Filing # 101193215 E-Filed 01/06/2020 04:31:57 PM
`
`IN THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA
`
`Case No. SC19-1464
`DCA Case No. 1D18-4471
`L.T. Case No. 2017-CA-2549
`
`FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,
`OFFICE OF MEDICAL MARIJUANA USE,
`ET AL.,
`
`
`Petitioners,
`
`v.
`
`
`
`FLORIGROWN, LLC, a Florida Limited
`Liability Company, and VOICE OF
`FREEDOM, INC., d/b/a FLORIGROWN,
`
`Respondents.
`
`/
`
`RESPONDENTS’ ANSWER BRIEF
`
`KATHERINE E. GIDDINGS, BCS
`(949396)
`katherine.giddings@akerman.com
`elisa.miller@akerman.com
`myndi.qualls@akerman.com
`Akerman LLP
`106 East College Avenue, Suite 1200
`Tallahassee, Florida 32301
`Telephone: (850) 224-9634
`Telecopier: (850) 222-0103
`
`JONATHAN S. ROBBINS (989428)
`jonathan.robbins@akerman.com
`nancy.alessi@akerman.com
`Akerman LLP
`Las Olas Centre II, Suite 1600
`350 East Las Olas Boulevard
`Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301
`Telephone: (954) 463-2700
`Telecopier: (954) 463-2224
`
`ARI H. GERSTIN (0839671)
`ari.gerstin@akerman.com
`marylin.herrera@akerman.com
`Akerman LLP
`Three Brickell City Centre
`98 Southeast Seventh St., Ste. 1100
`Miami, FL 33131
`Telephone: (305) 374-5600
`Telecopier: (305) 374-5095
`
`Attorneys for Respondents
`
`51031184;16
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`RECEIVED, 01/06/2020 04:33:36 PM, Clerk, Supreme Court
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`

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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`Page
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................................................................... iii
`
`INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................... 1
`
`STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS .......................................................... 4
`
`SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ...................................................................... 21
`
`STANDARD OF REVIEW ..................................................................................... 24
`
`ARGUMENT ........................................................................................................... 25
`
`SUBSTANTIAL
`A
`ESTABLISHED
` I. FLORIGROWN
`LIKELIHOOD OF SUCCESS ON THE MERITS .............................. 25
`
`A. The Statute Materially Alters, Restricts, and Contradicts The
`Amendment’s Definition Of An MMTC .................................... 25
`
`B. Nothing In The Record Or The Law Supports The Arbitrary
`And Artificial Caps Imposed By The Statute ............................. 30
`
`C. The Statutory Requirement For Vertical Integration Of
`MMTCs Violates The Amendment ............................................ 35
`
`D.
`
`Improperly Grants Special Advantages,
`The Statute
`Benefits, And Privileges That Only Apply To Particular
`Entities ........................................................................................ 39
`
`INJUNCTION
` II. FLORIGROWN MET THE REMAINING
`CRITERIA ............................................................................................ 41
`
`A. The Trial Court and First District Properly Recognized The
`Existence Of Irreparable Harm And Lack Of Adequate
`Remedy As A Matter Of Fact And Law ..................................... 42
`
`B. The Public Interest Factors Support The Injunction .................. 46
`
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`IS CONSISTENT WITH THE
`INJUNCTION
` III. THE
`AMENDMENT’S PLAIN LANGUAGE AND HAS NO
`BEARING ON THE DEPARTMENT’S REGULATION OF
`MMTCS ................................................................................................. 47
`
`INJUNCTION ORDERS MAKE THE REQUISITE
`IV. THE
`FACTUAL FINDINGS TO SUPPORT THE INJUNCTION
`CRITERIA ............................................................................................. 49
`
`CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................ 50
`
`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE .......................................................................... 52, 53
`
`CERTIFICATE OF FONT COMPLIANCE .......................................................... 53
`
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`ii
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`

`

`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`Cases
`
` Page
`
`Aaoep USA, Inc. v. Pex German OE Parts, LLC, 202 So. 3d 470
`
`(Fla. 1st DCA 2016) ..................................................................................... 50
`
`Adv. Op. to the Atty. Gen. re Use of Marijuana for Debilitating Med.
