Case: 1:21-cv-00135 Document #: 112-1 Filed: 06/28/21 Page 1 of 182 PageID #:1761
`Case: 1:21-cv-00135 Document #: 112-1 Filed: 06/28/21 Page 1 of 182 PageID #:1761
`
`EXHIBIT 1
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`EXHIBIT 1
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`

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`Case: 1:21-cv-00135 Document #: 112-1 Filed: 06/28/21 Page 2 of 182 PageID #:1762
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
`EASTERN DIVISION
`
`In re: Clearview AI, Inc., Consumer Privacy
`Litigation
`
`Case No: 1:21-cv-135
`
`Judge Sharon Johnson Coleman
`
`Magistrate Judge Maria Valdez
`
`MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT MACY’S RETAIL HOLDINGS,
`INC.’S MOTION TO DISMISS THE CONSOLIDATED COMPLAINT PURSUANT TO
`F.R.C.P. 12(B)(1) AND 12(B)(6)
`
`Defendant, Macy’s Retail Holdings, Inc. (“Macy’s”)1 submits this memorandum in support
`
`of its Motion to Dismiss the Consolidated Complaint (“Complaint”) pursuant to Federal Rules of
`
`Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) (the “Motion”), for reasons stated below.
`
`1 The Consolidated Class Action Complaint named Macy’s Retail Holdings, Inc. Dkt. 29 ¶ 18. On June 25, 2021,
`Plaintiffs sought leave to amend to add a plaintiff and to clarify that “Macy’s, Inc. — not Macy’s Retail Holdings,
`Inc. — is the defendant against whom the consolidated multidistrict complaint is alleged.” Dkt. 109. However, as
`Macy’s previously explained, the real party in interest is actually Macy’s Retail Holdings, LLC. See Dkt. 57 at 1 n.1.
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`

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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`Page
`
`B.
`
`II.
`
`INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................................... 1
`FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS ........................................................................................................ 2
`LEGAL STANDARD .................................................................................................................... 4
`ARGUMENT ................................................................................................................................. 5
`I.
`THIS COURT LACKS SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION OVER MACY’S
`PURSUANT TO RULE 12(B)(1) BECAUSE PLAINTIFFS DO NOT ALLEGE
`A CONCRETE INJURY THAT IS FAIRLY TRACEABLE TO MACY’S OR
`THAT CAN BE REDRESED BY AN ORDER AGAINST IT ........................................ 5
`A.
`The Complaint does not allege a concrete and particularized injury-in-fact
`caused by Macy’s ................................................................................................... 5
`The Complaint does not allege an injury that is fairly traceable to Macy’s,
`and which can be redressed through a decision against Macy’s ............................ 8
`PLAINTIFFS’ BIPA CLAIMS SHOULD BE DISMISSED PURSUANT TO
`RULE 12(B)(6) .................................................................................................................. 9
`A.
`Count I fails to allege a valid claim under Section 15(b) of BIPA ........................ 9
`B.
`Plaintiffs fail to plausibly allege that Macy’s violated Section 15(c) of
`BIPA .................................................................................................................... 11
`1.
`The Complaint Does Not Allege that Macy’s Possesses Plaintiffs’
`Biometric Information ............................................................................. 12
`The Complaint Does Not Allege that Macy’s Otherwise Profited
`from Plaintiffs’ Biometric Information .................................................... 13
`THE NON-BIPA CLAIMS ASSERTED AGAINST MACY’S (COUNTS X-XV)
`SHOULD BE DISMISSED PURSUANT TO RULE 12(B)(6) ...................................... 14
`A.
`Count X ................................................................................................................ 15
`B.
`Counts XI and XII ................................................................................................ 15
`C.
`Count XIII ............................................................................................................ 17
`D.
`Count XIV ............................................................................................................ 18
`E.
`Count XV ............................................................................................................. 19
`CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................ 19
`
`2.
`
`III.
