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`MEI SERVICES, INC.,
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`Plaintiff,
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`vs.
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`CARDINAL HEALTH 110, LLC
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`Defendant.
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`CIVIL ACTION NO.
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`1:20-CV-2424-CC
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`Case 1:20-cv-02424-CC Document 26 Filed 04/05/21 Page 1 of 21
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`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
`ATLANTA DIVISION
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`OPINION AND ORDER
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`This matter is before the Court on Defendant Cardinal Health 110, LLC’s
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`Motion to Dismiss MEI Services, Inc.’s First Amended Complaint (the “Motion to
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`Dismiss”) [Doc. No. 13] and Defendant Cardinal Health 110, LLC’s Motion for
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`Rule 11 Sanctions (the “Motion for Sanctions”) [Doc. No. 17]. For the reasons
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`stated below, the Court GRANTS the Motion to Dismiss and DENIES the Motion
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`for Sanctions.
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`I.
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`BACKGROUND
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`A.
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`Facts
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`Plaintiff MEI Services, Inc. (“Plaintiff” or “MEI”) is a pharmacy company
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`that provides a broad array of services including pharmacy consulting, wholesale
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`distribution, and pharmacy benefit management. (Pl. MEI Services, Inc.’s First
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`Am. Compl. (“First Am. Compl.) ¶ 3.) Defendant Cardinal Health 110, LLC
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`Case 1:20-cv-02424-CC Document 26 Filed 04/05/21 Page 2 of 21
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`(“Defendant” or “Cardinal Health”) is a multi-national health services company.
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`(Id. ¶ 4.) As a pharmacy company, MEI has engaged in considerable business with
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`Defendant Cardinal Health, including the purchase of significant amounts of
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`prescription drugs. (Id. ¶ 5 & First Am. Compl., Ex. 7 ¶¶ R1-R2.)
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`On or about December 27, 2016,1 MEI sold the assets of one of its stores to
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`CVS Pharmacy (“CVS”) pursuant to an Asset Purchase and Sale Agreement the
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`“APA”). (First Am. Compl. ¶ 6 & First Am. Compl., Ex. 1.) Pursuant to the APA,
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`$340,000 of the sale proceeds were to be kept by CVS as a holdback (the
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`“Holdback”) to ensure that MEI complied with certain indemnification provisions
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`in the APA. (First Am. Compl. ¶ 7.) To the extent the indemnification provision
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`was not triggered, the APA originally called for CVS to return fifty percent (50%)
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`of the Holdback to MEI after eighteen (18) months and the remaining fifty percent
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`(50%) after thirty-six (36) months. (Id. ¶ 8.)
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`Prior to the closing, MEI had negotiations with both Cardinal Health and
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`Live Oak Bank Company (“Live Oak”). (Id. ¶ 9.) Both Cardinal Health and Live
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`Oak were secured creditors of MEI and, as such, both would have to release liens
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`in connection with the closing. (Id.) Accordingly, it was agreed that MEI would
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`1 The First Amended Complaint alleges that APA occurred on our about December 27,
`2017, but based on the exhibits attached to the First Amended Complaint in support of
`that allegation, it appears that the date in paragraph 6 of the First Amended Complaint
`is a typographical error.
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`2
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`Case 1:20-cv-02424-CC Document 26 Filed 04/05/21 Page 3 of 21
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`assign the Holdback funds to Cardinal Health and Live Oak. (Id. ¶ 10.) On
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`February 7, 2017, Cardinal Health sent correspondence to CVS confirming this
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`agreement. (Id. ¶ 11 & First Am. Compl., Ex. 1.)
