Filing # 205693440 E-Filed 08/27/2024 04:41:31 PM
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`IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE
`11th JUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN AND FOR
`MIAMI-DADE COUNTY, FLORIDA
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`ELIASET SOCORRO, individually,
`MIGUEL ANGEL CARDOSO DIAZ, individually and
`AMALIA FALS ALVAREZ, individually,
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`vs.
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`ERNESTO RODRIGUEZ CASAS, individually,
`LYFT FLORIDA INC., a foreign corporation,
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`Plaintiffs,
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`CASE NO.: 2024-008830-CA-01
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`Defendants.
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`DEFENDANT LYFT, INC.’S MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER
`FOR PLAINTIFFS’ IMPROPERLY AND UNILATERALLY SCHEDULED
`CORPORATE REPRESENTATIVE DEPOSITION
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`Defendant, Lyft Florida, Inc. (“Lyft”), pursuant to Florida Rules of Civil Procedure 1.280
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`and 1.310, hereby moves for an order of protection relieving its corporate representative from
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`appearing at a deposition improperly and unilaterally set by Plaintiffs, and in support states as
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`follows:
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`INTRODUCTION
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`This is a personal injury action arising out of an alleged, minor 2023 motor vehicle accident
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`(the “Accident”) purportedly between Defendant Ernesto Rodriguez Casas (“Casas”) and
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`Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs sued Casas for negligent operation of his motor vehicle. Because Casas was
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`logged into the Lyft platform when the Accident occurred, Plaintiffs also sued Lyft on derivative
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`claims for vicarious and direct liability. A mere two months after Plaintiffs filed their lawsuit, they
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`immediately and unilaterally noticed a deposition of the corporate representative for Lyft. This is
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`improper and for multiple reasons.
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`CASE NO.: 2024-008830-CA-01
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`First, and foremost, Plaintiffs have not even pled a valid claim against Lyft as Lyft has
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`explained in its pending Motion to Dismiss. Without a valid claim, Plaintiffs have no right to take
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`Lyft’s corporate representative deposition, let alone 2 months into the litigation and on a string of
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`irrelevant and broad topics.
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`Second, despite the fact that Plaintiffs do not have a valid claim against Lyft, Lyft is more
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`than happy to provide Plaintiffs with proof that it complied with the governing Transportation
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`Network Companies (“TNC”) Statue, Fla. Stat. § 627.748 (the “TNC Statute”). That is the sole
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`inquiry on Lyft liability as mandated by the Florida Legislature’s recent amendment to the TNC
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`Statute (Section 18). See Motion to Dismiss. However, Plaintiffs have not even bothered to serve
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`Lyft with written discovery yet. And Plaintiffs apparently did no investigation prior to suing Lyft
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`to confirm Lyft’s compliance. Plaintiffs could have, and should have, done this bare-minimum
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`diligence before needlessly suing Lyft and making incorrect, conclusory allegations in their
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`Complaint. Plaintiffs should not be rewarded for this behavior with a priority Lyft deposition.
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`Third, a Lyft deposition at this early stage is unduly burdensome and out-of-proportion to
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`the needs of this case. At the same time, the TNC Statute bars Plaintiffs’ claims against Lyft at the
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`jump, it provides Plaintiffs with the opportunity to recover under a $1 million insurance policy that
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`Lyft procured to cover any negligence Plaintiffs prove against Casas. This was the compromise
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`the Florida Legislature made to streamline TNC litigation for car accidents for the betterment of
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`the parties and the courts, and to stop the very discovery tactics Plaintiffs have employed here in
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`the attempt to artificially increase the value of their case. Adopting Plaintiffs’ position that they
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`are entitled to an early deposition of Lyft (a TNC) on topics entirely unrelated to the Accident
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`would flip the TNC Statute on its head.
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`CASE NO.: 2024-008830-CA-01
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`Finally, Plaintiffs unilaterally set the Lyft deposition without any confirmation from Lyft
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`that it could provide a deponent at that date and time (it cannot) and knowing full well Lyft’s stance
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`that Plaintiffs’ notice was improper in form, substance, and number.
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`For all these reasons, the irrelevant, burdensome, and unilaterally scheduled deposition of
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`Lyft’s corporate representative should be prohibited. Lyft therefore requests that the Court enter a
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`protective order prohibiting Plaintiffs from pursuing Lyft’s corporate representative at this time.
