closer to human language than is object code,
`it tends to be comprehended more easily by humans than object code.
`
`Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 306 (S.D.N.Y.), aff’d sub nom.
`Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001) (internal citation omitted).
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`4
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`Case 9:19-cv-81160-RS Document 784 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/29/2020 Page 5 of 38
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`B. IPSW FILES
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`Apple continuously releases new versions of iOS. It also releases at least some components
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`of iOS in software files known as “IPSW” files. (Andrews Dep. 94:13-25; Krstic Dep. [DE 472-
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`1] 126:13-127:21; Wang Dep. [DE 472-6] 59:24-61:10.) IPSW files are available online for free
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`download from Apple’s servers, including via links provided on third-party sites like ipsw.me.
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`(Def.’s SOF ¶ 6.) A user is not presented with or required to agree to the iOS Software License
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`Agreement or End User License Agreement (“EULA”) before downloading an IPSW file. (Def.’s
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`SOF ¶ 12; Andrews Dep. 95:13-15, 98:14-20.)
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`IPSW files have iOS without some of the runtime elements such as the cryptographic
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`authorization ticket, which authorizes a given version of iOS to run in a given piece of hardware.
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`(Krstic Dep. 126:13-127:21.) Further, many parts of the IPSW files are unencrypted, including
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`the kernel, which is the core of the operating system that has complete control over all system
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`resources. (Def.’s SOF ¶ 8.) Thus, once downloaded, a person can read some of the file contents,
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`and it is possible to access contents of the kernel, as well as extract other parts of the file. (Krstic
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`Dep. 67:12-21, 129:21-130:4; Marineau-Mes Dep. 57:2-10.) The kernel can run on non-Apple
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`devices, but protections put in place by Apple––which intends for the kernel to run on Apple
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`devices––makes it difficult to do so. (Krstic Dep. 130:23-132:13, 141-143:3.) The IPSW files
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`also contain image files such as wallpaper. (Def.’s SOF ¶ 7.)
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`C. APPLE’S TECHNICAL CONTROL MEASURES
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`Apple designs iOS and devices running iOS as an integrated hardware/software system.
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`(Pl.’s SOF [DE 470-2] ¶ 10.) Apple does not provide the functionality to “clone” or copy the
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`complete contents of an iPhone. (Id. ¶ 11.) Combining hardware, software, and service features,
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`Apple has put security measures in place to protect its devices and customers’ experience. (Pl.’s
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`5
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`Resp. to Second Interr. No. 16 [DE 553-9].4) In its motion, Apple focuses on the following
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`measures:
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`Authorization Server: According to Apple, upon installing iOS on an Apple device (e.g.,
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`iPhone), the device must first communicate with Apple’s “authorization server” for approval. The
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`device sends information to Apple about the physical iPhone and the version of iOS the user seeks
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`to install. The authorization server checks this information, and if the information presented
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`checks out, returns a cryptographic signature (known as an “AP Ticket”) authorizing installation
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`on the device. The signed AP Ticket is saved to the device and is required to be checked every
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`time the device tries to run iOS. (Pl.’s SOF ¶¶ 14-15.) Corellium disagrees with this statement,
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`asserting instead that “iOS in the public IPSW distribution . . . has no such requirements––this
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`security function is hard-coded into physical iOS devices.” (Def.’s Resp. SOF [DE 513] ¶¶ 14-
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`15.)
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`Secure boot chain: Secure boot chain is a way Apple prevents unauthorized code from
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`running on its systems. The process involves an interaction between iOS and software embedded
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`in the physical device. (Wang Dep. 62:8-18, 212:4-22; Marineau-Mes Dep. 36:6-23.) It is “an
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`extremely well-meaning and well-designed feature that is intended to safeguard the privacy and
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`security of Apple iPhone users[.]” (Pl.’s SOF ¶ 18.) The boot chain is “secure” because each step
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`must be verified before the next step can proceed. (Wang Dep. 212:4-22; Pl.’s SOF ¶ 17.)
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`Buddy program: When iOS is freshly installed on an Apple device, a program called
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`“Buddy” runs. The “Buddy” program helps the user set up iOS on the device. One portion of the
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`“Buddy” program presents the EULA governing that version of iOS to the user on the iOS device.
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`A user must accept the EULA before the user can continue to interact with any other part of iOS.
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`4 The parties disagree on the nature, operation, and purpose of some of these measures.
`6
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`If the user does not accept the EULA, the Buddy program prevents the user from further accessing
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`iOS. (Andrews Decl. ¶ 17.)
