Case 9:21-cv-80645-AMC Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/02/2021 Page 1 of 28
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`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
`FORT LAUDERDALE DIVISION
`
`
`
`
`RANDY DOTY, individually and on behalf
`of all others similarly situated,
`
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`
`
`v.
`
`
`ADT, LLC d/b/a ADT SECURITY
`SERVICES, a Delaware limited liability
`company, and TELESFORO AVILES, an
`individual,
`
`
`Defendants.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
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`CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
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`Plaintiff Randy Doty (“Plaintiff”) brings this Class Action Complaint and Demand for Jury
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`Trial against Defendant ADT, LLC d/b/a ADT Security Services (“ADT”), based on its intentional
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`and negligent tortious acts in providing security services to its customers with remote-viewing
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`capabilities, and Defendant Telesforo Aviles (“Aviles”), for using those services to spy on Plaintiff
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`and others who resided in homes with ADT security systems. Plaintiff alleges as follows upon
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`personal knowledge as to himself and his own acts and experiences, and, as to all other matters,
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`upon information and belief.
`
`NATURE OF THE ACTION
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`1.
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`In April of 2020, Randy Doty’s wife received a terrifying phone call from ADT:
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`the technician who had installed their indoor security camera system, Telesforo Aviles, had granted
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`himself remote access, and had used that access an unknown amount of times to spy on Randy
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`Doty, his wife, and their minor son in their most private and intimate moments.
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`2.
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`And Mr. Doty was not the only one. He soon found out that hundreds of households
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`had experienced the same staggering invasion of privacy over at least a seven-year period. At fault
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`for this breach of trust: ADT’s unsecure and unmonitored “security” services.
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`3.
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`While ADT boasts that it has been protecting people for over 145 years and holds
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`itself out as the “#1 in smart home security” it failed to even secure its own systems from massive
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`and ongoing intrusions into its customers’ private lives.
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`4.
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`ADT failed to provide the security services its customers paid for by leaving large
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`vulnerabilities in the ADT Pulse application and, as a result, compromised the safety and security
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`of its customers’ homes and family members.
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`5.
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`The ADT vulnerability allowed any one of its technicians to grant themselves (or
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`for them to grant anyone else, for that matter) access to a customer’s ADT Pulse application and
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`control every aspect of the customer’s home security system, including surreptitiously opening
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`locks, disarming their system, and viewing and downloading security camera footage.
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`6.
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`This vulnerability allowed Aviles—as he admitted in a later guilty plea—to watch
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`people in their homes through the cameras for his own sexual gratification. He would watch
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`customers naked and engaging in sexual activity, which he did hundreds and hundreds of times
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`over, for years, without detection. See Factual Resume, United States v. Aviles, No. 20-cr-00506,
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`dkt. 6 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 19, 2020), attached hereto as Exhibit A.)
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`7.
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`Remarkably, just three months before ADT revealed this vulnerability, ADT
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`conducted a survey recognizing the “strong consumer expectations” of security that consumers
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`had in their smart home products: “With many data privacy and security issues in the news, it’s no
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`surprise that 92 percent of respondents feel smart home security companies need to take measures
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`to protect customers’ personal data and information.”1 ADT bragged that it was leading the
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`industry in establishing “best practices” for the protection of consumer privacy, one of which was
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`strict standards for access to data, promising that “[s]ecurity providers will only share audio or
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`video with first responders with their customers’ prior consent, or as required by law, and will not
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`otherwise access a customer’s audio or video without the customer’s knowledge.”2
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`8.
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`In a frantic effort to mitigate and hide the fact that the vulnerability in its supposedly
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`industry-leading smart home security systems permitted an employee to spy on people in their
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`homes, ADT began a campaign to call all affected account holders and secure a release and
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`confidentially agreement in exchange for a monetary payment representing a fraction of the value
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`of their claims. This effort, directed by lawyers but carried out by customer service representatives,
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`failed to determine whether individuals were represented by counsel, and attempted to mislead
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`them into believing that the release would cover account holders and non-account holders in the
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`household alike.
