2:22-cv-02020-CSB-EIL # 1 Page 1 of 27
`E-FILED
` Thursday, 27 January, 2022 05:09:41 PM
` Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
`URBANA DIVISION
`
`
`
` Case No. 22-cv-2020
`
`
`
`ARCHER-DANIELS-MIDLAND
`COMPANY,
`
` Plaintiff,
`
`v.
`
`CHRISTOPHER OSOWSKI AND
`GREEN PLAINS, INC.
`Defendants.
`
`
`
`
`PLAINTIFF’S VERIFIED COMPLAINT
`
`Plaintiff Archer-Daniels-Midland Company (“ADM” or “the Company”) by and through
`
`its undersigned counsel, Littler Mendelson, P.C., by way of this Verified Complaint against
`
`Christopher Osowski (“Osowski”) and Green Plains, Inc. (“Green Plains”) (collectively,
`
`“Defendants”) alleges as follows:
`
`SUMMARY OF THE CASE
`
`1.
`
`This case is about Defendant Osowski’s intentional breach of his contractual non-
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`compete obligations with ADM, Defendant Green Plains’s intentional interference with those
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`obligations, and Osowski’s retention and knowledge of ADM’s most sensitive and valuable trade
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`secrets and confidential information — information Osowski cannot avoid leveraging for the
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`benefit of his new employer, Green Plains.
`
`2.
`
`Since 2013 Osowski has served in several top-level strategic roles driving ADM’s
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`global product and manufacturing innovation. Most recently, Osowski served as ADM’s Vice
`
`President of Global Technology where, as a necessary and daily part of his job, he accessed, used,
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`and analyzed ADM’s most confidential and valuable trade secrets. Osowski abruptly resigned from
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`ADM on or about December 15, 2021, disclosing to leadership only that he was planning to “work
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`for a competitor” and then carefully concealing his plans to accept an apparently identical senior
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`executive role with Green Plains — one of ADM’s staunchest competitors in, among other areas,
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`the carbohydrate solutions market, where ADM derives a significant portion of its revenues.
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`3.
`
` Osowski was successful in concealing his plans to defy his contractual restrictions,
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`which he voluntarily agreed to in return for $347,546 in Restricted Stock Unit awards and
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`$27,436.28 in related dividend equivalent cash payments. The Company learned of Osowski’s
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`plans to violate his reasonable post-employment restrictions only through Green Plains’s January
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`4, 2022 press release announcing him as their new Executive Vice President of Operations and
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`Technology. In ADM’s view, this order of events — silence and refusal to disclose his new
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`employer, followed by an abrupt press release announcing his hiring at a top competitor in a
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`directly competitive role — was part of the plan Osowski worked out with Green Plains over
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`several weeks.
`
`4.
`
`As a top ADM executive, Osowski has been involved in confidential restrictive
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`covenant and trade secret investigations. ADM believes that Osowski leveraged this experience to
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`chart the best path for dodging legal action for his breaching conduct, at least until he began with
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`Green Plains in his directly competitive role. In addition to his refusal to tell senior ADM
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`leadership where he was going, he made sure to permanently delete all contents of his ADM-issued
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`iPhone before returning it. On the day of his resignation, Osowski Googled and researched the best
`
`way to accomplish this action.
`
`5.
`
`Other facts give rise to a reasonable inference that Green Plains counseled Osowski
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`on how to conceal his plans from ADM. For example, Osowski’s web history reveals that he e-
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`mailed multiple times with Green Plains General Counsel Michelle Mapes during his resignation
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`period, just a short time after he disclosed to ADM he was going to work for a “competitor,” but
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`refused to say anything else. On December 15, 2021, he also appears to have e-mailed with Green
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`Plains Chief People Officer Negil Mcpherson, Jr. Similarly, Osowski reviewed Mapes’s online
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`profile back in October 2021, suggesting that his conversations with Green Plains and its legal
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`officer(s) had been ongoing for some time, including potential discussions regarding Osowski’s
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`legal obligations and the risks associated with engaging in the actions he ultimately did. Osowski’s
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`new role clearly violates his enforceable non-competition restrictions, information adduced to date
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`illustrates that Osowski and Green Plains were aware of this fact, and they apparently worked
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`hand-in-hand in an effort to circumvent clear contractual and legal requirements.