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`Pursuant to correspondence dated August 6, 2018, which slightly modified
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`what was set forth in the prior correspondence, the Holdback funds were to be
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`split equally ($170,000.00 each, made in two installments) between Live Oak and
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`Cardinal Health. (First Am. Compl. ¶ 12 & First Am. Compl., Ex. 2.) MEI and
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`Cardinal Health specifically agreed on the usage and treatment of the Holdback
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`funds. (First Am. Compl. ¶ 13.) Under the agreement, Cardinal Health agreed to
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`use any Holdback funds received from CVS exclusively to pay any outstanding
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`notes or trade accounts between MEI and Cardinal Health. (Id. ¶ 14.) It was also
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`agreed that to the extent MEI was not indebted to Cardinal Health on any notes or
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`trade accounts, Cardinal Health would return the Holdback funds to MEI. (Id. ¶
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`15.)
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`In accordance with the above, on August 9, 2019, CVS sent the first
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`installment of the Holdback to Cardinal Health in the amount of $85,000.00. (Id.
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`¶ 16.) After discussing the matter, MEI requested that Cardinal Health apply the
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`$85,000.00 as a credit to a trade account operated by an MEI affiliate. (Id. ¶ 17.)
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`Cardinal Health agreed and the credit was applied without incident. (Id. ¶ 18.)
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`3
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`Case 1:20-cv-02424-CC Document 26 Filed 04/05/21 Page 4 of 21
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`In a separate transaction, in or about May 2018, MEI-affiliate Buckhead
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`Pharmaceutical Association (“Buckhead”), which signed its initial Cardinal Health
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`agreement contemporaneous with MEI’s initial agreement contemporaneous with
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`MEI’s initial agreement, sold its assets. (First Am. Compl., Ex. 7 ¶¶ R3 & R8.)
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`Following that sale, MEI-affiliate Buckhead incurred a debt on its account with
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`Cardinal Health in the amount of $69,511.65. (Id. ¶ R8.) Mr. Bogachek, Buckhead,
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`and MEI all refused to pay the debt. (Id.)
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`In February of 2020, MEI requested that CVS release the second—and final-
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`$85,000.00 payment. (First Am. Compl. ¶ 19.) Pursuant to the above request, CVS
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`paid the remaining $85,000.00 to Cardinal Health. (Id. ¶ 20.) At the time of the
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`payment, MEI and Cardinal Health were engaged in considerable business and
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`MEI was indebted to Cardinal Health on a certain trade account in an amount in
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`excess of $85,000.00. (Id. ¶ 21.) Accordingly, it was understood by both parties
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`that Cardinal Health would simply apply the $85,000.00 as a credit to MEI’s
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`account. (Id. ¶ 22.) This was consistent both with the initial agreement and also
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`with the course of dealing established with the payment of the initial Holdback
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`funds. (Id. ¶ 23.)
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`In fact, the above was confirmed in writing by Cardinal Health. (Id. ¶ 24.)
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`Specifically, on February 24, 2020, Cardinal Health confirmed the above credit in
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`an internal email that was specifically forwarded to MEI. (Id. & First Am. Compl.,
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`4
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`Case 1:20-cv-02424-CC Document 26 Filed 04/05/21 Page 5 of 21
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`Ex. 3.) Not only did Cardinal Health confirm the credit in writing, Cardinal Health
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`also apparently applied the credit at one point. (First Am. Compl. ¶ 25.) Although
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`Cardinal Health applied the credit, they inadvertently applied it to an MEI account
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`that was inactive (thus providing no benefit). (Id. ¶ 26.) As a result, MEI requested
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`that it be applied to the correct account. (Id.) Cardinal Health complied with the
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`request for a brief time. (Id.)
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`Around this time, MEI’s principal, Michael Bogachek, began to have a
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`number of other business disputes with Cardinal Health unrelated to the
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`Holdback. (Id. ¶ 27.) In March of 2020, MEI learned that Cardinal Health had
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`reversed course, retracted the credit, and was now refusing to pay the $85,000 to
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`MEI or apply it as a credit to MEI at all. (Id. ¶ 28.) Cardinal Health instead issued
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`instructions applying the Holdback amount to the trade account of MEI-affiliate
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`Buckhead. (First Am. Compl., Ex. 6.)
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`On March 23, 2020, counsel for MEI demanded the return of the $85,000.00.