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`Trust Cache: The trust cache is a list of trusted applications that Apple has approved for
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`execution on iOS. The trust cache prevents users from installing and operating unapproved
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`applications on iOS. The trust cache prevents the installation of rogue software and ensures that
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`only-Apple-verified applications can be run on iOS. (Pl.’s SOF ¶ 21.)
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`Pointer Authentication Codes (or PAC): This hardware feature works with Apple software
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`to protect iOS and makes it “difficult or impossible” for the kernel to run on non-Apple platform.
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`(Krstic Dep. 132:25-133:17, 140:23-141:18, 142:19-143:3.) Apple began implementing custom
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`PAC with the release of iOS 12.0 for the iPhone XR, XS, and XS Max in September 2018. (Pl.’s
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`SOF ¶ 22.) PAC is a cryptographic signature Apple inserts and stores in various places in iOS
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`code to ensure that the code is executed as intended, without modification or distortion. When the
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`device processor receives certain instructions, it generates the cryptographic measurement for the
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`next instruction it has been asked to execute. If the measurement does not match the stored PAC,
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`the processor will halt execution. (Id.)
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`D. THE CORELLIUM PRODUCT
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`Corellium was founded in August 2017. (Gorton Dep. [DE 472-25] 20:8; Skowronek Dep.
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`[DE 472-20] 46:21–47:2.) Development of a prototype of the Corellium Product began around
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`summer 2017. (Gorton Dep. 33:5-21.) By January 2018, Corellium was able to demo the creation
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`of a virtual device and was able to use the virtual device in basic ways. (Gorton Dep. 33:22-34:20).
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`Corellium developed both a cloud (or online) version and an on-premises version (i.e., where the
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`customer purchases and installs a server on their premises) of the Corellium Product. By the end
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`of January 2018, a trial version (Version 1.1) of the cloud-based product was offered to a limited
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`Case 9:19-cv-81160-RS Document 784 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/29/2020 Page 8 of 38
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`number of users for beta testing (to detect bugs and any usability issues) and business development.
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`(Gorton Dep. 52:23-53:9; Def.’s Fourth Am. Ans. to First Interr. No. 1 [DE 470-9].)
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`The Corellium Product enables users to create and interact with virtual devices by loading
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`firmware (that is, files for operating systems like iOS, Android, and Linux). (Def.’s SOF ¶ 30.)
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`Virtualization is the ability to run software on hardware it is not ordinarily meant to run on. (Wang
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`Dep. 55:10-21.) Among other reasons, virtualization is beneficial because it permits the user to
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`run software on faster hardware and permits examination and debugging of the software to get a
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`better understanding of how it works. (Wang Dep. 55:10-21.) According to Corellium’s founders,
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`the Corellium Product was developed with the primary intent of facilitating security testing,
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`research, and development by, inter alia, allowing researchers to examine aspects of iOS code.
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`(Wade Dep. 179:17-20, 180:12-13; Wang Dep. 210:9-212:3; Gorton Dep. 50:20-51:5; Skowronek
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`Dep. 71:18-23, 96:21-97:2.) Security research is an activity designed to find unintended and
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`unknown weaknesses in a system, including through source code inspection and certain runtime
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`debugging. (Krstic Dep. 123:12-124:3.) Among other things, security researchers are interested
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`in whether software has vulnerabilities and how and if those vulnerabilities can be exploited and
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`defended against. (Wang Dep. 249:17-22.) Security researchers include, for example, members
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`of Apple’s Security Bug Bounty Program, a program that rewards researchers who help find
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`vulnerabilities in Apple’s products. (Krstic Dep. 181:5-9.) Vulnerability is a technical term for a
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`bug that has security impact; that is, if exploited, it can undermine the security of the user’s system.
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`(Krstic Dep. 102:4-6.5) Security researchers can use their talent for good or for nefarious purposes.
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`(Pl.’s SOF ¶ 61.)
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`5 “In some context a bug could be different from a vulnerability . . . . An exploit uses a vulnerability
`to achieve a purpose,” such as a jailbreak. (Wang Dep. 51:9-14, 52:15-53:10.) Jailbreaking is a
`8
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`Case 9:19-cv-81160-RS Document 784 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/29/2020 Page 9 of 38
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`Turning back to the Corellium Product, Corellium directly sells to customers and has, until
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`recently, used a reseller for the on-premises version of the product.6 (Gorton Dep. 15:1-16:2,
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`53:15-54:14, 125:17-19, 127:1-11.) For its direct sales, Corellium has a vetting process. (Gorton
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`Dep. 52:14-18, 116:7-126:6; Dyer Dep. [DE 472-32] 32:2-36:15, 39:13-40:14, 46:14-57:13.)
