Case: 1:20-cv-05253 Document #: 1 Filed: 09/04/20 Page 1 of 145 PageID #:1
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`
`
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
`EASTERN DIVISION
`
`
`BOB EVANS FARMS, INC.
`
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`v.
`
`
` Case No: 1:20-cv-05253
`
`
`
`
`COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR
`JURY TRIAL
`
`
`
`TYSON FOODS, INC.; TYSON CHICKEN,
`INC.; TYSON BREEDERS, INC.; TYSON
`POULTRY, INC.; PILGRIM’S PRIDE
`CORPORATION; KOCH FOODS, INC.; JCG
`FOODS OF ALABAMA, LLC; JCG FOODS
`OF GEORGIA, LLC; KOCH MEAT CO., INC.;
`SANDERSON FARMS, INC.; SANDERSON
`FARMS, INC. (FOOD DIVISION);
`SANDERSON FARMS, INC. (PRODUCTION
`DIVISION); SANDERSON FARMS, INC.
`(PROCESSING DIVISION); HOUSE OF
`RAEFORD FARMS, INC.; MAR-JAC
`POULTRY, INC.; PERDUE FARMS, INC.;
`PERDUE FOODS, LLC; WAYNE FARMS,
`LLC; GEORGE’S, INC.; GEORGE’S FARMS,
`INC.; SIMMONS FOODS, INC.; SIMMONS
`PREPARED FOODS, INC.; O.K. FOODS,
`INC.; O.K. FARMS, INC.; O.K. INDUSTRIES,
`INC.; PECO FOODS, INC.; HARRISON
`POULTRY, INC.; FOSTER FARMS, LLC;
`FOSTER POULTRY FARMS; CLAXTON
`POULTRY FARMS, INC.; MOUNTAIRE
`FARMS, INC.; MOUNTAIRE FARMS, LLC;
`MOUNTAIRE FARMS OF DELAWARE, INC.;
`AGRI STATS, INC.; AMICK FARMS, LLC;
`CASE FOODS, INC.; CASE FARMS, LLC; and
`CASE FARMS PROCESSING, INC.
`
` Defendants.
`
`
`
`

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`Case: 1:20-cv-05253 Document #: 1 Filed: 09/04/20 Page 2 of 145 PageID #:2
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`
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`I.
`
`NATURE OF THE ACTION...........................................................................................1
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`Defendants Unlawfully Agreed to Curtail the Supply of Chicken .........................2
`
`Defendants Unlawfully Agreed to Manipulate Price and Contract
`Negotiations and Artificially Inflate the Georgia Dock .........................................6
`
`II.
`
`PARTIES ........................................................................................................................8
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`Plaintiff ................................................................................................................8
`
`Defendants ...........................................................................................................9
`
`(i)
`
`(ii)
`
`(iii)
`
`(iv)
`
`(v)
`
`The Tyson Defendants ..............................................................................9
`
`Pilgrim’s Pride Corporation .................................................................... 10
`
`The Koch Defendants ............................................................................. 10
`
`The Sanderson Farms Defendants ........................................................... 11
`
`House of Raeford Farms, Inc. ................................................................. 12
`
`(vi) Mar-Jac Poultry, Inc. .............................................................................. 12
`
`(vii) The Perdue Defendants ........................................................................... 12
`
`(viii) Wayne Farms, LLC ................................................................................ 13
`
`(ix)
`
`(x)
`
`(xi)
`
`The George’s Defendants ....................................................................... 13
`
`Simmons Foods ...................................................................................... 14
`
`The O.K. Foods Defendants .................................................................... 14
`
`(xii)
`
`Peco Foods, Inc. ..................................................................................... 15
`
`(xiii) Harrison Poultry, Inc. ............................................................................. 15
`
`(xiv) Foster Farms ........................................................................................... 15
`
`(xv) Claxton Poultry Farms, Inc. .................................................................... 16
`
`(xvi) The Mountaire Farms Defendants ........................................................... 16
`
`(xvii) Amick Farms, LLC ................................................................................. 17
`
`(xviii) The Case Foods Defendants .................................................................... 17
`
`(xix) Agri Stats ............................................................................................... 18
`
`III.
`
`AGENTS AND CO-CONSPIRATORS ......................................................................... 20
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`C.
