Filing # 99889596 E-Filed 12/05/2019 06:58:52 PM
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`SC19-1464
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`IN THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA
`________________________________________
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`FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,
`OFFICE OF MEDICAL MARIJUANA USE, et al.
`
`Petitioners,
`
`v.
`FLORIGROWN, LLC
`a Florida Limited Liability Company, and
`VOICE OF FREEDOM, INC. D/B/A FLORIGROWN
`
`Respondents,
`
`
`PETITIONERS’ INITIAL BRIEF
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`
`
`
`
`On Discretionary Review from a Decision of
`the First District Court of Appeal
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`
`
`_______________________________________________________________________
`
`
`Joe Jacquot (FBN 189715)
`Colleen Ernst (FBN 112903)
`Executive Office of the Governor
`The Capitol, PL-5
`400 South Monroe Street
`Tallahassee, Florida 32399
`(850) 717-9310
`Joe.Jacquot@eog.myflorida.com
`Colleen.Ernst@eog.myflorida.com
`
`Louise Wilhite-St. Laurent (FBN 91244)
`Florida Department of Health
`4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A-02
`Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1708
`(850) 245-4956
`Louise.StLaurent@flhealth.gov
`
`Jason Gonzalez (FBN 146854)
`Daniel Nordby (FBN 14588)
`Amber Stoner Nunnally (FBN 109281)
`Rachel Procaccini (FBN 1019275)
`Shutts & Bowen LLP
`215 South Monroe Street, Suite 804
`Tallahassee, Florida 32301
`
`(850) 241-1717
`
`
`JasonGonzalez@shutts.com
`DNordby@shutts.com
`ANunnally@shutts.com
`
`RProcaccini@shutts.com
`
`
`
`Counsel for Petitioners
`
`
`RECEIVED, 12/05/2019 07:00:48 PM, Clerk, Supreme Court
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`Page
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................................................................... iv
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`INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................... 1
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`STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS .......................................................... 4
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`SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ...................................................................... 15
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`STANDARD OF REVIEW ..................................................................................... 17
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`ARGUMENT ........................................................................................................... 18
`I. FLORIGROWN DOES NOT HAVE A SUBSTANTIAL LIKELIHOOD OF
`SUCCESS ON THE MERITS. ............................................................................... 18
`A. The Florida Constitution grants the legislature plenary
`lawmaking authority ............................................................................ 20
`B. The statutory cap on the number of MMTC licenses the
`Department may issue does not violate the Amendment .................... 24
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`C. The statutory requirement for vertical integration of
`MMTCs does not violate the Amendment .......................................... 28
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`II. FLORIGROWN FAILED TO SATISFY THE REMAINING THREE
`CRITERIA TO SUPPORT THE TEMPORARY INJUNCTION ..................................... 32
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`A. Florigrown has an adequate legal remedy and will not
`suffer irreparable harm absent a temporary injunction ....................... 33
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`B. The public interest does not support a temporary
`injunction ............................................................................................. 35
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`III. THE ORDER GRANTING A TEMPORARY INJUNCTION ATTEMPTS TO
`RADICALLY ALTER THE STATUS QUO. ............................................................ 38
`IV. THE ORDER GRANTING THE TEMPORARY INJUNCTION IS
`FACIALLY INVALID. ........................................................................................ 40
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`-ii-
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`A. The injunction order does not include any findings of fact
`to support the conclusions regarding irreparable harm and
`lack of an adequate remedy at law ...................................................... 41
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`B. The injunction order is not conditioned on the posting of
`a bond .................................................................................................. 42
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`CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................ 44
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`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE AND COMPLIANCE ........................................... 46
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
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` Page(s)
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`Cases
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`Bowling v. Nat’l Convoy & Trucking Co.,
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`135 So. 541 (Fla. 1931) ...................................................................................... 38
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`City of Jacksonville v. Naegele Outdoor Advert. Co.,
`634 So. 2d 750 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994). ..................................................... 17, 40, 41
`
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`Davis v. Gilchrist Cty. Sheriff’s Office,
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`280 So. 3d 524 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019) .................................................................. 18
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`Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. v. Millender,
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`666 So. 2d 882 (Fla. 1996) ................................................................................. 12
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`Fla. Dep’t of Health v. Florigrown,
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`44 Fla. L Weekly DI744, 2019 WL 2943329 (Fla. 1st DCA July 9,
`2019) ............................................................................................................passim
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`Fla. Dep’t of Health v. Florigrown,
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`44 Fla. L Weekly D2182, 2019 WL 4019919 (Fla. 1st DCA Aug.