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`(First Am. Compl. ¶ 30 & First Am. Compl., Ex. 5.) MEI disputed Cardinal
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`Health’s right to apply the Holdback to the Buckhead account. (First Am. Compl.,
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`Ex. 5 and Ex. 7 ¶ R7.) MEI and Mr. Bogachek threatened class litigation on behalf
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`of MEI and its affiliates, having nothing to do with the Holdback. (First Am.
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`Compl., Ex. 5 & Ex. 7 ¶ R6.)
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`5
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`Case 1:20-cv-02424-CC Document 26 Filed 04/05/21 Page 6 of 21
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`MEI and Cardinal Health began to have certain settlement negotiations
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`through counsel. (First Am. Compl. ¶ 31.) On April 16, 2020, the parties reached
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`a settlement agreement. (Id. ¶ 32.) The complete agreement between the parties
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`is reflected in an email chain. (Id. ¶ 33 & First Am. Compl., Ex. 6.) As part of the
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`agreement, Cardinal Health would credit the $85,000.00 to MEI’s debt and MEI
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`would provide “Cardinal Health with a full release of all claims, including the
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`usury class action claims previously alleged by Mr. Bogachek.” (First Am. Compl.
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`Ex. 6, p. 2.) Additionally, Cardinal Health agreed to provide a draft of the
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`settlement agreement on April 20, 2020, and Cardinal Health did so. (First Am.
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`Compl. ¶ 35 & First Am. Compl., Ex. 7.)
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`Prior to the email chain, the respective counsels for MEI and Cardinal
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`Health had verbal discussions. (First Am. Compl. ¶ 34.) At no point in the verbal
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`discussions, or any of the written communications, did Cardinal Health request
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`that MEI include any entity other than MEI in any settlement agreement. (Id.)
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`Much to MEI’s dismay, on April 20, 2020, counsel for Cardinal Health circulated a
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`proposed settlement draft that included a number of parties whose inclusion was
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`never discussed (or agreed upon)—either in telephone conversations or in the
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`email discussions. (Id. ¶ 35.)
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`As a result, MEI insisted that Cardinal Health honor the settlement that was
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`reached. (Id. ¶ 36.) Despite best efforts by MEI, Cardinal Health refused to honor
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`6
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`Case 1:20-cv-02424-CC Document 26 Filed 04/05/21 Page 7 of 21
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`the settlement. (Id. ¶ 37.) Moreover, Cardinal Health continues to hold the
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`$85,000.00. (Id. ¶ 38.) MEI consequently commenced the instant lawsuit. (Id. ¶
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`39.)
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`B.
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`Procedural History
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`On May 7, 2020, MEI commenced this action in the State Court of Gwinnett
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`County alleging claims for conversion, breach of contract (related to the
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`application of credit), breach of contract (related to the settlement agreement),
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`punitive damages, and attorney’s fees. On June 5, 2020, Cardinal Health removed
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`the case to this Court. On June 12, 2020, Cardinal Health moved the Court to
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`dismiss the Complaint. MEI exercised its right to amend its pleading and filed the
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`First Amended Complaint, which is now the operative pleading in the action. Like
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`the original Complaint, the First Amended Complaint includes claims for
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`conversion, breach of contract (related to the application of credit), breach of
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`contract (related to the settlement agreement), punitive damages, and attorneys’
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`fees pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 13-6-11. Cardinal Health presently moves the Court
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`to dismiss the First Amended Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
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`Procedure 12(b)(6).
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`7
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`Case 1:20-cv-02424-CC Document 26 Filed 04/05/21 Page 8 of 21
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`II. MOTION TO DISMISS
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`A.
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`Standard of Review
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`The Court may dismiss a pleading for “failure to state a claim upon which
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`relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
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`8(a)(2) provides that a complaint need only contain “a short and plain statement
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`of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” in order to “give the
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`defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.”
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`Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929
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`(2007) (citation and punctuation omitted). The complaint must “contain sufficient
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`factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
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`face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009)
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`(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). This standard “requires more than labels and
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`conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.”