`
`-i-
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`Page(s)
`
`Cases
`
`Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
`556 U.S. 662 (2009) ...............................................................................................................5, 9
`
`Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
`550 U.S. 544 (2007) ...............................................................................................................5, 9
`
`Bianca v. Univ. of Ill.,
`No. 18-CV-7256, 2021 WL 148803 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 15, 2021) ...................................................5
`
`Blazheiev v. Ubisoft Toronto Inc.,
`No. 17-CV-07160-EMC, 2018 WL 3417481 (N.D. Cal. July 13, 2018).................................16
`
`Bryant v. Compass Grp. USA, Inc.,
`958 F.3d 617 (7th Cir. 2020) .........................................................................................5, 6, 7, 8
`
`California v. Texas,
`No. 19-1019, 2021 WL 2459255 (U.S. June 17, 2021) .............................................................8
`
`Callahan v. Ancestry.com Inc.,
`No. 20-CV-08437-LB, 2021 WL 783524 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 2021) .......................................17
`
`Casillas v. Madison Avenue Associates, Inc.,
`926 F.3d 329 (7th Cir. 2019) .....................................................................................................6
`
`Cel-Tech Commc’ns, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Tel. Co.,
`20 Cal. 4th 163 (1999) .............................................................................................................15
`
`Clark v. Elam Sand & Gravel, Inc.,
`4 Misc. 3d 294, 777 N.Y.S.2d 624 (Sup. Ct. 2004) .................................................................18
`
`In re Facebook Priv. Litig.,
`791 F. Supp. 2d 705 (N.D. Cal. 2011), aff’d, 572 F. App’x 494 (9th Cir. 2014) ....................15
`
`In re Google, Inc. Privacy Polic’y Litig.,
`No. C-12-01382-PSG, 2013 WL 6248499 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2013) ......................................17
`
`In re Google, Inc. Privacy Policy Litig.,
`58 F. Supp. 3d 968 (N.D. Cal. 2014) .......................................................................................18
`
`Heard v. Becton, Dickinson & Co.,
`440 F. Supp. 3d 960 (N.D. Ill. 2020) ...........................................................................10, 11, 12
`
`-ii-
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`Page(s)
`
`Horist v. Sudler & Co.,
`941 F.3d 274 (7th Cir. 2019) ...................................................................................................19
`
`In re iPhone Application Litig.,
`844 F. Supp. 2d 1040 (N.D. Cal. 2012) ...................................................................................18
`
`Kloss v. Acuant, Inc.,
`462 F. Supp. 3d 873 (N.D. Ill. 2020) .........................................................................................5
`
`Low v. LinkedIn Corp.,
`900 F. Supp. 2d 1010 (N.D. Cal. 2012) .............................................................................18, 19
`
`Manley v. Law,
`889 F.3d 885 (7th Cir. 2018) .....................................................................................................4
`
`Namuwonge v. Kronos, Inc.,
`418 F. Supp. 3d 279 (N.D. Ill. 2019) .................................................................................10, 11
`
`Ostella v. Taitz,
`No. SACV1100485AGRAOX, 2018 WL 6190598 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 5, 2018),
`aff’d, 807 F. App’x 666 (9th Cir. 2020) ...................................................................................16
`
`Otero v. Houston Street Owners Corp,
`No. 104819/2010, 2012 WL 692037 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 28, 2012) .......................................18
`
`People v. Ward,
`215 Ill. 2d 317, 830 N.E.2d 556 (2005) ...................................................................................12
`
`Ramirez v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.,
`No. 2:17-CV-02379-MCE-AC, 2020 WL 1274618 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 17, 2020) ......................15
`
`Regan v. Sullivan,
`417 F. Supp. 399 (E.D.N.Y. 1976), rev’d in part on other grounds, 557 F.2d
`300 (2d Cir. 1977) ....................................................................................................................18
`
`Renier v. Eringer,
`No. CV 18-243 DSF, 2018 WL 6844717 (C.D. Cal. July 6, 2018) .........................................16
`
`Ross v. Roberts,
`222 Cal. App. 4th 677 (2013) ..................................................................................................17
`
`Sondik v. Kimmel,
`131 A.D.3d 1041 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015) ................................................................................19
`
`-iii-
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`Page(s)
`
`Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins,
`136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016) ...............................................................................................................5
`
`Teesdale v. City of Chicago,
`690 F.3d 829 (7th Cir. 2012) .....................................................................................................9
`
`Thornley v. Clearview AI, Inc.,
`984 F.3d 1241 (7th Cir. 2021) ......................................................................................... passim
`
`TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez,
`No. 20-297, 2021 WL 2599472 (U.S. June 25, 2021) ...........................................................5, 6
`
`Vance v. Amazon.com Inc.,
`No. C20-1084JLR, 2021 WL 1401633 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 14, 2021) .................................8, 14
`
`Vashisht-Rota v. Ottawa Univ.,
`No. 20-CV-959 TWR (KSC), 2020 WL 6544708 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 6, 2020) ...........................17
`
`In re Yahoo Mail Litig.,
`7 F. Supp. 3d 1016 (N.D. Cal. 2014) .......................................................................................17
`
`Zuniga v. Asset Recovery Sols.,
`No. 17-CV-05119, 2018 WL 1519162 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 28, 2018)..............................................4
`
`Statutes
`
`740 ILCS 14/5 ..................................................................................................................................8
`
`740 ILCS 14/10 ..........................................................................................................................7, 10
`
`740 ILCS 14/15(b) ..........................................................................................................................7,
`
`740 ILCS 14/15(c) .........................................................................................................................12
`
`740 ILCS 15/10 ..............................................................................................................................12
`
`CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17204 .................................................................................................15
`
`California Civil Code § 3344(a) ....................................................................................................16
`
`California’s Unfair Competition Law ............................................................................................15
`
`Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ..................................................................................................6
`
`Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201..................................................................................4
`
`-iv-
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
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`Page(s)
`N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 51 .....................................................................................................18
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`-ii-
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`INTRODUCTION
`
`Plaintiffs cannot establish any Article III injury under the Illinois Biometric Information
`
`Privacy Act (“BIPA”) or any other legal theory as it relates to Macy’s. Plaintiffs also cannot show
`
`that their purported “injuries” are fairly traceable to Macy’s or capable of redress through a ruling
`
`against it. As a result, Plaintiffs’ claims against Macy’s should be dismissed.