`
`Conditions, 181 So. 3d 471 (Fla. 2015) ...........................................................8
`
`Atwater v. Kortum, 95 So. 3d 85 (Fla. 2012) .................................................... 24, 27
`
`Baker v. Buckeye Cellulose Corp., 856 F.2d 167 (11th Cir. 1988) ........................ 44
`
`Browning v. Fla. Hometown Democracy, Inc., PAC, 29 So. 3d 1053
`
`(Fla. 2010) ..................................................................................................... 25
`
`Bush v. Holmes, 919 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 2006) .................................................... 25, 29
`
`Capraro v. Lanier Bus. Prods. Inc., 466 So. 2d 212 (Fla. 1985) ........................... 45
`
`Citizens for Strong Sch., Inc. v. Fla. St. Bd. of Educ., 262 So. 3d 127
`
`(Fla. 2019) ............................................................................................... 28, 29
`
`Crist v. Fla. Ass’n of Criminal Def. Lawyers, Inc., 978 So. 2d 134 (Fla. 2008) .... 24
`
`Dep't of Envtl. Prot. v. Millender, 666 So. 2d 882 (Fla. 1996) ........................ 38, 39
`
`Eskind v. City of Vero Beach, 159 So. 2d 209 (Fla. 1963) ..................................... 40
`
`Fla. Dep’t of Health v. Florigrown, LLC, --- So. 3d ---, 2019 WL 2943329
`
`(Fla. 1st DCA July 9, 2019) ................................................................... passim
`
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`

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`Fla. Dep’t of Health v. Florigrown, LLC, --- So. 3d ---, 2019 WL 4019919
`
`(Fla. 1st DCA Aug. 27, 2019) ...................................................................... 21
`
`Fla. Hosp. Waterman, Inc. v. Buster, 984 So. 2d 478 (Fla. 2008) ......................... 25
`
`Fla. House of Representatives v. Florigrown, LLC, 278 So. 3d 935
`
`(Fla. 1st DCA 2019) ..................................................................................... 19
`
`Gainesville Woman Care, LLC v. State, 210 So. 3d 1243 (Fla. 2017) ................... 44
`
`Garcia v. Andonie, 101 So. 3d 339 (Fla. 2012) ...................................................... 29
`
`Holley v. Adams, 238 So. 2d 401 (Fla. 1970) ......................................................... 25
`
`Maryland v. King, 567 U.S. 1301 (2012) ......................................................... 43, 47
`
`New Motor Vehicle Bd. of Cal. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 434 U.S. 1345
`
`(1977) ...................................................................................................... 43, 47
`
`Manatee Cty. v. 1187 Upper James of Fla., LLC, 104 So. 3d 1118
`
`(Fla. 2d DCA 2012) ...................................................................................... 43
`
`Notami Hosp. of Fla., Inc. v. Bowen, 927 So. 2d 139 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006) .......... 38
`
`Ralicki v. 998 SW 144 Court Rd., LLC, 254 So. 3d 1155 (Fla. 5th DCA 2018) .... 50
`
`Ruppel v. Gulf Winds Apts, Inc., 508 So. 2d 534 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987) .................. 49
`
`Sparkman v. State ex rel. Scott, 58 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1952) .................................... 29
`
`S & J Transp., Inc. v. Gordon, 176 So. 2d 69 (Fla. 1965) ...................................... 29
`
`Sun Ins. Office, Ltd. v. Clay, 133 So. 2d 735 (Fla. 1961) ....................................... 25
`
`The Fla. Bar v. Sibley, 995 So. 2d 346 (Fla. 2008) ................................................ 28
`
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`Treacy v. Lamberti, 141 So. 3d 174 (Fla. 2013) ..................................................... 44
`
`Florida Statutes and Constitutions
`
`§ 381.986, Fla. Stat. (2018) ...............................................................................passim
`
`§ 381.986(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2014) .............................................................................. 4
`
`§ 381.986(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (2016) ............................................................................ 25
`
`§ 381.986(1)(f), Fla. Stat. (2016) ............................................................................... 5
`
`§ 381.986(2), Fla. Stat. (2014) ................................................................................... 4
`
`§ 381.986(2), Fla. Stat. (2016) ................................................................................... 5
`
`§ 381.986(4)(a)7., Fla. Stat. (2018) .......................................................................... 37
`
`§ 381.986(5), Fla. Stat. (2014) ................................................................................. 10
`
`§ 381.986(5)(b), Fla. Stat. (2014) .............................................................................. 4
`