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`Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citation omitted). Additionally, “the tenet that a court
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`must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable
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`to legal conclusions.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation omitted).
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`Instruments attached to a pleading are part of the pleading, and the Court
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`may consider them for Rule 12(b)(6) purposes. Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c). Moreover,
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`the Eleventh Circuit has made it clear that when a plaintiff attaches exhibits to a
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`complaint and the exhibits contradict the allegations of the complaint, the exhibits
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`8
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`Case 1:20-cv-02424-CC Document 26 Filed 04/05/21 Page 9 of 21
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`control. See Griffin Indus., Inc. v. Irvin, 496 F.3d 1189, 1206 (11th Cir. 2007)
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`(“Conclusory allegations and unwarranted deductions of fact are not admitted as
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`true, especially when such conclusions are contradicted by facts disclosed by a
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`document appended to the complaint. If the appended document . . . reveals facts
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`which foreclose recovery as a matter of law, dismissal is appropriate.”)
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`“Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will . .
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`. be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial
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`experience and common sense. But where the well-pleaded facts do not permit
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`the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has
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`alleged–but it has not ‘shown’–‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Id. at 679
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`(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)) (other citation omitted). Likewise, dismissal is
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`warranted under Rule 12(b)(6) if, assuming the truth of the factual allegations of
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`plaintiff’s complaint, there is a dispositive legal issue that precludes relief. Neitzke
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`v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 326, 109 S. Ct. 1827, 104 L. Ed. 2d 338 (1989); Brown v.
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`Crawford Cty., 960 F.2d 1002, 1010 (11th Cir. 1992).
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`B.
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`Analysis
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`Cardinal Health contends that the Court should dismiss MEI’s First
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`Amended Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for three
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`reasons. First, Cardinal Health maintains that it cannot be liable for conversion
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`since it holds title to the funds that are the subject of the claim and because there
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`9
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`Case 1:20-cv-02424-CC Document 26 Filed 04/05/21 Page 10 of 21
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`is a commercial contract that allows Cardinal Health to apply the funds to the
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`defaulted account of an MEI affiliate that governs the parties’ debtor-creditor
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`relationship and the funds at issue. Second, Cardinal Health argues that its
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`internal directives did not establish a contract between Cardinal Health and MEI.
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`Finally, Cardinal Health contends that the parties never consummated the
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`settlement agreement and that, even if they did, MEI has not adequately alleged
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`how Cardinal Health breached the agreement.
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`1.
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`Conversion
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`MEI’s conversion claim fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
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`granted. Under Georgia law, “[c]onversion consists of an unauthorized
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`assumption and exercise of the right of ownership over personal property
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`belonging to another, in hostility to his rights; an act of dominion over the personal
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`property of another
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`inconsistent with his rights; or an unauthorized
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`appropriation.” Decatur Auto Ctr. v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 276 Ga. 817, 819, 583
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`S.E.2d 6 (2003). To state a claim for conversion, a plaintiff must allege four
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`elements: “(1) title to the property or the right of possession, (2) actual possession
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`in the other party, (3) demand for return of the property, and (4) refusal by the
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`other party to return the property.” Pierce v. Clayton Cty., Georgia, 717 F. App’x
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`866, 872 (11th Cir. 2017) (citing City of Atlanta v. Hotels.com, L.P., 332 Ga. App.
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`888, 775 S.E.2d 276, 279 (2015)).