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`9.
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`Beyond Aviles, potentially countless other unknown individuals have been
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`accessing customers’ ADT Pulse accounts and surreptitiously viewing their camera footage, for
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`years, all around the country.
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`10.
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`The mental and emotional impact this revelation has had on every person receiving
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`these calls from ADT is immeasurable. Moments once believed to be private and inside the sanctity
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`of the home are now voyeuristic entertainment for a third party. And worse, those moments could
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`
`ADT Survey Reveals Strong Consumer Expectations for Smart Home Privacy Protections, ADT
`1
`(Jan. 27, 2020), https://investor.adt.com/press-releases/press-release-details/2020/ADT-Survey-
`Reveals-Strong-Consumer-Expectations-for-Smart-Home-Privacy-Protections/default.aspx
`(permanent link available at https://cite.law/RNP5-BT3U).
`Id.
`2
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`3
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`have been captured, shared with others, or even posted to the Internet. ADT’s failure to protect its
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`customers irreparably destroyed their sense of security, safety, intimacy, and well-being.
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`PARTIES
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`11.
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`12.
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`Plaintiff Randy Doty is a natural person and a citizen of the State of Texas.
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`Defendant ADT, LLC is a limited liability company organized and existing under
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`the laws of Delaware with its principal place of business located at 1501 Yamato Road, Boca
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`Raton, Florida 33431.
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`13.
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`Defendant Telesforo Aviles is a natural person and a citizen of the State of Texas.
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`JURISDICTION AND VENUE
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`14.
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`This Court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2),
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`because (i) at least one member of the Class is a citizen of a different state than Defendant ADT,
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`(ii) the amount in controversy exceeds $5,000,000, exclusive of interests and costs, and (iii) none
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`of the exceptions under that subsection apply in this action.
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`15.
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`This Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendant ADT because Defendant ADT
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`conducts business in Florida and has its headquarters in this District. This Court has personal
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`jurisdiction over Defendant Aviles because Defendant Aviles conducts business in Florida through
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`his employment with Defendant ADT.
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`16.
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`Venue is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) because Defendant ADT maintains
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`its headquarters and conducts significant business in this District.
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`COMMON FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
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`I.
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`ADT Promises Safety and Security to Consumers.
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`17.
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`ADT is a home security company that touts its longstanding expertise in security
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`and claims to have been providing security services since the 19th century. According to ADT, it
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`is “America’s #1 smart home security provider.” ADT provides residential security systems and
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`monitoring plans that purportedly provide “immediate detection” to “help protect you from
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`intrusion”. In short, ADT promises that it is “committed to your security.”3
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`18.
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`ADT markets and sells a comprehensive security system package that includes the
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`hardware necessary to operate a home security system, the monitoring services that detect home
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`intrusions and alert the police, and the security system installation.
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`19.
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`ADT offers various tiers of its home security systems at different price points. The
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`basic tier, for example, features security monitoring equipment with 24/7 alarm monitoring while
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`the highest tier home security package includes various convenience and home automation
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`features.
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`20.
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`One of the highest tier home security packages is ADT Pulse. ADT Pulse allows
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`consumers to “check on your home - even if you’re away” by giving them remote access to
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`control their home security system from a mobile application or a web browser portal.
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`Specifically, consumers can arm and disarm their home security systems, remotely lock and
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`unlock doors, view live camera footage, and control various smart home devices like a
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`thermostat and lights. See Figure 1, showing a screenshot of ADT’s marketing materials for ADT
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`Pulse.4
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`ADT Services | Free In-Home Consultation, Expert Installation and Repairs, Personal
`3
`Customer Support, https://www.adt.com/services (last visited Apr. 1, 2021).
`4
`ADT Pulse® | Official ADT Smart Home Automation System,
`https://www.adt.com/pulse (last visited Apr. 1, 2021).