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`FACTUAL BACKGROUND LEADING TO THE FILING
`OF THE MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER
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`In May 2024, Plaintiffs filed their Complaint against Casas and Lyft. See Compl.
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`1.
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`In it, Plaintiffs asserted four claims against Lyft: (a) vicarious liability for Casas’s alleged
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`negligence; (b) vicarious liability via partnership; (c) the negligent training and supervision of
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`Casas; and (d) negligent hiring of Casas. For all four claims, Plaintiffs simply mimed the legal
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`elements of the cause of action with no corresponding factual allegations whatsoever. See
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`generally Compl. Counts II –V.
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`2.
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`Shortly after service of the Complaint on Lyft, and after speaking with Plaintiffs’
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`counsel by phone, Lyft sent a meet and confer letter to Plaintiffs’ counsel outlining its twofold
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`position See July 10, 2024 Meet and Confer Letter is attached hereto as “Exhibit A.” First, Lyft
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`explained why the TNC Statute barred Plaintiffs’ claims against Lyft at the pleadings stage, and
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`provided Plaintiffs’ counsel with authority confirming same from trial courts throughout Florida.
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`Id. Second, Lyft confirmed the applicability of a $1 million insurance policy that Lyft procured to
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`cover any negligence Plaintiffs prove against Casas consistent with the TNC Statute, and offered
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`Plaintiffs a stipulation outlining same to streamline this litigation over a minor car accident. Id.
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`CASE NO.: 2024-008830-CA-01
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`Plaintiffs essentially rejected the insurance stipulation and, before the case was
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`3.
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`even at issue, noticed Lyft’s corporate representative deposition without sending a single request
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`to the Undersigned counsel. See A true and correct copy of the July 8, 2024 Notice of Deposition
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`attached hereto as Exhibit “B”. The Undersigned informed Plaintiffs’ counsel that the deposition
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`was not mutually coordinated, and area of inquiries were not provided first as required by Florida
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`Rules of Civil Procedure. The Parties July 10, 2024 email correspondences regarding the
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`deposition request attached hereto as “Exhibit C.”
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`4.
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`The areas of inquiry and duces tecum requests in the Notice are irrelevant. Further,
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`discovery is in its infancy, and no other party has sat for a deposition, including Plaintiffs and
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`Casas (i.e. all of the people actually involved in the subject car accident).
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`5.
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`Plaintiffs’ inaction (and lack of pre-suit diligence) has also forced Lyft to file its
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`currently-pending Motion to Dismiss arguing that all of Plaintiffs’ claims against Lyft fail pursuant
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`to the plain language of the governing TNC Statute.
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`STANDARD OF REVIEW
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`The Court may restrict or deny a deposition following a motion for protective order, for
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`good cause shown, and when justice requires. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.280(c). The rule is designed “to
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`protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or
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`expense.” Id.; see also Elkins v. Syken, 672 So. 2d 517, 522 (Fla. 1996). “Abusive” depositions
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`of corporate representatives constitute good cause for a protective order. Medero v. Fla. Power &
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`Light Co., 658 So. 2d 566, 567-68 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995). And “[w]hether depositions, or any other
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`discovery, should be limited is within the broad discretion of the trial court.” Gross v. Security
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`Trust Co., 453 So.2d 944, 945 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984); SCI Funeral Servs. of Fla., Inc. v. Light, 811
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`So.2d 796, 798 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002); Office of Attorney General, Dept. of Legal Affairs, State of
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`CASE NO.: 2024-008830-CA-01
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`Fla. V. Millennium Communications & Fulfillment, Inc., 800 So.2d 255, 258 (Fla. 3rd DCA 2001)
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`(authorizing a court to protect a party from certain discovery).
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`MEMORANDUM OF LAW AND ARGUMENT
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`Lyft’s motion for protective order should be granted for four independent reasons:
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`First, Plaintiff does not have a valid claim against Lyft as outlined in Lyft’s pending
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`Motion to Dismiss. “Facial challenges to the legal sufficiency of a claim or defense, such as a
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`motion to dismiss based on failure to state a claim for relief, should . . . be resolved before
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`discovery begins.” Chudasama v. Mazda Motor Corp., 123 F.3d 1353, 1369 (11th Cir. 1997);
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`Isaiah v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, 960 F.3d 1296, 1308-09 (11th Cir. 2020) (same). “Such a dispute
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`always presents a purely legal question; there are no issues of fact because the allegations
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`contained in the pleading are presumed to be true.” Id. at 1367. “Therefore, neither the parties nor
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`the court have any need for discovery before the court rules on the motion.” Id.
