Case: 1:16-cv-08637 Document #: 4247 Filed: 01/29/21 Page 1 of 26 PageID #:286841
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
`EASTERN DIVISION
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`IN RE BROILER CHICKEN ANTITRUST
`LITIGATION
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`THIS DOCUMENT RELATES TO:
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`End-User Consumer Plaintiffs
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`Case: 1:16-cv-08637
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`Honorable Thomas M. Durkin
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`REDACTED VERSION
`MOTION TO FILE UNREDACTED
`VERSION UNDER SEAL PENDING
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`DEFENDANTS’ MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION TO EXCLUDE
`THE TESTIMONY OF DR. LUIS CABRAL
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`Case: 1:16-cv-08637 Document #: 4247 Filed: 01/29/21 Page 2 of 26 PageID #:286842
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................................... 1
`RELEVANT BACKGROUND ..................................................................................................... 3
`I.
`AGRI STATS......................................................................................................... 3
`A.
`Agri Stats’ Benchmarking Business .......................................................... 4
`B.
`How Agri Stats Reports Are Compiled ..................................................... 4
`C.
`How Agri Stats Reports Are Used ............................................................. 6
`D.
`Other Types of Agri Stats Information ...................................................... 7
`EMI ........................................................................................................................ 8
`II.
`CHICKEN INDUSTRY PERFORMANCE .......................................................... 9
`III.
`LEGAL STANDARD .................................................................................................................... 9
`ARGUMENT ............................................................................................................................... 10
`I.
`DR. CABRAL’S ENTIRE REPORT IS NOT HELPFUL, BECAUSE IT
`RELIES ON FALSE ASSUMPTIONS ............................................................... 10
`DR. CABRAL’S ENTIRE REPORT IS PREMISED ON
`INADMISSIBLE IPSE DIXIT REASONING .................................................... 12
`DR. CABRAL’S THIRD OPINION IS OUTSIDE HIS EXPERTISE .............. 15
`III.
`CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................ 15
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`II.
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`Cases
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
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`Page(s)
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`Agnew v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n,
`683 F.3d 328 (7th Cir. 2012) .....................................................................................................1
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`Ass’n v. United States,
`268 U.S. 564 (1925) ...................................................................................................................4
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`Barber v. United Airlines, Inc.,
`17 F. App’x 433 (7th Cir. 2001) ..............................................................................................10
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`Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
`550 U.S. 544 (2007) ...................................................................................................................2
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`Burtch v. Millberg Factors, Inc.,
`662 F.3d 212 (3d Cir. 2011).......................................................................................................1
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`Chi. Prof’l Sports Ltd. P’ship v. NBA,
`95 F.3d 593 (7th Cir. 1996) .......................................................................................................1
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`Clark v. Takata Corp.,
`192 F.3d 750 (7th Cir. 1999) ...................................................................................................14
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`Concord Boat Corp. v. Brunswick Corp.,
`207 F.3d 1039 (8th Cir. 2000) .................................................................................................10
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`Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,
`509 U.S. 579 (1993) .....................................................................................................10, 13, 14
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`Fleischman v. Albany Med. Ctr.,
`728 F. Supp. 2d 130 (N.D.N.Y. 2010) .....................................................................................13
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`Gayton v. McCoy,
`593 F.3d 610 (7th Cir. 2010) ...................................................................................................15
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`Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner,
`522 U.S. 136 (1997) ...........................................................................................................10, 13
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`Kleen Prod. LLC v. Int’l Paper,
`2017 WL 2362567 (N.D. Ill. 2017) ...................................................................................11, 12
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`Kumho Tire v. Carmichael,
`526 U.S. 137 (1999) .................................................................................................................10
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`ii
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`Messner v. Northshore Univ. Healthsystem,
`669 F.3d 802 (7th Cir. 2012) .....................................................................................................9
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`Naeem v. McKesson Drug Co.,
`444 F.3d 593 (7th Cir. 2006) ...................................................................................................14
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`Reed v. Advocate Health Care,
`268 F.R.D. 573 (N.D. Ill. 2009) .................................................................................................1
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`Schmidt v. Apfel,
`201 F.3d 970 (7th Cir. 2000) ...................................................................................................15
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`Smith v. Ford Motor Co.,
`215 F.3d 713 (7th Cir. 2000) ...................................................................................................15
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`In re Text Messaging Antitrust Litig.,
`782 F.3d 867 (7th Cir. 2015) ...................................................................................................11
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`United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co.,
`438 U.S. 422 (1978) ...................................................................................................................1
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`Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes,
`564 U.S. 338 (2011) ...................................................................................................................9
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`Williamson Oil Co. v. Phillip Morris USA,
`346 F.3d 1287 (11th Cir. 2003) ...............................................................................................12
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`Zenith Elec. Corp. v. WH-TV Broad. Corp.,
`395 F.3d 416 (2d. Cir. 2005)....................................................................................................14
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`Other Authorities
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`Fed R. Evid. 702 ........................................................................................................................2, 10
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`U.S. Dep’t of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm’n, Antitrust Guidelines for
`Collaborations Among Competitors § 3.31(b) (2000) ...............................................................4
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`iii
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`Defendants1 respectfully submit their motion to exclude the testimony of the End-User
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`Consumer Plaintiffs’ (the “EUCPs” or “Plaintiffs”) economic expert, Dr. Luis Cabral.