`27, 2019) ................................................................................................. 14, 19, 36
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`Fla. Dep’t of Health v. Florigrown,
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`2019 WL 5208142 (Fla. Oct. 16, 2019).............................................................. 14
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`Fla. Dep’t of Revenue v. City of Gainesville,
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`918 So. 2d 250 (Fla. 2005) ................................................................................. 17
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`Fla. Dry Cleaning & Laundry Bd. v. Everglades Laundry,
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`190 So. 33 (Fla. 1939) ........................................................................................ 43
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`Florigrown, LLC v. Fla. Dep’t of Health,
` Case No. 2017-CA-2549 (Fla. 2d Cir. Ct.) ......................................................... 42
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`Fraternal Order of Police v. City of Miami,
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`243 So. 3d 894, 897 (Fla. 2018) ......................................................................... 18
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`Gainesville Woman Care, LLC v. State,
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`210 So. 3d 1243 (Fla. 2017) ............................................................................... 34
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`-iv-
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`Gawker Media, LLC v. Bollea,
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`129 So. 3d 1196 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014) ................................................................. 38
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`Genchi v. Lower Fla. Keys Hosp. Dist.,
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`45 So. 3d 915 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010) ..................................................................... 33
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`Grant v. Robert Half Int’l, Inc.,
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`597 So. 2d 801 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992) ................................................................... 38
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`Hadi v. Liberty Behavioral Health Corp.,
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`927 So. 2d 34 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006) .................................................................... 41
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`Holley v. Adams,
`
`238 So. 2d 401 (Fla. 1970) ................................................................................. 31
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`In re Adv. Op. to Att’y Gen. re Use of Marijuana for Debilitating
`Medical Conditions,
`181 So. 3d 471 (Fla. 2015) ................................................................................... 2
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`
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`Jackson v. State,
`
`191 So. 3d 423 (Fla. 2016) ................................................................................. 18
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`Lieberman v. Marshall,
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`236 So. 2d 120 (Fla. 1970) ................................................................................ 38
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`Manatee Cty. v. 1187 Upper James of Fla., LLC,
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`104 So. 3d 1118 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012) ................................................................. 37
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`Milin v. Nw. Fla. Land, L.C.,
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`870 So. 2d 135 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003) .................................................................. 40
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`New Motor Vehicle Bd. of Cal. v. Orrin W. Fox Co.,
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`434 U.S. 1345 (1977) .......................................................................................... 37
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`Notami Hospital of Fla., Inc. v. Bowen,
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`927 So. 2d 139 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006) ............................................................ 30, 31
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`Peters v. Meeks,
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`163 So. 2d 753 (Fla. 1964) ................................................................................. 20
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`Pinder v. Pinder,
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`817 So. 2d 1104 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) ................................................................. 43
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`Provident Mgmt. Corp. v. City of Treasure Island,
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`796 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 2001) ........................................................................... 17, 35
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`Salazar v. Hometeam Pest Defense, Inc.,
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`230 So. 3d 619 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017) ................................................................... 40
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`Santos v. Tampa Med. Supply,
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`857 So. 2d 315 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) ................................................................... 41
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`Sharp v. Bussey,
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`176 So. 763 (Fla. 1937) ...................................................................................... 43
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`St. Johns Mgmt. Co. v. Albaneze,
`22 So. 3d 728 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) .................................................................... 17
`
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`State v. Bd. of Pub. Instruction for Dade Cty.
