Case 1:19-cv-05362-JPB Document 1 Filed 11/25/19 Page 1 of 103
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`INFORM INC.,
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`vs.
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`GOOGLE LLC;
`GOOGLE INC.;
`ALPHABET INC.;
`YOUTUBE, LLC;
`YOUTUBE, INC.;
`and JOHN DOES 1-100;
`
`
`Plaintiff,
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`
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`CIVIL ACTION FILE
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`
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`NO. ______________________
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`
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`JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
`
`
`Defendants.
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`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
`ATLANTA DIVISION
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`COMPLAINT
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`Plaintiff Inform, Inc. (“Inform”), by and through its attorneys, brings this
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`action against Defendants Google LLC, Google Inc., Alphabet Inc., YouTube,
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`LLC, YouTube, Inc., and John Does 1-100 (collectively “Defendants” or
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`“Google”). Inform makes its allegations upon personal knowledge as to its own
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`acts and upon information and belief as to all other matters, as well as based upon
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`the ongoing investigation of its counsel. Plaintiff respectfully shows the Court as
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`follows:
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`
`
`INFORM INC.,
`
`
`vs.
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`GOOGLE LLC;
`GOOGLE INC.;
`ALPHABET INC.;
`YOUTUBE, LLC;
`YOUTUBE, INC.;
`and JOHN DOES 1-100;
`
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`
`
`CIVIL ACTION FILE
`
`
`
`NO. ______________________
`
`
`
`
`JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
`
`
`Defendants.
`
`
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
`ATLANTA DIVISION
`
`
`
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
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`)
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`)
`
`
`COMPLAINT
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`
`
`
`
`
`
`Plaintiff Inform, Inc. (“Inform”), by and through its attorneys, brings this
`
`action against Defendants Google LLC, Google Inc., Alphabet Inc., YouTube,
`
`LLC, YouTube, Inc., and John Does 1-100 (collectively “Defendants” or
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`“Google”). Inform makes its allegations upon personal knowledge as to its own
`
`acts and upon information and belief as to all other matters, as well as based upon
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`the ongoing investigation of its counsel. Plaintiff respectfully shows the Court as
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`follows:
`
`
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`Case 1:19-cv-05362-JPB Document 1 Filed 11/25/19 Page 2 of 103
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`I.
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`INTRODUCTION
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`1.
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`This is an action under, inter alia, the Sherman Antitrust Act, the
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`Clayton Antitrust Act, and Georgia’s common law tort of tortious interference to
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`restrain the anticompetitive conduct of Defendants, to remedy the effects of the
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`Defendants’ past unlawful conduct, to protect free market competition from
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`continued unlawful manipulation, and to remedy harm to consumers and competitors
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`alike.
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`2.
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`Plaintiff Inform is a digital media advertising company that for over a
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`decade has directly competed with Google in the online advertising market,
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`specifically online video advertising, by providing a platform of services to online
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`publishers, content creators, and online advertisers. While Inform had revenues in
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`excess of $100 million for its online advertising services between 2014 and 2016,
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`since that time Google has effectively put Inform out of business as a direct result of
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`the illegal conduct described herein. Google’s pattern of anticompetitive practices
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`has thwarted competition on the merits and excluded Inform and other Google
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`competitors from the relevant markets. The result has been to eviscerate competition
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`in multiple markets, harm consumers, degrade consumer choice and consumer
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`privacy, and stifle innovation.
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`2
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`3. At its core, Google is in the business of online advertising, services from
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`which it derives the vast majority of its revenues. Users of the Google search engine
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`do not pay a monetary fee; rather Google monetizes users’ personal data to drive
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`online advertising revenue. In essence, Google is a broker of Internet user data for
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`online advertising profits.
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`4.
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`For many years, Google’s goal has been to monopolize the online
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`advertising market by: (1) amassing and controlling Internet user data; (2)
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`controlling the devices and tools with which users access the Internet; and (3)
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`ultimately controlling the advertising content that is served and consumed by
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`Internet users.