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`INTRODUCTION
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`The EUCPs and their expert, Dr. Luis Cabral, have bitten off more than they can chew.
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`Unlike every other plaintiff in this case, the EUCPs argue that the mere provision of benchmarking
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`data to Defendants by two third-party organizations, Agri Stats, Inc. (“Agri Stats”) and Express
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`Markets, Inc. (“EMI”), was illegal under the Sherman Act’s rule of reason mode of analysis. See
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`Dkt. 3747 at ¶¶ 197-220. But “the mere exchange of . . . information” alone “does not violate the
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`Sherman Act.” Burtch v. Millberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 218, 222 (3d Cir. 2011). In fact,
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`information exchanges often “increase economic efficiency and render markets more, rather than
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`less, competitive.” United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 441 n.16 (1978). Therefore,
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`the EUCPs must show that Defendants entered into an agreement that caused anticompetitive
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`effects that outweigh any procompetitive benefits in a relevant antitrust market. See Agnew v.
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`Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 683 F.3d 328, 335 (7th Cir. 2012).
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`Consequently, the core question that EUCPs must answer is whether this exchange of
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`information caused anticompetitive effects (i.e., price increases or output restrictions). Chi. Prof’l
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`Sports Ltd. P’ship v. NBA, 95 F.3d 593, 597 (7th Cir. 1996). At the class certification stage,
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`EUCPs must show not only that there is class-wide evidence that the information exchange had an
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`anticompetitive effect, but also that any defense of the information exchange as procompetitive is
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`also common to the class. See, e.g., Reed v. Advocate Health Care, 268 F.R.D. 573, 581 (N.D. Ill.
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`2009). Then they must show that the anticompetitive effect filtered through multiple layers of
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`distribution and actually harmed the members of the EUCP class. See Dkt. 4213 at 5.
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`1 For purposes of this brief, “Defendants” are only those entities that have signed this motion.
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`1
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`Dr. Cabral is the economist faced with that unenviable task, but his report is fatally
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`simplistic and violates multiple tenets of Federal Rule of Evidence 702.
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` Ex. 1 at ¶¶ 41-77.
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`50:10-15.
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`Ex. 1 at ¶¶ 33-34; Ex. 2 at 60:16-61:12.2 That’s it; that’s his report.
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` Id. at ¶¶ 83-152; Ex. 2 at
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` Ex. 2 at 53:23-55:3, 63:23-64:23, 66:18-
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`67:17.
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` Id. at 60:16-63:8.
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` Ex. 2 at 60:16-63:8.
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` Id. at 62:23-65:18.
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`2 See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 553-54 (2007) (“mere interdependent parallelism
`does not establish the contract, combination, or conspiracy required by Sherman Act § 1”).
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`2
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`Worse yet, Dr. Cabral’s testimony betrays a fundamental lack of understanding of how
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`Agri Stats and EMI data is compiled and used. Dr. Cabral’s opinion that Agri Stats reports likely
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`have anticompetitive effects is based on false assumptions.
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` See Ex. 3 at ¶¶ 37, 69-70.
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`on demonstrably false assumptions regarding the information contained in Agri Stats reports.
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` See Ex. 1 at ¶¶ 92-95. This theory is based
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`Moreover, Dr. Cabral misunderstands how Defendants used the data.