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`170 So. 602 (Fla. 1936) ................................................................................ 20, 23
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`State, Dep’t of Health v. Bayfront HMA Med. Ctr., LLC,
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`236 So. 3d 466 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018) ...................................................... 17, 33, 40
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`Stone v. State,
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`71 So. 634 (Fla. 1916) ........................................................................................ 20
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`Sullivan v. Moreno,
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`19 Fla. 200 (Fla. 1882) ........................................................................................ 38
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`SunTrust Banks, Inc. v. Cauthon & McGuigan, PLC,
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`78 So. 3d 709 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) .................................................................... 33
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`Yardley v. Albu,
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`826 So. 2d 467 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002) .................................................................. 40
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`Statutes, Session Laws, and Court Rules
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`§ 381.986(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2014) ............................................................................ 22
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`§ 381.986(5)(b), Fla. Stat. (2014) ............................................................................ 22
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`§ 381.986, Fla. Stat. (2016) ........................................................................................ 4
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`§ 381.986, Fla. Stat. (2017) ...............................................................................passim
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`§ 381.986(8), Fla. Stat. (2017) ..........................................................................passim
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`-vi-
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`§ 381.986(8)(a), Fla. Stat. (2017) ................................................................ 20, 25, 26
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`§ 381.986(8)(a)1., Fla. Stat. (2017) ..................................................................... 6, 24
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`§ 381.986(8)(a)2.-3., Fla. Stat. (2017) ................................................................. 6, 24
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`§ 381.986(8)(a)4., Fla. Stat. (2017) ..................................................................... 9, 24
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`§ 381.986(8)(b), Fla. Stat. (2017) .............................................................................. 6
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`§ 381.986(8)(e), Fla. Stat. (2017) .....................................................................passim
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`Ch. 2014-157, Laws of Fla.. ................................................................................ 6, 22
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`Ch. 2016-123, Laws of Fla.. ................................................................................ 6, 22
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`Ch. 2017-232, Laws of Fla.. ...................................................................................... 6
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`Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.610. .......................................................................................... 40, 42
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`Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.610(b) ............................................................................................ 43
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`Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.610(c) ............................................................................................ 40
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`Constitutional Provisions
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`Art. III, § 1 Fla. Const. ....................................................................................... 20, 21
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`Art. X, § 25, Fla. Const. ........................................................................................... 31
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`Art. X, § 29, Fla. Const. ....................................................................................passim
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`Art. X, § 29(a)(1), Fla. Const. .................................................................................... 4
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`Art. X, § 29(a)(1)-(3), Fla. Const. ...................................................................... 31, 35
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`Art. X, § 29(a)(3), Fla. Const. .................................................................................... 4
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`Art. X, § 29(b)(5), Fla. Const. ........................................................................ 5, 28, 29
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`Art. X, § 29(c)-(d), Fla. Const. ................................................................................ 22
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`Art. X, § 29(d), Fla. Const. .................................................................................. 4, 23
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`Art. X, § 29(d)(1), Fla. Const. .................................................................................. 23
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`Art. X, § 29(d)(1)c., Fla. Const. ..................................................................... 5, 23, 24
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`Art. X, § 29(d)(3), Fla. Const. .................................................................................. 35
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`Art. X, § 29(e), Fla. Const. ............................................................................ 5, 23, 26
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`Other Authorities
`Fla. Dep’t of Health, Office of Medical Marijuana Use, Weekly
`Update (Nov. 29, 2019), available at
`https://knowthefactsmmj.com/about/weekly-updates/ ....................................... 27
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`Memorandum from Deputy Attorney General James M. Cole,
`Guidance Regarding Marijuana Enforcement (Aug. 29, 2013),
`available at
`https://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/3052013829132756857
`467.pdf ................................................................................................................ 25
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`-viii-
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`INTRODUCTION
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`This case arises out of a trial court’s entry of a temporary injunction
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`enjoining the implementation of section 381.986, Florida Statutes (2017), and
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`ordering the Florida Department of Health (Department) to grant a medical
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`marijuana treatment center (MMTC) license to a newly formed company with no
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`revenue, significant assets, or relevant industry experience. The company—the
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`Respondent in these proceedings—is run by a web video producer and owned by
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`Joe Redner, neither of whom are botanists, pharmacists, physicians or have any
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`professional experience or credentials in the medical field. This company
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`unilaterally chose not to wait for the Department to begin accepting MMTC
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`applications and instead purported to “register” itself as an MMTC by delivering a
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`letter to the Department two weeks after the effective date of the constitutional
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`amendment establishing limited state law immunity for medical marijuana in
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`Florida. This stunt, which makes a mockery of all legal and regulatory procedures
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`related to article X, section 29 of the Florida Constitution, has resulted in the case
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`now before this Court.