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`5
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`security providers “manage consumer data and protect their privacy.” Those principles included
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`“Privacy by Design,” promising to “embed[]” privacy “in all areas of the security industry,” which
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`“begins with the design of the products used to help protect and connect customers.” They also
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`included, specifically, “Handling of Audio and Video,” claiming that security providers would
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`share audio or video only with prior consent and would otherwise never “access a customer’s audio
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`or video without the customer’s knowledge.”13
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`II.
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`
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`ADT Failed to Detect a Seven-Year-Long Breach of its Systems That, at the Very Least,
`Resulted in an ADT Employee Improperly Accessing Customers’ Accounts.
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`30.
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`Unfortunately for all of ADT’s Pulse customers and those living in homes with
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`ADT Pulse security systems, a vulnerability in the Pulse system completely obliterates all of
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`ADT’s promises of security and protection.
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`31.
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`On or around April 23, 2020, ADT began to contact some of its customers to inform
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`them that a vulnerability in the ADT Pulse system had allowed unauthorized users to access
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`customers’ ADT Pulse accounts as if they were a regular user. In other words, an unauthorized
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`user could remotely arm and disarm security systems, access smart home devices, and view and
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`download security camera footage, including footage from indoor cameras designed to, among
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`other things, protect their children.
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`32.
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`In fact, ADT’s investigation revealed that at least one ADT employee in the Dallas-
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`Fort Worth, Texas area, named Telesforo Aviles, had access to more than 200 different customers’
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`ADT Pulse accounts for the last seven years. According to an ADT spokesperson, Aviles was able
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`to add—and, in fact, did add—his own personal email address to customers’ accounts, allowing
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`him to remotely login to a customer’s account using his own unauthorized credentials.
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`13
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`Id.
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`33.
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`Aviles was ultimately charged by the United States with one count of fraud and
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`related activity in connection with computers, in violation of 18. U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(C) and
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`(c)(2)(B)(ii), due to his accessing of ADT Pulse customer accounts. See Information, United States
`
`v. Aviles, 20-cr-00506, dkt. 1 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 19, 2020), attached hereto as Exhibit B.
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`34.
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`Subsequently, Aviles plead guilty to this charge on October 19, 2020. Plea
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`Agreement, United States v. Aviles, 20-cr-00506, dkt. 4 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 19, 2020), attached hereto
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`as Exhibit C. In support of his guilty plea, Aviles agreed and stipulated to multiple facts
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`surrounding his access of ADT Pulse customer accounts. See Factual Resume, Ex. A.
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`35.
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`Aviles admitted that when ADT technicians installed the ADT Pulse system in
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`customer homes, ADT permitted them to add their ADT employee email to the application for
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`access to the security system. Through this process, Aviles would add his personal email to a given
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`customer’s ADT Pulse system during installation. See Factual Resume, Ex. A, ¶¶ 3–4.
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`36.
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`Over the course of at least five years, Telesforo Aviles accessed customer’s ADT
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`Pulse systems and viewed their interior and exterior security footage for the purposes of sexual
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`gratification. This included watching videos captured on the ADT Pulse system that depicted
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`naked women and couples engaging in sexual activity inside of their homes, without the
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`customer’s consent. See id., ¶¶ 5–6.
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`37.
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`This type of access admitted to by Aviles could only occur because ADT failed to
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`implement adequate procedures to ensure that technicians removed their access to customer’s ADT
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`Pulse systems after installation. Further, ADT failed to implement procedures that would prevent
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`non-household members from adding non-household email addresses.
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`38.
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`Similarly, ADT failed to monitor consumers’ accounts and promptly alert them any
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`time a new email was added to their accounts. Countless checks could have been in place to prevent
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`or at least stop this conduct. Instead, this breach came to light only by luck and happenstance: a
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`customer, reporting a technical issue, inadvertently revealed the unwanted third-party access. But
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`for that event, ADT would be unaware of this invasive conduct and it would continue unabated to
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`this day (and likely expanding to new households).
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`39.
