Case: 1:19-cv-08318 Document #: 1 Filed: 12/19/19 Page 1 of 55 PageID #:1
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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`NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
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`EASTERN DIVISION
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`
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`No.
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`CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
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`
`
`
`DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
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`
`
`Plaintiffs,
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`v.
`
`OLEAN WHOLESALE GROCERY
`COOPERATIVE, INC. and JOHN GROSS
`AND COMPANY, INC.
`
`
`
`
`
`AGRI STATS, INC., BUTTERBALL LLC,
`CARGILL, INC., CARGILL MEAT
`SOLUTIONS CORPORATION, COOPER
`FARMS, INC., FARBEST FOODS, INC.,
`FOSTER FARMS, LLC, FOSTER POULTRY
`FARMS, THE HILLSHIRE BRANDS
`COMPANY, HORMEL FOODS
`CORPORATION, HORMEL FOODS, LLC,
`HOUSE OF RAEFORD FARMS, INC.,
`KRAFT HEINZ FOODS COMPANY, KRAFT
`FOODS GROUP BRANDS LLC, PERDUE
`FARMS, INC., PERDUE FOODS LLC,
`TYSON FOODS, INC., TYSON FRESH
`MEATS, INC. AND TYSON PREPARED
`FOODS, INC.,
`
`
`
`
`
`Defendants.
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`010737-11/1219159 V2
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`Case: 1:19-cv-08318 Document #: 1 Filed: 12/19/19 Page 2 of 55 PageID #:2
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`I. 
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`II. 
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`Page
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`NATURE OF ACTION .......................................................................................................1 
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`JURISDICTION AND VENUE ........................................................................................13 
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`III. 
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`PARTIES ...........................................................................................................................14 
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`A. 
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`B. 
`
`C. 
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`Plaintiffs .................................................................................................................14 
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`Defendants .............................................................................................................15 
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`Co-Conspirators .....................................................................................................20 
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`IV. 
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`FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS ............................................................................................20 
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`A. 
`
`B. 
`
`C. 
`
`D. 
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`Agri Stats’ information exchange services began in the broiler
`industry, where it has been used to facilitate widespread collusion. .....................21 
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`Defendants entered into an agreement to exchange information
`through Agri Stats regarding their production and sales of turkey. .......................23 
`
`Defendants possess market power in the market for turkey and
`turkey is the type of product for which information exchange is
`particularly likely to have anticompetitive effects. ................................................27 
`
`1. 
`2. 
`
`Defendants have market power in the market for turkey. ..........................27 
`There are high barriers to entry in the market for turkey for
`meat consumption. .....................................................................................28 
`The defendants have market power in the market for turkey
`for meat consumption. ...............................................................................30 
`The market for turkey is the type of market where the information
`exchanges orchestrated by Agri Stats are likely to harm competition. ..................30 
`
`3. 
`
`1. 
`2. 
`3. 
`4. 
`5. 
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`The turkey market features few sellers. .....................................................31 
`Turkey is a fungible market. ......................................................................31 
`The turkey market features price-based competition. ................................31 
`Demand for turkey is relatively inelastic. ..................................................32 
`The turkey market features a trend towards price uniformity. ...................32 
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`E. 
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`F. 
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`Industry-wide production cuts during the Conspiracy Period were
`facilitated through the information exchange conducted through
`Agri Stats. ..............................................................................................................32 
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`Abnormal pricing during the Class Period demonstrates the
`anticompetitive effects of the exchange of turkey information
`conducted through the Agri Stats sales reports. .....................................................33 
`
`1. 
`
`2. 
`
`3. 