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` See Ex. 2 at 254:7-255:16.
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`133:18-134:5, 134:21-135:10; 273:20-275:3.
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`21 (
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` See Ex. 4 at
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` See, e.g., Ex. 5 at 128:8-
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`Dr. Cabral’s testimony does not satisfy the standard for admissibility for three reasons.
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`First, Dr. Cabral’s testimony misstates the record and is unhelpful because he does not understand
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`how Agri Stats data is compiled and used. Second, Dr. Cabral’s testimony relies on inadmissible
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`and unhelpful ipse dixit reasoning regarding Agri Stats and EMI untethered to any factual analysis.
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`Third, Dr. Cabral’s testimony that there is “class-wide evidence” that the Agri Stats and EMI
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`information exchanges had anticompetitive effects is, as he admits, outside his expertise.
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`RELEVANT BACKGROUND
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`AGRI STATS
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`I.
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`A.
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`Agri Stats’ Benchmarking Business
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`Benchmarking often has procompetitive effects, such as increasing the efficiency of firms.3
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`Agri Stats is one such benchmarking service. Ex. 6 at 25:20-22; Ex. 7 at 029.
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` Id. at 34.
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` Id.
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` Ex. 7 at 029,
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` Id.
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`B.
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`How Agri Stats Reports Are Compiled
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` Id. at 34-35.
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`7 at 35.
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` Id.
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` Ex.
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`3 See, e.g., Maple Flooring Mrfs.’ Ass’n v. United States, 268 U.S. 564, 584 (1925) (“[p]ersons
`who unite in gathering and disseminating information in . . . statistical reports on industry, who
`gather and publish statistics as to the amount of production of [products] in interstate commerce,
`and who report market prices, are not engaged in unlawful conspiracies in restraint of trade merely
`because the ultimate result of their efforts may be to stabilize prices or limit production through a
`better understanding of economic laws”); U.S. Dep’t of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm’n, Antitrust
`Guidelines for Collaborations Among Competitors § 3.31(b) (2000) (“[T]he sharing of information
`among competitors may be procompetitive and is often reasonably necessary to achieve
`procompetitive benefits of certain collaborations.”).
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`4
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`Case: 1:16—cv-08637 Document #: 4247 Filed: 01/29/21 Page 9 of 26 PageID #:286849
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` Ex. 8 at 41.
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` Ex. 7 at 36-37,
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`Ex. 3 at ¶ 18.
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`7 at 37.
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` Id.
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` Ex. 7 at 37.
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` Id.
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`See, e.g., Ex. 9 (
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` Ex. 3 at ¶ 21-31.
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` See, e.g., Ex. 10 at 81 (
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` Ex. 11 at 4
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` See, e.g., Ex. 12 (
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` See Ex. 3 at ¶ 23-36.
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` Ex. 3 at ¶ 23.
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` Ex. 13 at 202-04.
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` Id. at 202-04.
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`Id. at 203.
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`04.
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` Id. at 202-
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` See Ex. 3 at ¶ 23.
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` Id. at ¶ 37.
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`C.
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`How Agri Stats Reports Are Used
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` See, e.g., Ex. 14; Ex. 15 at 37-38.
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` Ex. 16 at 100:15-101:2.
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` Id. at 100:19-101:2.
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` Id. at 99:16-100:14
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`4 at 54:15-56:4, 58:16-59:2, 274:11-20.
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` See, e.g., Ex. 17 at 289:13-291:3.
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`D.
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`Other Types of Agri Stats Information
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` See, e.g., Ex.
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`e.g., Ex. 18
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`; Ex. 3 at ¶¶ 72-76.
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` See Ex. 19 at 30.
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` See Ex. 3 at ¶ 73.
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` Id. at ¶ 14.
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` Id. at ¶ 73.
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` See, e.g., Ex. 20; Ex. 21.
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`See, e.g., Ex. 22; Ex. 23 at 718
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`II.
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`EMI
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`EMI is an Agri Stats subsidiary.
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`78-79.
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` Ex. 24 at 86.
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` Ex. 24 at 86; Ex. 3 at ¶¶
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` Ex. 24 at 85-86.
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` Id.
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` Id.
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` Id.
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` Ex. 3 at ¶ 88.