`
`6.
`
`But it is not just Osowski’s facial non-compete violations compelling this action
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`and ADM’s request for emergency relief. Osowski has knowledge and access to ADM’s most
`
`confidential trade secret information and he cannot operate or function in his Green Plains role
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`without using, disclosing, and leveraging it.
`
`7.
`
`This is not an ethereal or conjectural concern; Osowski has the playbook against
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`ADM in an exceedingly competitive branch of its business, which comprises approximately forty
`
`(40) percent of its annual revenues. Osowski’s complex knowledge of ADM’s capital investment
`
`strategies, manufacturing processes, non-public pricing data, and technological advancements
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`would be key motivators for any competitor, and certainly one unconcerned about fair and legal
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`competition, to retain Osowski as their Executive Vice President of Operations and Technology.
`
`8.
`
`In his role as one of ADM’s top strategic officers, Osowski led comprehensive
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`capital planning across ADM’s businesses. In his own words, he was “[r]esponsible for ADM
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`getting to and remaining at the forefront of innovation and efficiency through the introduction of
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`technology within its global manufacturing and business footprint[s]” and “creat[ed] . . . Asset
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`Strategies by business unit to . . . prioritize future capital allocation amongst [ADM’s] most
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`strategic manufacturing assets.”
`
`9.
`
`Green Plains is well-aware of the highly competitive role and valuable strategic
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`trade secret assets Osowski possesses, wields, and daily drew upon as a regular part of his ADM
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`executive duties. As stated in its January 4 press release, Osowski “led strategic capital expenditure
`
`planning, coordinated technology centers, and implemented new technology” at ADM. Further,
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`Osowski touted in his resume to Green Plains that he managed a capital expenditure budget of
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`approximately $850 million and he had direct responsibility over ADM’s manufacturing strategies,
`
`proprietary innovations, technological research, and operational planning. Green Plains CEO Todd
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`Becker has also noted that Osowski’s work “translating innovation into production” is a “key
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`asset” for Green Plains, as it works to undergo its planned “transformation.”
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`10.
`
`Green Plains knows Osowski possesses highly valuable ADM trade secret
`
`information he cannot avoid using as the leader of corporate operations and innovation, knowingly
`
`hired him into a substantially similar role at Green Plains, has taken no action to protect against
`
`disclosure of ADM’s trade secrets, and worked with Osowski to plan his departure. If Osowski
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`and Green Plains are not timely enjoined, ADM will suffer irreparable harm money cannot address.
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`Osowski has access to highly confidential, competitive trade secrets regarding ADM’s total future
`
`investment strategies over the course of several years, budgeted to be in the hundreds of millions
`
`of dollars. Osowski knows, for instance, how to exploit this information to directly underbid ADM
`
`on pricing in an increasingly competitive biofuel and commodities market.
`
`11.
`
`ADM brings this action to secure its highly valuable and competitive trade secrets
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`and enforce the reasonable contractual promises Osowski made in return for significant
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`consideration. ADM therefore seeks a temporary restraining order, preliminary and permanent
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`injunctive relief, damages, and attorney fees and costs. Immediate and irreparable injury will result
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`if Osowski and Green Plains are not immediately enjoined.
`
`THE PARTIES
`
`12.
`
`Plaintiff Archer-Daniels-Midland Company is a Delaware corporation with its
`
`principal place of business at 77 West Wacker Drive, Suite 4600, Chicago, Illinois 60601. ADM
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`also has significant operations and facilities in Decatur, where Osowski was based at the relevant
`
`time. Founded in 1902, ADM is a global leader in agricultural origination and processing,
`
`commodity innovation, and human and animal nutrition.
`
`13.