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`5. Google, the world's largest and most accessed search engine, has an
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`overwhelming market dominance – well over 90% – in Internet Search and other
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`related markets. For many years now, Defendants have possessed and still possess
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`monopoly power in this search engine market (hereinafter the “Internet Search
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`Market”) and numerous interrelated and overlapping markets, including but not
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`limited to the Search Advertising Market and the Ad Server Market. Google is also
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`dominant in the Web Browser Market and the broader Online Advertising Market.
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`Additionally, through its 2005 acquisition of the Android operating system (“OS”),
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`and the resulting control over handheld Android devices, Google has established a
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`monopoly in the worldwide market for Licensable Mobile Device Operating
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`3
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`Systems. Collectively, the markets as described above have been leveraged by
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`Google to gain and maintain monopoly power and will be referred to herein as
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`“Defendants’ Leveraged Monopolies.”
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`6.
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`To maximize their advertising profits, to protect their valuable
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`monopolies against potential competitive threats, and to extend Defendants’
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`Leveraged Monopolies globally and across digital devices, Defendants have
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`simultaneously engaged in a series of acquisitions and anticompetitive activities
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`designed to thwart competition on the merits.
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`7.
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`To maintain their monopolies and gain additional monopoly power,
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`Defendants have resorted to blatant and rampant coercive and anticompetitive
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`activities. Defendants’ anticompetitive conduct includes:
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` coercing consumers to use Google’s products and services;
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` coercing advertisers to use Google’s products and services;
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` illegally undermining competitive products and services;
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` entering agreements tying other Google products, services and
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`applications to the Android operating systems (OS) offered by
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`Google and/or to the Google Ad Server;
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` entering into exclusionary agreements that preclude companies from
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`advertising, distributing, promoting, buying, or using products of
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`competitors or potential competitors to Google’s applications;
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`4
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` entering into exclusionary agreements that restrict the right of
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`companies to provide services or resources to competitors or
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`potential competitors to Google's advertising services and products;
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` tortiously interfering with competitors’ contracts and business
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`relationships;
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` maliciously and artificially imposing restrictions on how ads can be
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`supported and accepted for display, while exempting or whitelisting
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`its own platforms from these rules;
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` improperly influencing and infiltrating governmental agencies,
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`including the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) and the United
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`States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) to further Google’s
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`interests; and
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` engaging in a decades-long campaign to acquire disparate tech
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`companies and patent portfolios with the goal of leveraging its
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`monopoly power
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`to maintain market dominance
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`throughout
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`Defendants’ Leveraged Monopolies.
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`Defendants’ conduct described above shall be referred to herein as “Defendants’
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`Competitive Restraints.”
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`8. Defendants have illegally leveraged their monopoly power and market
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`dominance in interrelated markets both to maintain dominance in those markets
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`5
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`already monopolized by Google (e.g., Internet Search Market, Search Advertising
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`Market, Ad Server Market, and the Licensable Mobile Device Operating Systems
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`Market), as well as to gain further dominance in related markets like the Web
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`Browser Market and the broader Online Advertising Market.
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`9.
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`This case is not the first time Google’s illegal monopolistic behavior has
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`been challenged. In fact, there already exists a lengthy public record detailing
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`Google’s illegal activities, including but not limited to the following:
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` June 2010: French regulators found that Google had abused its dominant
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`position in the Internet advertising market when it barred a location data
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`company from using its AdWords service.
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` November 2010: The European Commission announces an investigation
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`into whether Google abused a dominant market position in online search by
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`allegedly lowering or downgrading the search results of competing services
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`and by giving preferential placement to the results of its own vertical search
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`services in order to shut out competing services.
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` November 2010: The Commission also announced that it will also look
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`into allegations that Google lowered the 'Quality Score' for sponsored links
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`of competing vertical search services – one of the factors that determine the
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`price paid to Google by advertisers. (Comparison Shopping Investigation)
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`6
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` April 2011: Daum Communications files antitrust complaints with the
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`South Korean Fair Trade Commission, asserting that Google blocked them
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`from putting their search applications on Android phones in South Korea,
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`where Samsung and LG Android phones are manufactured.