`
`122367075.6
`
`Producer Co-Conspirator Allen Harim ............................................................... 20
`
`Producer Co-Conspirator Keystone Foods .......................................................... 21
`
`Producer Co-Conspirator Fieldale Farms Corporation ........................................ 21
`
`i
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`
`
`IV.
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`JURISDICTION AND VENUE..................................................................................... 32
`
`V.
`
`TRADE AND COMMERCE ......................................................................................... 33
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`Background on the Broiler Chicken Market ....................................................... 33
`
`The United States Broiler Market is a National Market Comprising Tens
`of Billions of Dollars’ Worth of Annual Sales .................................................... 34
`
`VI.
`
`FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS REGARDING DEFENDANTS’ UNLAWFUL
`CONSPIRACY.............................................................................................................. 36
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`C.
`
`Overview of Defendants’ Illegal Conspiracy ...................................................... 36
`
`Agri Stats Participated in, and Actively Facilitated, Defendants’
`Communications Among Themselves, and Provided Data Necessary to
`Effectuate, Monitor and Enforce the Conspiracy ................................................ 39
`
`Agri Stats’ Detailed Reports Enable Defendants to Accurately Assess and
`Monitor Their Competitors’ Production Levels and Breeder Flocks ................... 45
`
`(i)
`
`(ii)
`
`Agri Stats’ Critical Role in the Chicken Industry .................................... 49
`
`Defendants’ Public Statements Show the Relevance of Agri Stats’
`Data to their Collective Efforts to Cut Production ................................... 51
`
`D.
`
`Defendants’ Conspiracy Artificially Increased and Maintained Chicken
`Prices ................................................................................................................. 55
`
`(i)
`
`(ii)
`
`The State of the U.S. Chicken Market Prior to the Conspiracy –
`2007 ....................................................................................................... 55
`
`Defendants Depart from Historical Practice by Collectively
`Reducing Breeder Flocks in Unprecedented Amounts Beginning in
`2008 ....................................................................................................... 57
`
`(a)
`
`(b)
`
`(c)
`
`(d)
`
`(e)
`
`Defendants’ Executives Publicly Decry the Effect of
`Oversupply on “Our Industry,” Telling their Competitors
`that Unified Action Was Necessary ............................................. 59
`
`Defendants Begin to Cut Production in Concert .......................... 61
`
`Defendants’ Chicken Production Cuts, from 2008 to Early
`2009, Included Unprecedented Reductions to Chicken
`Breeder Flocks ............................................................................ 70
`
`Defendants’ Conspiracy, Hatched in the Great Recession
`Continued into 2011 With Another Round of Collective
`Production Cuts .......................................................................... 72
`
`Drastically-Reduced Breeder Flocks Boost Chicken Prices
`and Raise Defendants’ Profits to Record Levels .......................... 83
`
`
`
`ii
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`(iii)
`
`Collusively Manipulating the Georgia Dock Benchmark Price
`Index ...................................................................................................... 91
`
`(a)
`
`(b)
`
`(c)
`
`Overview of the Georgia Dock, USDA Composite, Urner
`Barry, and EMI Chicken Price Indices ........................................ 92
`
`The Georgia Dock Pricing Methodology and Its
`Susceptibility to Manipulation ................................................... 93
`
`Georgia Dock Prices Diverged From the USDA Composite
`and Urner Barry Price Indices Beginning in 2013 ...................... 103
`
`E.
`
`The Structure and Characteristics of the Chicken Market Make it Highly
`Susceptible to Collusion ................................................................................... 105
`
`(i)
`
`(ii)
`
`(iii)
`
`(iv)
`
`(v)
`
`Highly-Concentrated Market with Vertically-Integrated Producers ....... 105
`
`The Market for Broilers is Characterized by Inelastic Supply and
`Demand ................................................................................................ 108
`
`There are no Significant Substitutes for Broiler Chickens ..................... 109
`
`The Broiler Industry Has Experienced High Consolidation and is
`Highly Concentrated ............................................................................. 109
`
`The Broiler Industry Has a History of Government Investigations
`and Collusive Actions. .......................................................................... 111
`
`(vi)
`
`Defendants Had Numerous Opportunities to Collude ............................ 113
`
`(a)
`
`(b)
`
`(c)
`
`(d)
`
`Trade Associations .................................................................... 113
`
`Overseas Distribution Solutions ................................................ 118
`
`Investor Conferences................................................................. 119
`
`Competitor Plant Tours ............................................................. 120
`
`(e) Merger, Acquisition, and Capital Financing Discussions ........... 121
`
`(f)
`
`Other Business Dealings ........................................................... 121
`
`(vii) High Barriers to Entry .......................................................................... 121
`
`(viii) Defendants Have Similar Cost Structures and Work
`Collaboratively to Share Cost Information ............................................ 124
`
`F.
