Case: 1:20-cv-04699 Document #: 224 Filed: 04/27/22 Page 1 of 19 PageID #:11804
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
`EASTERN DIVISION
`
`IN RE: TIKTOK, INC. CONSUMER
`PRIVACY LITIGATION
`
`
`
`
`This Document Relates to All Cases
`
`
`
`MDL No. 2948
`
`Master Docket No. 20 C 4699
`
`Judge John Z. Lee
`
`Magistrate Judge Sunil R. Harjani
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`DEFENDANT TIKTOK INC.’S OPPOSITION TO
`MOTION TO ACCEPT MASS OPT-OUTS
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`CONTENTS
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`I.
`II.
`
`III.
`
`IV.
`V.
`
`VI.
`
`INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................1
`THE SETTLEMENT EXPRESSLY PROHIBITS OPT-OUTS
`SOLICITED AND SUBMITTED EN MASSE ............................................1
`THE COURT’S PRELIMINARY APPROVAL ORDER APPROVED
`AND EXPLAINED THE NEED TO PROHIBIT SOLICITATION OF
`MASS OPT-OUTS ......................................................................................3
`THE MASS OPT-OUTS WERE IMPROPERLY SOLICITED .................5
`THE MASS OPT-OUTS ARE PLAGUED WITH INDIVIDUAL
`DEFECTS ..................................................................................................10
`CONCLUSION ..........................................................................................14
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`AUTHORITIES
`
`CASES
`Allianz Glob. Invs. GMBH v. Bank of Am. Corp.,
`463 F. Supp. 3d 409 (S.D.N.Y. 2020)................................................................................11
`Chalian v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc.,
`No. 16-8979, 2020 WL 7347866 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2020)................................................9
`Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc.,
`160 F.R.D. 478 (E.D. Pa. 1995) .....................................................................................9, 10
`Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard,
`452 U.S. 89 (1981) ...............................................................................................................8
`Hallie v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.,
`No. 12-00235, 2015 WL 1914864 (N.D. Ind. Apr. 27, 2015) .........................................3, 4
`In re CenturyLink Sales Pracs. & Sec. Litig.,
`No. 17-2832, 2020 WL 3512807 (D. Minn. June 29, 2020)............................................3, 4
`In re Chesapeake Energy Corp.,
`--- F. Supp. 3d ----, 2021 WL 4776685 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 13, 2021) ......................................4
`In re Deepwater Horizon,
`819 F.3d 190 (5th Cir. 2016) ...............................................................................................4
`In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig.,
`282 F.3d 220 (3rd Cir. 2002) ...............................................................................................3
`In re Equifax Inc. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig.,
`No. 17-2800, 2020 WL 256132 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 17, 2020) .................................................4
`In re Facebook Biometric Info. Privacy Litig.,
`522 F. Supp. 3d 617 (N.D. Cal. 2021),
`aff’d, No. 15-03747, 2022 WL 822923 (9th Cir. 2022) .......................................................8
`In re Facebook Biometric Info. Privacy Litig.,
`No. 15-03747, ECF No. 487 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 2020) .....................................................8
`In re Four Seasons Sec. Laws Litig.,
`493 F.2d 1288 (10th Cir. 1974) .........................................................................................11
`In re Graniteville Train Derailment,
`No. 05-115, 2010 WL 11229662 (D.S.C. Feb. 8, 2010) ....................................................11
`In re McKesson HBOC, Inc. Sec. Litig.,
`126 F. Supp. 2d 1239 (N.D. Cal. 2000) .............................................................................10
`In re Navistar Maxxforce Engines Mktg. Sales Pracs. & Prods. Liab. Litig.,
`990 F.3d 1048 (7th Cir. 2021) ...........................................................................................11
`
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`In re Oil Spill by Oil Rig Deepwater Horizon in Gulf of Mex.,
`910 F. Supp. 2d 891 (E.D. La. 2012),
`aff’d sub nom. In re Deepwater Horizon, 739 F.3d 790 (5th Cir. 2014) .............................4
`In re Payment Card Interchange Fee & Merch. Disc. Antitrust Litig.,
`No. 05-1720, 2014 WL 4966072 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 3, 2014) ............................................9, 13
`Kleiner v. First Nat’l Bank,
`751 F.2d 1193 (11th Cir. 1985) ...........................................................................................9
`Larson v. AT&T Mobility LLC,
`No. 07-5325, 2009 WL 10689759 (D.N.J. Jan. 16, 2009) ...................................................3
`Mullen v. GLV, Inc.,
`334 F.R.D. 656 (N.D. Ill. 2020) ...........................................................................................8
`Plummer v. Chemical Bank,
`668 F.2d 654 (2d Cir. 1982)...............................................................................................11
`MISCELLANEOUS
`1 Elizabeth J. Cabraser, Litigating Tort Cases § 9:16 (2021) ..........................................................9
`Federal Judicial Center, Manual for Complex Litigation § 21.33 (4th ed. 2004) ............................5
`Federal Judicial Center, Manual for Complex Litigation § 22.922 (4th ed. 2004) ..........................5
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`I.