`§ 381.986(5)(c), Fla. Stat. (2016) .............................................................................. 5
`
`§ 381.986(6), Fla. Stat. (2018) ................................................................................. 10
`
`§ 381.986(6), Fla. Stat. (2016) ................................................................................... 5
`
`§ 381.986(6)(a), Fla. Stat. (2018) ............................................................................. 37
`
`§ 381.986(8), Fla. Stat. (2018) ........................................................................... 10, 48
`
`§ 381.986(8)(a), Fla. Stat. (2018) ...................................................................... 10, 37
`
`§ 381.986(8)(a)1., Fla. Stat. (2018) ................................................................... 12, 16
`
`§ 381.986(8)(a)(2), Fla. Stat. (2018) ........................................................................ 12
`
`§ 381.986(8)(a)2., Fla. Stat. (2018) .......................................................................... 12
`
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`§ 381.986(8)(a)2.a., Fla. Stat. (2018) ................................................................passim
`
`§ 381.986(8)(a)3., Fla. Stat. (2018) .................................................................... 12, 16
`
`§ 381.986(8)(a)5.d., Fla. Stat. (2018) ........................................................... 12, 47, 49
`
`§ 381.986(8)(b)1., Fla. Stat. (2018) ......................................................................... 38
`
`§ 381.986(8)(b)7.a., Fla. Stat. (2018) ...................................................................... 46
`
`§ 381.986(8)(e), Fla. Stat. (2018) ......................................................................passim
`
`§ 381.986(8)(e)1., Fla. Stat. (2018) .......................................................................... 12
`
`§ 381.986(10), Fla. Stat. (2018) ............................................................................... 46
`
`§ 381.986(10)(f), Fla. Stat. (2018) ........................................................................... 47
`
`§ 381.986(12)(h), Fla. Stat. (2018) .......................................................................... 47
`
`§ 381.986(12)(i), Fla. Stat. (2018) ........................................................................... 47
`
`§ 381.986(12)(j), Fla. Stat. (2018) ........................................................................... 47
`
`§ 381.986(13), Fla. Stat. (2018) ............................................................................... 47
`
`Art. III § 11(a)(12), Fla. Const. .......................................................................... 16, 41
`
`Art. X § 29(b)(5), Fla. Const. ............................................................................passim
`
`Art. X § 29(b)(8), Fla. Const. ................................................................................... 38
`
`Art. X § 29(d), Fla. Const ................................................................................ 6, 9, 36
`
`Art. X § 29(d)(1), Fla. Const. ..................................................................................... 6
`
`Art. X § 29(d)(1)c., Fla. Const ..........................................................................passim
`
`Art. X § 29(d)(2), Fla. Const. ..................................................................................... 6
`
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`Art. X § 29(d)(3), Fla. Const. ............................................................................passim
`
`Art. X § 29(e), Fla. Const. ............................................................................. 7, 22, 36
`
`Rules and Regulations
`
`Rule 64-4.002, F.A.C. (2015) .................................................................................... 4
`
`Rule 9.130, Fla. R. App. P. ...................................................................................... 49
`
`Rule 9.210(a)(2), Fla. R. App. P. ............................................................................. 53
`
`Rule 1.610, Fla. R. Civ. P. ....................................................................................... 50
`
`Other
`
`Art. X, § 29, Const. Reg. 1-1.02(2), (6), (9), (17) ................................................... 46
`
`Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts
`116 (2012) ...................................................................................................... 28
`
`Dara Kam, The News Service of Florida, 8 More Firms to Get Pot Licenses,
`https://www.news4jax.com/news/2019/04/17/8-more-firms-to-get-pot-
`licenses/ .......................................................................................................... 31
`
`Fla. Dept. of Health, Article X, Section 29, of the Florida Constitution Regulation
`Development Procedure, https://www.flrules.org/Gateway/View_notice.asp?