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`For this reason, Florida courts routinely stay discovery pending a ruling on a motion to
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`dismiss. See, e.g., Bank of Am. v. De Morales, 314 So. 3d 528, 532 (Fla. 3d DCA 2020) (finding
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`that “the trial court abused its discretion in failing to stay discovery until it ruled on [defendant’s]
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`motion to dismiss”); Romanoff v. Lazarus, 267 So. 3d 33, 35 (Fla. 4th DCA 2019) (trial court
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`properly “granted [defendant’s] motion to stay discovery pending the motion to dismiss”); Feigin
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`v. Hosp. Staffing Servs. Inc., 569 So. 2d 941, 942 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990) (“the trial court did not
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`abuse its discretion . . . by staying [Plaintiffs’] discovery depositions pending the motion to dismiss
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`hearing”); Orlando Sports Stadium, Inc. v. Sentinel Star Co., 316 So. 2d 607, 609 (Fla. 4th DCA
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`1975) (affirming “protective order on the grounds that . . . [a] motion to dismiss was still pending”).
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`CASE NO.: 2024-008830-CA-01
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`This commonly-applied principle has even more force here. Lyft’s Motion to Dismiss is
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`based on a statutory provision that was passed by the Florida Legislature to specifically curb
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`Plaintiffs’ tactics in this case: unnecessary, invasive, and costly discovery to a TNC in a car
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`accident case when there is already $1 million of TNC insurance to compensate the plaintiff
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`without need to name the TNC. See generally Chudasama, 123 F.3d at 1367–38 (“Allowing a case
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`to proceed through the pretrial processes with an invalid claim that increases the costs of the case
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`does nothing but waste the resources of the litigants in the action before the court, delay resolution
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`of disputes between other litigants, squander scarce judicial resources, and damage the integrity
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`and the public’s perception of the federal judicial system.”).
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`By contrast, Plaintiffs will suffer no prejudice if the Court stays a Lyft deposition unless
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`and until Plaintiffs can get over the pleadings hurdle. This lawsuit is in its nascent stages and Lyft
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`will schedule its Motion to Dismiss on the earliest date that is amenable to both Plaintiffs and the
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`Court. If the Court grants Lyft’s Motion to Dismiss (even in part), the Notice will be invalid. If
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`the Court denies Lyft’s Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiffs will have ample time to conduct discovery
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`on relevant issues, and the parties will then have the necessary time to argue the significant issues
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`related to the specific topics in the Notice. See Theodore D’Apuzzo, P.A. v. United States, No. 16-
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`CV-62769, 2017 WL 3098713, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 11, 2017) (“A brief stay of discovery will not
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`cause any prejudice to [the plaintiff], who will have sufficient opportunity to conduct discovery if
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`his claims advance.”).
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`Second, Plaintiffs have served no written discovery on Lyft and apparently did no pre-suit
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`investigation before suing Lyft. And Plaintiffs have not pled any actual facts in the Complaint
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`CASE NO.: 2024-008830-CA-01
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`supporting their claims against Lyft either.1 This is important. Section 18 of the TNC Statute
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`requires the plaintiff to do their homework before needlessly suing the TNC and driving up the
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`cost of TNC driver litigation for car accidents. Under Section 18, the plaintiff must allege, in good
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`faith, specific facts showing that an exception applies to the general rule of TNC immunity. See
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`Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiffs have entirely failed to do so here. Plaintiffs should not be rewarded
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`with an early Lyft deposition in these circumstances.
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`Third, a Lyft deposition at this preliminary stage is unduly burdensome and not
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`proportional to the needs of this minor car accident.2 This is not a difficult calculation. On one
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`hand, the TNC Statute required Lyft to ensure Plaintiffs’ ability to fully recover the damages they
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`seek from a $1 million insurance policy for any negligence Plaintiffs proves against Casas without
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`the need to name Lyft. This was designed to streamline car accident cases like this one—not
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`complicate them. On the other hand, Plaintiffs are using purely derivative claims against Lyft to
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`seek expansive, burdensome discovery completely untethered from the actual Accident. See
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`Notice. Forcing Lyft to prepare a witness on sweeping topics, and then collecting, reviewing, and
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`producing responsive documents to Plaintiffs’ duces tecum would be a futile exercise and an
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`unnecessary waste of the parties’ and the Court’s time and resources at this early stage when
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`Plaintiffs’ (invalid) claims have not even been ruled upon and no other witness has been deposed.