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`INTRODUCTION
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`Defendant TikTok Inc. (“TikTok”) respectfully opposes the mass motion filed by a few
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`law firms who solicited and submitted 2,254 opt-out requests en masse that were rejected by the
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`Settlement Administrator (ECF No. 207) (the “Motion”). The Motion should be denied because
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`these mass opt-outs are expressly prohibited by the Settlement Agreement for the reasons the Court
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`identified in its September 30, 2021 Memorandum Opinion and Order preliminarily approving the
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`Settlement Agreement (ECF No. 161). These mass opt-outs were also improperly solicited using
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`deceptive advertising that ignored and disregarded the Court-approved class communications. In
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`addition to the problems inherent in the solicitation of mass opt-outs, the motion seeking to validate
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`these opt-outs en masse is being used to mask the fact that the opt-out requests are plagued with
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`individual defects, such that they would have also been rejected on an individual basis. The
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`abundance of defects is yet another ill consequence of the mass opt-out process and provides yet
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`another reason why courts enforce prohibitions on such mass opt-outs.
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`II. THE SETTLEMENT EXPRESSLY PROHIBITS OPT-OUTS SOLICITED
`AND SUBMITTED EN MASSE
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`By way of background, the Settlement Agreement requires the following individual action
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`by each class member seeking to opt-out of the Settlement: (1) “the Class Member must complete,
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`sign, and mail to the Settlement Administrator a Request for Exclusion”; (2) “using a form to be
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`agreed on by the Parties”; and (3) that “must be signed by the Class Member seeking exclusion
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`under penalty of perjury.” Settlement Agreement (“Agmt.”) § 10.1 (emphasis added).
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`The Settlement Agreement further requires that each individual seeking exclusion provide
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`information necessary to confirm their intention, identity, and contact information: “(i) the name
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`of the Action; (ii) the person’s or entity’s full name, address, email address and telephone number;
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`(iii) a specific statement of the person’s or entity’s intention to be excluded from the Settlement;
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`(iv) the identity of the person’s or entity’s counsel, if represented; and (v) the person’s or entity’s
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`authorized representative’s signature and the date on which the request was signed.” Id.
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`The Settlement Agreement expressly disallows “mass” opt-outs that are solicited, prepared,
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`and mailed in by a law firm on behalf of a mass of individuals to opt them out of the settlement:
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`“So-called ‘mass’ or ‘class’ opt-outs shall not be allowed.” Agmt. § 10.1. Different from “class”
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`opt-outs in which one individual seeks to opt-out a class of others without each individual’s
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`personal involvement, “mass” opt-outs occur when numerous individual opt-outs are solicited and
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`submitted jointly as part of a coordinated campaign by the same law firm or group of firms.
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`Pursuant to Section 10.1 of the Settlement Agreement, the parties prepared a Request for
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`Exclusion form that was submitted to the Court for review on April 20, 2021 and then posted to
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`the Settlement Website prior to dissemination of the Class Notice in November 2021. Declaration
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`of Anthony Weibell submitted herewith (“Weibell Decl.”), ¶ 2.
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`During the opt-out period, the Settlement Administrator received just 28 valid individual
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`opt-out requests, but also 4,036 invalid opt-out requests that were submitted en masse by the law
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`firms that filed the present Motion. Id. ¶ 3. Most of these mass opt-outs did not use the approved
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`Exclusion Request form, and at least 1,782 of them were duplicative—filed on behalf of the same
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`person as other requests—leaving 2,254 unique individuals included in the mass opt-outs. Id.