`
`Defendant Christopher Osowski is an individual presently residing in Decatur,
`
`Illinois. Osowski holds a Bachelor of Science degree from North Dakota State University in
`
`biosystems engineering and a Master of Business Administration degree from Minnesota State
`
`University, Mankato. He started at ADM in a junior level position in 2002 before leaving for other
`
`opportunities, returning again in August 2013, and thereafter working his way from several high-
`
`level operational roles in Illinois, India, and Russia to his ultimate appointment as ADM’s Vice
`
`President of Global Technology.
`
`14.
`
`Defendant Green Plains, Inc. is an Iowa corporation with its principal place of
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`business at 450 Regency Parkway, Suite 400, Omaha, NE 68114. Green Plains, like ADM, is a
`
`key player and top ADM competitor in the agricultural production and energy industry. In recent
`
`years, Green Plains has also sought to expand into several other areas directly competitive with
`
`ADM and about which Osowski has highly confidential ADM strategic trade secrets and
`
`confidential information.
`
`
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`JURISDICTION AND VENUE
`
`15.
`
`This Court has original, federal question jurisdiction over this action under
`
`28 U.S.C. § 1331, as the Defend Trade Secrets Act (“DTSA”), 18 U.S.C. § 1836, et seq. arises
`
`under federal law and expressly authorizes original claims to be made in federal court. See 18
`
`U.S.C. § 1836(c). This Court has supplemental jurisdiction to hear this action under 28 U.S.C.
`
`§ 1367 because all state law claims set forth in this matter are so related to ADM’s DTSA claim
`
`that they form part of the same case or controversy.
`
`16.
`
`Venue is proper in this Court because a substantial part of the actions giving rise to
`
`the claims occurred within the Central District of Illinois, including Osowski’s breach of restrictive
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`covenant obligations agreed to in this District and Green Plains’s intentional interference with
`
`these same obligations. Moreover, this Court has personal jurisdiction over both defendants in this
`
`action, as Green Plains has and maintains significant operations in Illinois and Osowski is a citizen
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`of and at all relevant times was employed by ADM in Illinois.
`
`BACKGROUND
`
`A. Osowski’s Role as ADM Vice President of Global Technology and his
`Development, Use, and Implementation of ADM’s Trade Secrets.
`
`17.
`
`Agribusinesses like ADM and Green Plains operate in an exceedingly competitive
`
`
`
`space, with market share and revenue-driving opportunities awarded to those best able to leverage
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`research, development, and capital expenditures to turn corn, soybean, and related commodities
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`into marketable and commercially viable applications across industries. Top market players also
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`increasingly research, develop, and invest in more profitable pre-existing product applications by,
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`for instance, enhancing product output (such as generating more oil from the same number of
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`soybean or corn bushels). In the area of increasing efficiency and output alone, ADM invests
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`hundreds of millions annually.
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`18.
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`The global oil and fuel markets primely illustrate how and why business is so
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`competitive for key market players like ADM, and why Green Plains is so heavily incentivized to
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`advance its business objectives at all costs. Corn, soy, and certain other grain commodities are now
`
`central to meeting the world’s increasing energy demands at a time when reduction of the world’s
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`carbon footprint is an environmental, economic, and legal imperative.
`
`19.
`
`Indeed, corn- and soy-based fuel feedstock have become central revenue and
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`innovation drivers for agribusinesses globally as world economies look for cost-effective ways to
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`maintain or increase energy consumption while decreasing carbon output. Production and
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`manufacturing technologies, methods, and strategies for these fuel products change at a rapid clip
`
`as competitors pour capital into finding new or more profitable and environmentally sound end-
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`products through ever-enhancing manufacturing techniques and technologies, all while seeking to
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`underbid competitors on prices by leveraging and investing in new methods and strategies.
`
`20.
`
`Similar competitive pressures apply to those technologies, methods, and strategies
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`involved in developing products in all other ADM business sectors (including, without limitation,
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`animal nutrition, sweeteners, and food products). For example, related environmental, economic,
`
`and legal pressures have altered meat manufacturing and production, resulting in agribusinesses
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`pivoting into researching, developing, and creating profitable meat replacement products through
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`soy and related product manufacturing and development.
`
`21.