`id=19086610 .................................................................................................. 13
`
`Fla. Dep’t of Health site at: http://knowthefactsmmj.com/mmtc/ ........................... 32
`
`Fla. Dep’t of Health, Office of Medical Marijuana Use, Medical Marijuana
`Treatment Centers, https://knowthefactsmmj.com/mmtc/ (listing “license
`date” and “authorization status” of all existing MMTCs) ............................. 30
`
`Fla. Dep’t of Health, Office of Medical Marijuana Use Weekly Update (Dec. 13,
`2019),
`https://s27415.pcdn.co/wp-content/uploads/ommu_updates/2019/
`121319-OMMU-Update.pdf .......................................................................... 32
`
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`Zac Anderson, DeSantis Wants Legislature to Repeal Medical Marijuana Smoking
`Ban, The Fla. Times-Union (Jan. 17, 2019) ............................................ 14, 15
`
`www.jacksonville.com/news/20190117/desantis-wants-legislature-to-repeal-
`medical-marijuana-smoking-ban ................................................................... 15
`
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`INTRODUCTION
`
`In 2016, 71% of Florida voters fundamentally changed the way medical
`
`marijuana is provided to patients in Florida. The voters enshrined into their
`
`constitution a new medical marijuana system that significantly expanded the
`
`potential patient base, created a “horizontal market” allowing multiple businesses to
`
`perform a variety of business functions for those patients receiving treatment, and
`
`made the Department of Health (the “Department”) responsible for administering
`
`this new policy for medical marijuana. The Legislature responded by simply turning
`
`back the clock and reverting to its previous oligopoly-style “vertical” medical
`
`marijuana system. The Legislature wrote a law that directly contravened the
`
`mandatory language of the Amendment, and then threatened to withhold funding
`
`from the Department until it implemented its will over the policy that the people
`
`chose to add to their constitution. That is the unrebutted record in this case.
`
`This case is no “stunt.”1 The statutory provisions at issue have been found
`
`unconstitutional by a circuit court judge and all three judges on the First District
`
`Court of Appeal panel that heard the case. Florigrown has every right to challenge
`
`those provisions.
`
`The record fully supports Florigrown’s qualifications—but this case is not
`
`1 See IB at 1. Citations to the Department’s Initial Brief and the Florida House of
`Representatives’ amicus brief appear as IB XX and House Br. XX, respectively.
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`about Florigrown’s qualifications. It is about statutory provisions that directly
`
`conflict with the Medical Marijuana Amendment (the “Amendment”). It is about
`
`requiring the Department to do what the Amendment mandates. It is about providing
`
`a fair process that allows prospective medical marijuana providers to register with
`
`the Department so the Department can review their qualifications to determine
`
`whether they meet the requirements for licensure.
`
`The State has a robust system in place to ensure that the medical marijuana
`
`program is safe and regulated. But the State is unconstitutionally restricting access
`
`to that system and picking and choosing who to let in, creating what Governor
`
`DeSantis himself characterized as a “cartel.” Indeed, the Governor has said that the
`
`current system does not adhere to free market principles and should be “opened up.”
`
`The Amendment expressly directs the Department to issue regulations to
`
`register Medical Marijuana Treatment Centers (“MMTCs”) by October 2017. In
`
`direct violation of the Amendment, the Department failed to do so because the
`
`Legislature said it would withhold the Department’s funding if it enacted such
`
`regulations. The Legislature then arbitrarily gave away a limited number of MMTC
`
`licenses. It gave licenses to pre-Amendment “dispensing organizations” who have
`
`never been evaluated to determine whether they meet the requirements for post-
`
`Amendment licensure. It gave away licenses to settle pre-Amendment litigation
`
`over who could be a provider under the pre-Amendment medical marijuana
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`program—some of whom were previously found to be unqualified. And, it is
`
`allowing those licensees to sell these coveted licenses for $50 million or more
`
`without ever operating to produce any marijuana at all, or serving even one single
`
`patient. These actions are not only unconstitutional—the entire scheme is a “hoax”
`
`that undermines the explicit will of the voters who chose to add horizontal licensing
`
`to their constitution in order to ensure the availability and safe use of medical
`
`marijuana.