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`Because these 2,254 opt-outs solicited and submitted en masse violated the Settlement’s
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`prohibition against mass opt-outs, the Settlement Administrator rejected them as facially invalid.
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`Although the Settlement Administrator did not thereafter conduct an individual review of
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`each of these opt-outs to determine whether they otherwise complied with the exclusion
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`requirements, a review of the requests submitted with the Motion shows that more than a thousand
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`of them were also individually defective for various reasons, as explained in Section V below.
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`III. THE COURT’S PRELIMINARY APPROVAL ORDER APPROVED AND
`EXPLAINED THE NEED TO PROHIBIT SOLICITATION OF MASS
`OPT-OUTS
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`It is “clearly within the court’s discretion to turn away attempts by lawyers to opt-out class
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`members en masse.” In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., 282 F.3d 220, 241 (3rd Cir. 2002). Courts
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`routinely approve class settlements with prohibitions on mass opt-outs because “[c]lass actions
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`and class settlements would lose their effectiveness if internal struggles among different plaintiffs’
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`lawyers and factions of plaintiffs were paired with an easy way to fragment the class.” Hallie v.
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`Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 12-00235, 2015 WL 1914864, at *4 (N.D. Ind. Apr. 27, 2015).
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`Accordingly, there is an “overwhelming amount of law denying mass opt-outs.” Larson v. AT&T
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`Mobility LLC, No. 07-5325, 2009 WL 10689759, at *3 (D.N.J. Jan. 16, 2009). Courts will also
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`block attempts by law firms seeking to solicit masses of individuals to opt-out of a class settlement.
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`See, e.g., id. (“The Court also finds that [defendant] is not obligated to provide to [opt-out counsel]
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`the names and contact information of each of his class members, such that he might effect an opt-
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`out on behalf of each named individual.”).
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`Here, the Court’s memorandum opinion on preliminary approval explained and approved
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`the need for the Settlement to prohibit solicitation of mass opt-outs by law firms. See ECF No. 161
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`at 30-31. The Court shared the view of other courts that class members should be required to
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`personally complete, sign, and mail in their requests for exclusion because electronic and Internet
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`technology “makes it easier for third parties and their counsel to file unauthorized mass opt-outs.”
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`Id. (quoting In re CenturyLink Sales Pracs. & Sec. Litig., No. 17-2832, 2020 WL 3512807, at *3
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`(D. Minn. June 29, 2020)).
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`Because they lack the traditional attorney-client relationship where a client and attorney
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`individually discuss the client’s individual situation, mass opt-outs are particularly prone to
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`encouraging opt-outs from those who are uninformed, vulnerable, easily-misled, frauds, imposters,
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`double-dippers (i.e., both opting out and submitting a claim under the settlement), or even
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`fictitious. See In re Equifax Inc. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., No. 17-2800, 2020 WL 256132,
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`at *26 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 17, 2020) (“[T]he personal signature requirement decreases the likelihood
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`that services encouraging mass objections or opt-outs file unauthorized or fictitious objections.”).
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`As this Court recognized, mass opt-outs are also “highly indicative of a conclusion that . . .
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`counsel did not spend very much time evaluating the merits of whether or not to opt-out in light
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`of the individual circumstances of each of their clients and in consultation with them.” ECF No.
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`161 at 31 (quoting In re Oil Spill by Oil Rig Deepwater Horizon in Gulf of Mex., 910 F. Supp. 2d
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`891, 939 (E.D. La. 2012), aff’d sub nom. In re Deepwater Horizon, 739 F.3d 790 (5th Cir. 2014));
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`see also Hallie, 2015 WL 1914864, at *4 (the goal of enforcing mass opt-out prohibitions in class
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`settlements is to “heighten[] the likelihood that each class plaintiff will make an informed,
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`individualized decision whether to opt-out, and courts want to encourage this careful
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`decisionmaking process”).