`
`Defendants Collusively Adopted Additional Strategies to Reinforce Their
`Conspiracy ....................................................................................................... 126
`
`(i)
`
`(ii)
`
`A Collective Shift Away from Long-Term Fixed-Price Contracts ......... 126
`
`Inter-Defendant Sales ........................................................................... 128
`
`(iii) Atypical Increases in Defendants’ Exporting of Chickens ..................... 130
`
`G.
`
`The Statute of Limitations Does Not Bar Plaintiff’s Claims.............................. 131
`
`(i)
`
`Plaintiff Did Not Discover (and Could Not Have Discovered) the
`Conspiracy Until 2016 or Later............................................................. 131
`
`iii
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`
`
`(ii)
`
`(iii)
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`Defendants Actively Concealed Their Conspiracy ................................ 133
`
`Plaintiff’s Claims Were Tolled by the Direct Purchaser Class
`Action Complaint Filed in 2016 ............................................................ 135
`
`VII. ANTITRUST IMPACT ............................................................................................... 136
`
`VIII. CLAIMS FOR RELIEF AND CAUSES OF ACTION ................................................. 136
`
`VIOLATION OF 15 U.S.C. § 1 (AGAINST ALL
`COUNT I
`DEFENDANTS) .............................................................................................. 136
`
`
`
`
`
`iv
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`

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`Plaintiff Bob Evans Farms, Inc. (“Bob Evans” or “Plaintiff”) brings this action against the
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`Defendants identified below for Defendants’ illegal conspiracy, which increased the prices of
`
`chicken sold in the United States. Plaintiff brings this action for treble damages under the antitrust
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`laws including Section 1 of the Sherman Act. Plaintiff demands a trial by jury in which it will
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`seek treble damages from Defendants, who are jointly and severally liable for Plaintiff’s purchases
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`of chicken from at least as early as 2008 through at least as late as 2017.
`
`I.
`
`NATURE OF THE ACTION
`
`1.
`
`This case concerns the United States broiler chicken industry. As set out herein,
`
`Defendants – largely comprising chicken producers – conspired and combined to unlawfully and
`
`artificially inflate the price of chicken, beginning at least as early as 2008 through at least as late
`
`as 2017 (generally referred to herein as the “relevant period”). Through the unlawful agreements
`
`and coordinated conduct alleged in this Complaint, Defendants successfully implemented supra-
`
`competitive chicken prices that Plaintiff and other purchasers throughout the United States were
`
`required to pay.
`
`2.
`
`Defendants’ restraint of trade was implemented through several mechanisms during
`
`the relevant period. Among other things, Defendants conspired to artificially inflate broiler
`
`chicken prices and increase their profits by coordinated reductions in the supply of broiler
`
`chickens, manipulation of price and contract negotiations with buyers, and manipulation of price
`
`indices that Defendants falsely touted as reliable benchmarks in order to justify the inflated chicken
`
`prices that buyers were required to pay.
`
`3.
`
`One of the participants in the alleged conspiracy, Producer Co-Conspirator Fieldale
`
`Farms, has already agreed to pay $2.25 million to settle claims by a putative class of direct
`
`purchasers alleging that Fieldale Farms participated in this conspiracy.
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`
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`1
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`4.
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`Moreover, both the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and the Antitrust Section
`
`of the Florida Attorney General’s office are currently investigating the industry for anticompetitive
`
`practices. To date, the DOJ’s Investigation has resulted in an indictment being filed in the District
`
`of Colorado against individuals from Defendants, Pilgrim’s Pride and Claxton Poultry.
`
`Specifically, the Indictment charges Jayson Penn, President and CEO of Pilgrim’s Pride, Mikell
`
`Fries, President of Claxton, Scott Brady, Vice President of Claxton, and Roger Austin, Vice
`
`President of Pilgrim’s Pride, for conspiring “to suppress and eliminate competition by rigging bids
`
`and fixing prices and other price-related terms for broiler chicken products sold in the United
`
`States” in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.1
`
`A.