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`Finally, Plaintiffs chose to immediately and unilaterally set Lyft’s deposition for a date
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`Lyft cannot make, without meaningfully engaging in any meet-and-confer on Lyft’s position, and
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`1 The Complaint reads like a bad copy-and-paste job. For example, it incorrectly calls Lyft a “food delivery services”
`company, alleges that the driver did “not undertake property precautions while operating his vehicle”, and leaves off
`in mid-sentence that “Had LYFT completed a reasonable investigation, they would have been on notice.” (Compl. ¶¶
`50, 56, 63). “Notice” of what Plaintiffs never tellingly say.
`2 As of January 1, 2025, the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure will explicitly “require[] that discovery be proportional
`to the needs of the case.” In re Amends. to Fla. Rules of Civ. Proc., 386 So. 3d 497, 499 (Fla. 2024).
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`CASE NO.: 2024-008830-CA-01
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`in defiance of Lyft’s commonsense stance that Plaintiffs must first get past the pleadings stage
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`before Plaintiffs can depose a corporate deponent with a pleadings defense. Such tactics only serve
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`to needlessly increase the expense of litigating a minor car accident case; they should not be
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`condoned.
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`For all these reasons, Lyft’s Motion should be granted.
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`CONCLUSION
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`This court should enter an Order protecting Defendant from Plaintiffs’ unilaterally and
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`improperly set deposition of a Lyft corporate representative.
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`WHEREFORE, Defendant, Lyft Florida, Inc., respectfully requests that this Court enter an
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`Order protecting Lyft from Plaintiffs’ unilaterally and improperly set deposition of a Lyft corporate
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`representative, and any other relief this Court deems just and proper.
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`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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`I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true copy of the foregoing was served by e-Filing with the
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`Clerk of Court and via Florida e-Filing Portal on August 27, 2024, to:
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`Xenia Hernandez, Esq.
`XENIA HERNANDEZ, ESQ
`6923 NW 77th Ave
`Miami, FL 33166
`Telephone:786-207-3960
`E-mail: xh@xhernandezlaw.com
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`AND
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`Maibel Reyes, Esq.
`5825 Sunset Drive, Suite 301
`Miami, FL 33143
`E-mail: mr@xhernandezlaw.com
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`Counsel for Plaintiff
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`CASE NO.: 2024-008830-CA-01
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`/s/ Brittney I. Polo
`SCOTT M. SARASON
`Florida Bar No.: 0394718
`E-mail: ssarason@rumberger.com
`docketingmiami@rumberger.com
`ssarasonsecy@rumberger.com
`SUZANNE A. SINGER
`Florida Bar No.: 0946222
`E-mail: ssinger@rumberger.com
`docketingmiami@rumberger.com
`ssingersecy@rumberger.com
`BRITTNEY I. POLO
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`Florida Bar No.: 1010827
`E-mail: bpolo@rumberger.com
`docketingmiami@rumberger.com
`bpolosecy@rumberger.com
`Rumberger, Kirk, & Caldwell, P.A.
`Brickell City Tower, Suite 3000
`80 Southwest 8th Street
`Miami, Florida 33130-3037
`Tel: 305.358.5577
`Fax: 305.371.7580
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`Attorneys for Lyft, Inc.
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`19628951.v1
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`EXHIBIT A
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`Brittney I. Polo
`Attorney
`Rumberger, Kirk & Caldwell, P.A.
`Attorneys at Law
`Brickell City Tower, Suite 3000
`80 Southwest 8th Street
`Miami, Florida 33130-3037
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`Phone: 305.358.5577
`Fax:
`305.371.7580
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`bpolo@rumberger.com
`www.rumberger.com
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`July 10, 2024
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`VIA EMAIL
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`Maibel Reyes, Esq.