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`The Court further explained that “courts have routinely enforced the requirement that class
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`members individually sign and return a paper opt-out form as ‘vital’ to ensuring ‘that the class
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`member is individually consenting to opt-out.’” ECF No. 161 at 30-31 (quoting CenturyLink, 2020
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`WL 3512807, at *3-4 (collecting cases); citing In re Deepwater Horizon, 819 F.3d 190, 197 (5th
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`Cir. 2016) (noting that this “common and practical requirement” is “consistently enforced” in
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`MDLs)); see also In re Chesapeake Energy Corp., --- F. Supp. 3d ----, 2021 WL 4776685, at *21
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`(S.D. Tex. Oct. 13, 2021) (“Group opt-outs are disfavored, and individual opt-out requirements
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`are not unduly burdensome.”).
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`The prohibition on solicitation of opt-outs en masse is the best and preferred solution to
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`the mass opt-out problem. The alternative, of course, is for defendants to demand a “blow-out” or
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`“blow-up” provision that would terminate the settlement when a certain number of opt-outs is
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`reached. See Federal Judicial Center, Manual for Complex Litigation § 22.922 (4th ed. 2004)
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`(“Defendants often condition a settlement in a Rule 23(b)(3) class on having the number of opt-
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`outs remain at or below a certain percentage or number of absent class members, commonly known
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`as a ‘blow-out’ clause.”). Blow-up provisions are bad for the class because there is a significant
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`risk that mass opt-outs will blow-up the settlement, ruin the benefits of the settlement for the vast
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`majority of class members, and result in a complete waste of the court’s and parties’ settlement-
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`approval efforts. Here, Plaintiffs’ Lead Counsel obtained the optimal result for the Class by
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`negotiating a class settlement that uses a prohibition on solicitation of mass opt-outs in lieu of a
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`blow-up clause to address the mass opt-out problem. See Agmt. § 10.1. This negotiated benefit to
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`all parties cannot be disregarded.
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`Given the express terms of the Settlement Agreement and the Court’s preliminary approval
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`decision, the Settlement Administrator’s rejection of these mass opt-outs should be affirmed.
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`IV. THE MASS OPT-OUTS WERE IMPROPERLY SOLICITED
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`Separate from the submission of mass opt-outs, the manner in which the mass opt-outs here
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`were improperly solicited also illustrates the concerns that courts have raised with mass opt-outs.
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`See Federal Judicial Center, Manual for Complex Litigation § 21.33 (4th ed. 2004) (“Objectors to
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`a class settlement or their attorneys may not communicate misleading or inaccurate statements to
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`class members about the terms of a settlement to induce them to file objections or to opt-out.”).
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`For example, one of the ads run by the law firms who filed the Motion deceptively
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`advertised that TikTok users could “prequalify for possible compensation” as part of a lawsuit
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`against TikTok. But the ad failed to mention that a class settlement had already been reached to
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`provide significant compensation to class members, failed to note that the law firm running the ad
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`was not appointed counsel for class members, failed to note that class members were already being
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`represented in the lawsuit by Class Counsel appointed by the Court, and failed to mention that all
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`U.S. TikTok users automatically qualified for compensation without needing to “prequalify” for
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`compensation:
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`One of the other law firms that filed the Motion distributed a similarly deceptive and
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`misleading solicitation for mass opt-outs. While this solicitation gestures toward the existence of
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`a settlement, it does not include any information on the actual terms of the settlement, much less
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`link to the Court-approved settlement notice or settlement website. Even more problematic, the ad
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`deceptively encourages class members to “seek[] a more significant monetary recovery in private
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`arbitration” without warning class members that any attempt to do so would forever forfeit their
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`right to a payment from the existing Settlement. Nor does the ad warn class members of the very
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`high risk that any individual claims brought in arbitration would fail and result in no recovery at
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`all for the class member. In addition, the ad includes hashtags like “#FreeFromDebt” and
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`“#BankruptcyLaw,” which are otherwise non sequiturs in the context of this privacy matter, and
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`thus appears targeted to class members who are economically vulnerable and more susceptible to
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`misinformation:
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`Such mass solicitations are simply unethical because the law firms seeking to opt-out
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`masses of class members have little to lose and everything to gain, while individual class members
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`who mistakenly respond to these ads may unknowingly forfeit all rights under the Settlement
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`without ever being told the Court has found the Settlement fair, reasonable, and adequate for class
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`members. Notably, both of the above ads appear to have been run after the public announcement
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`of the MDL Settlement but prior to distribution of the Class Settlement Notice by the Settlement
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`Administrator, thereby preempting the Court-approved notice and potentially misdirecting class
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`members to these law firms instead of to the Court-appointed class counsel and the Court-approved
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`notice and settlement website.