`
`5.
`
`Defendants Unlawfully Agreed to Curtail the Supply of Chicken
`
`Broiler chickens constitute approximately 98% of all chicken meat sold in the
`
`United States. Defendants are among the leading suppliers of chicken in an industry with over
`
`$30 billion in annual wholesale revenue, and are among those who control approximately 90% of
`
`the wholesale chicken market. The industry is highly concentrated, with a small number of large
`
`producers in the United States controlling supply.
`
`6.
`
`One aspect of Defendants’ scheme curtailed the supply of chickens in the market
`
`via unprecedented cuts at the top of the supply chain in the form of collusively reducing “breeder
`
`flocks” that produce chickens ultimately slaughtered for meat consumption. Historically, when
`
`faced with low market prices, Defendants relied primarily on mechanisms that temporarily reduced
`
`production – at the middle or end of the supply chain, such as reducing eggs placements, killing
`
`newly-hatched chicks, or idling processing plants – but which still allowed them to ramp up
`
`production within weeks if chicken prices increased.
`
`
`1 United States of America v. Jayson Jeffrey Penn et al., Crim. Action No. 20-cr-00152-PAB (D. Col. June 2, 2020)
`[D.E. 1].
`
`
`
`2
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`

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`7.
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`Historically, the chicken industry was marked by boom and bust cycles where, in
`
`response to rising prices, producers increased production, which caused an oversupply and
`
`resulting decrease in pricing. However, that market pattern changed markedly in 2008. By their
`
`wrongful conduct as alleged in this complaint, Defendants not only materially reduced or
`
`eliminated the historical boom and bust cycle of the chicken industry, they propped up chicken
`
`prices during periods of rapidly falling input costs by, among other means, coordinating supply
`
`restrictions and manipulating one or more Broiler price indices.
`
`8.
`
`The historic pattern of annual increases in chicken production became so
`
`entrenched over decades of experience that by the 2000s, a widely-repeated industry refrain was
`
`that the market would grow by 3% more broilers per year. A leading industry publication noted
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`in early 2009 that chicken “production in the U.S. used to be just like government spending, it
`
`never went down and cutbacks only resulted in slowing the rate of growth, but not anymore,”
`
`because for “the first time in decades, total broiler production in 2008 remained virtually
`
`unchanged from the year before. WATT POULTRYUSA 2008 rankings data show the industry’s
`
`total weekly ready-to-cook (RTC) production at 724.05 million pounds, just slightly more than the
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`723.71 million RTC pounds per week reported at the end of 2007.”
`
`9.
`
`In 2008, faced with dropping prices and low profits, Defendants collectively began
`
`cutting their ability to ramp up production by materially reducing their breeder flocks. While in
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`the past, Defendants undertook traditional, short-term production cuts, this was a significant shift
`
`in their behavior. Defendants’ collective market-changing cuts to breeder flocks – a first round
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`from 2008 to early 2009, and a subsequent round from 2011 to 2012 as the conspiracy continued
`
`into the current decade – effectively eliminated their ability to meaningfully increase supply for
`
`years.
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`3
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`10.
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`Defendants’ joint efforts to impose supply-side “discipline” included public
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`statements by their senior executives about a Defendant’s individual commitment to production
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`cuts as well as the importance of instituting and maintaining this “discipline” within the industry
`
`as a whole. Defendants’ public statements on the need for, and benefits of, industry-wide supply
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`“discipline” marked a significant departure from past industry practice.
`
`11.
`
`Defendants’ coordinated output restriction scheme was successfully facilitated by,
`
`monitored and policed using reports purchased, at significant cost, from Defendant Agri Stats, Inc.
`
`(“Agri Stats”), which in 2013 became a subsidiary of global pharmaceutical company Eli Lilly &
`
`Co. Agri Stats collects detailed, proprietary data from all Defendants and their Producer Co-
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`Conspirators, including housing used, breed of chicks, average size, and production and breeder
`
`flock levels. Although certain Defendants had used Agri Stats before 2008, the output-restriction
`
`part of Defendants’ conspiracy began when Defendant Tyson Foods – which had stopped using
`
`Agri Stats sometime in the mid- 2000s – became a subscriber again in early 2008.