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` Id. at ¶ 88.
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` Ex. 25; see also Ex. 3 at ¶ 85.
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` Id.
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` Id. at ¶ 86.
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` See, e.g., Ex. 26 at 16
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`¶¶ 100-01.
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` Ex. 3 at ¶ 108.
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` See, e.g., Ex. 27 at 79; Ex. 28; Ex. 3 at
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` Ex. 27 at 79,
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`III. CHICKEN INDUSTRY PERFORMANCE
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`Agri Stats and EMI data did not result in coordinated pricing or production decisions. See,
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`e.g., Ex. 29 at 36
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` See Ex. 30 at Ex. 1, Ex. 2, Ex. 11.
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` see Ex. 1 at ¶ 38 n.37),
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` Id. at Ex. 12.
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` Id.
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`LEGAL STANDARD
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`Before ruling on class certification, a district court must conduct a “rigorous analysis” of
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`Rule 23’s prerequisites for certifying a class. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338,
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`350-51, 374 (2011). When, as here, an expert’s testimony is “critical to class certification,” the
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`court’s analysis must include “a conclusive ruling on any challenge to that expert’s qualifications
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`or submissions before it may rule on a motion for class certification.” See Messner v. Northshore
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`Univ. Healthsystem, 669 F.3d 802, 812 (7th Cir. 2012). The admissibility of expert testimony is
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`governed by Federal Rule of Evidence 702, which requires that it be helpful to the trier of fact and
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`rest on sufficient facts and data, as well as reliable principles and methods reliably applied to the
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`facts of the case. Fed. R. Evid. 702; see also Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509
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`U.S. 579, 588-95 (1993). The court must also examine the expert’s opinions to ensure that they
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`“fit” the facts of the case. To measure fit, the trial court’s “gatekeeping inquiry must be tied to the
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`facts of a particular case.” Kumho Tire v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 150 (1999) (citations and
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`quotation marks omitted). “[N]othing in either Daubert or the Federal Rules of Evidence requires
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`a district court to admit opinion evidence that is connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit
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`of the expert.” Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997).
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`ARGUMENT
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`I.
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`DR. CABRAL’S ENTIRE REPORT IS NOT HELPFUL, BECAUSE IT RELIES
`ON FALSE ASSUMPTIONS
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`Expert testimony is admissible only to the extent it “help[s] the trier of fact to understand
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`the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.” Fed. R. Evid. 702(a). Therefore, expert testimony
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`that ignores or misstates relevant facts should be excluded. See, e.g., Barber v. United Airlines,
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`Inc., 17 F. App’x 433, 437 (7th Cir. 2001) (testimony inadmissible where expert “cherry-picked
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`the facts he considered to render an expert opinion”); Concord Boat Corp. v. Brunswick Corp.,
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`207 F.3d 1039, 1055-57 (8th Cir. 2000) (finding that expert testimony should be excluded because
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`it did not incorporate all relevant circumstances and ignored inconvenient evidence).
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`Dr. Cabral’s testimony is unhelpful because the linchpin of Dr. Cabral’s testimony⸺that
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`Agri Stats reports can be used to monitor production and therefore have anticompetitive effects,
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`Ex. 1 at ¶¶ 92-97⸺rests on demonstrably false information regarding Agri Stats reports.
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` Ex. 1 at ¶ 94.
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` See Ex. 1 at ¶ 94.
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` Ex. 3 at ¶ 48.
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` Ex. 2 at 176:20-177:10.
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` Ex. 3 at ¶ 58. In other words, the entire
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`premise of EUCP’s expert’s theory that Agri Stats reports could be used to reduce output and
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`increase price is flat out wrong, undermining the entire premise of their unlawful “information
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`exchange” theory, and requiring exclusion of Dr. Cabral’s testimony.
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`1 at ¶ 98.
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` Supra at 5, 8.
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` Supra at 9.
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`Moreover, Dr. Cabral’s opinion is not helpful, because it defines “collusion”
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` Ex.
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` Ex. 1 at ¶¶ 13, 34;
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`see, e.g., In re Text Messaging Antitrust Litig., 782 F.3d 867, 872 (7th Cir. 2015) (“Express
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`collusion violates antitrust law; tacit collusion does not.”). But “deploy[ing] the word ‘collusion’
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`with imprecision, sometimes using it interchangeably with illegal, express collusion and
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`sometimes not[,]” makes expert testimony “especially prone to misinterpretation.” Kleen Prod.