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`Courts have criticized such deceptive conduct in the solicitation of mass opt-outs. As noted
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`by another court in this District, “[m]isrepresentations about the suit to class members gives rise
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`to ‘an obvious potential for confusion and/or adversely affecting the administration of justice’ in
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`class proceedings.” Mullen v. GLV, Inc., 334 F.R.D. 656, 661-62 (N.D. Ill. 2020) (quoting Gulf
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`Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 100 n.12 (1981)). Moreover, “[c]ommunications that are
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`potentially coercive by encouraging individuals to opt-out can affect a class member’s decision to
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`participate in the suit, undermining Rule 23’s policy of ensuring that this is an informed choice
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`based on unbiased information.” Id. (collecting cases).
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`Indeed, in the Facebook BIPA class action frequently cited in the settlement approval
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`papers here, a law firm that engaged in similar conduct was made to cease solicitation and to send
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`a curative notice to the thousands of class members who had responded to their misleading
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`solicitation of mass opt-outs. See In re Facebook Biometric Info. Privacy Litig., 522 F. Supp. 3d
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`617, 623 (N.D. Cal. 2021), aff’d, No. 15-03747, 2022 WL 822923 (9th Cir. 2022); Tr. of
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`Proceedings at 13:14-16, In re Facebook Biometric Info. Privacy Litig., No. 15-03747 (N.D. Cal.
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`Sept. 22, 2020), ECF No. 487 (ads soliciting opt-outs “cannot be disruptive” to the settlement).
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`Similarly, courts have held that “[i]mproper communications from non-parties that attempt
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`to do an end run around the court-approved notice of settlement are particularly concerning: the
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`class notice is ‘crucial to the entire scheme of Rule 23’ in that it provides a neutral description that
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`enables class members to conduct an ‘independent analysis of their own self-interest’ in
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`determining whether to object to or opt-out of a settlement.” Chalian v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc., No.
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`16-8979, 2020 WL 7347866, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2020) (quoting Georgine v. Amchem Prods.,
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`Inc., 160 F.R.D. 478, 490 (E.D. Pa. 1995)). One U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals further decried the
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`biased “one-sided” nature of ads soliciting mass opt outs: “Unsupervised, unilateral
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`communications with the plaintiff class sabotage the goal of informed consent by urging exclusion
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`on the basis of a one-sided presentation of the facts, without opportunity for rebuttal.” Kleiner v.
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`First Nat’l Bank, 751 F.2d 1193, 1203 (11th Cir. 1985). Accordingly, “courts have taken various
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`curative actions to prevent court-approved class notification materials from being nullified by
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`competing and inaccurate information.” In re Payment Card Interchange Fee & Merch. Disc.
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`Antitrust Litig., No. 05-1720, 2014 WL 4966072, at *31 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 3, 2014) (collecting cases).
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`To make matters worse, certain law firms will now use new Internet technology to make
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`mass opt-outs appear like individually signed opt-outs and give the appearance that class members
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`have made an individually-considered decision to opt out in consultation with counsel. See
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`1 Elizabeth J. Cabraser, Litigating Tort Cases § 9:16 (2021) (“Unauthorized opt-out campaigns
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`are nothing new to class action settlements . . . . However, the era of the Internet has enabled
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`increasingly cheap and far-ranging opt-out campaigns to be launched, challenging the ability and
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`will of the courts to protect the integrity of the class certification and settlement notification
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`process by ensuring that only court-authorized, complete and accurate communications reach class
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`members.”). Using such technology, the law firms here seem to have run online ads to solicit
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`names, contact information, and consent from class members and then used this information to
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`automatically generate
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`individual requests for exclusion with electronically generated
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`“signatures.”