`X. Hernandez, Esq. Law Firm PLLC
`6923 NW 77th Ave
`Miami, Florida 33166
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`Re: Socorro, Diaz, and Alvarez v. Casas and Lyft
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`Our File No.: 148366
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`Dear Ms. Reyes:
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` I
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` represent Lyft, Inc. (“Lyft”) in the above-referenced matter involving a February 6, 2023
`accident between your clients and Ernesto Rodriguez Casas (the “Driver”). I am writing to
`discuss your claims against Lyft and the insurance coverage provided to the Driver in an
`effort to streamline this case and reduce litigation costs, for the benefit of all parties.
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`As explained in further detail below: (1) Florida law expressly bars the claims you assert
`against Lyft, as Florida courts have repeatedly held under virtually identical circumstances;
`and (2) although there is no viable claim against Lyft here, Lyft has procured a $1 million
`combined single-limit auto liability policy which provides coverage for parties who prove
`that they were injured by a TNC driver’s negligent operation of a vehicle while engaged in
`a prearranged ride on the Lyft platform. Lyft need not be named as a party for that insurance
`policy to apply.1
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`Please contact us to discuss next steps, including dismissal of Lyft in exchange for written
`confirmation of the insurance policy referenced above, after you have had an opportunity
`to review this letter.
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`1 Investigation into the alleged facts of loss is ongoing, including into the potential for fraudulent claims
`and/or a staged accident. In the event that any such fraud is determined, Lyft will make a request for dismissal
`pursuant to Fl. Stat. Ann. § 57.105 and Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 9.410 and will proceed with a motion
`for sanctions if appropriate.
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`July 10, 2024
`Page 2
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`The Florida TNC Law
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`As an initial matter, your clients’ claims against Lyft fail as a matter of Florida law. Lyft
`is a transportation network company (“TNC”). In Florida, TNCs are regulated exclusively
`and comprehensively under the TNC law. See Fla. Stat. §627.748. On June 23, 2020,
`Governor DeSantis signed legislation amending the TNC Law to explicitly state that a TNC
`cannot be held liable for “harm to persons or property which results or arises out of the use,
`operation, or possession of a vehicle operating as a TNC vehicle while the driver is logged
`on to the digital network” absent circumstances inapplicable here. Fla. Stat. Ann.
`§627.748(18) (West).
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`Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ claims are not viable under Florida law. See also § 627.748(1)(e)
`and (9) (confirming that TNC drivers are independent contractors that TNCS are not
`deemed to “control”). Florida courts have uniformly reached the same conclusion with
`respect to TNCs as a matter of law. See, e.g., McGillis v. Dep’t of Econ. Opportunity, 210
`So. 3d 220, 226 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017) (“Uber drivers . . . decide whether, when, where, with
`whom, and how to provide rides using Uber’s computer programs. This level of free agency
`is incompatible with the control to which a traditional employee is subject”); see also
`Symeon N. Cook v. Adrian Delgadoreyes, et al, Case No.: 21-004213-CI (Fla. Cir. Ct. Feb.
`27, 2023) (granting Lyft’s motion for summary judgment on plaintiff’s vicarious liability
`claim pursuant to the TNC Statute in personal injury case); Jonathan Stacy, et al v. Lyft
`Florida, Inc., et al, Case No.: CA20-0615 (Fla. Cir. Ct. November 3, 2022) (same); Luis
`Melendez Carmona et al v. Luthianos J McPhee et al, Case No. 2018-029175-CA-01 (Fla.
`Cir. Ct. September 22, 2022) (same); Dorian Rozier v. Rondacious Bryant. et al, Case No.
`2020-002740-CA-01 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Aug. 24, 2022) (same); Alberto I. Gonzalez v. Jose R.
`Montilva Roa, et al, Case No. 2019-027305-CA-01 (Fla. Cir. Ct. July 8, 2022) (same);
`Victoria Morrison, et al v. Lyft Inc., et al, Case No. 2019-CA-007334 (Fla. Cir. Ct. June
`28, 2022) (same); Matthew Dyer v. Frederick Tydeman, et al, Case No. 2020-023727-CA-
`01 (Fla. Cir. Ct. April 21, 2022) (same); Teresa Brookes v. Lyft Inc. et al, Case No. 50
`2019-CA-004782 XXXXMB (Fla. Cir. Ct. Mar. 22, 2022) (same).
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`Insurance Coverage
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`Although the TNC Law bars your clients’ claims against Lyft, it also requires TNCs like
`Lyft to procure $1 million in insurance coverage for a driver’s negligent operation of a
`vehicle while engaged in a prearranged ride on the Lyft platform. See § 627.748(7)(c), Fla.