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`LLC v. Int’l Paper, 2017 WL 2362567, at *12 (N.D. Ill. 2017).
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`That is true here, just as it was in Kleen.
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`¶ 39 n.48,
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` Ex. 1 at
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` id. at ¶ 78,
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` id. at ¶ 104,
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` Id. at ¶ 129. But Dr. Cabral is never clear about whether he is referring to an illegal
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`agreement or legal conscious parallelism. Nor does his report parse the evidence he believes is
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`consistent with conscious parallelism from the evidence he believes is consistent with an unlawful
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`agreement. Consequently, Dr. Cabral’s testimony is not helpful, because it does not help the
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`factfinder distinguish between illegal and legal conduct. Indeed, his report intentionally blurs the
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`lines between each form of conduct. Therefore, his testimony should be excluded. Williamson
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`Oil Co. v. Phillip Morris USA, 346 F.3d 1287, 1323 (11th Cir. 2003) (affirming dismissal of
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`expert’s testimony where expert “defined ‘collusion’ to include conscious parallelism” and,
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`therefore, could “not differentiate between legal and illegal pricing behavior”).
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`II.
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`DR. CABRAL’S ENTIRE REPORT IS PREMISED ON INADMISSIBLE IPSE
`DIXIT REASONING
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`Dr. Cabral’s testimony should also be excluded because his theory about anticompetitive
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`effects cannot be linked to the factual record. Dr. Cabral theorizes that information exchanges via
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`Agri Stats and EMI might have caused anticompetitive harm but admits he did not consider
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`whether the exchanges here had procompetitive effects or whether those information exchanges
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`actually affected prices or output. As a result, Dr. Cabral cannot exclude the possibility that these
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`information exchanges were procompetitive. Nevertheless, Dr. Cabral asks the Court to simply
`
`accept his ipse dixit opinion that the information exchanges likely had anticompetitive effects.
`
`An expert’s testimony must “fit”—i.e., have a scientifically valid connection to the issues
`
`
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`12
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`in the lawsuit so as to assist the factfinder in understanding the evidence. Daubert, 509 U.S. at
`
`590-92 & n.9. This requirement cannot be satisfied when there is “simply too great an analytical
`
`gap between the data and the opinion proffered.” Joiner, 522 U.S. at 138. Dr. Cabral’s analysis
`
`fails the Daubert fit requirement, because it is tethered to the facts of the case only by his own ipse
`
`dixit reasoning.
`
`1 at ¶¶ 29-77; see also Ex. 2 at 60:3-12.
`
`¶¶ 78-145,
`
`at 6-7.
`
`Ex. 2 at 50:10-15.
`
`
`
` Ex.
`
` Ex. 1 at
`
` Supra
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
` Ex. 2 at 54:11-15; 63:9-22.
`
` And Dr. Cabral’s report unravels under basic scrutiny.
`
`
`
`
`
`Given Dr. Cabral’s far-reaching theories concerning the purported anticompetitive harm of
`
` Ex. 2 at 61:13-62:4.4
`
`
`4 In one case, a district court permitted an expert to testify that “the nature, frequency, and scope
`with which Defendants shared information would make it easier . . . to establish and maintain an
`agreement to reduce . . . competition.” Fleischman v. Albany Med. Ctr., 728 F. Supp. 2d 130, 151
`(N.D.N.Y. 2010). But in that case, the plaintiffs’ expert differentiated between illegal and legal
`information sharing and opined that the information exchanges at issue in that case had no potential
`procompetitive value. Id. at 152.
`
`
`
`
`
`
` Ex. 2 at 61:13-62:4.
`13
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`information exchange, one would expect that Dr. Cabral would have used the mountain of
`
`available empirical data to link the exchange of Agri Stats and EMI data with an effect on chicken
`
`prices or supply levels. But, unlike every other expert in this case, Dr. Cabral inexplicably failed
`
`to do so. See supra at 2.
`
`Ex. 2 at 248:23-249:6.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
` Therefore, his testimony is simply an
`
`inadmissible untested hypothesis about how information exchanges might result in anticompetitive
`
`harm. See, e.g., Daubert, 509 U.S. 593 (“Ordinarily, a key question to be answered . . . will be
`
`whether [the expert’s theory] can be (and has been) tested.”).