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`10
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`Case 1:20-cv-02424-CC Document 26 Filed 04/05/21 Page 11 of 21
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`Based on the allegations set forth in the First Amended Complaint, there is
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`no dispute that MEI assigned its right, title, and interest in the Holdback amount
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`to Cardinal Health and Live Oak. That means that MEI has no title to the Holdback
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`amount in question and that Cardinal Health has a right to assert ownership over
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`the relevant portion of the Holdback amount. MEI cannot show “an unauthorized
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`assumption and exercise of the right of ownership over personal property
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`belonging to [MEI], in hostility to [MEI’s] rights . . . or an unauthorized
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`appropriation.” DCA Architects v. Am. Building Consultants, 203 Ga. App. 598,
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`600, 417 S.E.2d 386 (1989) (internal marks and citation omitted). Cardinal Health’s
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`act of dominion over the $85,000.00 was rightfully asserted, which renders MEI’s
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`conversion claim meritless. See Kline v. Atlanta Gas Light Co., 246 Ga. App. 172,
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`173, 538 S.E.2d 93 (2000) (“[I]f a party has a right to assert ownership, the act of
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`dominion is not wrongful and does not constitute conversion.”).
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`Moreover, to the extent that MEI retained any rights in the Holdback
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`amount, the economic loss rule limits MEI to seeking a remedy in contract, not in
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`tort. “The purpose of the economic loss rule is to distinguish between those actions
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`cognizable in tort and those that may be brought only in contract. . . . The
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`economic loss rule generally provides that a contracting party who suffers purely
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`economic losses must seek his remedy in contract and not in tort.” City of Cairo
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`11
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`Case 1:20-cv-02424-CC Document 26 Filed 04/05/21 Page 12 of 21
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`v. Hightower Consulting Engineers, 278 Ga. App. 721, 728, 629 S.E.2d 518 (2006)
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`(internal marks and citation omitted).
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`To the extent that the parties had an agreement regarding how Cardinal
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`Health was to apply the Holdback amount, after receiving it from CVS, any
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`noncompliance with Cardinal Health with that agreement gives rise to a breach of
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`contract claim, not a tort claim. A close review of the First Amended Complaint
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`reveals that this is what MEI alleges. MEI alleges that the application of the
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`Holdback amount was subject to an agreement between the parties. (First Am.
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`Compl. ¶¶ 13-16.) MEI further avers that Cardinal Health did not apply the funds
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`as agreed. (Id. ¶¶ 28 & 42.) Insofar as MEI alleges a contractual relationship
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`governing the application of the Holdback amount and a purely economic loss
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`from the alleged misapplication, the economic loss rule bars MEI’s conversion
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`claim.
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`The cases on which MEI relies to argue that the Court should permit the
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`conversion claim to go forward, notwithstanding the contractual relationship
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`between MEI and Cardinal Health, are distinguishable and
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`therefore
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`unpersuasive. In Charter Mortgage Co. v. Ahouse, 165 Ga. App. 497, 497, 300
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`S.E.2d 328 (1983), the court upheld a jury verdict on conversion involving an
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`escrow company that was not a party to the escrow agreement between the
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`plaintiff and a third party. In Atlantic Mechanical Contractors, Inc. v. Hurston,
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`12
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`Case 1:20-cv-02424-CC Document 26 Filed 04/05/21 Page 13 of 21
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`185 Ga. App. 511, 364 S.E.2d 638 (1988), the court affirmed the entry of default
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`judgment and an award of punitive damages flowing from a conversion claim
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`against an employer that converted an employee’s insurance premiums, finding
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`that the employer’s conduct constituted a “violation of its duty (imposed by law
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`and not by the contract) not to convert appellant’s funds to its own use and
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`benefit.” Id. at 512. In the instant case, in contrast, it is apparent that MEI bases
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`its conversion claim on Cardinal Health’s alleged breach of an alleged agreement
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`and not a violation of an independent duty. As such, the conversion claim fails as
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`a matter of law.
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`2.
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`Breach of Contract (Application of Credit)
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`The breach of contract claim that MEI alleges in Count Two fails to state a
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`claim because Cardinal Health’s internal communications did not give rise to a
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`contract that MEI can enforce. To state a claim for breach of contract, a plaintiff
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`must allege facts establishing the following:
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`parties able to contract, a consideration moving to the contract, the
`assent of the parties to the terms of the contract, and a subject matter
`upon which the contract can operate. Each of these essential terms
`must be certain. In order that it may allege an agreement, a petition
`must set forth a contract of such certainty and completeness that
`either party may have a right of action upon it.
