throbber
Filing # 185790166 E-Filed 11/08/2023 11:21:37 PM
`
`IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE
`NINTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, IN AND
`FOR ORANGE COUNTY, FLORIDA
`
`CASE NO.: 2023-CA-014512-0
`
`Complex Business Court
`DIVISION: 43 (Orange County)
`
`WAYNE AUTOMATIC
`SPRINKLERS, INC.,
`
`FIRE
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`v.
`
`SANJAY OUDI and TOTAL FIRE
`PROTECTION OF MICHIGAN, INC.,
`
`Defendants.
`
`/
`
`AMENDED
`TO PLAINTIFF'S
`DEFENDANTSOPPOSITION
`MOTION FOR TEMPORARY INJUNCTION
`
`Defendants, SANJAY OUDI ("OUDI") and TOTAL FIRE PROTECTION
`
`OF MICHIGAN, INC. ("TFPM") (collectively, "Defendants"), by and through their
`
`undersigned counsel and pursuant to the Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.140, file
`their opposition to Plaintiff WAYNE AUTOMATIC FIRE SPRINKLERS, INC.' s
`
`(WAFS") Amended Motion for Temporary Injunction, and state as follows:
`
`INTRODUCTION
`
`1.
`
`Plaintiff has moved this Court to enter a temporary injunction enjoining
`
`Defendant OUDI
`
`"and those persons acting in concert with Oudi," from (a)
`
`competing in the fire protection business within the State of Florida for two (2) years;
`
`(b) soliciting, directly or
`
`indirectly, WAFS's officers, employees, consultants,
`
`

`

`independent contractors, or agents for employment with a competing business
`
`during the restricted time; and (c) divulging or using for his own benefit or
`
`the
`
`benefit of others any "confidential
`
`information about WAFS's business, and/or its
`
`trade secrets, and/or customer
`
`lists, prospective customer
`
`lists,
`
`or
`
`names
`
`of
`
`customers or prospective customers of which he or others obtained knowledge while
`
`in the employment of WAFS." See Mot. for Inj. at p. 1.
`
`2.
`
`Plaintiff also seeks a temporary injunction enjoining Defendant TFPM
`
`"and those persons acting in concert or participation with TFPM," from (a) tortiously
`
`interfering with WAFS's contractual relationship with OUDI and (b) disclosing any
`
`confidential and proprietary information of WAFS obtained from OUDI to third
`
`parties.
`
`3.
`
`The law in Florida is clear that
`
`injunctive relief is an extraordinary
`
`remedy that should be used sparingly and only after the moving party has alleged
`and proven facts entitling it to relief. Here, Plaintiff has failed to establish it is
`
`entitled to the equitable relief it seeks and Plaintiff s motion must be denied.
`
`MEMORANDUM OF LAW
`
`I.
`
`General Legal Principles.
`
`Section 542.18 of the Florida Statutes provides that "[e]very contract,
`combination, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or
`in this state is
`
`commerce
`
`unlawful." Section 542.335 provides that notwithstanding section 542.18,
`
`

`

`"enforcement of contracts that restrict or prohibit competition during or after the
`
`term of restrictive covenants, so long as such contracts are reasonable in time, area,
`
`and line of business, is not prohibited." Fla. Stat. § 542.335(1) (2017) (emphasis
`
`added). However, Section 542.335 does not protect covenants "whose sole purpose
`
`is to prevent competition per se because those contracts are void against public
`
`policy. White v. Mederi Caretenders Visiting Services ofS.E. Fla., LLC, 226 So. 3d
`
`774, 785 (Fla. 2017). For an employer to be entitled to protection, "there must be
`
`special facts present over
`
`and above ordinary competitioe such that, absent a non-
`
`competition agreement, "the employee would gain an unfair advantage in future
`
`competition with the employer." Id [emphasis in original].
`
`In addition, the person seeking enforcement of a restrictive covenant must
`
`plead and prove the existence of one
`
`or more
`
`legitimate business interests justifying
`
`the restrictive covenant. Fla. Stat. § 542.335(1)(b) (2017). Any restrictive covenant
`
`not supported by a
`
`legitimate business interest
`
`is unlawful and is void and
`
`unenforceable.
`
`Id.
`
`A "legitimate business interesr is:
`
`...
`
`[A]n identifiable business asset
`that constitutes or
`represents an
`if that asset
`investment by the proponent of the restriction such that,
`taken without
`by
`competitor
`misappropriated
`(i.e.,
`were
`a
`in competition against its former owner would
`compensation), its use
`be "unfair competition." Put another way,
`a "legitimate business
`interesr is a business asset that, if misappropriated, would give its new
`an unfair competitive advantage over
`its former owner.
`owner
`
`