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
` That is not admissible expert testimony. Naeem
`
`v. McKesson Drug Co., 444 F.3d 593, 608 (7th Cir. 2006) (affirming exclusion of expert who is
`
`“talking off the cuff—deploying neither data nor analysis”). It is inadmissible ipse dixit. See
`
`Zenith Elec. Corp. v. WH-TV Broad. Corp., 395 F.3d 416, 419-20 (2d. Cir. 2005) (excluding
`
`testimony reliant on bare expertise because “[r]eliable inferences depend on more than say-so”);
`
`Clark v. Takata Corp., 192 F.3d 750, 759 n.5 (7th Cir. 1999) (“A supremely qualified expert cannot
`
`
`
`
`14
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`waltz into the courtroom and render opinions unless those opinions are based upon some
`
`recognized scientific method and are reliable and relevant”). Thus, his opinions should be
`
`excluded.
`
`III. DR. CABRAL’S THIRD OPINION IS OUTSIDE HIS EXPERTISE
`
`Experts may not testify outside their area of expertise. Gayton v. McCoy, 593 F.3d 610,
`
`617 (7th Cir. 2010) (“The question we must ask is not whether an expert witness is qualified in
`
`general, but whether his qualifications provide a foundation for [him] to answer a specific
`
`question”) (internal quotation marks omitted). There is “no duty to respect expert opinions []given
`
`outside a witness’s field of expertise.” Schmidt v. Apfel, 201 F.3d 970, 973 (7th Cir. 2000).
`
`Dr. Cabral is an economist; he does not claim any expertise on non-economic questions.
`
` Ex. 1 at ¶ 9; Ex. 2 at 109:24-110:7.
`
`110:8-25.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
` Ex. 2 at
`
`
`
` Ex.
`
`2 at 25:18-26:18. In short, Dr. Cabral’s opinion regarding
`
` is an economist’s
`
`attempt to answer a non-economic question by reference to his lay understanding of an industry.
`
`He usurps the role of this Court as finder of fact on class certification. His opinion offers the Court
`
`no assistance and should be excluded. Smith v. Ford Motor Co., 215 F.3d 713, 718 (7th Cir. 2000).
`
`For the foregoing reasons, Dr. Cabral’s testimony should be excluded.
`
`CONCLUSION
`
`
`
`
`
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`15
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`Case: 1:16-cv-08637 Document #: 4247 Filed: 01/29/21 Page 20 of 26 PageID #:286860
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`
`
`Dated: January 29, 2021
`
`Respectfully submitted,
`
`
`
`WEIL GOTSHAL & MANGES LLP
`
`MAYER BROWN LLP
`
`
`
`By: /s/ Carmine R. Zarlenga
`Carmine R. Zarlenga (#90784529)
`William H. Stallings (admitted pro hac vice)
`Stephen M. Medlock (admitted pro hac
`vice)
`Oral D. Pottinger (admitted pro hac vice)
`1999 K Street, N.W.