`
`To drive innovation and spawn rapid progress in identifying strategic opportunities
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`for its products and methods, ADM created the global Center of Excellence in or around 2018.
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`This organization focuses on optimizing the use of technology and operations throughout ADM’s
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`business to drive continuous improvement in several key strategic areas, including capital
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`planning and execution, process control and technological automation, and process optimization
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`and innovation.
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`22.
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`In his role as the Vice President of Global Technology, Osowski was responsible
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`for all technical and strategic aspects of the Center of Excellence and, as a result, developed,
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`implemented, analyzed, and had direct input into ADM’s non-public operational strategies,
`
`investment plans, and technologies.
`
`23.
`
`Indeed, shortly before he left ADM, Osowski was among a handful of senior leaders
`
`in charge of ADM’s five-year strategic capital planning process, making Osowski among the most
`
`knowledgeable executives regarding the Company’s future and highly confidential business
`
`strategies. Beyond this, Osowski’s breadth of experience on the operational side of ADM’s
`
`business, coupled with his frequent presence and analysis of ADM’s facilities across the globe,
`
`gave Osowski unique and particularized insight into the Company’s operational strengths and
`
`weaknesses, allowing him to immediately undercut ADM at a competitor like Green Plains by
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`implementing non-public processes and strategies to counter the highly confidential innovations
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`and planned future investments ADM has spent years and hundreds of millions of dollars
`
`developing and implementing.
`
`24.
`
`Osowski was, for instance, a top leader on the Company’s strategies for investing
`
`in manufacturing and developing Sustainable Aviation Fuels (“SAF”) using its current commodity
`
`portfolio. Given its significant investments in this area, ADM believes it is ahead of the pack in
`
`terms of leveraging research, development, and strategic capital investments to pivot from the
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`current gamut of ethanol-based fuel solutions to fuels such as SAF, which have significantly lower
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`carbon footprints and projected higher profit margins than traditional methods.
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`25.
`
`ADM’s investments into this area also include developing and implementing
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`technologies and facilities for other low-carbon fuels and is on record with its current plan to
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`produce no less than 500 million gallons of such fuels by 2025 or 2026. The production of these
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`fuels is anticipated to take up more than half of ADM’s total present ethanol-based fuel output.
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`ADM’s plans on this project have been announced, but how it accomplishes these plans, and its
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`strategies for using the end-product are extremely confidential and legally protected.
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`26.
`
`Underscoring the competitiveness of these technologies and the substantial
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`financial sums at stake, the market for low-carbon footprint hydrocarbon fuels such as SAF is
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`anticipated to be worth at least $46 billion by 2050. Osowski knows ADM’s plans, regularly
`
`referenced and had access to ADM’s non-public and trade secret protected strategies regarding
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`these significant business opportunities and knows how to leverage such strategies for the benefit
`
`of Green Plains.
`
`27.
`
`Green Plains has on several occasions announced its intention to invest in and
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`develop SAF as a part of its sustainability initiatives and to drive revenues through the next several
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`decades. ADM does not believe, however, that Green Plains is anywhere close to ADM’s progress
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`on these technologies, even though Green Plains has on several occasions publicized its intention
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`to “explor[e] sustainable aviation fuel” and to collaborate with several bodies to “assess corn
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`ethanol alcohol-to-jet fuel.” In Osowski, it found an experienced senior executive knowledgeable
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`about ADM’s trade secret processes and technologies in this space.
`
`28.
`
`Along the same vein, Osowski has direct knowledge of highly confidential capital
`
`expenditure planning for ADM’s carbon capture technologies and ventures, in which ADM has
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`invested significant sums and substantial effort over the last several years. Although ADM has
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`publicly announced the general plans themselves, it has not disclosed its operational strategies in
`
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`this area — one ADM views as a key priority to drive revenues into the future. Osowski was one
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`of the few ADM executives leading, advising, and directing innovation on such technologies and
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`the capital expenditures relating to them. His disclosure of such highly confidential trade secrets
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`to Green Plains on this project would cause immediate, irreparable harm to ADM’s long-term
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`investments. Indeed, Green Plains recently announced its own plans to invest in and develop
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`strategies for carbon capture technologies for its own operations, indicating strong incentives on
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`the part of Green Plains to know, understand, and analyze the scope and extent of ADM’s
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`investments and planning in an increasingly competitive and fast-growing area.