`
`As to the Amici, it is not surprising that some legislators who created this
`
`system, and some companies that are benefiting from it, would want to convince the
`
`Court that the legislation is constitutional and should remain in place. But the
`
`unrebutted record reflects that the system is failing and causing harm to the most
`
`vulnerable in our society—those that must turn to medical marijuana for relief from
`
`a debilitating or terminal condition. Just like other oligopolies, the medical
`
`marijuana cartel created by the Legislature has resulted in high prices, product
`
`scarcity, and limited product options. Every court that has looked at this scheme has
`
`said it violates the Constitution.
`
`Florigrown has not asked any court to hand it a license. It is asking the Court
`
`to require the Legislature and the Department to comply with the Amendment’s
`
`mandates—nothing less, nothing more.
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`STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS2
`
`Pre-Medical Marijuana Amendment Background
`
`In 2014, the Legislature allowed a small class of patients (those with cancer
`
`or a condition causing seizures or severe muscle spasms) to use low-THC cannabis.
`
`See, e.g., § 381.986(2), Fla. Stat. (2014). The Legislature directed the Department
`
`to authorize a total of five “dispensing organizations” to provide qualified patients
`
`with low-THC cannabis. § 381.986(5)(b), Fla. Stat. (2014).
`
`The Legislature defined “dispensing organization” as “an organization
`
`approved by the department [of health] to cultivate, process, AND dispense low-
`
`THC cannabis.” § 381.986(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2014) (emphasis added). The
`
`Legislature required the Department to develop an application form for the eventual
`
`determination of the five entities that would receive authorization to cultivate,
`
`process, AND dispense low-THC cannabis. § 381.986(5)(b), Fla. Stat. (2014). The
`
`Legislature also set forth qualifications for the dispensing organizations. Id.
`
`The Department adopted rules governing application requirements and an
`
`application form. See Rule 64-4.002, F.A.C. (2015). In 2015, the Department issued
`
`five dispensing organization licenses based on a comparative review of all
`
`applications. [R. 2928] Other than this one instance, the Department has never
`
`accepted applications for a medical marijuana business (whether for a dispensary
`
`2 Record references are to the page number of the Supreme Court Record.
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`organization under the 2014 legislation or an MMTC under the legislation at issue
`
`here). As a result of problems with the Department’s 2015 scoring process, which
`
`an administrative law judge characterized as a “dumpster fire,” litigation ensued
`
`against the Department by those who were not granted a license. [R. 3639]
`
`In 2016, the Legislature expanded section 381.986 to allow terminally ill
`
`patients to use full-potency marijuana. See, e.g., § 381.986(1)(f), (2), Fla. Stat.
`
`(2016). The Legislature authorized three additional dispensing organizations if
`
`certain, very limited requirements were met, § 381.986(5)(c), Fla. Stat. (2016), but
`
`all licenses were given to previous applicants who originally had been denied a
`
`dispensing organization license under the 2014 legislation. The Legislature also set
`
`forth a host of requirements for dispensing organizations, including, but not limited
`
`to, requirements governing growth, inspections, processing, testing, packaging,
`
`delivery, dispensing, security, off-site storage facilities, lighting, tracking, number
`
`of employees that must be on the premises at all times, photo identification,
`
`transportation, and training. § 381.986(6), Fla. Stat. (2016).
`
`The Medical Marijuana Amendment
`
`On November 8, 2016, over 71% of Florida voters overwhelmingly approved
`
`the Amendment, codified in article X, section 29, of the Florida Constitution, to
`
`allow for the legal “Use of Marijuana for Debilitating Medical Conditions.” [R.
`
`2719] Pertinent here, the Amendment does three things.
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`First, it creates MMTCs instead of the “dispensing organizations” that were
`
`created under the earlier legislation. It also expressly expands and alters the
`
`definition the Legislature gave to “dispensing organizations” by defining an MMTC
`
`as “an entity that acquires, cultivates, possesses, processes (including development
`
`of related products such as food, tinctures, aerosols, oils, or ointments), transfers,
`
`transports, sells, distributes, dispenses, OR administers marijuana, products
`
`containing marijuana, related supplies, or educational materials to qualifying
`
`patients or their caregivers and is registered by the Department.” Art. X, § 29(b)(5),
`
`Fla. Const. (emphasis added).