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`The average turkey wholesale price experienced an
`unprecedented increase beginning in 2009. ...............................................33 
`Beginning in 2009, defendants’ revenues radically diverged
`from their costs. .........................................................................................34 
`During the conspiracy period, prices rose but production
`failed to rise to match demand, indicating an anticompetitive
`restraint on supply in the market for turkey facilitated by the
`information exchange through Agri Stats. .................................................36 
`During the conspiracy period, prices of turkey radically
`diverged from the costs of underlying feed. ..............................................37 
`A regression model demonstrates the anticompetitive effects
`on the price of turkey caused by the information exchange
`conducted through Agri Stats. ....................................................................38 
`Defendants actively concealed the extent of their information
`exchange and plaintiffs did not and could not have discovered
`defendants’ anticompetitive conduct. ....................................................................39 
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`4. 
`
`5. 
`
`G. 
`
`H. 
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`Defendants had numerous opportunities to collude. ..............................................41 
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`CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS ..................................................................................42 
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`ANTITRUST INJURY ......................................................................................................45 
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`V. 
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`VI. 
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`VII.  CAUSE OF ACTION ........................................................................................................46 
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`
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`VIOLATION OF THE SHERMAN ACT .........................................................................46 
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`FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF VIOLATION OF SECTION 1 OF THE
`SHERMAN ACT FOR CONSPIRACY TO EXCHANGE COMPETITIVE
`INFORMATION 15 U.S.C. § 1 (ON BEHALF OF NATIONWIDE CLASS
`FOR INJUNCTIVE AND EQUITABLE RELIEF AND DAMAGES) ............................46 
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`VIII.  REQUEST FOR RELIEF ..................................................................................................49 
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`IX. 
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`JURY TRIAL DEMANDED .............................................................................................50 
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`Plaintiffs bring this action on behalf of themselves individually and on behalf of a
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`plaintiff class consisting of all persons and entities who purchased turkey directly from a
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`defendant or co-conspirator in the United States beginning at least as early as January 1, 2010
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`through January 1, 2017 (Class Period).1 Plaintiffs bring this action for treble damages and
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`injunctive relief under Section 1 of the Sherman Act. Plaintiffs demand a trial by jury.
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`I.
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`NATURE OF ACTION
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`1.
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`The turkey integrator defendants are the leading suppliers of turkey in an industry
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`with approximately $5 billion in annual commerce. The turkey industry is highly concentrated,
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`with a small number of large producers in the United States controlling supply. Defendants and
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`their co-conspirators collectively control approximately 80 percent of the wholesale turkey
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`market in the United States. The turkey integrator defendants are Butterball LLC (Butterball);
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`Cargill Inc. and Cargill Meat Solutions Corporation, (together and separately, Cargill); Cooper
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`Farms, Inc. (Cooper Farms); Farbest Foods, Inc., (Farbest); Foster Farms LLC and Foster Poultry
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`Farms (together and separately, Foster Farms); Hormel Foods Corporation and Hormel Foods
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`LLC (together and separately, Hormel); House of Raeford Farms, Inc., (House of Raeford); Kraft
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`Heinz Foods Company and Kraft Foods Group Brands LLC (together and separately, Kraft
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`Foods), Perdue Farms, Inc. and Perdue Foods LLC (together and separately, Perdue); Tyson
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`Foods, Inc., The Hillshire Brands Company, Tyson Fresh Meats, Inc. and Tyson Prepared Foods,
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`Inc. (together and separately, Tyson).
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`2.
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`Defendant Agri Stats is a company that provides secretive information exchange
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`services to companies in a variety of agricultural sectors, including pork, chicken, and turkey.
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`1 For purposes of this complaint, turkey includes turkey meat purchased fresh or frozen, and
`either uncooked or cooked.
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`3.
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`The turkey integrator defendants each entered into an agreement from at least
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`2010 to January 1, 2017, to exchange sensitive information through Agri Stats regarding their
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`production and sales of turkey.
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`4.
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`Agri Stats reports are far different from lawful industry reports. Agri Stats gathers
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`detailed financial and production data from each of the turkey integrators, standardizes this
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`information, and produces customized reports and graphs for the co-conspirators. On a monthly
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`basis, Agri Stats provides the turkey integrators with current and forward-looking sensitive
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`information (such as profits, costs, prices and slaughter information).