`
`A dichotomy exists in the Complaint between the vast majority of allegations against
`
`Clearview, and the scarce references to Macy’s. On the one hand, Plaintiffs allege that Clearview
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`scraped their biometric information (along with “millions” of others) from internet sites to compile
`
`a “biometric database” (the “Clearview Database”), which it incorporated into its own algorithmic
`
`technology. On the other hand, Plaintiffs sparsely claim that Macy’s, in the context of ensuring
`
`security at its stores, uploaded “photographs” of unknown individuals to the Clearview Database
`
`at some undefined time in order to identify these individuals, and that by doing so, Macy’s
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`somehow came into contact with Plaintiffs’ purported biometric information, which already
`
`existed in the Clearview Database.
`
`Based on this dichotomy, Plaintiffs cannot show that Macy’s — as opposed to Clearview
`
`— caused Plaintiffs an Article III injury-in-fact. Accepting the pleadings as true at this stage, once
`
`Macy’s uploaded a photograph of an unknown individual to Clearview, the latter used its own
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`algorithms to convert the photograph to math, and then compared this math to information in the
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`pre-existing Clearview Database. No allegations plausibly suggest that Macy’s uploading of a
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`photograph resulted in actual privacy injuries, as opposed to Clearview’s original creation of the
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`Clearview Database itself. Not one allegation even remotely ties any Plaintiff to a Macy’s store.
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`Plaintiffs do not even allege that Macy’s ever collected their biometric information, a reality
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`underscored by the fact that Plaintiffs sought an emergency preliminary injunction against
`
`Clearview, and not Macy’s (the “Preliminary Injunction Motion”). And, any claim or remedy
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`sought against Macy’s for merely “profiting” from the use of a Clearview product is merely
`1
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`

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`Case: 1:21-cv-00135 Document #: 112-1 Filed: 06/28/21 Page 9 of 182 PageID #:1769
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`procedural according to recent Seventh Circuit precedent, and cannot alone form the basis for
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`Article III standing.
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`Furthermore, even if Plaintiffs could somehow show that Article III standing exists, they
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`have not pled any plausible claims under Iqbal-Twombly pleadings standards. Plaintiffs have not
`
`alleged, and cannot allege that Macy’s ever “collected” Plaintiffs’ biometric information without
`
`consent, so as to maintain a Section 15(b) claim under BIPA. Plaintiffs also have not sufficiently
`
`alleged that Macy’s ever possessed such data, or “profited” from it, so as to maintain a Section
`
`15(c) BIPA claim. Finally, Plaintiffs’ California and New York statutory and common law
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`theories do not come close to alleging any valid claims, where Plaintiffs merely allege that Macy’s
`
`submitted photographs taken in public areas of its stores to Clearview for identification of
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`unknown persons and in the context of store security. For these reasons, Plaintiffs’ claims against
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`Macy’s should be dismissed with prejudice.
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`FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
`
`The following allegations are derived from the Complaint, which this Court must take as
`
`true for purposes of the Motion.