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`29.
`
`And it is of course not simply two significant and largely confidential initiatives
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`Osowski has intimate knowledge of and for which he developed, analyzed, and used extremely
`
`valuable trade secrets in his VP of Global Technology role at ADM. As set forth throughout this
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`Verified Complaint, the very essence of Osowski’s role required that he be in the weeds on non-
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`public technologies and processes so he could advise on capital expenditures and strategic
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`investments for ADM’s products and facilities throughout the world.
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`30.
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`The strategic business information and capital planning summarized through this
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`Verified Complaint is protected by state and federal trade secret laws, and Green Plains should not
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`be permitted to learn, nor should Osowski be permitted to disclose highly competitive strategic
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`trade secret information regarding ADM’s investments and plans in this same area. An injunction
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`is warranted on these facts.
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`B.
`
`Osowski’s Agreement to Reasonable and Limited Business Restrictions in
`Return for Substantial Consideration from ADM.
`
`31.
`
`As discussed above, ADM has compelling incentives to protect its trade secrets and
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`Confidential Information to address the precise scenario that resulted in this action. Accordingly,
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`ADM incorporates reasonable and limited non-competition restrictions (among other reasonable
`
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`restrictive covenants) into its Restricted Stock Unit Award Agreements (“RSU Agreement”),
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`which are annually offered to senior leadership of the Company in return for accepting RSU
`
`Awards. Between 2017 and 2021, ADM granted Osowski $347,546.00 in RSUs, and over that
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`same period paid him $27,436.28 in quarterly “dividend equivalent payments,” for retaining the
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`RSUs over the three-year period in which each RSU grant vests.
`
`32.
`
`In 2017, for instance, ADM granted Osowski 1,145 RSUs which, at the time of the
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`grant, came to $47,883.00. In 2018, he received 1,666 RSUs totaling $65,551 in value at the time
`
`of granting. The value of his RSU grants picked up steam in the years that followed — 1,828 RSUs
`
`($72,925) in 2019, 1,734 RSUs ($74,385) in 2020, and 1,694 ($86,802) in 2021. He also received
`
`dividend equivalent cash payments for holding the RSUs after ADM granted them during this
`
`same period — $5,015.12 in 2017, $7,580.30 in 2018, $7,896.20 in 2019, $5,063.28 in 2020, and
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`$1,880.62 in 2021.
`
`33.
`
`Through Section 7(c)(iii) of the RSU Agreement, Osowski agreed as follows:
`
`During the time in which your Restricted Stock Units shall vest and for one year
`after the Vesting Date under Section 3 (even if your employment hereafter ends and
`your Restricted Stock Units are no longer eligible for vesting) . . . you may not,
`without the Company’s prior written consent, directly or indirectly, for you or for
`any other person or entity, as agent, employee, officer, director, consultant, owner,
`principal, partner or shareholder, or in any other individual or representative
`capacity:
`
` . . [e]ngage in or participate in any activity that is similar to those you
`performed during the [24 months preceding termination of employment]
`and/or likely to result in your use or disclosure of the Company’s Confidential
`Information on behalf of any person or entity that competes, directly or
`indirectly, with any Company product or service that you engaged in,
`participated in, or had Confidential Information about during the [24 month
`period preceding termination of employment] including, but not limited to, any
`business engaged in any of the following with respect to which you were involved
`or had responsibilities . . . or about which you received or had access to Confidential
`Information: (i) the development and/or manufacture of products which
`involve experimental and/or inventive work relating to the origination, trading
`and/or processing of agricultural commodities, (ii) the development,
`
` .
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`manufacture, sourcing and/or supply of food and/or feed ingredients,
`flavoring, ethanol, biodiesel, derivatives of agricultural feedstocks, enzymes,
`probiotics and/or other biologically active compositions, and/or (iii) the
`operation of grain elevators and/or crop origination and/or transportation networks.