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`5.
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`The United States Supreme Court has long recognized that “exchanges of current
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`price information, of course, have the greatest potential for generating anticompetitive effects.”2
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`Agri Stats’ sales reports prove the truth of that maxim. Agri Stats prepared monthly reports for
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`defendants regarding their sales of turkey that identified, on a specific product by product level,
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`the prices and returns that each defendant was obtaining on their sales of turkey. These reports,
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`unavailable to anybody besides Agri Stats subscribers, allowed the integrator defendants to
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`easily identify potential opportunities where their prices for turkey products were significantly
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`lower than their competitors.
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`6.
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`Turkey is the relevant product market and the geographic market is the
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`continental United States. Defendants collectively possess market power in the market for
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`turkey. Defendants and co-conspirators collectively possessed approximately 80 percent of the
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`overall market share for turkeys during the Class Period.
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`7.
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`Blair Snyder, a senior executive at Agri Stats, publicly stated in 2009 that “about
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`95% of the turkey industry [is] participating” in Agri Stats, and that for “turkey participants,
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`2 United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 443 (1978).
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`pretty much it’s a list of who’s who in the turkey business.” This is a comparable portion to the
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`percentage of broiler chicken industry participating in Agri Stats reports, with Mr. Snyder stating
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`that “we’ve got high 90 percentage of both broilers and turkeys.”
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`8.
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`Each one of the defendants and co-conspirators entered into an agreement to
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`exchange information through Agri Stats. Each defendant’s agreement to exchange information
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`regarding turkey production is shown in the below 2010 excerpt from an Agri Stats presentation
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`that lists the participants in Agri Stats’ turkey reports.
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`9.
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`This 2010 presentation slide shows that each of the defendant integrator and Co-
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`Conspirator Integrators entered into an agreement to exchange information regarding their turkey
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`operations through Agri Stats during the conspiracy period. The document directly identifies
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`defendants Butterball, Cargill, Cooper’s, Farbest, Foster Farms, House of Raeford and Perdue
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`Farms, as participants in Agri Stats’s reports on turkey. The document directly identifies Co-
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`Conspirators Circle-S Ranch, Prestage Farms, and West Liberty Foods as participants in Agri
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`Stats’ reports on turkey. Jennie-O is the brand name for Hormel’s turkey operations and thus
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`Hormel participated in Agri Stats’ reports on turkey. The document also identifies Louis Rich, a
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`Kraft Foods brand that produces turkey, as receiving Agri Stats reports, and thus Kraft Foods
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`participated in Agri Stats’ reports on turkey. Sara Lee’s turkey operations, Hillshire Brands, was
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`subsequently acquired by Tyson in 2014 and thus Tyson participated in Agri Stats’ reports on
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`turkey.
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`10.
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`The information exchange by the defendant integrators through Agri Stats is
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`exactly the type of information exchange that the Supreme Court has recognized is likely to have
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`anticompetitive effects under a rule of reason analysis. First, the data is current and forward-
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`looking – which courts consistently hold has “the greatest potential for generating
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`anticompetitive effects.”3 Second, information contained in Agri Stats reports is specific to the
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`turkey producers, including information on profits, prices, costs and production levels. Third,
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`none of the Agri Stats information was publicly available. Agri Stats is a subscription service,
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`which required the defendant integrators to pay hefty fees over the Class Period – far in excess of
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`any other pricing and production indices and to agree to volunteer their own data. “Public
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`dissemination is a primary way for data exchange to realize its pro-competitive potential.”4 Agri
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`Stats ensured that its detailed, sensitive business information was available only to the co-
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`conspirators and not to any buyers in the market. Thus, for example, buyers on the market could
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`not use Agri Stats data in Agri Stats sales reports to negotiate lower prices; instead, only
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`defendants could use it as a way to identify opportunities to raise their prices.