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` June 2011: The FTC launches an antitrust investigation against Google for
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`abusing its monopoly power and anticompetitive practices, focused on,
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`inter alia, whether Google unfairly ranks search results to favor its own
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`businesses; whether exclusive agreements to provide search services to
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`online publishers and other Web sites hurt competition; whether Google
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`abused its monopoly in the search engine market to increase advertising
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`rates for competitors and made it difficult for advertisers to compare
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`advertising data running on rival sites such as Yahoo and Microsoft’s Bing;
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`and whether the company used control of the Android mobile operating
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`system to pre-install Google’s bundled default apps and to discourage
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`smartphone and other mobile device manufacturers from using rivals’
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`applications.
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` June 2011: The FTC also looks at whether Google violated the FRAND
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`Agreement signed by Motorola Mobility when it acquired 17,000 of the
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`Motorola’s standard essential patents SEPs
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`(and 7,000 pending
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`applications) that are crucial to device interoperability – by not licensing
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`7
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`the patents to rivals, willing licensees, and competitors on fair, reasonable,
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`and non-discriminatory terms (FRAND).
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` August 2012: The FTC announces that Google agreed to pay $22.5 million
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`to settle the FTC's charges that Google "placed an advertising tracking
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`cookie on the computers of Safari users who visited sites within Google's
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`DoubleClick advertising network.”
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` August 2012: After several years of investigation, an FTC staff report
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`recommends prosecuting Google for anticompetitive practices related to
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`scraping, exclusive deals, and restricting advertisers’ ability to run
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`advertising campaigns on competitors’ search engines.
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` July 2013: The FTC finalizes settlement in Google Motorola Mobility case
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`for excluding competitors on Android technology, indicating that Google
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`violated the FRAND Agreement.
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` April 2015: The European Commission opens a separate investigation on
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`whether Google has entered into anti-competitive agreements or abused its
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`monopoly in the mobile device operating system market, to pre-install
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`Google search, Google Chrome, and a host of other Google software as
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`default apps in mobile devices and to make it difficult for competing third-
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`party apps and search engines to be pre-installed on mobile devices
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`operating on Google Android.
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`8
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` July 2016: The European Commission announces it will also investigate
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`whether Google abused its market dominance to prevent competing
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`advertising companies to sell ads to web sites already using Google
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`AdSense.
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` April 2017: In a settlement with Russia’s Federal Antimonopoly Service,
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`Google agrees to pay US $7.8 million in fines and rewrite contracts with
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`smartphone manufacturers under a settlement over access to the Android
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`operating system. The settlement ended a two-year legal battle after
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`regulators — acting on a complaint filed by Yandex, Google’s main
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`competitor in Russia — found that Google apps were being given
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`prominence over rivals on Android-based smartphones.
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` June 2017: Google is fined with a record $2.7 billion by the European
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`Commission for manipulating search results.
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` July 2018: The European Commission fines Google with another record
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`$5.1 billion in Android antitrust case for, inter alia, illegally tying of
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`Google's search and browser apps; illegally making anticompetitive
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`payments conditional on exclusive pre-installation of Google Search; and
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`illegal obstructing of development and distribution of competing Android
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`operating systems.
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`9
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` March 2019: The European Commission fines Google $1.7 billion for
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`abusive antitrust online advertising activities in imposing a number of
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`restrictive clauses in the AdSense contracts with third-party websites which
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`prevented Google's rivals from placing their search advertisements on these
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`websites.
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` June 2019: The U.S. Justice Department announces that it will launch an
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`antitrust investigation against Google, which prompts the company to file
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`an SEC regulatory filing stating that the DOJ has requested all documents
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`related to Google’s previous antitrust investigations and convictions here in
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`the U.S. and elsewhere.
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` September 2019: Google faces a host of antitrust investigations by 50 U.S.
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`states. Led by Texas, the state attorney generals signed onto an antitrust
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`investigation into Google search and search advertising businesses.