`
`12. While the Agri Stats reports superficially “anonymize” individual producer
`
`information, they are sufficiently detailed so that any reasonably informed producer may discern
`
`the identity of its competitors’ information, including breeder flocks, and other production,
`
`capacity and cost data. Agri Stats, as detailed below, plays both a unique role in the chicken
`
`industry and an important role in the conspiracy alleged here, by willfully enabling Defendants
`
`and their Producer Co-Conspirators to know what each of them were doing in furtherance of the
`
`concerted action among the producers.
`
`13.
`
`The information available to Defendants in these Agri Stats reports is not the kind
`
`of information that, in a competitive market, would be disclosed by one competitor to another.
`
`Agri Stats reports include individual lines (sometimes called “rows”) of facility-level data for over
`
`
`
`4
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`

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`
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`100 of Defendants’ chicken integrated production facilities. Most of these vast facilities, referred
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`to as “complexes,” include housing for Defendants’ breeder flocks and hatcheries where breeder
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`flock hens lay the eggs that will ultimately become the chickens sold to the market.
`
`14.
`
`The Agri Stats reports identify each complex with unique numbers, including a
`
`coding system identifying the region and sub-region, for each chicken complex, with the cover
`
`pages of each sub-regional report identifying by name the companies whose complexes are
`
`covered in the report itself. For example, “Region 20” includes “Sub-Region 21 – Upper Mid
`
`Atlantic,” identifying, with a unique number, sixteen chicken complexes, including four Tyson
`
`complexes, four Perdue complexes, three Mountaire complexes, two Pilgrim’s Pride complexes,
`
`and one George’s complex.2
`
`15.
`
`Agri Stats’ reports are not publicly available and Producer Defendants and Producer
`
`Co-Conspirators closely guard from those outside the industry the reports’ contents and the degree
`
`of Producer Defendants’ and Producer Co-Conspirators’ participation in Agri Stats’ data-gathering
`
`and data-dissemination processes. Producer Defendants and Producer Co-Conspirators have
`
`reported detailed data to Agri Stats on a regular basis (usually weekly).
`
`16.
`
`Agri Stats both facilitated and participated in the conspiracy because, among other
`
`things:
`
`• Agri Stats’ coding system enabled Producer Defendants’ and Producer Co-
`Conspirators’ personnel to decipher, simply by eyeballing the “rows” in a given
`report, the production, feed, sales and other competitively-sensitive metrics of
`their competitors, many of whom had complexes “right down the road from”
`each other in the same Agri Stats sub- region;
`
`
`2 Agri Stats reports also include specific data for Defendants’ chicken complexes (listed by producer and location) in:
`North Carolina (“Sub-Region 22”); Northern Georgia and Tennessee (“Sub-Region 31”); Southern Georgia, Florida
`and South Carolina (“Sub-Region 32”); Alabama and Mississippi (sub-regions 41 and 42); lower Arkansas, Louisiana
`and Texas (“Sub- Region 51”); upper Arkansas and Missouri (“Sub-Region 52”); Kentucky, Ohio, Minnesota, Indiana
`and Wisconsin (“Sub-Region 60”); and California and the Pacific Northwest (“Region 10)” (which is composed solely
`of Defendant Foster Farms’ three complexes).
`
`
`
`5
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`
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`• Agri Stats’ regular meetings with each Producer Defendant and Producer Co-
`Conspirator allowed Agri Stats to share production information among the
`Defendants. For example, mid-level Tyson personnel working at complexes in
`the Mid-Atlantic region were advised by their complex managers about
`competitors’ production following quarterly meetings between the Tyson
`complex managers and Agri Stats account managers; and
`
`• Agri Stats account managers created, for each of their Producer Defendant and
`Producer Co-Conspirator customers, a series of data compilations known as
`“books,” based on the competitively- sensitive data that a particular Defendant
`had submitted to Agri Stats. On a number of occasions, Agri Stats personnel
`sent copies of one Defendant’s “books” to other Defendants.
`
`B.
`
`Defendants Unlawfully Agreed to Manipulate Price and Contract Negotiations
`and Artificially Inflate the Georgia Dock
`
`17.