`
`Second, the Amendment places specific mandates on the Department, not the
`
`Legislature. Art. X, § 29(d), Fla. Const. It requires the Department to promulgate
`
`regulations by July 3, 2017 (six months after the Amendment’s effective date) and
`
`to begin registering MMTCs by October 3, 2017 (nine months after the
`
`Amendment’s effective date). Id. at § 29(d)(1)-(2). The Department must develop
`
`“[p]rocedures for the registration of MMTCs that include procedures for the
`
`issuance, renewal, suspension and revocation of registration, and standards to ensure
`
`proper security, record keeping, testing, labeling, inspection, and safety.” Id. at §
`
`29(d)(1)c. (emphasis added).
`
`Third, the Amendment provides that “[i]f the Department does not issue
`
`regulations, or if the Department does not begin issuing identification cards and
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`registering MMTCs within the time limits set in this section, any Florida citizen shall
`
`have standing to seek judicial relief to compel compliance with the Department’s
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`constitutional duties.” Id. at § 29(d)(3) (emphasis added). The Amendment allows
`
`the Legislature to enact laws related to the Amendment but only if those laws are
`
`“consistent with” the Amendment. Id. at § 29(e) (emphasis added).
`
`The Analysis Of Intent Document
`
`Before the Amendment was adopted, its drafters published an “Analysis of
`
`Intent” document (“Intent Document”), which states:
`
`This Amendment allows for MMTCs to register with the [Department]
`to engage in a variety of discrete activities, as outlined. MMTCs must
`be registered to engage in any of the activities listed in the definition
`[of an MMTC], but do not have to engage in all of them. For example,
`a cultivator may be registered separately from a dispensary. Some of
`the activities listed may overlap between the various MMTCs (such as
`possessing medical marijuana). The Amendment provides for multiple
`types of MMTCs, including, but not necessarily limited to: cultivation;
`processing; distributing; dispensing; transportation; and administration.
`This language allows cross ownership of MMTCs, but does not require
`any cross ownership of MMTCs. A requirement that a single MMTC
`must perform all MMTC functions would be contrary to the language
`and intent of this Amendment, which clearly calls for a variety of
`business functions in the language. The Amendment also allows the
`legislature to set reasonable limits on ownership of multiple MMTCs
`by any operator. This ownership structure is intended to foster and
`support the sufficient availability of medical marijuana, reasonable
`cost, and safe use for qualified patients.
`
`[R. 2461-62 (emphasis added)] Thus, in addition to the Amendment’s plain use of
`
`the word “or” when defining an MMTC, the Intent Document confirms that there
`
`are to be multiple types of MMTCs and that MMTCs cannot be required to perform
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`all MMTC functions. This makes perfect business sense because a market will only
`
`function efficiently and safely if participants are able to specialize in business
`
`functions for which there is a real demand that they are well positioned to fill.
`
`Pre-Election, This Court Determined That The Ballot Language And The
`Amendment’s Plain Language Were Not Misleading
`
`This Court unanimously approved the Amendment, concluding: “The [ballot]
`
`language is clear and does not mislead voters regarding the actual content of the
`
`proposed amendment.” Adv. Op. to Atty. Gen. re Use of Marijuana for Debilitating
`
`Med. Conditions, 181 So. 3d 471, 478 (Fla. 2015). This Court recognized that the
`
`Amendment gave the Department “regulatory oversight,” which was appropriate
`
`because such oversight would not include “policy decisions that are prohibited under
`
`the doctrine of non-delegation of legislative power.” Id. at 477-78. The Department
`
`would simply enact regulations to “register and oversee providers, issue
`
`identification cards, and determine treatment amounts.” Id. at 477 (emphasis added).
`
`Of course, this Court also recognized that Floridians, rather than the Legislature,
`
`would be determining “whether Floridians wish to include a provision in our state
`
`constitution permitting the medical use of marijuana.” Id.
`
`The Department Prepares To Implement The Amendment
`
`Before the Amendment passed, the Department began to prepare for its
`
`anticipated passage. The Department surveyed other states with similar medical
`
`marijuana directives. It estimated there would be approximately 440,552 patients
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`who would qualify for, and be in need of, medical marijuana. [R. 3289] It
`
`anticipated there would need to be approximately 1,993 MMTCs to perform all of
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`the necessary and distinct functions of cultivating, processing, distributing,
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`dispensing, transporting, and administering medical marijuana to patients. [R. 2827]
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`This number of MMTCs is consistent with the Amendment’s directive that
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`the Department issue regulations “to ensure the availability and safe use of medical
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`marijuana by qualifying patients.” Art. X, § 29(d), Fla. Const. (emphasis added).