`
`Exhibit 1 (emphasis added).
`
`
`34.
`
`Pursuant to Section 7(c)(vi), Osowski’s non-competition restrictions set forth above
`
`last for two (2) years following the end of his employment with ADM. These restrictions are
`
`supremely reasonable, especially considering the nature and value of the proprietary Confidential
`
`Information and trade secrets with which ADM entrusted Osowski. They apply for a short period
`
`of time and are limited to competitive activities Osowski had Confidential Information about or
`
`worked on during his ADM employment. Moreover, in return, Osowski received significant
`
`consideration in the form of RSUs and cash dividend equivalent payments.
`
`35.
`
`Equally important, Osowski was never required as a condition of his employment
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`to sign the RSU Agreements, which the RSU Agreement expressly makes clear. (Ex. 1, § 7(c)(v).)
`
`He always had the option of declining the RSU awards and opting to not be covered by the RSU
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`Agreement’s restrictive terms. Osowski is a highly educated, highly compensated, and experienced
`
`senior executive; he was well-aware of his restrictions and his rights and obligations with respect
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`to the RSU Agreement at all times.
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`36.
`
`Section 7(c)(i), titled “Non-Disclosure and Return of Confidential Information”
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`also has clear confidentiality restrictions regarding the use or disclosure of ADM’s trade secrets
`
`and other Confidential Information. The provision explains that through his role, Osowski “will
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`be given access to and provided sensitive, confidential, proprietary, and/or trade secret
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`information,” provides several specific examples of ADM’s Confidential Information at issue, and
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`requires that Osowski refrain from “disclos[ing] or us[ing] Confidential Information, either during
`
`or after [Osowski’s] employment with the Company,” subject to a few impertinent exceptions. Id.
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`37.
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`Osowski also agreed to the reasonableness of the RSU Agreements’ restrictions and
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`acknowledged that ADM “may seek any additional legal or equitable remedy, including injunctive
`
`relief, for any . . . violation” of “subparagraph 7(c).” Id. § 16. Further, Osowski agreed that to the
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`extent he violates any provision of Section 7(c) and the Company’s seeks injunctive relief, “the
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`Company shall be entitled to obtain and enforce immediately temporary restraining orders,
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`preliminary injunctions, and final injunctions without the posting of a bond enjoining such breach
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`or threatened breach.” Id.
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`38.
`
`As stated above, ADM plainly has a legitimate protectable interest in its trade
`
`secrets, proprietary technologies, and other Confidential Information Section 7 of the RSU
`
`Agreement seeks to protect. Moreover, especially given Osowski’s knowledge of high-value
`
`strategic information, the temporal scope of the restrictions are no broader than necessary to protect
`
`those interests.
`
`39.
`
`Osowski executed RSU Agreements with substantially similar provisions in each
`
`of the last five (5) years of his employment with the Company; had he had issues with the
`
`restrictions at any point in that timeframe, there was nothing preventing him from rejecting them.
`
`C.
`
`ADM’s Reasonable Measures to Ensure Protection of its Trade Secrets and
`Confidential Information.
`
`40.
`
`In addition to the RSU Agreement’s robust confidentiality restrictions that senior
`
`
`
`employees must sign to receive any RSU awards, ADM has several other comprehensive policies
`
`and procedures applicable to its entire workforce which target the protection of its Confidential
`
`Information and trade secrets. As a condition of employment, ADM requires its employees
`
`(including Osowski) to sign Non-Disclosure Agreements at the commencement of their
`
`employment, through which they must agree they will not:
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`[U]se or disclose to any person, firm or corporation, at any time, either during
`his/her employment with the Company or thereafter, any such invention, discovery
`
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`or improvement, or any trade secret or confidential information of the Company,
`whatsoever, including, without limitation, information regarding any of the
`Company’s customers, markets, future plans, the prices at which it obtains or has
`obtained its raw materials and other supplies, the prices at which it sells or has sold
`its products, processes, procedures, machines, equipment, reagents, materials,
`formulae, computer systems, programs, designs, forms, documentation or any
`automated or manual information system methods or procedures, conditions and
`methods of operation or apparatus used or employed by the Company or in any way
`useful in or connected with its business or activities.