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`As such, countless other ADT technicians and/or employees could have taken
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`advantage of ADT’s lax security and granted themselves unfettered access to other customer
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`accounts—entirely unbeknownst to both the customer and to ADT.
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`40.
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`Although ADT claims it has implemented procedures to prevent similar incidents
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`in the future, it is already too late for an unknown number of households whose accounts and
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`security camera footage have already been accessed and potentially exploited.
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`FACTS SPECIFIC TO PLAINTIFF DOTY
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`41. Mr. Doty’s household has been a long-time ADT security customer. In
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`approximately 2014, Mr. Doty’s wife upgraded her account to the ADT Pulse system which
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`included installing security cameras inside her home. ADT represented to Mr. Doty’s wife that
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`this upgrade would enhance her household’s security.
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`42.
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`Shortly thereafter, Aviles installed the ADT Pulse system, including an indoor
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`security camera with a wide-angle view that provided a visual of a bathroom, entryway, family
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`room and dining space, stairs, and into the master bedroom.
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`43.
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`On April 23, 2020, a phone call from ADT destroyed whatever security and safety
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`its security system promised. An ADT “Concierge Specialist” called Mr. Doty’s wife to explain
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`that one of its technicians (who they did not name) had gained access to her account and therefore
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`had access to her household’s camera, potentially viewing Mr. Doty, his wife, and their minor son,
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`for an unknown amount of time. ADT claimed it was unknown how many times this technician
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`accessed their camera.
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`44.
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`In an email later that day, ADT Concierge Representative Wayne Walker described
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`it as “a difficult message to hear.” Difficult is, of course, woefully inadequate to truly describe
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`Plaintiff’s loss of security, loss of safety, humiliation, and anger.
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`45.
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`Based upon the cameras’ wide-angle lens and placement, ADT’s employee had an
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`opportunity to watch at least the following events:
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`a. Mr. Doty, his wife, and his minor son nude;
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`b. Mr. Doty, his wife, and his minor son in various states of undress;
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`c. Mr. Doty, his wife, and his minor son getting ready for bed; and
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`d. Moments of physical intimacy.
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`46.
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`Immediately after the call, Mr. Doty’s wife disabled the ADT camera in their home.
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`Mr. Doty’s wife expended significant time addressing the current and future consequences of the
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`exposure enabled by ADT, including, but not limited to, removing ADT security hardware, and
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`researching additional surveillance and security devices and services.
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`47.
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`Prior to April 23, 2020, Mr. Doty and his wife never received any call, text, email,
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`or notification of any kind informing them that another user was added to the ADT Pulse account
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`or that a third-party user accessed the ADT Pulse account.
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`CLASS ALLEGATIONS
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`48.
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`Class Definition: Plaintiff Randy Doty brings this action on behalf of himself and
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`a class of similarly situated individuals, as well as a sub-class of those individuals, defined as
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`follows:
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`Class: All individuals in the United States who (1) reside in a household with an ADT
`Pulse security system but are not the account holder; and (2) where that security system
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`was remotely accessed by an employee or agent of Defendant ADT without authorization
`from the account holder.
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`Sub-Class: All individuals in the United States who (1) reside in a household with an ADT
`Pulse security system but are not the account holder; and (2) where that security system
`was remotely accessed by Telesforo Aviles without authorization from the customer.
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`The following people are excluded from the Class: (1) any Judge or Magistrate presiding over this
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`action and the members of their family; (2) Defendants, Defendants’ subsidiaries, parents,
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`successors, predecessors, and any entity in which the Defendants or their parents have a controlling
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`interest and their current or former employees, officers, and directors; (3) persons who properly
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`execute and file a timely request for exclusion from the Class; (4) persons whose claims in this
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`matter have been finally adjudicated by a court of law on the merits; (5) Plaintiff’s counsel and
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`Defendants’ counsel; and (6) the legal representatives, successors, and assigns of any such
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`excluded persons.
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`49.