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`10. Defendants’ illegal actions described herein are concerted attempts to
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`maintain inextricably intertwined monopolies and to achieve dominance in other
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`markets, not by innovation and other competition on the merits, but rather by self-
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`serving and Google-biased manipulation of search algorithms, illegal tie-ins,
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`exclusive dealing contracts, predatory pricing, manipulation of the patent process,
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`tortious interference with competitors’ contracts and business relationships,
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`selective blocking of software applications, and other anticompetitive tactics that
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`10
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`deter innovation, exclude competition, and rob customers of their right to choose
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`among competing alternatives.
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`II.
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`THE PARTIES
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`11. Plaintiff Inform, Inc. (“Plaintiff” or “Inform”) is a Delaware corporation
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`with a principal place of business located at 3445 Peachtree Road NE, Suite 1000,
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`Atlanta, GA, 30326. Inform was formerly known as News Distribution Network,
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`Inc. (“NDN”). Plaintiff is a digital media advertising company that provides a
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`platform of services to online publishers, content creators, and online advertisers.
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`12. Defendant Google Inc. incorporated in California in September 1998
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`and reincorporated in Delaware in August 2003. In or around 2017, Google changed
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`from a corporation to a limited liability company (LLC) under the umbrella of
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`Alphabet Inc. Defendant Google LLC is a Delaware Limited Liability Company
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`with its principal place of business at 1600 Amphitheatre Parkway in Mountain View
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`California. Google is the world leader in general Internet search conducted on all
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`devices and in handheld general search. It also is the owner of the Android OS and
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`popular and exclusive mobile and tablet applications including YouTube, Google
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`Maps, and Gmail. In 2018, Google’s annual revenues topped $136 billion, the vast
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`majority of which was derived from online advertising.
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`13. Defendant Alphabet Inc. is a Delaware corporation with its headquarters
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`and principal place of business at the “Googleplex” in Mountain View, California.
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`Defendant Alphabet is one of the top ten largest companies in the United States with
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`more than $100 billion in annual revenue. Alphabet, ranking 15th in the list of
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`Fortune 500 companies, is traded on the NASDAQ under the symbol “GOOGL” and
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`is included in the S&P 100 Index. Alphabet beat revenue expectations with $40.5
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`billion in the most recent quarter, Q3 2019. For Q3 2019, advertising revenue hit a
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`record $33.9 billion.
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`14. Defendant YouTube, Inc. registered as a corporation in the State of
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`Delaware in October 2005 and was converted into YouTube, LLC a year later.
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`Defendant YouTube, LLC is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Google LLC. YouTube
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`is headquartered in San Bruno, California.
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`15. Defendants and Inform are competitors in several markets, including the
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`Online Advertising Market, and specifically in online video advertising. As
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`discussed below, Google provides services similar to Inform through a stable of
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`advertising products and applications including, without limitation, Google Ads, the
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`AdSense program, AdX, DoubleClick for Publishers (DFP) and Google Ad
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`Manager.
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`III.
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`JURISDICTION AND VENUE
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`16. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action under 28
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`U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1337, Section 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1, et seq.,
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`and Sections 3, 4 and 16 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 14, 15 and 26, because
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`Plaintiff alleges violations of federal law. The Court also has supplemental
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`jurisdiction over the Plaintiff’s state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).
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`17. Venue is proper in this district under 15 U.S.C. §§ 15, 22, and 26 and
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`under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) and (c) because: (1) Google transacts business and is
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`found within this district, (2) Inform’s principal place of business is in this district;
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`and (3) a substantial portion of the events giving rise to this claim herein occurred
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`within this district.
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`IV. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
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`A.
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`The Advent of Online Advertising
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`18. When the Internet started to become more popular in the early 1990s,
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`traditional print publishers established websites and began to publish their
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`substantive content online. This created vast amounts of news and other content on
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`the Internet and opened the door to digital or online advertising and a new means of
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`generating advertising profits through display and video advertisements.
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`19. Like other advertising medium, online advertising often includes: (1) a
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`publisher, who integrates advertisements into its online content; (2) an advertiser,
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`who provides the advertisements to be displayed; and (3) advertising agencies that
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`help create and place the ads. The goal of online advertising generally is to put an
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`advertisement in front of the best possible audience for that ad. A view of the ad by
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`a user is commonly referred to as an impression.