`
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`3 Todd v. Exxon Corp., 275 F.3d 191, 2011 (2d Cir. 2001) (Sotomayor, J.) (quoting United
`States v. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 441 n.16 (1978)).
`4 Id. at 213.
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`11.
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`Indeed, Agri Stats specifically marketed itself to potential participants as a way
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`that they could “improve profitability” rather than engage in competition through production
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`increases. Agri Stats was good to its word; its sales reports specifically identified opportunities
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`for defendants where defendants’ products were lower than that of the industry average and
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`where defendants could consequently raise prices to meet that of their competitors.
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`12.
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`Industry participants relied on Agri Stats reports in their analysis of their business
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`operations. For example, Hormel, at its 2011 Investor Day, stated in its presentation that “when
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`you optimize the supply chain” you “improve your relative industry position (Agri Stats).”
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`Hormel also touted that “Jennie-O Turkey Store is consistently one of the top companies in
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`operating profits (Agri Stats).”
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`13.
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`Confidential Witness 1 (CW1) is a former sales executive at Butterball involved
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`in the pricing of turkeys. CW1 was employed at Butterball during the entire Class Period. CW1
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`stated that Butterball relied on the monthly reports issued by Agri Stats: “The company used the
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`information to evaluate — by item, item group, price, distribution — where we stood against
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`other turkey companies.” CW1 stated that he and other sales personnel looked at Agri Stats data
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`to see how Butterball ranked against peers in the turkey industry. CW1 stated that he personally
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`looked at the Agri Stats data to assess costs and returns. CW1 stated that costs were an important
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`factor in determining how Butterball set its prices.
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`14.
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`Confidential Witness 2 (CW2) is a former accountant at Cooper Farms. CW2
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`stated that Cooper Farms received monthly reports from Agri Stats. In addition, Agri Stats
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`representatives met with Cooper Farms executives every six months. CW2 stated that Cooper
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`Farms submitted cost information to Agri Stats every month. CW2 explained that Agri Stats
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`reports grouped data into various types of turkey products, including deli meat and smoked meat.
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`15.
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`CW2 stated that Agri Stats representatives regularly met with the Cooper
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`Leadership Management Group, which included top management and executives from Cooper
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`Farms. CW2 stated that “the upper group received advice” from Agri Stats. CW2 stated that the
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`advice from Agri Stats helped Cooper Farms improve its returns per pound.
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`16.
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`Agri Stats reports also contained detailed information on industry-wide supply
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`levels. For example, a job description of an Agri Stats employee stated that they analyzed Turkey
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`“breeder flock and hatchery data” as well as Turkey “growout flocks.”
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`17.
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`Based on publicly available information filed in a February 7, 2018, complaint in
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`the Broiler Chicken Antitrust Litigation, 5 Agri Stats data on growout flocks contained
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`information such as the number of broilers placed, chick mortality by week and overall
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`percentage, chick cost, days between flocks provided to contract farmers (aka, “down time”),
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`feed conversion rate (pounds of feed per pound of broiler), and average daily weight. On
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`information and belief, the growout data that Agri Stats compiled for the turkey industry
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`contained similar levels of data. This type of data allowed defendants to monitor industry-wide
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`supply levels.
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`18.
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`Although Agri Stats reports are nominally anonymous, defendant integrators were
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`often able to deanonymize the reports to identify the data of specific companies based on their
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`industry knowledge. CW2 stated that he could determine the identity of companies in Agri Stats
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`reports because “you could usually figure out who was who because they have a certain cooked
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`meat, or if they were browning and running it through an oven.” CW2 further stated that “we
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`could sit there and discuss it, because a lot of us knew what the other plants in the big areas, what
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`5 In re Broiler Chicken Antitrust Litigation, Case No. 1:16-cv-08637 (N.D. Ill.) (ECF No.