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`Numerosity: The exact number of members of the Class is unknown and is not
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`available to Plaintiff at this time, but individual joinder in this case is impracticable. The Class
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`likely consist of over 40 individuals. Members of the Class can be easily identified through
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`Defendant ADT’s records. While the exact number of members of the Sub-Class is unknown, there
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`are over 200 households affected by Aviles’ conduct that have been identified by Defendant ADT,
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`and the exact membership of the Class can be identified through Defendant ADT’s records.
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`50.
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`Commonality: There are many questions of law and fact common to the claims of
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`Plaintiff and the other members of the Class, and those questions predominate over any questions
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`that may affect individual members of the Class. Common questions for the Class include but are
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`not limited to the following:
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`a. Whether Defendant ADT’s conduct constitutes negligence;
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`b. Whether Defendant ADT’s conduct constitutes gross negligence;
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`c. Whether Defendant ADT’s conduct constitutes an intrusion upon seclusion;
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`d. Whether Defendant ADT’s conduct constitutes intentional infliction of emotional
`distress;
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`e. Whether Defendant ADT’s conduct entitles the Class to privacy monitoring; and
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`f. Whether Defendant ADT’s conduct constitutes negligent hiring, supervision, and
`retention.
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`There are many questions of law and fact common to the claims of Plaintiff and the other
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`members of the Sub-Class, and those questions predominate over any questions that may affect
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`individual members of the Class. Common questions for the Class include but are not limited to
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`the following:
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`a. Whether Defendant Aviles’s conduct constitutes intrusion upon seclusion; and
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`b. Whether Defendant Aviles’s conduct constitutes intentional infliction of
`emotional distress.
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`Typicality: Plaintiff’s claims are typical of other members of the Class and Sub-
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`51.
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`Class, in that Plaintiff and the members of the Class and Sub-Class sustained damages arising out
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`of Defendants’ uniform wrongful conduct.
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`52.
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`Adequate Representation: Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and
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`protect the interests of the Class and Sub-Class and has retained counsel competent and
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`experienced in complex class actions. Plaintiff has no interest antagonistic to those of the Class or
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`Sub-Class, and Defendants have no defenses unique to Plaintiff.
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`53.
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`Predominance and Superiority: This case is also appropriate for class
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`certification because Class proceedings are superior to all other available methods for the fair and
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`efficient adjudication of this controversy because joinder of all parties is impracticable. The
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`damages suffered by the individual members of the Class and Sub-Class will likely be relatively
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`small, especially given the burden and expense of individual prosecution of the complex litigation
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`necessitated by Defendants’ actions. Thus, it would be virtually impossible for the individual
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`members of the Class and Sub-Class to obtain effective relief from Defendants’ misconduct. Even
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`if members of the Class and Sub-Class could sustain such individual litigation, it would still not
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`be preferable to a class action because individual litigation would increase the delay and expense
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`to all parties due to the complex legal and factual controversies presented in this Complaint. By
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`contrast, a class action presents far fewer management difficulties and provides the benefits of
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`single adjudication, economies of scale, and comprehensive supervision by a single Court.
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`Economies of time, effort, and expense will be fostered, and uniformity of decisions ensured.
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`FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
`Negligence
`(On Behalf of Plaintiff Doty and the Class against Defendant ADT)
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`Plaintiff incorporates paragraphs 1–53 as if fully set forth herein.
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`Defendant ADT had full knowledge of the purpose for which its security cameras
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`54.
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`55.
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`were being used and the sensitivity of the people and things the cameras were designed to secure
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`and protect—that which “matters most” to their clients. ADT also knew the types of harm that
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`Plaintiff and the members of the Class could and would suffer if the integrity of the security system
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`was compromised.
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`56.
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`ADT had a duty to exercise reasonable care in ensuring that all ADT security
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`systems were secure, safe to use, and inviolable by unauthorized parties. This duty includes, among
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`other things, ensuring that reasonable and proper protocols and safeguards are in place so that
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`consumers’ security cameras are not easily compromised by unauthorized users.