`Washington, D.C. 20006
`Telephone: (202) 263-3000
`Facsimile: (202) 263-3300
`czarlenga@mayerbrown.com
`wstallings@mayerbrown.com
`smedlock@mayerbrown.com
`opottinger@mayerbrown.com
`
`Attorneys for Defendant Foster Farms, LLC
`and Foster Poultry Farms, a California
`Corporation
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`By: /s/ Carrie C. Mahan
`Carrie C. Mahan (#459802)
`Christopher J. Abbott (#1014487)
`2001 M Street N.W., Ste. 600
`Washington, D.C. 20036
`Telephone: (202) 682-7000
`Facsimile: (202) 857-0940
`carrie.mahan@weil.com
`christopher.abbott@weil.com
`
`Pravin R. Patel (#0099939)
`Brian G. Liegel (#0119269)
`1395 Brickell Avenue, Ste. 1200
`Miami, FL 33131
`Telephone: 305-577-3100
`pravin.patel@weil.com
`brian.liegel@weil.com
`
`EIMER STAHL LLP
`
`Michael L. McCluggage (#01820966)
`224 South Michigan Avenue, Ste. 1100
`Chicago, IL 60604
`Telephone: (312) 660-7665
`Facsimile: (312) 692-1718
`mmccluggage@eimerstahl.com
`
`Attorneys for Defendant Pilgrim’s Pride
`Corporation
`
`
`
`
`16
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`

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`
`
`
`
`
`VENABLE LLP
`
`
`
`By: /s/ J. Douglas Baldridge
`J. Douglas Baldridge (#437678)
`Lisa Jose Fales (admitted pro hac vice)
`Danielle Foley (admitted pro hac vice)
`Andrew Hernacki (admitted pro hac vice)
`600 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
`Washington, D.C. 20001
`Telephone: (202) 344-4000
`Facsimile: 202-344-8300
`jdbaldridge@venable.com
`ljfales@venable.com
`drfoley@venable.com
`athernacki@venable.com
`
`FALKENBERG IVES LLP
`
`Kirstin B. Ives
`30 N. LaSalle St., Ste 4020
`Chicago, IL 60602
`Telephone: (312) 566-4803
`Facsimile: (312) 566-4810
`kbi@ffilaw.com
`
`Attorneys for Defendants Perdue Farms,
`Inc. and Perdue Foods LLC
`
`
`
`By: /s/ John W. Treece
`John W. Treece (#3122889)
`1135 West Montana Street
`Chicago, IL 60614
`Telephone: (312) 961-7808
`jtreece@jwtreece.com
`
`ROSE LAW FIRM
`
`Amanda K. Wofford (admitted pro hac vice)
`Bourgon Reynolds (admitted pro hac vice)
`120 East Fourth Street
`Little Rock, AR 72201
`Telephone: (501) 375-9131
`Facsimile: (501) 375-1309
`awofford@roselawfirm.com
`breynolds@roselawfirm.com
`
`Attorneys for Defendants Mountaire Farms
`Inc., Mountaire Farms, LLC and Mountaire
`Farms of Delaware, Inc.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`17
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`

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`
`
`
`
`
`
`NOVACK AND MACEY LLP
`
`By: /s/ Stephen Novack
`Stephen Novack
`Stephen J. Siegel
`Christopher S. Moore
`100 North Riverside Plaza
`Chicago, IL 60606
`Telephone: (312) 419-6900
`Facsimile: (312) 419-6928
`snovack@novackmacey.com
`ssiegel@novackmacey.com
`cmoore@novackmacey.com
`
`Attorneys for Defendants Koch Foods
`Incorporated, JCG Foods of Alabama LLC,
`JCG Foods of Georgia LLC and Koch Meat
`Co., Inc.
`
`VEDDER PRICE P.C.
`
`By: /s/ Gregory G. Wrobel
`Gregory G. Wrobel (#3122900)
`222 N. LaSalle Street
`Chicago, IL 60601
`Telephone: (312) 609-7722
`Facsimile: (312) 609-5005
`gwrobel@vedderprice.com
`
`JORDAN PRICE WALL GRAY JONES &
`CARLTON, PLLC
`
`Henry W. Jones, Jr. (admitted pro hac vice)
`1951 Clark Avenue
`
`Raleigh, NC 27605
`Telephone: (919) 828-2501
`Facsimile: (919) 834-8447
`hjones@jordanprice.com
`
`Attorneys for Defendant House of Raeford
`Farms, Inc.
`
`
`
`
`
`KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP
`
`By: /s/ Daniel E. Laytin, P.C.
`Daniel E. Laytin, P.C.
`Christa C. Cottrell, P.C.
`Stacy Pepper
`300 North LaSalle Street
`Chicago, IL 60654
`Telephone: (312) 862-2000
`Facsimile: (312) 862-2200
`dlaytin@kirkland.com
`ccottrell@kirkland.com
`stacy.pepper@kirkland.com
`
`Attorneys for Defendants Sanderson Farms,
`Inc., Sanderson Farms, Inc. (Foods
`Division), Sanderson Farms, Inc.