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`This technology does not change the fact that these firms are still soliciting and submitting
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`opt-out requests en masse to disrupt the Court-approved settlement. All of the same concerns
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`discussed with traditional mass opt-outs still apply to these mass-auto-generated individual
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`electronic opt-outs. See In re McKesson HBOC, Inc. Sec. Litig., 126 F. Supp. 2d 1239, 1244, 1246
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`(N.D. Cal. 2000) (“The court is particularly troubled by the distribution of a ‘notice’ not authorized
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`by the court and by the assembly-line pre-authorization of class ‘opt-outs.’”); Georgine, 160
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`F.R.D. at 490, 497 (voiding opt-outs solicited en masse by non-settling lawyers who “exposed
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`class members to one-sided, misleading claims that likely will prohibit a ‘free and unfettered’
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`decision to opt-out of the class”).
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`As in the cases cited above, the mass opt-outs here should be rejected for improperly
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`seeking to disrupt the Rule 23 class action process and the court-approved class settlement.
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`V. THE MASS OPT-OUTS ARE PLAGUED WITH INDIVIDUAL DEFECTS
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`In addition to the problems inherent in the solicitation and submission of mass opt-outs,
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`the motion to validate these opt-outs en masse is being used to mask the fact that the individual
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`opt-out forms are plagued with individual defects that would have disqualified them on an
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`individual basis. Notably, the Settlement Administrator initially received 4,036 opt-out requests
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`en masse from these laws firms but later discovered that at least 1,782 of them were duplicative of
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`each other, leaving just 2,254 non-duplicative opt-out requests. Because the Settlement
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`Administrator rejected all of these for violating the Settlement’s prohibition on mass opt-outs, none
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`of them were individually reviewed by the Settlement Administrator for compliance with the
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`Settlement terms and Preliminary Approval Order. However, a review of the exhibits to the Motion
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`shows that at least 1,037 of them suffer from various defects. See Weibell Decl., Ex. A.
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`Class members seeking to have their opt-outs accepted by the Court bear an individual
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`burden to show the Court that they submitted a valid opt-out request. Allianz Glob. Invs. GMBH
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`v. Bank of Am. Corp., 463 F. Supp. 3d 409, 438 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (“The class member must show
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`that [opt-out] notice was effectively and timely communicated.”); In re Graniteville Train
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`Derailment, No. 05-115, 2010 WL 11229662, at *2 (D.S.C. Feb. 8, 2010) (“It is Plaintiff’s burden
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`to prove that he properly opted-out of the class settlement.”). Notably, the Motion relies on dated,
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`out-of-circuit authority to argue that any “reasonable indication” of an intent to opt-out will suffice.
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`See Mot. at 11 (quoting In re Four Seasons Sec. Laws Litig., 493 F.2d 1288, 1291 (10th Cir. 1974);
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`Plummer v. Chemical Bank, 668 F.2d 654 (2d Cir. 1982)). But the Seventh Circuit has explicitly
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`rejected Four Seasons and Plummer’s “reasonable indication” approach as “difficult if not
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`impossible to administer,” recognizing that defects matter. In re Navistar Maxxforce Engines
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`Mktg. Sales Pracs. & Prods. Liab. Litig., 990 F.3d 1048, 1052 (7th Cir. 2021). “Following
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`mechanical rules is the only sure way to handle suits with thousands of class members.” Id. at 105.
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`Here, the 2,254 individuals who are a part of the mass motion to have their opt-outs
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`validated by the Court have not met their individual burden of proof, and many of them have no
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`hope of doing so because their requests are missing required information and elements.1
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`1 The law firms that filed the Motion have suggested that the defects in their submissions should
`be excused because the full list of required information was not listed in the FAQs and Class Notice
`on the Settlement Website, even though it was listed in multiple other places on the Settlement
`Website (namely, the Settlement Agreement, the Court’s order granting preliminary approval, and
`the “Exclusion Form” on the website). Such an argument is easily rejected because the Motion
`itself lists the requirements, admits the law firms knew what information was required, and claims
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`Case: 1:20-cv-04699 Document #: 224 Filed: 04/27/22 Page 16 of 19 PageID #:11819
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`Many of the mass forms are not just missing information, but actually contain fictitious
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`information, such as the demonstrably fictitious phone number made up entirely of the number
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`“5.” ECF No. 208-2 at 216. Other opt-out requests are even more egregious. For example, one of
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`the purported opt-outs submitted by these firms was filled out and signed by a class member with
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`the fictious name “wob wob!!!!!” (exclamation marks included in the name field and in the
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`electronic signature), and another was filled out and signed by “JaydenDropemOff frog” (though
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`the signature inexplicably reads “BIG DOA”):
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`ECF No. 208 at 85, 131. It is difficult to believe that opt-outs signed “wob wob!!!!!” and “BIG
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`DOA” were the result of an informed, individual discussion with counsel about the pros and cons
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`of opting out of the Settlement.