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`57.
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`Defendant ADT, by and through its agents, employees, and independent
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`contractors, was negligent in its acts and/or omissions by, among other things, allowing technicians
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`to create authorized user accounts, and by failing to discover that its employees could make and
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`did make themselves authorized users gaining unauthorized access to the ADT Pulse account
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`connected to their home, thereby allowing surreptitious videos and images to be viewed and taken
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`of Plaintiff in his home.
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`58.
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`Plaintiff and the members of the Class were the foreseeable and probable victims
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`of any inadequate security practices and procedures. ADT knew of or should have known of the
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`inherent risks of allowing ADT cameras to be set up and used without adequate security protocols
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`and safeguards.
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`59.
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`Defendant ADT further knew or should have known that: (1) the surreptitious
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`recordings of Plaintiff contained private and confidential information about Plaintiff; (2) Plaintiff
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`had a reasonable expectation of privacy in being partially and fully naked, engaging in consensual
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`intimate activity, and having private conversations in a private home; (3) the recordings were taken
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`without Plaintiff’s knowledge or consent; (4) the surreptitious recordings would reveal private and
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`personal things about Plaintiff which ADT and Aviles had no right or authorization to view, use,
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`disseminate, or disclose; and (5) the viewing of these private acts and occasions constitutes a
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`substantial violation of Plaintiff’s right of privacy.
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`60.
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`Beyond ordinary negligence, Defendant ADT was grossly negligent because the
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`acts and omissions of Defendant ADT and its employee and agents were more than momentary
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`thoughtlessness or inadvertence. Rather the conduct, when viewed objectively from the standpoint
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`of Defendant ADT at the time of these events, involved an extreme degree of risk, considering the
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`probability and magnitude of the potential harm to Plaintiff. Moreover, Defendant ADT had
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`subjective knowledge of the risk of employees gaining unauthorized access to clients’ cameras but
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`failed to disclose to Plaintiff the vulnerability of their monitoring systems and the ability of ADT
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`employees to monitor and observe their home without their consent, and acted with conscious
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`indifference to the rights, safety, and welfare of their clients.
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`61.
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`ADT’s own actions and inactions created a foreseeable risk of harm to Plaintiff and
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`the members of the Class. ADT’s misconduct included, but was not limited to, its failure to sell
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`security systems with sufficiently robust security protocols to prevent unauthorized users from
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`gaining access to the cameras and failing to inform Plaintiff and the members of the Class when
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`unknown individuals added their email addresses to customer accounts.
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`62.
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`ADT was in a position to protect against the harm suffered by Plaintiff and the
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`members of the Class and had a duty to reasonably protect Plaintiff and the Class from invasions
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`of privacy through unauthorized access of the ADT Pulse system.
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`63.
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`ADT, through its actions, unlawfully breached its duty to Plaintiff and the members
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`of the Class by failing to ensure their cameras and set up procedures were sufficiently robust to
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`protect against unauthorized use.
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`64.
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`As a result of ADT’s negligence, Plaintiff and the members of the Class have
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`suffered and will continue to suffer damages and injury including, but not limited to: mental
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`anguish and suffering in the form of anxiety, stress, loss of security, fear, loss of safety,
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`humiliation, and anger; the time spent monitoring and addressing the current and future
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`consequences of the exposure enabled by ADT; and the necessity to engage legal counsel and incur
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`attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses.
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`65.
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`Further, because ADT’s acts and omissions resulted from gross negligence,
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`exemplary damages should be awarded against ADT in an amount to be determined by the jury in
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`this case. Moreover, exemplary damages should be awarded without limitation, as set forth in Tex.
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`Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 41.008(c).
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`Case 9:21-cv-80645-AMC Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/02/2021 Page 19 of 28
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`SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
`Intrusion Upon Seclusion
`(On Behalf of Plaintiff Doty and the Class against Defendant ADT)
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`Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing paragraphs 1–53 as if fully set forth herein.