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`Generally, upon receiving an inquiry, the process begins with an initial evaluation. This initial
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`analysis takes several factors into consideration, including whether the inquiry came from an
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`enterprise account or from an individual account (e.g., a Gmail account). Corellium also considers
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`the nature of the content of the inquiry and whether it comports with Corellium’s intended use for
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`its product. For example, if the inquiry requests the ability to run iOS on an Android mobile
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`device, Corellium discards it. Similarly, if there are red flags based on the identity of a putative
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`customer (e.g., someone involved with unlawful activity) or based on the geographic origins of
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`the request, Corellium does not engage.
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`If Corellium finds, after the initial evaluation, that the request might be a qualified lead, it
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`responds and starts a line of communication with the putative customer. Discussions at this stage
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`may entail a telephone conversation, demo of the Corellium Product, providing a data sheet of
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`product features and pricing or an order form with license terms, or an offer of a trial period in the
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`cloud. In some cases, Corellium also continues to investigate the potential customer to determine,
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`for instance, the nature of their business and their affiliations. Red flags during this investigation
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`may result in a decision by Corellium not to continue to engage with the company.
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`
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`“mechanism to exploit security vulnerability or allow execution of code that didn’t come from [the
`developer].” Jailbreaking can be used for good. (Andrews Dep. 97:6-98:13.)
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` Corellium contracted with two resellers but only one has engaged in any sales. (Gorton Dep.
`15:25-16:16.)
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`. (Gorton Dep.
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`123:3-124:25, 163:8-164:7; Dyer Dep. 143:9-144:5, 150:15-153:11.) The vetting process is
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`similar for the on-premises and cloud versions of the Corellium Product, except that for the cloud
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`product, Corellium may sell to locations they are not otherwise comfortable shipping servers to.
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`(Gorton Dep. 125:21-126:6.)
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`In terms of Corellium’s control of the use of its product, customers are not required to
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`report bugs or vulnerabilities in iOS to Apple or Corellium. (Gorton Dep. 128:7-130:16.)
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`However, for the cloud product, if there are concerns regarding malicious activity, Corellium can
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`log into an account, investigate, and terminate the account, if necessary. (Gorton Dep. 98:1-6,
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`99:13-17, 107:10-20; Wade Dep. 204:4-15, 205:14-207:16, 208:24-15.) Corellium does not have
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`the same control over the on-premises version of the Corellium Product; there is no way to even
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`know where the product is after it has been shipped from Corellium, and customers are not required
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`to keep the product in a particular location upon sale. Instead, Corellium asserts that it relies on
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`the legal enforcement of licensing or end user agreements to ensure that its customers comply with
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`any legal requirements.
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`Corellium’s CEO and its Vice President of Sales and Business Development testified that
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`the typical inquiry received pertains to application security testing, operating system security
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`testing, training, and “miscellaneous.” “Miscellaneous” requests are not received often but might
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`include things like continuous integration or the development of tools, such as forensics tools.
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`(Gorton Dep. 118:4-24; see also Dyer Dep. 48:5-17, 83:9-105:15.) While Corellium may engage
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`with iOS app developers, these developers are not target customers, and Corellium generally does
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`not advertise for application development, because the Corellium Product “is designed for security
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`testing and research particularly,” and “[t]he price point makes it unattractive to app developers .
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`. . .” (Gorton Dep. 118:14-24.)
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`Once Corellium decides to sell the product, for either version of the Corellium Product,
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`customers must pay an annual licensing fee and must purchase a server. Additionally, if the user
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`chooses the Enterprise or Premium edition of the Corellium Product they must pay an upgrade fee.
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`(Gorton Dep. 92:13-95:21; Dyer Dep. 66:1-24.) On-premises customers perform their own install
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`and upgrades and manage their network. (Gorton Dep. 98:23-99:2; Wang Dep. 99:23-103:7,
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`106:4-7.) Prior to April 2018, upon setting up the hardware and IP settings, an on-premises
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`customer would not need to take additional steps to setup, as firmware (e.g., IPSW file) links were
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`provided by ipsw.me. (Def.’s Fourth Am. Ans. to First Interr. No. 2.) However, for versions of
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`the Corellium Product released between April 2018 and March 2019, an additional step of
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`obtaining IPSW files must be performed and the files must be placed in
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`. (Def.’s Fourth Am. Ans. to First Interr. No. 2.) Then, for versions of the
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`Corellium Product released during or after March 2019, there are additional steps to get to the
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`directory permitting download of the IPSW files required to set up iOS devices. (Def.’s Fourth
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`Am. Ans. to First Interr. No. 2.) The setup for cloud-based customers is more straightforward;
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`users log into their online account to get started.