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`In 2016, voters passed an amendment to the Florida Constitution
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`(Amendment) to address the “Use of Marijuana for Debilitating Medical
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`Conditions.” The text of this new constitutional provision was clear about its
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`purpose: to provide limited immunity under Florida law for authorized medical use
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`1
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`of marijuana for certain debilitating conditions. Equally clear was that medical use
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`of marijuana would not be unrestricted. Rather, the Amendment provides a
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`framework under which qualifying patients, physicians, caregivers, MMTCs, and
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`the marijuana itself would be subject to regulation and oversight.
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`As this Court recognized when reviewing the Amendment for placement on
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`the ballot, nothing in the Amendment alters the legislature’s power to make policy
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`decisions related to the regulatory oversight of medical marijuana in Florida.1 In
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`fact, the Amendment itself invites legislative action by reaffirming the
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`longstanding principle that the legislature has plenary authority to enact laws
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`consistent with the constitution. In June 2017, the legislature did just that when it
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`created a broad regulatory scheme to implement the Amendment, including
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`regulations for the licensing and structure of MMTCs. These regulations are
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`codified in section 381.986, Florida Statutes (2017).2
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`Despite clear authority for the action taken by the legislature, the trial court
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`determined that certain provisions of section 381.986(8) are in conflict with the
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`1 See In re Adv. Op. to Att’y Gen. re Use of Marijuana for Debilitating Medical
`Conditions, 181 So. 3d 471, 477 (Fla. 2015) (“If the proposed amendment passes,
`the Department of Health would perform regulatory oversight, which would not
`substantially alter its function or have a substantial impact on legislative functions
`or powers.”).
`2 All citations to the Florida Statutes are to the 2017 version, unless otherwise
`indicated.
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`2
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`constitution and ordered the Department to commence registering MMTCs,
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`including Respondent Florigrown, LLC (Florigrown), “in accordance with the
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`plain language of” the Amendment. The trial court’s order granting temporary
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`injunctive relief immediately injected confusion and uncertainty into the MMTC
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`registration process—the antithesis of preserving the status quo. In a split decision,
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`the First District Court of Appeal added to that confusion by affirming the
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`temporary injunction with purported “modifications.” On the Department’s
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`motion, the First District subsequently certified to this Court a question of great
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`public importance: whether Florigrown had demonstrated a substantial likelihood
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`of success on the merits of its constitutional challenges to section 381.986(8) to
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`justify the entry of a temporary injunction.
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`Because the order granting the temporary injunction is both substantively
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`and facially flawed, this Court should answer the certified question in the negative,
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`quash the First District’s decision, and remand with directions that the case be
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`further remanded to the circuit court for an order denying Florigrown’s motion for
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`a temporary injunction.
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`STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS
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`A.
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`Florida’s Medical Marijuana Amendment
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`On November 8, 2016, Florida’s electorate approved Amendment 2, a
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`citizens’ initiative that amended the Florida Constitution to create article X, section
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`29, titled “Medical marijuana production, possession and use.” Before the
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`Amendment’s passage, the use of low-THC and medical cannabis was addressed
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`exclusively in section 381.986, Florida Statutes (2016). The Amendment expanded
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`the class of persons eligible for medical use of marijuana in Florida and directed
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`the Department of Health to issue reasonable regulations for its implementation
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`and enforcement. Art. X, § 29(d), Fla. Const. The regulations mandated by the
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`Amendment are intended to “ensure the availability and safe use of medical
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`marijuana by qualifying patients.” Id. The Amendment went into effect on January
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`3, 2017.