`

`White, So. 3d at 784-85.
`
`The determination of whether an activity qualifies as a protected legitimate
`
`business interest under the statute is inherently a factual inquiry, which is heavily
`
`Id. at 786. [emphasis in original]. Trial courts are
`industry and context-specific.
`well positioned to construe the phrase "legitimate business interest" to determine the
`
`legitimacy of a particular business interest -
`
`in conjunction with the industry context
`
`and evidence adduced.
`
`Id.
`
`A party seeking enforcement of a restrictive covenant must also plead and
`
`prove that the contractually specified restraint is reasonably necessary to protect the
`
`legitimate business interest justifying the restriction. Fla. Stat. § 542.335(1)(c)
`
`(2017).
`
`If an employer establishes aprimafacie case that the contractually specified
`restraint is "reasonably necessary to protect the legitimate business interest[s]...
`justifying the restriction," the burden of proof shifts to the employee to show that
`
`"the contractually specified restraint
`
`is overbroad, overlong, or otherwise not
`
`reasonably necessary to protect the established legitimate business interest[s]." Fla.
`
`Stat. § 542.335(1)(c) (2017).
`
`If
`
`a court
`
`finds that
`
`the "contractually specified restraint
`
`is overbroad,
`
`overlong, or otherwise not reasonably necessary to protect the legitimate business
`is required to "modify the restraint and grant only the relief
`
`interest[s]," the court
`
`reasonably necessary to protect such interest or
`
`interests." Id. "The violation of an
`
`

`

`enforceable restrictive covenant creates a presumption of irreparable injury to the
`
`person seeking enforcement of a restrictive covenant." Fla. Stat. § 542.335(1)(j)
`
`(2017). This presumption, however, is rebuttable. Proudfoot Consulting Co. v.
`
`Gordon, 576 F.3d 1223, 1231 (11th Cir. 2009) (citing JonJuan Salon, Inc. v. Acosta,
`
`922 So. 2d 1081, 1084 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006)).
`
`"A temporary injunction is an extraordinary remedy, to be granted sparingly
`
`and only after the moving party establishes the following criteria: (1) the likelihood
`
`of irreparable harm; (2) the unavailability of an adequate remedy at
`
`law; (3) a
`
`substantial likelihood of success
`
`on the merits; and (4) consideration of the public
`
`interest." Avalon Legal Info. Servs., Inc. v. Keating, 110 So. 3d 75, 80 (Fla. Dist.
`
`Ct. App. 2013):
`
`Temporary injunctions are governed by Rule 1.619(b) of the Florida Rules of
`Civil Procedure, which provides: "No temporary injunction shall be entered unless
`the court deems proper, conditioned for
`in an amount
`
`a bond is given by the movant
`
`the payment of costs and damages sustained by the adverse party if the adverse party
`
`is wrongfully enjoined." "[T]he caselaw is clear that the trial court cannot waive the
`
`requirement for bond or set a nominal amount" except in limited circumstances set
`
`forth in the rule (i.e., involving a municipality or
`
`the state). Highway 46 Holdings,
`
`LLC v. Myers, 114 So. 3d 215, 222 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012).
`
`

`

`II.
`
`s Motion for Temporary Injunction Against Defendant OUDI
`Plaintiff
`Must Be Denied.
`
`In this case, WASF cannot meet the showing required for entry of a temporary
`injunction against Defendant OUDI and its motion must be denied. WASF clearly
`
`cannot establish a likelihood of irreparable harm or
`
`a substantial
`
`likelihood of
`
`success
`
`on
`
`the merits in this case.
`
`As noted above, it is the general principle in
`
`Florida that contracts in restraint of trade are unlawful. Only those contracts meeting
`
`the requirement of section 542.335 are enforceable. Thus, any restrictive covenant
`
`must be supported by proof that one
`
`or more
`
`legitimate business interests exists and
`
`that the contractually specified restraint is reasonably necessary to protect the
`
`legitimate business interest justifying the restriction. See Fla. Stat. § 542.335(1)(b);
`
`White supra; see also Pirtek USA, LLC v. Twillman, No. 6:16-cv-01302-0r1-37TBS,
`
`2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 138811, at *21 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 6, 2016).
`
`The statute includes a non-exclusive list of such interests to include: (1) trade
`
`secrets as defined in § 688.002(4); (2) valuable confidential business or professional
`
`information that does not otherwise qualify as
`
`a trade secret;
`
`(3) substantial
`
`relationships with specific existing or prospective customers; (4) goodwill within a
`
`specific geographic location; and (5) extraordinary or specialized training.
`
`Id. Any
`
`restrictive covenant not supported by a legitimate business interest is unlawful and
`
`is void and unenforceable. Fla. Stat. § 542.335(1)(b); White supra.
`
`