`710)
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`they did.” For example, CW2 stated that one competitor company had five separate facilities
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`included in the Agri Stats reports, and that therefore, it was easy to determine the identity of that
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`company.
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`19.
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`Confidential Witness 3 (CW3) is a former employee of Cargill during the
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`conspiracy period. CW3 stated that Cargill received monthly reports from Agri Stats on turkey.
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`CW3 stated that the monthly Agri Stats turkey reports went directly to Cargill finance
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`executives.
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`20.
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`Throughout the conspiracy period, defendant integrators were able to exercise a
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`remarkable level of industry-wide restraint in keeping the growth of turkey supply in check,
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`causing turkey prices to rise. Thus, Agri Stats had the anticompetitive effect of allowing
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`defendants to engage in collusion to restrain the supply of turkey by facilitating information
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`exchange about supply levels throughout the industry. The industry-wide cuts in turkey
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`production during the conspiracy period are shown in the following chart:
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`21.
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`In a competitive market, production generally matches demand. More demand
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`will lead to more supply. Conversely, a drop in production caused by falling demand should
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`correspond to falling prices. However, in the turkey market during the conspiracy period,
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`production, measured through USDA data, remained artificially restrained even as demand,
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`captured by higher per capita expenditures on turkey, rose significantly. These observed price
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`and output dynamics, shown in the below analysis performed by plaintiffs’ experts, indicate that
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`it was not falling demand that caused a decline in supply during the conspiracy period.
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`22.
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`In addition to their participation in Agri Stats, defendant integrators had frequent
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`opportunities to communicate, in conjunction with formal meetings of various trade associations.
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`In particular, the National Turkey Federation each year held regular meetings, including the NTF
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`Annual Convention and the NTF Leadership conference, which were widely attended by the
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`defendant integrators. CW3 stated that senior Cargill executives, including Cargill’s CEO and
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`CFO, attended National Turkey Federation meetings. For example, CW2 stated that Cooper
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`Farms leadership were involved in the National Turkey Federation, for example Cooper Farms
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`COO Gary Cooper served as immediate past chairman of the NTF board in 2014.
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`23.
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`Collectively, Hormel, Cargill, and Butterball control approximately 50 percent of
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`the turkey market. Hormel is the only publicly traded company among these three. In its earnings
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`calls during the conspiracy period, Hormel repeatedly discussed the industry-wide success in
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`executing production cuts and maintaining industry-wide production discipline during the Class
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`Period.
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`24.
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`On June 2, 2009, Hormel emphasized that it was making production cuts in
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`response to an alleged oversupply in the market and closely monitoring the overall level of
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`production in the market, showing the importance of the kind of information exchanged through
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`Agri Stats:
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`There is an oversupply of turkey. There continues to be perhaps more
`production as well as cold storage stocks than the demand would
`warrant. We have been very deliberate about making the appropriate
`production cuts. We announced them over a year ago. And we have
`even exceeded the amount we expected to reduce. We have seen the
`placements and indicators of forward looking supply come down, so
`that was as expected, and we expected the second half of 2009 to be a
`little kinder in the turkey side of the business, but there is still a lot of
`storage, cold storage stocks to go through, we feel comfortable that
`we’ve cleaned up our inventories that we had on hand. Our production
`cuts were more than the decrease in our sales because we did work off
`inventories. I had a feeling the industry will rebound. It's going to take
`a work through of the excess inventories as well as those production
`cuts hitting the marketplace.
`
`25.
`
`On August 20, 2010, Hormel stated, “We think the turkey business has reached a
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`good equilibrium, and we don’t have any major expansion plans and have not heard others in
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`that mode, so I think those conditions should remain favorable into next year.”
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`26.