`
`Defendants’ conspiracy to illegally increase and maintain chicken prices was also
`
`achieved through the coordinated manipulation of prices offered for contracts and for the sale of
`
`Broiler products, as well as the artificial inflation of prices on the “Georgia Dock,” a widely used
`
`weekly benchmark price compiled and published by the Georgia Department of Agriculture (the
`
`“GDA”). Unlike other price indices available to chicken buyers, the Georgia Dock benchmark
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`price is a self-reported number from a group of at least ten chicken producers (Defendants
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`Pilgrim’s Pride, Tyson, Perdue, Sanderson Farms, Koch Foods, Claxton Poultry, Harrison Poultry,
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`Mar-Jac and Wayne Farms and co-conspirator Fieldale Farms). Senior executives from eight of
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`the ten companies who participated in the Georgia Dock price submission prices (hereinafter, the
`
`“Georgia Dock Defendants”3) were members of a private sector “Georgia Dock Advisory Board,”
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`which played a role in the compilation and manipulation of the Georgia Dock benchmark price.
`
`18.
`
`Following intense scrutiny – first in mid-2016 from the U.S. Department of
`
`Agriculture (“USDA”), and then by the press, which in late 2016 first revealed the easily
`
`manipulated methodology used to create the Georgia Dock benchmark price – the GDA, on
`
`
`3 Fieldale Farms Corporation has not been named as a Defendant in this Complaint but is a Defendant in other pending
`Complaints based on similar allegations.
`
`
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`6
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`November 28, 2016, suspended reporting the Georgia Dock benchmark price. The GDA
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`considered implementing new price-reporting requirements, including the submission of an
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`affidavit by each Georgia Dock Defendant vouching for the accuracy of their submitted price
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`inputs. However, the Georgia Dock Defendants balked at these new rules, so in late November
`
`2016, the GDA stopped publishing the Georgia Dock benchmark index altogether, citing a “lack
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`of submissions” under the new reporting requirements.
`
`19.
`
`The November 23, 2016 Georgia Dock benchmark whole-bird price of $1.0975/lb.
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`was the last one reported by the GDA. The GDA later introduced a new index called the “Georgia
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`Premium Poultry Price Index,” which purported to be a more transparent, accurate, and verifiable
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`pricing mechanism – but abandoned the new index in February 2017 due to a lack of participation
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`by chicken producers. The Antitrust Section of the Florida Attorney General’s office is currently
`
`investigating the chicken industry for anticompetitive practices, including the manipulation of the
`
`Georgia Dock.
`
`20.
`
`Defendants’ conduct has led to public reports of Defendants’ anticompetitive
`
`behavior. For instance, stock market analysis service Seeking Alpha reported in November 2016,
`
`in an article titled “Evidence Of Chicken Price Manipulation: The Curious Case Of The Georgia
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`Dock,” that the chicken companies (including Pilgrim’s Pride, Tyson, and Sanderson) “may be
`
`manipulating the Georgia Dock price index in order to receive a much higher price than real market
`
`prices.” Seeking Alpha noted that Defendants’ conduct surrounding this price index manipulation
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`“has accounted for >100% of earnings for pure-play chicken companies recently.” The alleged
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`unlawful conduct was so serious that Seeking Alpha projected “60% downside for [Pilgrim’s
`
`Pride], 40% downside for [Sanderson], 40% downside for [Tyson]” upon correction of their
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`behavior, before any “potential penalties.” The result of the “potential LIBOR-rigging type
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`7
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`scandal,” Seeking Alpha reported, was that “US consumers have been over-charged for chicken
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`by more than $3 billion per year” and that major chicken producers were “significantly over-
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`earning as a result of what may be a manipulated price index.”
`
`21.
`
`Defendants’ conspiracy was instigated in a market with numerous characteristics
`
`making it highly susceptible to collusion, including: (a) a highly-concentrated market dominated
`
`by vertically-integrated producers; (b) high barriers to market entry; (c) a standardized, commodity
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`product where competition is based principally on price; (d) inelastic demand for the product; (e)
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`numerous opportunities for producers to conspire through a number of regularly scheduled trade
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`association meetings; and (f) access to competitors’ data through Agri Stats. Indeed, the chicken
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`industry has the hallmarks of an industry susceptible to collusion, including high consolidation,
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`predictable demand in a commodity market, and routine, public display of prices to deter deviation
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`from the collusive behavior.
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`II.