`

`According to the statute, confidential business information not rising to the
`
`level of a trade secret may be considered a legitimate business interest that can be
`
`protected by a restrictive covenant.
`
`"However, information that is commonly known
`
`in the industry and not unique to the allegedly injured party is not confidential and
`
`is not entitled to protection." AutoNation, Inc. v. O'Brien, 347 F. Supp. 2d 1299,
`
`1304 (S.D. Fla. 2004); see also Colucci v. Kar Kare Auto. Group, 918 So. 2d 431,
`
`439 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (protectable information is unique in the industry and
`
`confidential); Anich Indus.
`
`v. Raney, 751 So. 2d 767 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000)
`(knowledge of customers that are commonly known are not subject to protection);
`
`Harry G. Blackstone, D.O., P.A. v. Dale City Osteopathic Clinic, 511 So. 2d 1050
`
`(Fla. 2d DCA 1987) (customer lists which can be compiled from readily accessible
`
`sources
`
`not protected).
`
`In the fire protection industry, potential customers and
`
`vendors are well known in the industry, and contracts for fire protection services
`
`must be bid through a competitive process where the bids are accessible by potential
`
`bidders. As such, there are
`
`no
`
`trade secrets or other proprietary value related to
`
`customers/potential customers because their identity is known by those in the
`
`industry and are
`
`readily identifiable via the internet and other sources.
`
`In other
`
`words, a "list" of customers and/or potential customers would not be deemed
`
`confidential under Florida law.
`
`

`

`Moreover, Florida law is clear that a blanket assertion claiming a defendant
`
`is in possession of "confidential" information is not sufficient. WellCare Health
`
`Plans, Inc. v. Preitauer, No. 8:12-cv-713-T-30MAP, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76920,
`
`*11 (M.D. Fla. May 23, 2012), report and recommendation adopted by 2012 U.S.
`
`Dist. LEXIS 76912 (M.D. Fla. June 4, 2012). Nor is mere parroting of the language
`
`of the statute.
`
`Id (holding that allegation that the defendant had access
`
`to "business
`
`plans, formulas, compilations, methods, techniques, and process ...." was
`
`too general
`
`to warrant protection as a legitimate business interest); see also Lucky Cousins
`
`Trucking, Inc. v. QC Energy Res. Texas, LLC, 223 F. Supp. 3d 1221,1225 (M.D. Fla.
`
`2016) (noting that Igleneric allegations do not establish a legitimate business
`
`interest").
`
`In Plaintiff s motion for a temporary injunction, it makes a vague and blanket
`to confidential and proprietary information of
`assertion that OUDI
`
`"had access
`
`WAFS including WAFS's
`
`business methods, pricing information, sales and
`
`marketing materials, and customers/prospective customer
`
`lists." See Mot. for Inj. at
`
`page 8. The allegations in Plaintiff s Complaint are equally generic. See Compl. at
`
`¶ 25. Simply alleging that information is "confidentiar or a "trade secret" does not
`
`make it so. WASF's argument that knowledge OUDI possesses may be confidential
`a "lisr of customers
`
`or constitute trade secrets is unpersuasive, as
`
`is clearly
`
`insufficient to constitute a trade secret.
`
`Identifying and compiling a list of customers
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`

`

`in the fire protection industry can easily be done by conducting a search on
`
`the
`
`internet. Moreover, WASF's allegations in its Motion are devoid of any factual
`
`specificity as to the type of information at issue, the value of any such information
`
`to WASF,
`
`or any efforts WASF may have used to attempt
`
`to maintain the
`
`confidentiality of any such information. Absent sufficient pleading and proof that
`
`WASF's alleged proprietary information indeed constitutes valuable "confidential"
`
`information or otherwise constitutes a legitimate business interest, it is not subject
`
`to protection. As such, an injunction prohibiting use of such information without
`
`proper pleading and proof would clearly be improper.
`
`In short, there is no question that the facts alleged by Plaintiff are insufficient
`
`to establish any "proprietary informatioe that would constitute a legitimate business
`
`interest necessary to enforce the alleged restrictive covenant
`
`in this case.
`
`Accordingly, WASF cannot establish a substantial
`
`likelihood of success
`
`on
`
`the
`
`merits of this claim.
`
`To the extent WASF is attempting to assert a legitimate business interest in
`
`its client "goodwilr generated in the fire protection services industry, it similarly
`
`fails to provide sufficient detail or proof to support any such "goodwilr or
`
`identification of any such "clients." WASF offers no evidence of any exclusive
`
`relationship(s)
`
`it maintains with any customers
`
`or how any such exclusive
`
`