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`At the point users are ready to create a virtual iOS device, Corellium maintains an IPSW
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`database which matches physical devices with available versions of iOS and the associated internet
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`download addresses (URLs) for each IPSW file. (Pl.’s SOF ¶ 51.) From early 2019 until February
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`2020, Corellium’s cloud interface included a “dropdown” menu that enabled its customers to select
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`from a prepopulated list of iOS versions and iOS Devices. The customer would pick a version of
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`iOS and device from that menu (e.g., iPhone 11 Max running iOS 13), and the Corellium Product
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`would automatically download the associated IPSW file from Apple’s servers. (Pl.’s SOF ¶ 52.)
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`Corellium also instructs its customers on how to manually download IPSW files from Apple’s
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`servers and then load or import those files into the Corellium Product to create iOS virtual devices.
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`(Pl.’s SOF ¶ 53.) Thus, customers obtain IPSW files by manual download or by a Corellium
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`program that automates downloading the IPSW files from Apple servers. On-premises customers
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`have the option of saving IPSW files manually. (Def.’s SOF ¶ 55.) Each time a Cloud user wants
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`an IPSW file, the user must download it from Apple’s servers; Corellium does not save the IPSW
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`file on its system. (Wang Dep. 152:18-153:1.7)
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`The Corellium Product dynamically unpacks IPSW files as they are downloading. (Def.’s
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`SOF ¶ 53.) The files are “transiently stored” until they can be transferred to the right compute
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`node and translated, and are there for a “very short amount of time.” (Wang Dep. 173:8-17;
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`Skowronek Dep. 116:2-117:1, 119:13-120:22, 166:8-19.) Additionally, in creating virtual devices,
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`the Corellium Product does not use iOS in the form in which it exists within the downloaded IPSW
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`files. Rather, once a user loads the firmware, the Corellium Product “transforms” iOS by
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`. (Def.’s SOF ¶ 66.9) Thus, following the transformation process, the software
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`7 There is evidence that, at least once, Corellium provided IPSW files to its reseller for a demo
`unit. (Azimuth Security, LLC Dep. [DE 557-13] 175:176:4.)
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` Corellium uses the term “transform” to describe this process, while Apple appears to prefer the
`word “modify.” Regardless if it is a “transformation” or “modification,” there are some changes
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`involved in creating the virtual device derives from a combination of Corellium’s code and Apple’s
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`iOS code. (Wang Dep. 158:13-159:16, 161:15-162:5, 195:17-23; Andrews Dep. 102:23-103:16.)
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`Additionally, Corellium ordinarily avoids using encrypted parts of the IPSW files because it cannot
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`decrypt them. (Wang Dep. 64:2-15, 65:4-12, 259:19-24.) However, if a user has an unencrypted
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`version of otherwise encrypted portions of the firmware, the Corellium Product allows the user to
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`load it and see those portions displayed in the Corellium Product. (Gorton Dep. 96:9-19.)
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`E. ACQUISITION EFFORTS
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`Between January 2018 and the summer of 2018, the parties engaged in discussions
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`regarding Apple’s potential acquisition of Corellium. During this time, the parties met in-person
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`and telephonically. Corellium explained to Apple the technology behind the Corellium Product
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`and how it works, and discussed Corellium’s business and intention to commercialize the
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`Corellium Product.10 In addition to several engineers, discussions involved Apple’s Senior Vice
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`President of Software Engineering, the Vice President of OS Software Engineering, and the Head
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`of Apple’s Security Engineering and Architecture. (See Federighi, Andrews, & Krstic Dep., supra
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`n.10.) Corellium also provided Apple with a temporary account or administrative access to the
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`Corellium Product. (Andrews Dep. 50:15-54:9, 60:15-20, 168:17-25.) While Apple’s legal
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`department did not formally discuss copyright violations with Corellium, there is a dispute as to
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`whether, and to what extent, Corellium was told by Apple employees that Corellium needed a
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`made once the user loads the IPSW files. Hence, the Court uses the words “change,’ “modify,”
`and “transform” interchangeably.
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`10 See, e.g., Gorton Dep. 177:22-178:8, 180:18-181:17; Andrews Dep. 48:23-49:25, 50:15-54:9,
`60:15-20, 102:13-22, 112:23-113:13, 133:2-134:4, 162:14-163:12, 168:17-25, 188:17-24; Krstic
`Dep. 72:12-23, 74:18-75:3, 143:20-144:6, 149:6-15; Wade Dep. 274:4-276:15; Smith Dep. [DE
`472-28] 64:13-65:25, 83:18-84:10, 134:4-135:3; Federighi Dep. [DE 472-10] 31:8-23, 73:5-13,
`142:8-23.