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`ADT intentionally intruded upon Plaintiff’s and each of the Class members’
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`66.
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`67.
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`seclusion by creating the means and opportunity for its employees to spy on Plaintiff and the Class
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`in one of their most private spaces—their homes—and providing Aviles and potentially others
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`with round-the-clock access to their most intimate moments. Specifically, ADT’s policy of
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`allowing technicians to add their emails to customer’s ADT Pulse accounts created this
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`opportunity. Indeed, ADT had an affirmative duty not to let unauthorized third parties gain access
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`to these spaces.
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`68.
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`ADT’s creation of this opportunity and failure to stop such access is highly
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`offensive to a reasonable person as it reveals intimate private details about Plaintiff and each of
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`the Class members and the activities they participate in inside the privacy of their own homes.
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`69.
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`ADT is also liable for the actions of its agents who accessed the security systems
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`in Plaintiff’s and the Class’s homes, which was done in the normal and routine course and scope
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`of their employment.
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`70.
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`ADT’s intrusion upon the Plaintiff’s and the Class members’ seclusion caused
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`Plaintiff and the Class members mental anguish and suffering in the form of anxiety, loss of
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`security, loss of safety, humiliation, and anger.
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`THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
`Negligent Hiring, Supervision and Retention
`(On Behalf of Plaintiff Doty and the Class against Defendant ADT)
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`Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing paragraphs 1–53 as if fully set forth herein.
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`At all relevant times, Telesforo Aviles was ADT’s employee and/or agent.
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`71.
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`72.
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`73. Whenever in this Complaint it is alleged that ADT did any act or thing, it is meant
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`that each of ADT’s officers, agents, servants, employees, or representatives did such act and/or
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`that at the time such act or thing was done, it was done with the full authorization or ratification
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`of ADT or was done in the normal and routine course and scope of employment of each of ADT’s
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`officers, agents, servants, employees, or representatives.
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`74.
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`ADT had the opportunity and duty to screen its employees, including Aviles, to
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`ensure they were fit to perform the duties asked of them.
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`75.
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`ADT knew or should have known Aviles was incompetent or unfit. Nonetheless,
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`ADT made the reckless decision to hire and retain Aviles as a technician.
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`76.
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`ADT and its agents, servants, and employees, who were at all times acting in the
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`course and scope of their employment, were guilty of negligence toward Plaintiff. Defendant ADT
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`is further liable for the negligent acts of their agents, servants, or employees, including Aviles,
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`under the legal doctrine of respondeat superior. At all relevant times, Aviles was an agent apparent
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`or ostensible agent of Defendant ADT.
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`77.
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`ADT’s negligence was a proximate cause of Plaintiff’s and Class members’ injuries
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`and damages, including, but not limited to, ADT’s negligence in:
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`a. Failing to perform due diligence in contacting Aviles’s prior employers;
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`b. Failing to adequately evaluate Aviles’s mental state prior to hiring;
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`c. Any and all actions and omissions as may be proven at trial;
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`d. Negligently hiring Aviles in a position allowing him to have access to sensitive
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`client information;
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`e. Negligently allowing Aviles to access sensitive client information when Defendant
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`ADT knew, or in the exercise of ordinary care should have known, that Aviles was
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`Case 9:21-cv-80645-AMC Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/02/2021 Page 21 of 28
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`unfit;
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`f. Negligently retaining Aviles in its employ in a position that provided him with
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`access to sensitive client information;
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`g. Negligently and inadequately supervising its employees;
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`h. Failing to create and/or enforce safety rules, polices, and procedures governing
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`employee conduct regarding access to clients’ cameras and other sensitive
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`information;
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`i. Failing to warn Plaintiff of the inappropriate and substandard hiring and retention,
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`training, and supervision of their employees; and
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`j. Negligently allowing Aviles to accomplish the tort upon Plaintiff by the existence
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`of his agency relationship with Defendant ADT.
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`78.
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`These actions and omissions of ADT singularly, or in combination with others,
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`proximately ca