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`On May 25, 2011, Hormel stated that the turkey industry was maintaining solid
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`pricing based on the information that Hormel was receiving about industry-wide turkey
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`production levels: “We certainly see egg set and poultry placement numbers that take us through
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`the end of this year and a little bit into next fiscal year. But right now, on the basis of those
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`numbers, on the basis of what we see in terms of production in the industry and on the basis of
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`cold storage numbers, coupled with still strong demand on the export side, we feel that the
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`amount of product going to market will support solid pricing on a commodity basis.”
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`27.
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`On August 25, 2011, Hormel stated that the turkey industry was maintaining
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`better discipline than the poultry industry: “The industry as a whole has shown a little better
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`discipline, perhaps, than the other poultry side of the ledger.” This statement is notable because
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`the chicken industry is currently the subject of multiple civil lawsuits as well as a DOJ
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`investigation of potential antitrust violations during this period of time.
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`28.
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`Furthermore, the turkey market has all of the characteristics of a market where
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`information exchange is likely to have anticompetitive effects. Turkey is a fungible product, the
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`market for turkey has price-based competition, the demand for turkey is relatively inelastic, and
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`the turkey market features a trend towards price uniformity.
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`29.
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`The information exchange through Agri Stats did not have the kind of
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`characteristics that would produce procompetitive effects sufficient to outweigh the
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`anticompetitive harms. The information exchange involved current and forward-looking data.
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`Agri Stats regularly prepared monthly reports that contained data that was less than six weeks
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`old. Agri Stats also only allowed companies to access the data if they themselves shared the data,
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`thus ensuring that only defendants and other similarly situated turkey integrators who received
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`the Agri Stats reports were able to use the data.
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`30.
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`During the conspiracy period, the price of turkey spiked dramatically, driven by
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`the anticompetitive effects of the information exchange through Agri Stats regarding turkey
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`production that helped facilitate defendants restraint over the growth in the supply of turkey.
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`31.
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`The information exchange through Agri Stats in fact had anticompetitive effects
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`on the market. Prior to the conspiracy, turkey prices closely tracked the underlying cost of feed,
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`which is the primary input cost in the production of turkey. Beginning in 2009-2010, prices of
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`turkey spiked to an unprecedented level, showing the anticompetitive effects of defendants’
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`information exchange through Agri Stats. Remarkably, as demonstrated in the analysis
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`performed by plaintiffs’ experts, shown in the below chart, prices of turkey quickly returned to
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`match underlying feed costs after litigation was filed in late 2016 in the broiler industry that
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`centered on the anticompetitive use of Agri Stats. Defendants clearly changed their behavior
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`after the commencement of the Broilers litigation, as Tyson dismissed their CEO, Donnie Smith,
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`in late 2016, shortly after the first civil lawsuits were filed.
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`Feed accounts for approximately 60-70% of the cost of raising a turkey.
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`32.
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`Plaintiffs’ experts constructed a regression model based on the underlying feed cost that models
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`what the “but for” price of turkey would have been if the historical relationship between feed and
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`turkey costs had continued during the conspiracy period. The model demonstrates that the
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`anticompetitive information exchange of data regarding turkey production through Agri Stats
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`caused anticompetitive effects in the market for turkey.
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`Class Action Complaint - Case No.:
`010737-11/1219159 V2
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`-12-
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`Case: 1:19-cv-08318 Document #: 1 Filed: 12/19/19 Page 16 of 55 PageID #:16
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`33.
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`As a result of defendants’ unlawful conduct, plaintiffs and the Class paid
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`artificially inflated prices for turkey during the Class Period. Such prices exceeded the amount
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`they would have paid if the price for turkey had been determined by a competitive market. Thus,
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`plaintiffs and class members were injured by defendants’ agreement to exchange information
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`through Agri Stats regarding the turkey market.
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`II.
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`JURISDICTION AND VENUE
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`34.