`

`relationship is part of its so-called "goodwill" with clients. See Mot. for Inj. at page
`
`10.
`
`WASF also suggests that some of the aforementioned information constitutes
`
`trade secrets. Whether a particular type of information constitutes a trade secret is a
`
`question of fact. Capital Asset Research Corp. v. Finnegan, 160 F.3d 683, 686 (11th
`
`Cir. 1998). Florida's Uniform Trade Secrets Act defines a trade secret as follows:
`
`[I]nformation,
`including a
`formula, pattern, compilation, program,
`device, method, technique, or process that:
`(a) Derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not
`being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by, other
`persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use; and
`(b) Is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances
`to maintain its secrecy.
`
`Fla. Stat. § 688.002(4) (2016).
`
`In an action involving trade secrets,
`
`the plaintiff bears the burden of
`
`demonstrating both that the specific information it seeks to protect is secret and that
`it has taken reasonable steps to protect this secrecy. American Red Cross v. Palm
`
`Beach Blood Bank, 143 F.3d 1407, 1410 (11th Cir. 1998) (applying Florida law).
`
`Information generally known or readily ascertainable cannot qualify for trade secret
`
`protection.
`
`Id. Accordingly, "customer lists constitute trade secrets where they are
`
`a product of great expense and effort, rather than a compilation of information
`
`available to the public." MDT Personnel, LLC v. Camoco, LLC, No. 8:10-cv-2545-
`
`T-33MAP, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 138956, 2010 WL 5535066, at *3 (M.D. Fla.
`
`

`

`Dec. 8, 2010). In addition, merely proclaiming that a methodology for presenting or
`
`interpreting information is confidential
`
`is not enough to constitute a trade secret
`
`where the underlying information is accessible to others. Health Care Management
`
`Consulting v. McCombes, 661 So.2d 1223, 1226 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995) ("self-
`
`professed confidential methodology of presenting and interpreting
`
`regulations in the home care
`
`industry does not constitute a trade secret")
`
`Importantly, a party asserting trade secret protection must describe the
`
`allegedly misappropriated trade secrets with reasonable particularity. Levenger Co.
`v. Feldman, 516 F. Supp. 2d 1272 (S.D. Fla. 2007), See also Del Monte Fresh
`
`Produce Co. v. Dole Food Co. Inc., 148 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1325 (S.D. Fla. 2001)
`
`The allegations must be specific enough to inform the defendant of the nature of the
`
`material involved. DynCorp Intl
`
`v. AAR Airlift Grp., Inc., 664 F.App'x 844, 848
`
`(11th Cir. 2016). Conclusory allegations or statements of broad categories of
`
`documents are insufficient.
`
`Id.
`
`Here, for the same
`
`reasons WASF has failed to show that its information is
`
`confidential or proprietary,
`
`it has also failed to meet
`
`the greater burden of
`
`establishing that any of the information constitutes a trade secret.
`
`Its bare,
`
`conclusory assertions of trade secrets are
`
`insufficient to support injunctive relief
`
`under section 542.335.
`
`

`

`In addition, the restrictive covenants in the Agreement are overbroad in scope
`
`and geographic area, not
`
`reasonably necessary to protect a legitimate business
`
`interest and thus not enforceable pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 542.335. Defendant OUDI
`
`worked in sales when he was employed with WAFS. However, his position with
`
`TFPM does not
`
`involve em sales activities. Rather, OUDI is employed with TFPM
`
`solely in a management position and is not engaged in any sales activities. There is
`
`no question that the Agreement at issue is overbroad and unenforceable to the extent
`from "...work[ing]for or provid[ing] services to any
`
`it attempts to prohibit OUDI
`
`competing business...". WAFS cannot demonstrate a legitimate business interest
`
`that would justify enforcement of restrictive covenants encompassing such a broad
`
`spectrum of services (i.e., prohibiting OUDI from performing tmE services for "any
`
`competing business"). Moreover, the geographic limitation in the Agreement is also
`
`not reasonable to the extent
`
`it attempts to define the restricted area as the entire state
`of Florida, which is clearly overbroad considering the work OUDI performed when
`
`he was
`
`an employee of WAFS.
`
`In short, the Agreement is not enforceable under Fla. Stat. § 542.335 as the
`
`restrictive covenants are overbroad in scope and geographic area, and not reasonably
`
`necessary to protect a legitimate business interest.
`Additionally, the motion for a temporary injunction should also be denied
`
`because WASF cannot show irreparable harm, one of the requirements necessary to
`
`