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`The crux of the Amendment is that it provides a limited immunity under
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`state law. Specifically, the Amendment provides that “[t]he medical use of
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`marijuana by a qualifying patient or caregiver in compliance with th[e
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`Amendment] is not subject to criminal or civil liability or sanctions under Florida
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`law.” Art. X, § 29(a)(1), Fla. Const. Likewise, actions taken by a registered
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`MMTC that are done “in compliance” with the Amendment and the Department’s
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`regulations are not subject to state criminal or civil liability. Id. § 29(a)(3).
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`4
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`In furtherance of this purpose, the Amendment outlines certain duties of the
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`Department regarding the registration of MMTCs. Specifically, the Amendment
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`provides that the Department shall promulgate “[p]rocedures for the issuance,
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`renewal, suspension and revocation of registration [of MMTCs], and standards to
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`ensure proper security, record keeping, testing, labeling, inspection, and safety.”
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`Art. X, § 29(d)(1)c., Fla. Const. An MMTC is defined in the Amendment as “an
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`entity that acquires, cultivates, possesses, processes . . . transfers, sells, distributes,
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`dispenses, or administers marijuana . . . and is registered by the Department.” Id. §
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`29(b)(5). Finally, the Amendment expressly clarifies that nothing limits the
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`legislature from enacting laws “consistent” with the Amendment. Id. § 29(e).
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`B.
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`Florigrown Challenges the Legislature’s Authority to Implement
`the Amendment
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`On January 17, 2017, just two weeks after the effective date of the
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`Amendment, the Department received a letter from counsel for Florigrown, which
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`purported to “register” Florigrown as an MMTC under the Amendment. (App.
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`184-86, 536-37). The letter stated that Florigrown would meet the requirements of
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`the Department’s MMTC regulations, referring to regulations that had not yet been
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`promulgated. (App. 183, 538-41). The Department promptly denied Florigrown’s
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`premature registration request. (App. 189, 197, 544, 546). Florigrown then filed a
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`5
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`Petition for Evidentiary Hearing with the Department in February 2017, which the
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`Department dismissed the same month. (App. 192-98, 206-07).
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`During a special session in June 2017, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill
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`8A, which set forth a detailed statutory framework for the registration of MMTCs.
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`See ch. 2017-232, Laws of Fla. First, the Legislature directed the Department to
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`convert the existing licenses of low-THC and medical cannabis dispensing
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`organizations into MMTC licenses.3 § 381.986(8)(a)1., Fla. Stat. Notably, to obtain
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`a converted license, a dispensing organization would still have to satisfy all criteria
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`set forth in the statute. Id. The Legislature also provided for ten additional MMTC
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`licenses for applicants that meet certain criteria. § 381.986(8)(a)2.-3. Additionally,
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`the Legislature made the policy determination that “[a] licensed medical marijuana
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`treatment center shall cultivate, process, transport, and dispense marijuana for
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`medical use.” § 381.986(8)(e). The Department is required to adopt rules to
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`establish a procedure for issuing MMTC licenses under the statute. §
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`381.986(8)(b).
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`3 In 2014, the Florida legislature passed the “Compassionate Medical Cannabis
`Act,” which provided state law immunity to a limited class of individuals—
`generally, patients with cancer or epilepsy—to possess and use low-THC
`marijuana based on a physician’s recommendation. See ch. 2014-157, Laws of Fla.
`The act was amended in 2016 to include full-potency marijuana, termed “medical
`cannabis,” for use by qualified terminally ill patients only. See ch. 2016-123, Laws
`of Fla.
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`6
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`Florigrown filed suit in December 2017, challenging the constitutionality of
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`the above-cited provisions of section 381.986.4 According to Florigrown, the limit
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`on the number of MMTC licenses in subsection (8)(a) and the requirement in
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`subsection (8)(e) that licensed MMTCs use a vertically integrated supply chain
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`violate the Amendment.
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`C.