`Stat. (2023). As noted above, Lyft has complied with this insurance requirement and
`procured a $1 million insurance policy, with remaining limits of $1 million, which provides
`coverage (even without Lyft in this suit) if your clients meet their burden to prove they
`were injured as a result of the Driver’s negligence. This remaining available limit is more
`than sufficient to cover your clients’ alleged damages. Because Lyft is an unnecessary
`party, if you agree to promptly dismiss Lyft, then as a courtesy we are willing to provide
`written confirmation of the relevant insurance policy information.
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`July 10, 2024
`Page 3
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`This insurance stipulation saves Plaintiffs both time and money since it eliminates the need
`to prove the claims against Lyft. It also makes it easier for Plaintiffs to recover quickly as
`there will be no trial continuances, extraneous discovery disputes, or dispositive motion
`briefing. Our proposal would therefore reduce litigation fees and expenses for both sides
`by eliminating unnecessary causes of action and parties from this lawsuit, with no financial
`downside to your client.
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`Preservation
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`In the event you still intend to pursue unnecessary claims against Lyft, presumably you
`have already advised your clients of their ongoing duties to preserve and retain evidence
`as required by Root v. Balfour Beatty Construction, Inc., 132 So. 3d 867, 869-70 (Fla. 2d
`DCA 2015) and Fla. Bar. Ethics Op. 14-1 (June 25, 2015). Please accept this
`correspondence as a request that you immediately remind and advise your clients of their
`preexisting and ongoing duty to preserve and suspend modification or deletion of any and
`all evidence of any type related to the Accident, their injuries, and any claimed
`damages, including but not limited to images (photos, videos, etc.); social media
`(Facebook, Instagram, TikTok, Venmo, etc.); writings/documents/communications
`(text messages, in-application messages, emails, Slack messages, etc.); health / fitness
`applications; and any and all electronic devices in your clients’ possession, custody or
`control (cell phones, computers, tablets, etc.). If your clients have failed to preserve any
`such evidence to date, please notify us immediately. This preservation reminder includes
`electronic social media and digitally stored media, which references, pertains to, relates to,
`or has any relevancy to any fact or incident that forms the basis of Plaintiffs’ claims,
`including any alleged damages resulting therefrom.
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`We note that by sending this letter, Lyft does not waive any rights, but expressly reserves
`them.
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`Please contact me to set up a time to discuss these issues further. I look forward to
`continuing a cooperative and productive dialogue with you in the hopes of efficiently
`resolving this matter. Thank you for your attention to this matter.
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`Sincerely,
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`/s/ Brittney Polo
`Suzanne A. Singer, Esq.
`Brittney I. Polo, Esq.
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`Plaintiffs,
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`ERNESTO RODRIGUEZ CASAS, individually,
`LFYT FLORIDA, INC, a foreign corporation.
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`Defendants.
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`Filing # 202028944 E-Filed 07/08/2024 12:16:15 PM
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`IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE 11TH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN AND FOR
`MIAMI-DADE COUNTY, FLORIDA
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`ELIASET SOCORRO, individually,
`MIGUEL ANGEL CARDOSO DIAZ, individually and
`AMALIA FALS ALVAREZ, individually,
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`CASE NO. 2024-008830-CA-01
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`NOTICE OF DEPOSITION DUCES TECUM
`(Interpreter not requested)
`
`
`PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the Plaintiff, by and through undersigned counsel, will take
`the digital video deposition by oral examination of the following persons, at the time, date and place
`indicated:
`
`
`LOCATION
`ZOOM
`
`DATE/TIME
`11/05/2024 at
`10:00 AM EST
`
`DEPONENT
`Corporate Representative
`(LFYT FLORIDA, INC)
`
`Prepared to testify regarding the following:
`
`(a) Contracts, agreements and relationships involving
`some or all of the Defendants;
`(b) driving policies of the Defendants,
`(c) safety policies of the Defendants,
`(d) the facts, events and circumstances pertaining to the
`allegations in the Complaint and the Answer and
`Affirmative Defenses and
`(e) the responses to Plaintiff’s discovery.