`

`obtain injunctive relief
`
`"For an injury to be irreparable, it must be 'neither remote
`
`nor speculative, but actual and imminent."' Trans Union Risk & Alternative Data
`
`Solutions, Inc. v. Challa, No. 16-11878, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 559, *8, 2017 WL
`
`117128 (11th Cir. Jan. 12, 2017) (unpublished). Or, stated another way, there must
`be "a substantial threat of impending injury before an injunction will issue." Direct
`Mail Holding, LLC v. Bush, No. 8:12-CV-145-T-30EAJ, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
`
`54607, 2012 WL 1344823 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 8, 2012).
`
`Where the alleged activities have been ongoing, a plaintiff is unable to meet
`
`its burden to demonstrate irreparable and imminent
`
`injury. Family Oriented
`
`Community United Strong, Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., No. 8:11-cv-217-30AEP,
`
`201 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26296, 2011 WL 902626 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 8, 2011), report and
`
`recommendation adopted by 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26289 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 15,
`
`2011); see also Viable Res., Inc. v Belyea, No. 8:16-cv-2669-T-30.15S, 2016 U.S.
`
`Dist. LEXIS 174240 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 1, 2016) (where the alleged harm has already
`
`occurred, there is no
`
`irreparable harm to support issuance of an injunction), report
`
`and recommendation adopted by 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 173971 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 16,
`
`2016).
`
`Although breach of an enforceable non-competition agreement gives rise to
`a presumption of irreparable harm,
`
`this presumption is rebuttable. Fla. Stat. §
`
`542.335(1)(j) (2017); Challa, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 559 at *10-11 (holding that
`
`

`

`mere presence at a competitor's business irrespective of the likelihood that employee
`
`would disclose confidential
`
`information is not
`
`the proper standard for determining
`
`irreparable harm).
`
`In this case, WASF's Motion fails to allege what actual and imminent
`
`irreparable harm will occur
`
`if a temporary injunction is not
`
`issued. The Motion
`
`states in a conclusory fashion that WASF will suffer irreparable harm, without
`
`providing sufficient reasoning as
`
`to why WASF would allegedly suffer such
`
`irreparable harm. Plaintiff s Motion and Complaint focuses only on activities that
`
`are alleged to have occurred and states in a conclusory fashion that WASF will suffer
`
`irreparable harm. These allegations are insufficient to support injunctive relief.
`
`III.
`
`Plaintiff
`Denied
`
`s Motion for
`
`Injunction Against Defendant TFPM Must Be
`
`WASF also alleges that Defendant TFPM tortiously interfered with a
`
`contractual relationship between WASF and Defendant OUDI. See Mot. for Inj. at
`
`page 13. To establish a claim for tortious interference, WAFS must prove: (1) the
`
`existence of a contract;
`
`(2) TFPM's knowledge of the contract;
`
`(3) TFPM's
`
`intentional and unjustified interference with the contract; and (4) damage to WASF
`
`as a result of the breach of the contract.
`
`Integrated Med, P.L. v. N. Fla. Women's
`
`Physicians, P.A., 50 So. 3d 21, 23 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010). Plaintiff cannot meet the
`
`showing required for entry of a temporary injunction against Defendant TFPM based
`
`on
`
`its claim of tortious interference and,
`
`therefore,
`
`its motion for an
`
`injunction
`
`