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`20. During the early years of online advertising, the buying and selling of
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`ads between an advertiser and a publisher was a direct and manual process whereby
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`publishers sold advertising space directly to advertisers through what are known as
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`“direct ad campaigns.” However, with the speed and growing popularity of the
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`Internet, publishers needed a more efficient and easier way to manage the various
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`advertisers’ campaigns that ran on the publisher’s website – an ad server.
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`21. An ad server is a piece of advertising technology (AdTech) that is used
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`by publishers, advertisers, ad agencies, and ad networks to manage and run online
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`advertising campaigns. Ad servers are responsible for making the instantaneous
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`decisions about what ads to show on a website, and then serving the ad onto that site.
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`Additionally, ad servers collect and report data (such as impressions and clicks) for
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`advertisers to gain insights from and monitor the performance of their ads. In the
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`same way WordPress is used to manage a website’s content, ad servers are used to
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`manage and display online advertising content to the right user on a website.
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`22. There are two main types of ad servers: a publisher’s ad server (also
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`called a first-party ad server) and an advertiser’s ad server (or a third-party ad
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`server). One such third-party ad server is Google’s Double Click for Publishers
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`(“DFP”).
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`23. First-party ad servers allow website publishers to manage the ad space
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`or ad slots on their own website and to display direct ad campaigns sold by the
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`publisher to the advertiser.
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`24. When direct ad campaigns are not available, the first-party ad server will
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`fill the ad space by serving ads from a third-party ad server, a supply side platform
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`(“SSP”) or an ad network.
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`25. The first-party ad server will: determine which ads to display on the
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`publisher’s website based on collected user data and preferences; serve the ad to the
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`user; and collect and report data such as impressions and clicks, which can be used
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`to determine the cost to the advertiser.
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`26. The primary function of the first-party ad server is to fill ad space on the
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`publisher’s website that is tailored to the interests of the particular user visiting the
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`publisher’s website.
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`27. A first-party ad server works as follows1: A user visits the publisher’s
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`website and the Internet browser (e.g., Google Chrome or Safari) sends a request to
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`the publisher’s web server asking for the page’s content to be displayed. The
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`publisher’s web server returns the HTML (or hypertext markup language) and it
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`starts rendering the page’s content. Simultaneously, an ad request is sent to the
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`1 See What is an Ad Server and How Does it Work, Maciej Zawadzinski,
`https://clearcode.cc/blog/what-is-an-ad-server/.
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`publisher’s ad server to fill the ad space or ad slot, which is a space left blank on the
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`displayed page to be populated by advertisements that are tailored to the user’s
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`interests. The publisher’s ad server chooses an ad campaign based on the
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`information obtained by the publisher about that user. The publisher’s ad server then
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`sends back the JavaScript tag to the publisher’s website and the relevant ad is
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`displayed to the user.
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`28. Third-party ad servers are similar but work somewhat differently. In
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`addition to serving ads, a third-party ad server also aggregates campaign data across
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`multiple publishers, which advertisers can then use to analyze the performance of
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`their ad campaigns and verify reports from the publishers.
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`29. A third-party ad server works as follows: A user visits the publisher’s
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`website and the Internet browser (e.g., Google Chrome) sends a request to the
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`publisher’s web server asking for the page’s content to be displayed. The publisher’s
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`web server returns the HTML (or hypertext markup language) and it starts rendering
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`the page’s content. Simultaneously, an ad request is sent to the publisher’s ad server
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`to fill the ad space or ad slot, which is a space left blank on the displayed page to be
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`populated by advertisements that are tailored to the user’s interests. The publisher’s
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`ad server chooses an ad campaign based on the information obtained by the publisher
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`about that user. The publisher’s ad server then sends back an ad markup (or the code
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`that is inserted into the ad slot) that contains a URL that points to the advertiser’s ad
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`server. The ad markup (or code) sends off a request to the advertiser’s ad server for
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`the ad markup (or code) and counts an impression. The advertiser’s ad server then
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`sends the markup to the publisher’s website and an ad from the third-party ad server
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`is displayed to the user.