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`13
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`Case 9:19-cv-81160-RS Document 784 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/29/2020 Page 14 of 38
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`license to utilize iOS in connection with the Corellium Product. (Wade Dep. 276:4-15, 278:1-5;
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`Federighi Dep. 42:9-44:8, 115:12-14, 128:2-9, 132:8-133:4.)
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`
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`If Apple had acquired the Corellium Product, the product would have been used internally
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`for testing and validation (that is, for verifying any system weaknesses and functioning of devices).
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`(Marineau-Mes Dep. 27:3-22, 121:17-19; Krstic Dep. 171:22-25; Smith Dep. 61:16-19.) Even
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`with the Corellium Product, Apple would still need physical iPhones to conduct its testing. (Wade
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`Dep. 210:20-21; Marineau-Mes Dep. 200:10-202:18.) Generally, the Corellium Product received
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`positive feedback from Apple employees. (Andrews Dep. 159:13-16, 192:23-193:15; Krstic Dep.
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`106:5-10.) But there were also concerns, including regarding its utility and long-term value to
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`Apple. (Krstic Dep. 106:5-107:12, 110:9-22.)
`
`
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`The parties ultimately could not agree on a price and, as a result, acquisition efforts were
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`unfruitful. Roughly a year after talks fell apart, Apple filed this suit. (See Compl. [DE 1].)
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`F. SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT
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`In the Second Amended Complaint [DE 589], Apple asserts claims against Corellium for
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`Direct Federal Copyright Infringement (Computer Programs), 17 U.S.C. § 501, Direct Federal
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`Copyright Infringement (Graphical User Interface Elements), 17 U.S.C. § 501, Contributory
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`Federal Copyright Infringement, 17 U.S.C. § 501, and Unlawful Trafficking, 17 U.S.C. §§
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`1201(a)(2), (b), 1203. Apple contends that Corellium infringed on the following products:
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`Case 9:19-cv-81160-RS Document 784 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/29/2020 Page 15 of 38
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`(Sec. Am. Compl., Ex. A.) Each of Apple’s copyright registrations “[e]xclude . . . [p]reviously
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`published Apple material,” including prior versions of iOS. (Def.’s SOF ¶ 21.)
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`SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
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`Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, “summary judgment is proper if the pleadings,
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`depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,
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`show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
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`a judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). “[G]enuine
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`disputes of facts are those in which the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict
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`for the non-movant.” Mann v. Taser Int’l, Inc., 588 F.3d 1291, 1303 (11th Cir. 2009) (internal
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`marks and citation omitted). A fact is material if, under the applicable substantive law, it might
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`affect the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
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`A party seeking summary judgment bears the initial responsibility of supporting its motion
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`and identifying those portions of the record which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine
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`issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. “[A]t the summary judgment stage the judge’s
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`15
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`Case 9:19-cv-81160-RS Document 784 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/29/2020 Page 16 of 38
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`function is not himself to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine
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`whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. The Court “must view all
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`the evidence and all factual inferences reasonably drawn from the evidence in the light most
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`favorable to the nonmoving party and must resolve all reasonable doubts about the facts in favor
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`of the non-movant.” Rioux v. City of Atlanta, Ga., 520 F.3d 1269, 1274 (11th Cir. 2008) (internal
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`marks and citation omitted).
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`DISCUSSION
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`Apple’s claims fall in two buckets: copyright infringement and violation of section 1201
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`of the DMCA. In its motion, Corellium argues it is entitled to summary judgment in its favor
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`because (1) the Corellium Product contains no copyrighted Apple code, (2) the fair use doctrine
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`makes any use of protectable elements of Apple’s work permissible, (3) Apple misused its
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`copyright, (4) Apple should be estopped from asserting a copyright claim against Corellium, (5)
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`Apple cannot show that Corellium infringed any of the 17 copyrights at issue in the Second
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`Amended Complaint,11 and (6) the Corellium Product does not violate the DMCA. Apple also
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`moves for partial summary judgment on the DMCA issue, arguing it is entitled to summary
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`judgment in its favor because Corellium violated the antitrafficking provisions of the statute.
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`Before turning to the DMCA, the Court will analyze the copyright claim. If the Court
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`agrees that the fair use doctrine applies, Cor