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`Laverson v. Macon Bibb County Hosp. Auth., 226 Ga. App. 761, 762, 487 S.E.2d
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`621 (1997) (internal citations and marks omitted). An offer that “is unilateral and
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`supported by no consideration . . . may be withdrawn at any time, without prior
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`13
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`Case 1:20-cv-02424-CC Document 26 Filed 04/05/21 Page 14 of 21
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`notice, for any reason or, indeed, for no reason at all, and its withdrawal breaches
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`no duty—for there is no duty to continue it—and violates no rights.” Smith v.
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`Federate Dept. Stores, Inc., 165 Ga. App. 459, 460, 301 S.E.2d 652 (1983).
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`In the First Amended Complaint, MEI alleges that an email between two
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`Cardinal Health employees constitutes a “binding agreement wherein Cardinal
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`agreed to apply the [$85,000] as a credit on MEI’s account.” (First Am. Compl. ¶
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`47.) However, MEI does not allege that it provided any consideration to support
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`the alleged contract upon which MEI bases the second count of the First Amended
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`Complaint. (See generally First Am. Compl.) MEI also does not address this issue
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`at all in response to Cardinal Health’s Motion to Dismiss. Simply put, the internal
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`instructions given by one Cardinal Health employee to another Cardinal Health
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`employee did not give rise to a contract. The Court rejects MEI’s conclusory
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`assertion that the email containing these instructions constitutes an “agreement”
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`that MEI can enforce, as the alleged contract lacks consideration.
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`3.
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`Breach of Contract (Settlement Agreement)
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`MEI next claims that Cardinal Health breached a settlement agreement
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`reached by the parties. Whether this claim should be dismissed presents a closer
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`question. However, after careful consideration, the Court agrees with Cardinal
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`Health that it is due to be dismissed, too.
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`14
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`Case 1:20-cv-02424-CC Document 26 Filed 04/05/21 Page 15 of 21
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`
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`“Under Georgia law, an agreement alleged to be in settlement and
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`compromise of a pending lawsuit must meet the same requisites of formation and
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`enforceability as any other contract.” Jones v. Frickey, 274 Ga. App. 398, 401, 618
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`S.E.2d 29 (2005). As indicated above, Georgia law provides the following in this
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`regard:
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`Under O.C.G.A. § 13–3–1, the plaintiff in a breach of contract action
`has the burden of pleading and proving three elements: subject matter
`of the contract, consideration, and mutual assent by all parties to all
`contract terms.
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`Broughton v. Johnson, 247 Ga. App. 819, 545 S.E.2d 370 (2001). O.C.G.A. § 13–3–2
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`provides:
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`The consent of the parties being essential to a contract, until each has
`assented to all the terms, there is no binding contract; until assented
`to, each party may withdraw his bid or proposition.
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`As explained by the court in TranSouth Financial Corp. v. Rooks, 269 Ga. App.
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`321, 324, 604 S.E.2d 562 (2004):
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`One seeking to enforce a contract must bear the burden of proof as to
`all the essential elements of the contract, including the assent to the
`contractual terms. No contract exists until all essential terms have
`been agreed to, and the failure to agree to even one essential term
`means
`there
`is
`no
`agreement
`to
`be
`enforced.
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`(internal citations and punctuation omitted).
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`
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`In this case, MEI contends that an email exchange between MEI and
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`Cardinal Health constitutes a complete settlement agreement between the parties.
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`15
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`Case 1:20-cv-02424-CC Document 26 Filed 04/05/21 Page 16 of 21
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`(See First Am. Compl., Ex. 6.) On April 10, 2020, Cardinal Health initially
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`proposed the following to resolve the parties’ dispute:
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`Cardinal Health agrees to return the $85,000 as a credit on the
`1.
`MEI account.
`2.
`In exchange for the $85k credit, MEI provides Cardinal Health
`with a full release of all claims, including the usury class action claims
`previously alleged by Mr. Bogachek.