`
`Relevant Allegations against the Clearview Defendants
`
`Plaintiffs allege that Defendants Clearview, Ton-That and Schwartz (collectively, the
`
`“Clearview Defendants”) covertly scraped three billion photographs of facial images from the
`
`internet, including photographs that Plaintiffs posted of themselves and others on various public
`
`websites while residing in Illinois, New York, California and Virginia. See e.g., Complaint, ¶¶ 43–
`
`50. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that, without obtaining their prior informed consent, the
`
`Clearview Defendants used artificial intelligence algorithms to scan their face geometry and that
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`of each individual depicted in the photographs they posted in order to harvest and store all of the
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`subjects’ unique biometric information. Id. ¶¶ 1, 51, 56, 57. Plaintiffs also claim the Clearview
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`Defendants used the scraped images to create the Clearview Database, which allegedly consists of
`2
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`“the Biometrics of millions of American residents, including residents of Illinois, California, New
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`York and Virginia.” Id. ¶ 5. Plaintiffs allege the Clearview Defendants sold software subscriptions
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`to the Clearview Database, which allowed users of the database “to identify unknown individuals
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`merely by uploading a photograph to the database.” Id. ¶ 1.
`
`Plaintiffs’ Allegations against Macy’s
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`Plaintiffs allege that Macy’s operates twenty-one retail stores in Illinois. Complaint, ¶¶ 18,
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`22. Plaintiffs then conclude that Macy’s uses the Clearview’s Database to identify individuals in
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`Macy’s Illinois retail stores. Id. The Complaint does not allege that any Plaintiff ever visited a
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`Macy’s store anywhere in the United States, let alone Illinois, but the Complaint does allege that
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`several Plaintiffs reside far from Illinois, and in states such as Virginia, New York, and California.
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`Plaintiffs further claim that Macy’s purchased a subscription with Clearview, which
`
`allowed Macy’s to potentially identify an unknown individual by uploading his or her photograph
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`to the Clearview Database. Id. ¶¶ 4, 23.2 Plaintiffs allege that each time Macy’s uploaded a
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`photograph to the Clearview Database, Clearview’s proprietary algorithm derived the facial
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`geometry of that individual (from a photograph) and compared it to Clearview’s previously-saved
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`facial geometry of Plaintiffs and millions of other individuals in the Clearview Database. Id. ¶ 33.
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`Plaintiffs surmise that Macy’s profited from their biometrics because Macy’s used the Clearview
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`Database “to prevent losses and/or improve the customer’s experience,” but Plaintiffs do not
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`elaborate on this point. Id. ¶ 57. Again, Plaintiffs do not allege that they ever entered into a Macy’s
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`store, or that Macy’s actually photographed them while they were in a Macy’s store, or submitted
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`their picture to Clearview.
`
`2 For ease of reference, Macy’s cites to the paragraph numbers used in Plaintiffs’ proposed First Amended
`Consolidated Class Action Complaint. Dkt. 109-1.
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`3
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`The Complaint alleges that Macy’s: (a) violated Section 15(b) of BIPA (Count I) by failing
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`to provide written notice to and obtain consent from Plaintiffs; (b) violated Section 15(c) of BIPA
`
`(Count III) by “profiting” from the use of Plaintiffs’ biometric information; and (c) run afoul of
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`various statutory and common law claims of California, Illinois and New York. (Counts X–XV).3
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`Plaintiffs purport to bring their claims against Macy’s on behalf of themselves and various classes
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`and sub-classes comprised of all United States residents whose images appeared in photographs
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`that Clearview scraped from the public internet, including individuals whose images appear in
`
`photographs but who did not publish the image on the internet. Complaint ¶ 65(a-e).
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`Moreover, Plaintiffs name Macy’s as a putative representative of a defendant class
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`comprised of Clearview’s private clients, even though the Complaint does not provide any
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`allegations as to why Macy’s is properly a putative representative defendant. Id. ¶ 67.
`
`LEGAL STANDARD
`
`A plaintiff seeking to survive a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss must establish that the
`
`district court has subject matter jurisdiction. Zuniga v. Asset Recovery Sols., No. 17-CV-05119,
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`2018 WL 1519162, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 28, 2018).4 If subject matter jurisdiction “is not evident
`
`on the face of the complaint, then the Rule 12(b)(1) motion is analyzed like any other motion to
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`dismiss, by assuming for the purposes of the motion that the allegations in the complaint are true.”
`
`Id. (internal citations omitted). “Ordinarily, it is the plaintiff who bears the burden of
`
`demonstrating that the district court has subject-matter jurisdiction over her case and that it falls
`
`within the ‘Judicial Power’ conferred in Article III.” Thornley v. Clearview AI, Inc., 984 F.3d
`
`1241, 1244 (7th Cir. 2021).
`
`3 Count XVI of the Complaint purports to assert a claim against Macy’s under the Declaratory Judgment Act,
`28 U.S.C. § 2201, but that statute “provides no independent source of federal subject-matter jurisdiction.” Manley v.