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`PARTIES
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`A.
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`Plaintiff
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`22.
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`Plaintiff Bob Evans Farms, Inc. (“Bob Evans”) is a Delaware corporation with its
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`principal place of business in New Albany, Ohio. Bob Evans brings this action on its own behalf,
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`and as assignee of its purchasing agent, Gordon Food Service, Inc., who purchased chicken on
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`Bob Evans’ behalf directly from Defendants and/or their co-conspirators during the relevant time
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`period, and assigned its claims arising out of these purchases to Bob Evans.
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`23.
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`During the time period relevant to Bob Evans’ claims, Bob Evans and/or its
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`assignors, directly purchased chicken in the United States from one or more Defendants and/or
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`their co-conspirators, and sustained injury and damages as a proximate result of the antitrust
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`violations alleged in this Complaint.
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`
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`8
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`

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`Case: 1:20-cv-05253 Document #: 1 Filed: 09/04/20 Page 14 of 145 PageID #:14
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`
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`24.
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`Both Bob Evans and Gordon Food Service, Inc. are a “person” with standing to sue
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`Defendants for damages and other relief under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1.
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`25.
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`The references in this Complaint to “Bob Evans” and/or “Plaintiff” refer
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`collectively to Bob Evans Farms, Inc. and its assignor.
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`B.
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`Defendants
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`(i)
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`The Tyson Defendants
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`26.
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`Defendant Tyson Foods, Inc. is a publicly held Delaware corporation headquartered
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`in Springdale, Arkansas.
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`27.
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`Defendant Tyson Chicken, Inc., a Delaware corporation headquartered in
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`Springdale, Arkansas, is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Defendant Tyson Foods, Inc.
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`28.
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`Defendant Tyson Breeders, Inc., a Delaware corporation headquartered in
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`Springdale, Arkansas, is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Defendant Tyson Foods, Inc.
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`29.
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`Defendant Tyson Poultry, Inc., a Delaware corporation headquartered in
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`Springdale, Arkansas, is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Defendant Tyson Foods, Inc.
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`30.
`
`Defendants Tyson Foods, Inc., Tyson Chicken, Inc., Tyson Breeders, Inc. and
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`Tyson Poultry, Inc. are collectively referred to as “Tyson” in this Complaint. Tyson reports a wide
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`variety of data to Agri Stats, including information about its breeder flocks and hatchery capacity,
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`and data for its complexes in Virginia, Pennsylvania, North Carolina, Georgia, Alabama,
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`Mississippi, Texas, Arkansas, Missouri, Indiana, Tennessee, and Kentucky. Until the Georgia
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`Dock benchmark price index stopped being published by the GDA in late November 2016, Tyson
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`was one of the ten Defendants that submitted false and artificially inflated price quotes to the GDA.
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`One of its plant managers served on the Georgia Dock Advisory Board. Tyson is a Georgia Dock
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`Defendant.
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`
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`9
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`Case: 1:20-cv-05253 Document #: 1 Filed: 09/04/20 Page 15 of 145 PageID #:15
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`
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`
`
`(ii)
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`Pilgrim’s Pride Corporation
`
`31.
`
`Defendant Pilgrim’s Pride Corporation (“Pilgrim’s” or “Pilgrim’s Pride”) is a
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`publicly held Delaware corporation headquartered in Greeley, Colorado. Pilgrim’s Pride reports
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`a wide variety of data to Agri Stats, including information about its breeder flocks and hatchery
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`capacity, and data for its complexes in Virginia, West Virginia, North Carolina, Georgia,
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`Tennessee, Florida, South Carolina, Alabama, Texas, Arkansas, and Kentucky. Until the Georgia
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`Dock benchmark price index stopped being published by the GDA in late November 2016,
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`Pilgrim’s Pride was one of the ten Defendants that submitted false and artificially inflated price
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`quotes to the GDA. Its executive vice president of sales and operations served on the Georgia
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`Dock Advisory Board. Pilgrim’s Pride is a Georgia Dock Defendant.
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`32.
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`Defendant Pilgrim’s Pride is liable for all conspiratorial acts undertaken while it
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`was in bankruptcy proceedings during 2009, and reentered, and reaffirmed its commitment to, the
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`conspiracy following its discharge from bankruptcy on December 29, 2009.
`
`(iii)
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` The Koch Defe