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`Plaintiffs bring this action under Section 16 of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. § 26) to
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`secure compensatory damages and injunctive relief against defendants for violating Section 1 of
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`the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. § 1). Plaintiffs seek to recover actual and/or compensatory damages,
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`double and treble damages as permitted, pre- and post-judgment interest, costs, and attorneys’
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`fees for the injury caused by defendants’ conduct in restricting the supply of turkey and
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`increasing the price of turkey. Plaintiffs seek damages in excess of $5,000,000. This Court has
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`subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1337, and Sections 4 and 16 of the Clayton
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`Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 15(a) and 26.
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`Class Action Complaint - Case No.:
`010737-11/1219159 V2
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`-13-
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`Case: 1:19-cv-08318 Document #: 1 Filed: 12/19/19 Page 17 of 55 PageID #:17
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`35.
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`Venue is appropriate in this District under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), (c) and (d)
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`because both Kraft Foods and Hillshire Brands are headquartered in the District, and one or more
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`defendants transacted business in this District, is licensed to do business or is doing business in
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`this District, and because a substantial portion of the affected interstate commerce described
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`herein was carried out in this District.
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`36.
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`This Court has personal jurisdiction over each defendant because, inter alia, each
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`defendant: (a) transacted business throughout the United States, including in this District;
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`(b) manufactured, sold, shipped, and/or delivered substantial quantities of turkey throughout the
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`United States, including in this District; (c) had substantial contacts with the United States,
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`including in this District; and/or (d) engaged in an antitrust conspiracy that was directed at and
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`had a direct, foreseeable, and intended effect of causing injury to the business or property of
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`persons residing in, located in, or doing business throughout the United States, including in this
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`District.
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`37.
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`The activities of the defendants and all co-conspirators, as described herein, were
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`within the flow of, were intended to, and did have direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable
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`effects on, the foreign and interstate commerce of the United States.
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`A.
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`Plaintiffs
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`III.
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`PARTIES
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`38.
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`Plaintiff Olean Wholesale Grocery Cooperative, Inc. (Olean Wholesale) is a
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`retailers’ cooperative located in Olean, New York. Its members are independent, family-owned
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`supermarkets. Olean has served supermarkets in Western and Central New York, Western
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`Pennsylvania, and Northeastern Ohio since 1922. Olean Wholesale is a New York corporation
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`with its principal place of business in Olean, New York, and purchased turkey directly from one
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`Class Action Complaint - Case No.:
`010737-11/1219159 V2
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`-14-
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`Case: 1:19-cv-08318 Document #: 1 Filed: 12/19/19 Page 18 of 55 PageID #:18
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`or more defendants during the Class Period and suffered antitrust injury as a result of the
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`violations alleged in this Complaint.
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`39.
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`John Gross and Company, Inc. (John Gross) is a full line food distributor located
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`in Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania. Founded in 1950, the company has been owned and operated
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`by the Gross family for four generations. John Gross is a Pennsylvania corporation with its
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`principal place of business in Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania, and purchased turkey directly from
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`one or more defendants during the Class Period and suffered antitrust injury as a result of the
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`violations alleged in this Complaint.
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`B.
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`Defendants
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`40.
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`Agri Stats, Inc. is an Indiana corporation located in Fort Wayne, Indiana.
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`Throughout the Class Period, Agri Stats acted as a co-conspirator of the turkey integrator
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`defendants by facilitating the exchange of confidential, proprietary, and competitively sensitive
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`data among defendants and their co-conspirators.
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`41.
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`Butterball, LLC is a privately held North Carolina corporation engaged in the
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`production of meat and food products, and the marketing of these products. During the Class
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`Period, Butterball and/or its predecessors, wholly owned or controlled subsidiaries, or affiliates
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`sold turkey in interstate commerce, directly or through its wholly owned or controlled affiliates,
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`to purchasers in the United States.
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`42.
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`Cargill, Inc. is a privately held Delaware corporation headquartered in
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`Minnetonka, Minnesota. During the Class Period, Cargill and/or its predecessors, wholly ow