`(Processing Division), and Sanderson
`Farms, Inc. (Production Division) and
`Liaison Counsel for Defendants
`
`PROSKAUER ROSE LLP
`
`By: /s/ Christopher E. Ondeck
`Christopher E. Ondeck (admitted pro hac
`vice)
`Stephen R. Chuk (admitted pro hac vice)
`1001 Pennsylvania Ave., NW, Ste 600
`South
`Washington, D.C. 20004
`Telephone: (202) 416-6800
`Facsimile: (202) 416-6899
`condeck@proskauer.com
`schuk@proskauer.com
`
`Attorneys for Wayne Farms LLC
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`18
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`

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`
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`
`
`KUTAK ROCK LLP
`
`EDWARD C. KONIECZNY LLC
`
`
`
`By: /s/ John P. Passarelli
`John P. Passarelli (admitted pro hac vice)
`James M. Sulentic (admitted pro hac vice)
`1650 Farnam Street
`Omaha, NE 68102
`Telephone: (402) 346-6000
`Facsimile: (402) 346-1148
`john.passarelli@kutakrock.com
`james.sulentic@kutakrock.com
`
`J.R. Carroll (admitted pro hac vice)
`Jeffrey M. Fletcher (admitted pro hac vice)
`234 East Millsap Road, Ste 200
`Fayetteville, AR 72703-4099
`Telephone: (479) 973-4200
`Facsimile: (479) 973-0007
`jr.caroll@kutakrock.com
`Jeffrey.fletcher@kuakrock.com
`
`Kimberly M. Hare (#6323326)
`One South Wacker Drive, Ste 2050
`Chicago, IL 60606-4614
`Telephone: (312) 602-4100
`Facsimile: (312) 602-4101
`kimberly.hare@kutakrock.com
`
`Attorneys for Defendants O.K. Foods, Inc.,
`O.K. Farms, Inc., and O.K. Industries, Inc.
`
`
`
`By: /s/ Edward C. Konieczny
`Edward C. Konieczny (admitted pro hac
`vice)
`400 Colony Square, Ste 1501
`1201 Peachtree Street, NE
`Atlanta, GA 30361
`Telephone: (404) 380-1430
`Facsimile: (404) 382-6011
`ed@koniecznylaw.com
`
`SMITH, GAMBRELL & RUSSELL, LLP
`
`David C. Newman (admitted pro hac vice)
`W. Parker Sanders (admitted pro hac vice)
`1230 Peachtree Street, N.E.
`Promenade, Ste 3100
`Atlanta, GA 30309
`Telephone: (404) 815-3500
`Facsimile: (404) 815-3509
`dnewman@sgrlaw.com
`psanders@sgrlaw.com
`
`James L. Thompson
`Lynch Thompson LLP
`150 S. Wacker Drive, Suite 2600
`Chicago, IL 60606
`T: (312) 445-4623
`F: (312) 896-5883
`jthompson@lynchthompson.com
`
`Attorneys for Defendants Mar-Jac Poultry,
`Inc., Mar-Jac Poultry MS, LLC, Mar-Jac
`Poultry AL, LLC, Mar-Jack AL/MS, Inc.,
`Mar-Jac Poultry, LLC, Mar-Jac Holdings,
`Inc.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`19
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`

`

`Case: 1:16-cv-08637 Document #: 4247 Filed: 01/29/21 Page 24 of 26 PageID #:286864
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`
`
`VAUGHAN & MURPHY
`
`HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP
`
`
`
`By: /s/ Charles C. Murphy, Jr.
`Charles C. Murphy, Jr. (admitted pro hac
`vice)
`690 S Ponce Court NE
`Atlanta, GA 30307
`Telephone: (404) 667-0714
`Facsimile: (404) 529-4193
`cmurphy@vaughanandmurphy.com
`
`WINSTON & STRAWN LLP
`
`James F. Herbison
`Michael P. Mayer
`35 West Wacker Drive
`Chicago, IL 60601
`Telephone: (312) 558-5600
`Facsimile: (312) 558-5700
`jherbison@winston.com
`mmayer@winston.com
`
`Attorneys for Defendant Norman W. Fries,
`Inc. d/b/a Claxton Poultry Farms
`
`
`
`By: /s/ William L. Monts III
`William L. Monts III (admitted pro hac
`vice)
`Justin W. Bernick (admitted pro hac vice)
`555 Thirteenth Street, N.W.
`Washington, D.C. 20004-1109
`Telephone: (202) 637-5910
`Facsimile: (202) 637-5911
`william.monts@hoganlovells.com
`justin.bernick@hoganlovells.com
`
`MILLER, CANFIELD, PADDOCK, AND
`STONE P.L.C