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`The Department then began work on timely issuing such regulations. [R. 3078]
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`Florigrown Seeks Registration As An MMTC
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`In January 2017, Florigrown sought registration as an MMTC to ensure that
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`it was in line for the MMTC registrations that the Department would be processing.
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`[R. 2427] The Department rejected Florigrown’s registration request without
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`allowing it to submit any documentation as to its qualifications—even after
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`Florigrown petitioned for a hearing. [R. 2432, 2435] The Department eventually
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`told Florigrown it could seek relief in circuit court once the Department promulgated
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`and implemented regulations per the Amendment. [R. 2438-39]
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`Legislature Amends Section 381.986 During A Special Session
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`Just before the Amendment’s deadline for the Department to promulgate
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`implementing regulations, the Legislature amended section 381.986 (the “Statute”).3
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`3 References to section 381.986, Florida Statutes, are to 2018 unless otherwise stated.
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`51031184;16
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`9
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`As noted above, the Statute previously housed provisions for Florida’s pre-
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`Amendment medical marijuana program for terminally ill patients with only one
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`year remaining to live and low-THC medical marijuana program.
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`In direct conflict with the Amendment, which expressly defines an MMTC as
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`an entity that may perform one of any number of services related to the cultivation,
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`processing, OR selling of marijuana, the Statute uses the same language required
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`earlier for “dispensing organizations,” which mandates that an MMTC must perform
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`every function in the medical marijuana supply chain (characterized as “vertical
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`integration”). See § 381.986(8)(e), Fla. Stat. The Statute ignores the Amendment’s
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`express change in the definition of an MMTC by changing the word “OR” in the
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`Amendment to “AND,” thereby completely altering the Amendment’s definition of
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`an MMTC. As a result, the Statute prohibits licensure of any entity that wants to
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`perform only one function in the supply chain—such as only cultivating marijuana—
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`even though it is expressly permitted to do so under the Amendment.
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`The Statute also ignores the Amendment’s requirement that the Department
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`“register” MMTCs—requiring instead that MMTCs be “licensed.”4 Florigrown is
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`4 Compare Art. X, § 29(d)(1)c. (Department must promulgate regulations governing
`procedures “for the registration of MMTCs that include procedures for the issuance,
`renewal, suspension and revocation of registration”), with § 381.986(8)(a)
`(Department must “license” MMTCs). Notably, the Statute uses the Amendment’s
`term “register” in implementing all other provisions of the Amendment regarding
`patients and caregivers; however, it ignores “registration” of MMTCs, requiring
`instead that MMTCs be licensed. Compare § 381.986(5) & (6), with § 381.986(8).
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`51031184;16
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`10
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`not, however, challenging here the fact that MMTCs must first “register” and then
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`be “licensed.” Florigrown is challenging the scheme under which those licenses are
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`issued and is seeking to be allowed to register in the hopes of qualifying for a license.
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`As the trial court found following the evidentiary hearing, if the unconstitutional
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`licensing provisions at issue are severed from the Statute, the Department still has a
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`framework in place under which an entity can register to become an MMTC if it
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`meets objective standards; then, if it meets additional requirements set forth in the
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`Statute that are not at issue here, it can receive a license to operate. [R. 2723]
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`Under the Legislature’s licensing scheme challenged here, the Statute directs
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`the Department to issue most of the limited number of MMTC licenses by fiat to
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`certain private entities, including entities that were previously rejected by the
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`Department and were in current litigation with the Department regarding their failure
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`to qualify for the pre-Amendment statutorily authorized dispensary organization
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`licenses. See § 381.986(8)(a)2.a., Fla. Stat.; see also [R. 3325-26] Thus, the
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`Legislature used the licensing requirements to settle cases in litigation by granting
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`licenses to that limited class of applicants—to the exclusion of others, regardless of
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`qualifications. Making matters worse, under the Statute, the Department had no
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`authority to evaluate these entities before registering them and then issuing them a
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`coveted MMTC licen