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`Beyond the 1,782 duplicate opt-out requests caught by the Settlement Administrator, the
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`exhibits to the Motion still contained several duplicates that raise troubling questions about how
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`these opt-out requests were harvested and prepared. Some individuals appear to have signed
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`multiple different opt-out forms on the same day. See ECF No. 208-2 at 64, 234, 434; id. at 62,
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`that their opt-out requests contained all of this required information. See Mot. at 2 (“Movants,
`following the Court’s Preliminary Approval Order (“Order”) (Dkt. 162 ) and the class Notice
`instructions, submitted their individual exclusion requests, within each of the 2,254 exclusions
`stating: (i) the name of the Action; (ii) the person’s or entity’s full name, address, email address
`and telephone number; (iii) a specific statement of the person’s or entity’s intention to be excluded
`from the Settlement; (iv) the identity of the person’s or entity’s counsel, if represented; and (v) the
`person’s or entity’s authorized representative’s signature and the date on which the request was
`signed.”). If these law firms were unsure about the requirements, they could always just use the
`Exclusion Form provided on the website or email the Settlement Administrator for clarification.
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`Case: 1:20-cv-04699 Document #: 224 Filed: 04/27/22 Page 17 of 19 PageID #:11820
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`265, 273. Although counsel for the opt-outs claims these are merely erroneous duplicates (see ECF
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`No. 220 ¶ 4), upon inspection, there are discernable differences in the signatures and layouts of
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`the forms. Such discrepancies suggest that the forms submitted to the Court with the Motion may
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`not be the same documents presented to these class members for signature (if any forms were
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`actually signed at all), but rather may have been pieced together by the law firm to add required
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`information after the fact.
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`In addition to duplicate opt-out forms, many individuals listed as opt-outs later personally
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`submitted a claim form under penalty of perjury to the Settlement Administrator to receive a
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`payment from the Settlement, thereby contradicting and superseding their request for exclusion.
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`Weibell Decl. ¶ 3. To include such individuals in the Motion to validate their opt outs is fraudulent.
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`Raising even more questions, the opt-out law firms filed a supplemental declaration more
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`than a week after their motion in which they admit that they entirely omitted the opt-out requests
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`for fourteen of their clients and belatedly seek to have those requests validated three months after
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`the deadline. See ECF No. 220 ¶ 5; ECF No. 220-1. Such untimely requests should be disregarded.
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`Moreover, their supplemental declaration compounds—rather than resolves—the confusion
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`created by the initial filing, as even this limited batch of tardy opt-outs presents a variety of facial
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`defects. For instance, there are forms that lack essential address information, such as city and state
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`(ECF No. 220-1 at 5) or street address (id. at 3). One entry even reads as follows: “My full address
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`is: N/A (UNABLE TO SUBMIT FORM WITHOUT SIGNING THIS PAGE).” Id. at 15.
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`The abundance of defects in the mass opt-outs provide an independent basis on which the
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`Court should deny the Motion and another good reason why courts enforce prohibitions on such
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`mass opt-outs.
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`VI. CONCLUSION
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`For all these reasons, the Motion should be denied. However, because class members may
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`have been victims of the law firms that solicited their opt-outs en masse, TikTok does not object
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`to providing a 14-day or other reasonable time period for the individuals listed in the Motion to
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`participate in the Settlement and obtain a monetary recovery by submitting a claim to the
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`Settlement Administrator.
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`
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`DATED: April 27, 2022
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`Respectfully submitted,
`
`WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI
`Professional Corporation
`
`
`By: /s/Anthony J Weibell
`Anthony J Weibell
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`Lead Counsel for all Defendants
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`Case: 1:20-cv-04699 Document #: 224 Filed: 04/27/22 Page 19 of 19 PageID #:11822
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`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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`I hereby certify that on April 27, 2022, the foregoing document was filed electronically
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`through the Court’s Electronic Case Filing System. Service of this document is being made upon
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`all counsel