`
`
`
`
`In accordance with the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, persons needing a special
`accommodation to participate in this proceeding should contact XENIA HERNANDEZ, Esq. at
`6923 NW 77th Ave, Miami, FL 33166, Tel: (786) 207-3960. The digital video deposition will be
`under oath and conducted pursuant to the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure before an associate or
`deputy court reporter of the offices of Universal Court Reporting, or their duly designated
`
`

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`representative, who is not of counsel to any of the parties or interested in the outcome of the case.
`The deposition will continue from day to day until completed.
`
`This digital video deposition is being taken for the purpose of discovery, for use at trial, or
`for such other purposes as are permitted under the applicable and governing rules.
`
`Each Deponent is to have with him or her the following documents in accordance with the
`Duces Tecum requirement of this notice.
`SCHEDULE “A”
`1. All documents responsive to Plaintiff’s Request for Production not previously produced
`and for which no objection has been sustained.
`2. All digital images of photographs or videos reflecting the scene of the crash and/or any of
`the vehicles or individuals involved in the crash.
`
`
`
`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
`
`I HEREBY CERTIFY that a copy of the foregoing was filed with Florida’s e-Filing Portal,
`which furnished a copy of the foregoing via electronic mail delivery on this 8th day of July 2024, to
`all the parties registered with the e-Filing Portal system.
`
`
`
` Respectfully submitted,
`
`
`
`XENIA HERNANDEZ, ESQ
`By: /s/ Xenia Hernandez
`FL BAR NO: 1002248
`6923 NW 77TH AVE
`MIAMI, FL 33166
`Tel: 786-207-3960
`E-mail- xh@xhernandezlaw.com
`Alternate - ssuarez@xhernandezlaw.com
`
`OF COUNSEL:
`MAIBEL REYES, ESQ.
`By: /s/ Maibel Reyes
`FL BAR NO: 1002572
`5825 Sunset Drive, Suite 301
` E-mail- mreyes@xhernandezlaw.com
` Alternate - ssuarez@xhernandezlaw.com
`
`
`
`

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`OxDC-areb
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`EXHI
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`OU
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`EXHIBIT C
`EXHIBIT C
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`From:
`Sent:
`To:
`
`Cc:
`Subject:
`
`Sergio Suarez <ssuarez@xhernandezlaw.com>
`Wednesday, July 10, 2024 11:25 AM
`Polo, Brittney; Tracy Majer; John Murphy; John Murphy; DL-Secy-BPolo; Docketing
`Miami; Sarason, Scott; DL-Secy-SSarason; Singer, Suzanne; Parrado, Sunen; Docketing
`Miami
`Xenia Hernandez; Maibel Reyes; Sergio Suarez
`RE: Socorro, Diaz & Alvarez vs Casas (LYFT) STFARM-22789: 090A Eliaset Socorro -
`SERVICE OF COURT DOCUMENT CASE NUMBER 132024CA00883001GE01 ELIASET
`SOCORRO et al vs ERNESTO RODRIGUEZ CASAS et al [RKC-ACTIVE.FID3819543]
`
`
`090A Eliaset Socorro - CASE NO. 2024-008830-CA-01 – Depositions
`
`Areas Of Inquiry Corporate Representative
`
`(a)Contracts, agreements and relationships involving some or all of the Defendants;
`(b)driving policies of the Defendants,
`(c)safety policies of the Defendants,
`(d)the facts, events and circumstances pertaining to the allegations in the Complaint and the Answer and Affirmative
`Defenses and
`(e)the responses to Plaintiff’s discovery.
`
`
`We would also appreciate it if you could identify the specific corporate representative who will be deposed and
`confirm their availability.
`
`
`Please let us know at your earliest convenience if these times are suitable for all of us or if any adjustments are
`necessary. Should there be a need to reschedule, kindly provide alternative dates and times that work for your clients.
`
`
`Thank you for your cooperation.
`
`Should you have any questions or concerns, please do not hesitate to contact us at any time.