`
`Exhibit 2.
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`41.
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`The Company’s Code of Conduct and policies also strictly prohibit the use or
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`disclosure of any Company Confidential Information for any reason other than in performing bona
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`fide duties as a necessary part of employees’ positions. For example, the Code explains that “[t]o
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`ensure that ADM’s confidential information is properly protected, none of us may disclose it to
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`anyone outside of ADM except when authorized or legally required to do so. We also cannot
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`discuss this information with colleagues who do not have a business need to know it.”
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`42.
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`In addition, the Code requires that employees not “lose, misplace or leave
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`confidential information (or technologies containing such information) unattended” and must
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`“never discuss this information where those who do not have a business need to know it might
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`overhear . . . .” Under the Code, employees must also take several steps to ensure protection against
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`unauthorized access to the Company’s technologies and systems. And it adds teeth to these policies
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`by emphasizing that any violations of the Code’s provisions, including those relating to data and
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`technology security “can have severe consequences for both our company and the people
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`involved” and “may lead to disciplinary action, up to and including termination of employment.”
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`43.
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`ADM also leverages several security protocols and systems to safeguard against the
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`possibility that non-public data and information are disclosed to third parties, including market
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`competitors. For instance, ADM’s systems are password protected and the ADM network requires
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`two-factor verification procedures for remote access. ADM also implements several other security
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`2:22-cv-02020-CSB-EIL # 1 Page 15 of 27
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`measures, employee trainings, and audit processes to protect its Confidential Information and
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`proprietary data, including but not limited to:
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`• Employee training on data security and systems. For example, ADM required Osowski to
`take the courses “Protecting Proprietary Information” and “Cyber Security Awareness” and
`it requires similar trainings with other similarly situated officers and employees as
`necessary.
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`• Through the Emergency Termination Request process, upon termination of employment,
`immediately revoking a user’s access to the ADM network and data upon termination of
`employment.
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`• Restricting access to certain ADM data and systems based on those who have a business
`need for accessing confidential data and information.
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`• Under ADM’s Acceptable Use Policy, prohibiting circumventions of user authentication
`or security of any host, network, or account and forbidding improper uses of ADM’s
`systems and devices in a manner that may jeopardize data and system security. The policy
`also gives ADM IT the right to monitor equipment, systems, and network traffic at all
`times.
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`Implementing procedures targeted at flagging suspicious activities that may evidence
`improper transfers of data or related system and information breaches.
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`•
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`44.
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`This is only a short summary of the steps ADM takes to ensure its data and
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`
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`information is secure and that its Confidential Information, including trade secrets, are not
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`exploited for improper means. It underscores that ADM takes seriously what it views as a business
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`necessity to ensure its data and information are not leaked to others outside the business.
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`D. Osowski Informs Senior Leadership of His Departure for a “Competitor.”
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`45.
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`On or about December 15, 2021, Osowski asked to speak with ADM’s Vice
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`President of Human Resources, Jennifer Cunningham. In the meeting, he informed her that he was
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`“going to work for a competitor.” As discussed earlier, despite multiple requests for information
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`about his future professional plans, Osowski consistently refused to disclose this information to
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`ADM.
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`2:22-cv-02020-CSB-EIL # 1 Page 16 of 27
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`46.
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`After receiving Osowski’s ADM-issued devices, ADM learned that Osowski had
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`irretrievably deleted any and all data on his Company iPhone, which ADM believes Osowski did
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`in part to cover his tracks regarding his discussions with Green Plains and erase evidence of
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`information he provided to them before his last day. This action is also in direct violation of
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`Osowski’s RSU Agreement, which required that he return all Company property and information
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`at termination – including but not limited to any and all Company data on his ADM-issued iPhone.
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`See Exhibit 1, § 7(c)(i).
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`47.
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`On or about December 21, 2021, ADM sent Osowski a letter reminding him both
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`of his RSU Agreement obligations and his legal obligations under state