`

`against TFPM must also be denied. Plaintiff has not and cannot set forth any
`
`evidence to establish that TFPM has interfered or will
`
`intentionally interfere with
`
`or agreement between WAFS and anyone else, or
`any contract
`suffered or will suffer any damages as a result.
`
`In short, there is no evidence
`
`that WASF has
`
`whatsoever to suggest that TFPM in any way intentionally or unjustifiably interfered
`
`with Defendant OUDI's or anyone else's agreement with WASF.
`
`As such,
`
`Plaintiff s motion for an injunction against TFPM must also be denied.
`
`IV. Bond Requirement.
`
`Section 542.335(1)(j) provides that no
`
`temporary injunction enforcing a
`
`restrictive covenant shall be entered "unless the person seeking enforcement of a
`
`restrictive covenant gives a proper bond." Also, Rule 1.610(b) of the Florida Rules
`
`of Civil Procedure states in pertinent part:
`
`No temporary injunction shall be entered unless a bond is given by the
`the court deems proper, conditioned for the
`in an amount
`movant
`payment of costs and damages sustained by the adverse party if
`the
`adverse party is wrongly enjoined.
`
`Florida caselaw is clear that in cases
`
`involving private parties, it is improper
`
`for a trial court to either waive the bond requirement or set bond at a nominal amount.
`
`Myers, 114 So. 3d at 22. Here, there is no dispute that all the parties involved are
`
`private parties. The bond requirement
`
`is essential because the overall amount of
`
`damages recoverable by a wrongfully enjoined party is limited to the bond amount.
`
`Id.
`
`

`

`The bond amount should reflect the court's determination of the foreseeable
`
`damages for a wrongful injunction. Avalon Legal Info. Servs. v. Keating, 110 So. 3d
`
`75, 84 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013) (holding that bond set at $10,000 was not a clear abuse
`
`of discretion). By way of example, courts have conditioned injunctions entered
`
`pursuant
`
`to section 542.335 upon bonds ranging in amounts
`
`from $10,000 to
`
`$250,000.
`
`Id.; see also Pitrek USA, LLC v. Twillman, No. 6:16-cv-01302-Orl-
`
`37TBS, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 138811, 2016 WL 5846978 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 6, 2016)
`
`(conditioning injunction upon posting of $50,000 bond); United Subcontractors, Inc.
`
`v. Godwin, No. 11-81329, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67061 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 3, 2012)
`
`(conditioning
`
`injunction
`
`upon posting of $110,000
`
`bond),
`
`report
`
`and
`
`recommendation approved by 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66505 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 9,
`
`2012); Technomedia Solutions, LLC v. Scopetto, No. 6:13-CV-1061-0r1-36GJK,
`
`2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 174767, 2013 WL 6571558 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 13, 2013)
`
`(condition injunction upon posting of $250,000 bond).
`
`CONCLUSION
`
`WASF's request for an injunction premised upon section 542.335 must be
`
`denied. WASF has failed to show that
`
`its so-called "proprietary information" is
`
`confidential or a trade secret. Thus, it would be improper to conclude that WASF's
`
`purported proprietary information constitutes a legitimate business interest that
`
`could support the restrictive covenant at
`
`issue. WASF is also unable to show the
`
`

`

`requisite irreparable harm to support injunctive relief under section 542.335. For
`
`these reasons, WASF's motion for a temporary injunction should be denied.
`
`If this Court does find that a temporary injunction is warranted, the Court must
`
`order that WASF post a bond in an appropriate and non-nominal amount
`
`to cover
`
`costs and damages if it is later determined that they were
`
`improperly enjoined.
`
`Finally, Defendants request an award of attorney's fees and costs, pursuant to
`
`Fla. Stat. §§ 542.335(k), for having to defend the WASF's motion.
`
`WHEREFORE, Defendants respectfully request that this Honorable Court
`deny WASF's motion for a temporary injunction, grant Defendants entitlement to
`
`their attorney's fees and costs, and grant such and other relief that this Court deems
`
`necessary and just under the circumstances.
`
`Dated this 8th day of November 2023.
`
`Respectfully submitted,
`
`/s/ Kristvne E. Kennedy.
`Kristyne E. Kennedy
`Florida Bar No.: 0194700
`O. Serenity Eller
`Florida Bar No.: 1048615
`COLE, SCOTT & KISSANE, P.A.
`1900 Summit Tower Blvd., Suite 400
`Orlando, Florida 32810
`Telephone: (321) 972-0028
`Facsimile: (321) 972-0099
`kristyne.kennedy@csklegal.com
`ocean.eller@csklegal.com
`celia.cates@csklegal.com
`Attorneys for Defendants
`
`

`

`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
`
`I HEREBY CERTIFYthat on the 8th day of November, 2023, I electronically
`
`filed the foregoing with the Clerk of Orange County by using the Florida Courts e-
`
`Filing Portal, which will send a Notice of Electronic Filing to Counsel of Record.
`
`/s/ _Kristyne E. Kennedy
`
`

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