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`30. When a third-party ad server is used, the third-party ad server will:
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`determine which ads to display on the publisher’s website based on collected user
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`data and preferences across publishers; serve the ad to the user; and collect and report
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`data such as impressions and clicks, which can be used to determine the cost to the
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`advertiser.
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`B.
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`The Early Days of Google
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`31. Google is a multinational technology company based in the United
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`States, specializing in Internet-related services and products that include online
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`advertising technologies, search, cloud computing, software and hardware. Google
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`offers various services in every district in the United States and throughout the
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`world.
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`32. Google Inc. was founded in 1998 by Sergey Brin and Larry
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`Page. Google began as an online search firm and was established as a two-sided
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`platform that enabled users to search the Internet. While the first-generation of
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`search engines simply indexed the content of web pages, Google and Google’s
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`PageRank algorithm helped define second-generation search technology, which
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`looked at links to and from other Web pages as a way of determining
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`relevance. Third-generation search engines go well beyond the link analysis and use
`
`intelligent clustering of results, natural language processing, and more human input
`
`to improve search results for users.
`
`33. As Google’s dominance in Internet search began to grow, its product
`
`and service offerings diversified into several overlapping markets intended to
`
`leverage its increasing monopoly power. These markets included email, document
`
`creation, mobile phones and Internet advertising. One commentator noted:
`
`As the gateway to the Internet for the vast majority of users, Google
`has unparalleled influence over which content and services people
`discover, read, and use. Before Google’s need for growth compelled
`it to look beyond horizontal search, this unfettered market power
`wasn't necessarily a problem. Google tended to focus its efforts on
`providing the best possible search results for its users, even though
`that usually meant steering them to other people’s websites as
`quickly as possible. Starting around 2005, however, Google began to
`develop a significant conflicting interest—to steer users, not to other
`people’s services, but to its own growing stable of competing
`services, in price comparison, travel search, social networking,
`[news], video content and so on.2
`
`
`
`
`
`2 One of the earliest complainants against Google’s anticompetitive behavior was
`from a comparison shopping service called, Foundem. In their various submissions
`to antitrust enforcement authorities, Foundem succinctly lays out Google’s
`dominance and the effect of its abuse of monopoly power. See
`http://www.searchneutrality.org/search-neutrality/the-real-search-neutrality.
`
`
`
`
`18
`
`
`
`Case 1:19-cv-05362-JPB Document 1 Filed 11/25/19 Page 19 of 103
`
`
`
`C. Google’s Business Is Online Advertising.
`
`34. Google operated at a loss for the first two years it operated. In 2000,
`
`Google began selling text-based advertisements associated with search keywords,
`
`turning its first profits in 2001 with a net income of approximately $7 million. Since
`
`that time, Google’s ad offerings have become considerably more sophisticated,
`
`resulting in tens of billions of dollars of annual revenue. These services now include,
`
`inter alia, search campaigns, display campaigns and video campaigns, which can be
`
`implemented and viewed across multiple devices.
`
`35. Google’s ad-based revenue model entails creating and selling ads for a
`
`specific website, service, app, or other product or service and placing them on
`
`strategic, high traffic channels based upon Google’s proprietary algorithms and
`
`Google’s stable of advertising offerings, including Google Ads, AdSense, AdX,
`
`DFP, Google Ad Manager and other tools. Today, Google’s ad-based revenue
`
`model generates the vast majority of Google’s revenues, yielding billions in revenue
`
`each year as reflected in the following chart:
`
`
`
`19
`
`
`
`Case 1:19-cv-05362-JPB Document 1 Filed 11/25/19 Page 20 of 103
`
`
`
`
`
`For Q3 2019, the most recent quarter, advertising revenue hit a record $33.9
`
`billion.
`
`D. Google is A Broker of User Data for Online Advertising Profits.
`
`36. The multisided nature of Google’s platform, which connects distinct but
`
`interdependent demands, offers Internet users a service purportedly “free of charge.”