`
`
`***SCHEDULING *** IF THIS IS A SCHEDULING EMAIL PLEASE CONTACT SSUAREZ@XHERNANDEZLAW.COM. ALL
`HEARINGS AND DEPOSITIONS DATES/TIMES GIVEN WILL BE HELD FOR 24 HOURS. AFTER 24 HOURS, PROVIDED
`DATES/TIMES MAY BE NO LONGER AVAILABLE. ***SCHEDULING ***
`
`
`Kind Regards,
`
`
`1
`
`

`

`
`
`
`
`
`From: Polo, Brittney <bpolo@rumberger.com>
`Sent: Wednesday, July 10, 2024 11:01 AM
`To: Sergio Suarez <ssuarez@xhernandezlaw.com>; Tracy Majer <tmajer@gmm-law.com>; John Murphy
`<jjmurphy@gmm-law.com>; John Murphy <jjmurphy@gmm-law.com>; DL-Secy-BPolo <bpolosecy@rumberger.com>;
`Docketing Miami <docketingmiami@rumberger.com>; Sarason, Scott <ssarason@rumberger.com>; DL-Secy-SSarason
`<ssarasonsecy@rumberger.com>; Singer, Suzanne <ssinger@rumberger.com>; Parrado, Sunen
`<sparrado@rumberger.com>; Docketing Miami <docketingmiami@rumberger.com>
`Cc: Xenia Hernandez <xhernandez@xhernandezlaw.com>; Maibel Reyes <mreyes@xhernandezlaw.com>
`Subject: RE: Socorro, Diaz & Alvarez vs Casas (LYFT) STFARM-22789: 090A Eliaset Socorro - SERVICE OF COURT
`DOCUMENT CASE NUMBER 132024CA00883001GE01 ELIASET SOCORRO et al vs ERNESTO RODRIGUEZ CASAS et al [RKC-
`ACTIVE.FID3819543]
`
`Good morning,
`
`Please be advised the Lyft CR deposition was not coordinated with our office. Please file a notice of cancellation and
`provide areas of inquiry so we can properly coordinate the deposition.
`
`Thank you.
`
`Best,
`
`
`Brittney I. Polo
` Attorney at Law
`bpolo@rumberger.com | View my online bio
`
`
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`2
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`

`

`DIRECT
`MAIN
`
`
`
`
`
`80 Southwest 8th Street
`Suite 3000
`Miami, FL 33130
`
`The information in this e-mail message is legally privileged and confidential information. If you have received this e-mail in error, please delete from any device/media where the message is s
`
`305.995.5492
`305.358.5577
`
`
`
`From: Sergio Suarez <ssuarez@xhernandezlaw.com>
`Sent: Wednesday, July 10, 2024 10:53 AM
`To: Tracy Majer <tmajer@gmm-law.com>; John Murphy <jjmurphy@gmm-law.com>; John Murphy <jjmurphy@gmm-
`law.com>; Polo, Brittney <bpolo@rumberger.com>; DL-Secy-BPolo <bpolosecy@rumberger.com>; Docketing Miami
`<docketingmiami@rumberger.com>; Sarason, Scott <ssarason@rumberger.com>; DL-Secy-SSarason
`<ssarasonsecy@rumberger.com>; Singer, Suzanne <ssinger@rumberger.com>; Parrado, Sunen
`<sparrado@rumberger.com>; Docketing Miami <docketingmiami@rumberger.com>
`Cc: Xenia Hernandez <xhernandez@xhernandezlaw.com>; Maibel Reyes <mreyes@xhernandezlaw.com>; Sergio Suarez
`<ssuarez@xhernandezlaw.com>
`Subject: RE: Socorro, Diaz & Alvarez vs Casas (LYFT) STFARM-22789: 090A Eliaset Socorro - SERVICE OF COURT
`DOCUMENT CASE NUMBER 132024CA00883001GE01 ELIASET SOCORRO et al vs ERNESTO RODRIGUEZ CASAS et al
`
`090A Eliaset Socorro - CASE NO. 2024-008830-CA-01 – Depositions
`
`
`How to Join the Proceeding:
`
`• Click the link below to join the proceeding from your PC, Mac, iOS or Android device.
`https://uslegalsupport.remotecounsel.com/meetings/alw_HGYQctY/join
`• Select "Join as Participant" on the far left of the web browser window.
`
`Proceeding Details:
`
`• Case Name: Eliaset Socorro v. Ernesto Rodriguez Casas
`• Witness Name: (10:00 AM) Corporate Representative, (02:00 PM) Ernesto Rodriguez Casas
`• Job Number: 6660776
`• Date: Tuesday, November 5, 2024
`• Start Time: 10:00 AM EST
`• Meeting ID: 977-533-75861
`• Password: 851684
`• Cameo Room: Room0420
`
`If you are also joining the proceeding by phone:
`
`• Dial-In: 646-568-7788
`• Meeting ID: 977-533-75861
`
`
`
`Should you have any que