`
`
`(Id.)
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`
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`In response to Cardinal Health’s offer, MEI emphasized that it was
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`important for MEI to receive the funds as soon as possible. MEI stated that “[i]f
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`Cardinal can comply with the following deadlines/details then the offer below is
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`accepted.” The “deadlines/details included the following:
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`(1) Cardinal agrees to provide a settlement draft prior to Monday,
`April 20th at 5:00 P.M.;
`(2) Cardinal agrees to credit the $85,000 to MEI Services (Account
`No. 673316) within 48 hours of email receipt of the executed
`Settlement Agreement.
`
`(Id.) MEI reiterated that if the timeline was acceptable to Cardinal Health, the
`
`parties would have an agreement. (See id.) Cardinal Health accepted this
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`counteroffer, responding as following: “Cardinal Health agrees. You’ll be hearing
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`from me on Monday.” (Id.) Cardinal Health’s response constituted an
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`unequivocal acceptance.
`
`
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`The Court finds that MEI and Cardinal Health agreed on the essential terms.
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`While the parties still had to reduce the parties’ email agreement to a final,
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`16
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`Case 1:20-cv-02424-CC Document 26 Filed 04/05/21 Page 17 of 21
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`comprehensive settlement agreement, “t]he parties need only agree to the essential
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`terms of the contract, and the absence of agreement on nonessential terms does not
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`render the agreement unenforceable.” Rushin v. Ussery, 298 Ga. App. 830, 681
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`S.E.2d 263 (2009) (citing Henry v. Blankenship, 275 Ga. App. 658, 660–661(1)(a),
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`621 S.E.2d 601 (2005)).
`
`
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`MEI alleges that Cardinal Health “breached the agreement by failing to
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`follow through as agreed.” (First Am. Compl. ¶ 52.) This conclusory allegation,
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`however, is contradicted by factual allegations in the First Amended Complaint
`
`and the attachments to the First Amended Complaint. Cardinal Health’s first
`
`obligation, based on the parties’ email agreement, was to provide a settlement
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`draft. There is no dispute that Cardinal Health met that obligation. (First Am.
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`Compl. ¶ 35, Ex. 7.) The Court understands that MEI took and continues to take
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`issue with the proposed settlement draft,2 but Cardinal Health’s obligation was
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`only to provide a settlement draft. Cardinal Health was not obligated to take any
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`further action until after the parties executed the final settlement agreement, which
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`never happened.
`
`
`
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`2 It appears to the Court that MEI made a promise that it could not singularly execute –
`providing Cardinal Health with a full release of all claims, including the usury class
`action claims previously alleged by Mr. Bogachek. Thus, the inclusion of the additional
`parties may have been necessary to ensure Cardinal Health received the benefit of the
`bargain.
`
`
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`17
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`Case 1:20-cv-02424-CC Document 26 Filed 04/05/21 Page 18 of 21
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`III. MOTION FOR SANCTIONS
`
`
`
`
`
`A.
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`Contentions of the Parties
`
`Cardinal Health moves the Court pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
`
`Procedure 11 to impose sanctions against MEI and its attorneys for the filing of the
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`First Amended Complaint. Cardinal Health asserts that sanctions under Rule 11
`
`are warranted because MEI’s claims against it are plainly frivolous. Cardinal
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`Health does not specify the nature of sanctions it requests be imposed against MEI.
`
`
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`MEI argues that Cardinal Health’s Motion for Sanctions is an abuse of the
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`court system. MEI maintains that Cardinal Health could have waited for the
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`Court’s ruling on the Motion to Dismiss before filing the Motion for Sanctions.
`
`MEI suggests that Cardinal Health intentionally filed the Motion for Sanctions
`
`prematurely to influence the Court’s ruling on the Motion to Dismiss. MEI argues
`
`that the claims in the First Amended Complaint are not frivolous or improper and
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`that Cardinal Health should be sanctioned itself for filing the Motion for Sanctions.
`
`
`
`
`
`B.