`
`This consumer strategy has been an advantageous commercial strategy because it
`
`attracts users, which are a critical asset to Google because it allows the platform to
`
`sell advertising space to companies that are interested in reaching those users. In
`
`this way, Google connects users’ demand for information, products, and services
`
`with advertisers’ and publishers’ demand for access to those users.
`
`37. Thus, Google does not charge a monetary fee to Internet users for its
`
`search service either by way of subscription fees or usage fees, but rather its business
`
`model is based upon generating advertising revenue with advertisers appearing in or
`20
`
`
`
`
`
`Case 1:19-cv-05362-JPB Document 1 Filed 11/25/19 Page 21 of 103
`
`
`
`near the search results or on the webpages listed in the search results. While
`
`Google’s dominant business model suggests that users receive “free” access to
`
`services, the exchange in fact is for the commercial use of an individual’s personal
`
`data. This user data is critical for attracting advertisers who fund Google through
`
`billions of dollars in advertising revenue. In essence, Google is a broker of user data
`
`for advertising profits.
`
`38. Despite not charging a specific monetary fee to users in the form of
`
`fiat currency or the like, Google receives value from every platform user in the form
`
`of, inter alia, personally identifiable information, user impressions and preferences,
`
`and insight into patterns, timing, trends, location and demographics. Google then
`
`stores and monetizes this data through its proprietary algorithms.3
`
`
`3 See Commission decision of 27 June 2017 in Case 38606 - AT.39740 Google
`Search (Shopping), (the “EU Shopping Decision”) at ¶158 stating:
`[E]ven though users do not pay a monetary consideration for the use
`of general search services, they contribute to the monetization of the
`service by providing data with each query. In most cases, a user
`entering a query enters into a contractual relationship with the
`operator of the general search service. For instance, Google’s Terms
`of Service provide: ‘By using our Services, you agree that Google can
`use such data in accordance with our privacy policies.’. . . . The data
`which users agree to allow a general search engine to store and re-use
`is of value to the provider of the general search service as it is used to
`improve the relevance of the search service and to show more relevant
`advertising.”
`
`See also What’s The Value Of Your Data? Tech Crunch, October 13, 2015, Pauline
`Glikman, Nicolas Glady (“Data has become the most important strategic asset of
`pure players like Google and Facebook. And among the biggest companies in the
`21
`
`
`
`
`
`Case 1:19-cv-05362-JPB Document 1 Filed 11/25/19 Page 22 of 103
`
`
`
`39.
`
`Information generally, and personally
`
`identifiable
`
`information
`
`specifically, has become widely accepted as payment for goods and services. Users
`
`are no less paying customers simply because the medium of exchange is information
`
`and personal data rather than legal tender or banknotes.
`
`E.
`
`Understanding Google’s Business Lines and How They Feed Into
`Google’s Billion Dollar Advertising Business
`
`1. Google Search
`
`40. Google’s flagship online service is its general search engine, Google
`
`Search, which
`
`is
`
`accessible
`
`either
`
`through Google’s main website
`
`(www.google.com) or through localized websites. A search engine is a web-based
`
`tool that allows users to locate information on the Internet. Search engines, such as
`
`Google, Yahoo, Baidu and Bing, utilize automated software applications (referred
`
`to as robots, bots, or spiders) that travel along the Web and gather information used
`
`to create a searchable index of websites.
`
`41. Each search engine uses different complex mathematical formulas to
`
`generate search results. The results for a specific query are then displayed on the
`
`search engine results page (or “SERP”). These search engine algorithms take the
`
`key elements of a web page, including the page title, content, key word density,
`
`
`world, by market capitalization, a majority see their valuation estimated as a
`function of their user base and the data they collect.”).
`
`
`
`
`22
`
`
`
`Case 1:19-cv-05362-JPB Document 1 Filed 11/25/19 Page 23 of 103
`
`
`
`number of linked web pages, and determine where to place the results on the page.
`
`For websites seeking web traffic and/or seeking to sell products and services, where
`
`they rank on the SERP are dispositive of the website’s exposure, readership
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