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`Florigrown Requests a Temporary Injunction
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`Florigrown sought temporary injunctive relief on the grounds that it
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`allegedly has a constitutional right under the Amendment to be registered as an
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`MMTC and that the Department’s ongoing efforts to license MMTCs pursuant to
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`section 381.986 will allegedly cause Florigrown irreparable harm. (App. 248-78).
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`At an evidentiary hearing, Adam Elend, Florigrown’s president and CEO,
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`testified that Florigrown was established in 2016 prior to the passage of the
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`Amendment. (App. 532-33, 1206). At that time, Florigrown had no employees or
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`source of revenue. (App. 1206-08). According to Mr. Elend, Florigrown is
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`qualified to operate as an MMTC based on his own assessment of the requirements
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`in the Amendment and the former standards used to license low-THC and medical
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`4 Florigrown initially filed a 148-page, 18-count complaint, which it later amended
`after the trial court determined it was “not a short and plain statement of the
`ultimate facts . . . in violation of Rule 1.110, Florida Rules of Civil Procedure.”
`(App. 5-142, 451-52). In an amended complaint, Florigrown sought declaratory,
`injunctive, and mandamus relief. (App. 153-54). The trial court granted the
`Department’s motion to dismiss the claim for mandamus relief. (App. 511-12).
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`7
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`cannabis dispensing organizations under a previous version of section 381.986.
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`(App. 538-42). Mr. Elend, who is not a lawyer, also opined about the
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`constitutionality of section 381.986 and why he believes it is inconsistent with the
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`Amendment. (App. 550-54). Mr. Elend offered no testimony about how
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`Florigrown is irreparably harmed by the statute. Instead, Mr. Elend testified it may
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`be difficult for Florigrown to receive a license under section 381.986, but that it is
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`“certainly possible” that Florigrown could do so. (App. 1231-32).
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`Florigrown also submitted deposition testimony of Kayvan Khalatbari, a
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`medical marijuana consultant from Colorado, in support of its request for a
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`temporary injunction. (App. 1261-64). Mr. Khalatbari described himself as a “huge
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`advocate against vertical integration” and an opponent of “limited-license
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`structures” based on his experience in Colorado. (App. 1283-87). Mr. Khalatbari
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`offered generalized opinions about his policy concerns, but he provided no specific
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`evidence as to how section 381.986 was unconstitutional, any irreparable harm to
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`Florigrown, or how the public interest would be served by the requested injunction.
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`The Department called Courtney Coppola, the then-Deputy Director of the
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`Office Medical Marijuana Use. (App. 636). Ms. Coppola described the
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`Department’s ongoing rulemaking to implement the Amendment and section
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`381.986. (App. 642-46). At the time of the evidentiary hearing in July 2018, there
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`were 13 licensed MMTCs and the Department was engaged in rulemaking for
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`8
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`additional MTMCs.5 (App. 595, 644-45). Ms. Coppola testified that Florigrown
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`will be given a fair opportunity to compete for an MMTC license under the
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`procedure outlined in the Department’s promulgated rules. (App. 645-46).
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`D.
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`The Trial Court Grants a Temporary Injunction
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`The trial court initially denied Florigrown’s request for a temporary
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`injunction without prejudice after finding that it had not established irreparable
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`harm or that an injunction would serve the public interest. (App. 475-82).
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`However, the trial court determined that Florigrown had a substantial likelihood of
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`success on the merits and no adequate remedy at law. (App. 481).
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`As to the substantial likelihood of success on the merits, the trial court
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`determined that certain provisions in section 381.986(8) are inconsistent with the
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`Amendment because they “(a) modif[y] the definition of MMTC from the plain
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`text of the Amendment, (b) limit[] the number of licenses available by placing caps
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`on the number of MMTCs to be ultimately licensed, and (c) require[] the
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`mandatory issuance of ‘licenses’ to a closed class of private entities that were
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`unsuccessful applicants for a ‘Dispensing Organization’ license.” (App. 478-80).
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`As to whether Florigrown has an adequate remedy at law, the trial court found
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`5 The Department is authorized to license four additional MMTCs “[w]ithin 6
`months after the registration of 100,000 active qualified patients in the medical
`marijuana use registry.” § 381.986(8)(a)4., Fla. Stat. The medical marijuana use
`registry hit the 100,000 mark in July 2018. (App. 645).