`
`Standard of Review
`
`Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, a court has discretion to award
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`sanctions:
`
`(1) when a party files a pleading that has no reasonable factual basis;
`(2) when the party files a pleading that is based on a legal theory that
`has no reasonable chance of success and that cannot be advanced as a
`reasonable argument to change existing law; or (3) when the party
`files a pleading in bad faith for an improper purpose.
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`18
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`Case 1:20-cv-02424-CC Document 26 Filed 04/05/21 Page 19 of 21
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`Worldwide Primates, Inc. v. McGreal, 87 F.3d 1252, 1254 (11th Cir. 1996). “The
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`objective standard for testing conduct under Rule 11 is ‘reasonableness under the
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`circumstances’ and ‘what was reasonable to believe at the time’ the pleading was
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`submitted.” Baker v. Alderman, 158 F.3d 516, 524 (11th Cir. 1998) (footnote
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`omitted).
`
`
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`This Court may “impose an appropriate sanction on any attorney, law firm,
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`or party that violated [Rule 11(b)] or is responsible for the violation.” Fed. R. Civ.
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`P. 11(c)(1). The signature requirement of Rule 11 operates as a certification “to the
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`court that the signer has read the document, has conducted a reasonable inquiry
`
`into the facts and the law and is satisfied that the document is well grounded in
`
`both, and is acting without any improper motive.” Bus. Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic
`
`Commc’ns Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 533, 542-43, 111 S. Ct. 922, 112 L. Ed. 2d 1140
`
`(1991). The purpose of Rule 11 sanctions is to deter “baseless” filings in federal
`
`court by requiring attorneys to certify that the claims they raise are not for
`
`improper purposes, are warranted by law, and have evidentiary support. See Fed.
`
`R. Civ. P. 11(b).
`
`
`
`Rule 11(c)(2) contains a “safe harbor” provision, which provides in relevant
`
`part that “[t]he motion [for sanctions] must be served under Rule 5, but it must not
`
`be filed or be presented to the court if the challenged paper, claim, defense,
`
`contention, or denial is withdrawn or appropriately corrected within 21 days after
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`
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`19
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`Case 1:20-cv-02424-CC Document 26 Filed 04/05/21 Page 20 of 21
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`service . . . .” A Rule 11 motion must be served and filed prior to final judgment
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`or a judicial rejection of the offensive pleading. Peer v. Lewis, 606 F.3d 1306, 1313
`
`(11th Cir. 2010).
`
`
`
`
`
`C.
`
`Analysis
`
`In the case at bar, the Court finds that Rule 11 sanctions are not warranted.
`
`MEI’s claims in the First Amended Complaint were weak, especially the claim for
`
`conversion and the breach of contract claim based on the internal communications
`
`of Cardinal Health’s employees. However, the claims were not so objectively
`
`frivolous so as to justify an award of sanctions. Therefore, the Court DENIES the
`
`Motion for Sanctions.
`
`
`
`The Court likewise will not award MEI’s request for sanctions, as Cardinal
`
`Health’s Motion for Sanctions had to be served and filed prior to the time that the
`
`Court issued a ruling on the Motion to Dismiss. Further, the Motion for Sanctions
`
`was not substantively frivolous, given the weaknesses of the claims in the First
`
`Amended Complaint.
`
`IV. CONCLUSION
`
`
`
`Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS Defendant Cardinal Health
`
`110, LLC’s Motion to Dismiss MEI Services, Inc.’s First Amended Complaint (the
`
`“Motion to Dismiss”) [Doc. No. 13] and DENIES Defendant Cardinal Health 110,
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`LLC’s Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions (the “Motion for Sanctions”) [Doc. No. 17].
`
`
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`20
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`Case 1:20-cv-02424-CC Document 26 Filed 04/05/21 Page 21 of 21
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`The Court DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to mark this case closed.
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`SO ORDERED this 5th day of April, 2021.
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`s/ CLARENCE COOPER
`CLARENCE COOPER
`SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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`21
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