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`9
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`“there is no adequate remedy at law for the harm Florigrown will suffer if it
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`continues to be denied the opportunity to obtain MMTC registration.” (App. 481).
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`The trial court was clear it was denying the motion, though, because
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`Florigrown would have an opportunity in the future to compete for an MMTC
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`license and thus it would not suffer irreparable harm. (App. 481). The trial court
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`also explicitly determined that issuing a temporary injunction “would substantially
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`alter the status quo by halting the Department’s existing process and procedures for
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`the issuance of MMTC licenses as well as the rulemaking currently underway to
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`initiate the application process.” Id. The trial court then set a “case management
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`conference” for two months later to reconsider its findings on irreparable harm and
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`the public interest. Id.
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`Thereafter, Florigrown renewed its motion for a temporary injunction,
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`arguing that it should be granted its requested relief because “the Department has
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`continued to neglect and ignore the constitutional duties imposed on it by [the
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`Amendment].” (App. 483-86). The trial court held a “case management
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`conference” on Florigrown’s renewed motion. (App. 1348). At the hearing,
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`Florigrown reiterated its prior arguments as to why temporary injunctive relief was
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`allegedly warranted in this case. (App. 1348-58). Notably, however, Florigrown
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`did not present any evidence to meet its burden to establish irreparable harm,
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`which the trial court had determined just two months earlier did not exist.
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`On October 5, 2018, the trial court granted Florigrown’s motion and entered
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`a temporary injunction:
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`(1) immediately enjoining the Department of Health from registering
`or licensing any MMTCs pursuant to the unconstitutional legislative
`scheme set forth in Section 381.986, Florida Statutes, (2) requiring the
`Department by 5:00 PM Friday, October 19, 2018 to commence
`registering MMTCs in accordance with the plain language of the
`Medical Marijuana Amendment, and (3) requiring the Department to
`register Florigrown as an MMTC by 5:00 PM Friday, October 19,
`2018, unless the Department can clearly demonstrate to this court that
`such registration would result in unsafe use of medical marijuana by
`qualifying patients.
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`(App. 501) (emphasis in original). In support, the trial court cited its earlier
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`determination that Florigrown has a substantial likelihood of success on the merits
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`and no adequate remedy at law. (App. 498). As to the issue of public interest, the
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`trial court found only that “[t]he public interest was clearly stated with the passage
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`of the Constitution’s Medical Marijuana Amendment by over 70% of Florida
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`voters.” (App. 499). There are no findings regarding irreparable harm in the trial
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`court’s order. And the order is silent as to Florigrown’s obligation to post an
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`injunction bond.
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`
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`
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`E.
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`The First District Court of Appeal’s Decision
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`The Department appealed to the First District Court of Appeal the trial
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`court’s order granting the temporary injunction. In a 2–1 decision, the First District
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`upheld the injunction after concluding that Florigrown has a substantial likelihood
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`11
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`of success on the merits of its claims that the provisions of section 381.986(8)
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`requiring MMTCs to be vertically integrated and placing caps on the number of
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`MMTC licenses violate the Amendment. Fla. Dep’t of Health v. Florigrown
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`(Florigrown I), 44 Fla. L. Weekly D1744, 2019 WL 2943329, at *2-3 (Fla. 1st
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`DCA July 9, 2019).
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`
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`The three-judge panel determined that section 381.986(8) “directly
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`conflicts” with the Amendment because the statutory requirement for MMTCs to
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`“cultivate, process, transport, and dispense marijuana for medical use” amounts to
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`a “more restricted definition” of MMTC than in the Amendment. Id. at *3 (citing §
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`381.986(8)(e)); see also id. at *6 (Wetherell, J., concurring in part and dissenting
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`in part) (agreeing that “the statute likely contravenes the constitutional definition of
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`MMTC”). Only two judges agreed, however, that their ruling on vertical
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`integration “renders the statutory cap on th