`Law, 889 F.3d 885, 893 (7th Cir. 2018) (citing Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667, 671 (1950)).
`Because Count XVI is dependent upon the legal theories raised by Plaintiffs in their other claims, this claim should
`be dismissed for the reasons stated in this memorandum.
`4 Macy’s attaches in alphabetical order as Exhibit A those cited decisions that are only published electronically.
`4
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`In order to survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint “must contain
`
`sufficient factual matter to state a facially plausible claim to relief — one that allows the court to
`
`draw the reasonable inference the defendant committed the alleged misconduct.” Bianca v. Univ.
`
`of Ill., No. 18-CV-7256, 2021 WL 148803, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 15, 2021). This plausibility
`
`standard, derived from Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
`
`550 U.S. 544 (2007), “asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant acted unlawfully.”
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`Bianca, 2021 WL 148803, at *3. Rather, the claim must be described “in sufficient detail to give
`
`the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Kloss v. Acuant,
`
`Inc., 462 F. Supp. 3d 873, 876 (N.D. Ill. 2020). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
`
`action, supported by mere conclusory statements, are insufficient to withstand a 12(b)(6) motion
`
`to dismiss.” Id. (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).
`
`ARGUMENT
`
`I.
`
`THIS COURT LACKS SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION OVER MACY’S
`PURSUANT TO RULE 12(B)(1) BECAUSE PLAINTIFFS DO NOT ALLEGE A
`CONCRETE INJURY THAT IS FAIRLY TRACEABLE TO MACY’S OR THAT
`CAN BE REDRESED BY AN ORDER AGAINST IT.
`
`A.
`
`The Complaint does not allege a concrete and particularized injury-in-fact
`caused by Macy’s.
`
`The Constitution does not empower the judicial branch to “adjudicate hypothetical …
`
`disputes” or to “exercise general legal oversight … of private entities.” TransUnion LLC v.
`
`Ramirez, No. 20-297, 2021 WL 2599472, at *8 (U.S. June 25, 2021). Thus, plaintiffs seeking
`
`access to federal courts “bear the burden of establishing Article III standing, which only exists if
`
`they can establish that: (1) they suffered “an actual or imminent, concrete and particularized injury-
`
`in-fact”; (2) “a causal connection [exists] between her injury and the conduct complained of”; and
`
`(3) there is “a likelihood that this injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.” Bryant v.
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`Compass Grp. USA, Inc., 958 F.3d 617, 620–21 (7th Cir. 2020).
`
`5
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`The Bryant court, relying upon the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Spokeo, Inc.
`
`v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016), reaffirmed that in BIPA cases, “a bare procedural violation,
`
`divorced from any concrete harm, does not satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement of Article III.”
`
`Bryant, 958 F.3d at 621 (internal quotations omitted). Instead, “the plaintiff must show that the
`
`statutory violation presented an ‘appreciable risk of harm’ to the underlying concrete interest that
`
`the legislature sought to protect by enacting the statute.” See id. (holding that the plaintiff did not
`
`have Article III standing to assert a claim under Section 15(a) of BIPA).
`
`In Thornley v. Clearview AI, Inc., the Seventh Circuit extended the Bryant court’s
`
`reasoning, and held that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s claim that
`
`Clearview violated Section 15(c) of BIPA by profiting from the plaintiff’s biometric information,
`
`where the plaintiff alleged no injury other than a “statutory aggrievement.” 984 F.3d 1241, 1246–
`
`1247 (7th Cir. 2021). According to the Seventh Circuit, where the plaintiff asserts “no
`
`particularized injury resulting from the commercial transaction,” a plaintiff asserts only a
`
`generalized harm, which is insufficient to confer standing. Id. at 1247.5
`
`Here, the only action Plaintiffs allege Macy’s took was to upload photographs of unknown
`
`persons to the Clearview Database, for purposes of having Clearview determine the individual’s
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`identity from Clearview’s pre-existing cache of data. Yet Plaintiffs do not allege that Macy’s
`
`uploaded their photos, or caused them any type of harm whatsoever. “Only those plaintiffs who
`
`have been concretely harmed by a defendant’s statutory violation may sue that private defendant
`
`over that violation in federal court.” TransUnion LLC, 2021 WL 2599472, at *8 (emphasis in
`
`original). Article III simply does not permit Plaintiffs to sue in federal court to remedy harms they
`
`did not suffer. See id.
`
`5The court analogized the Thornley plaintiffs’ lack of concrete injury to a Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
`(“FDCPA”) case, Casillas v. Madison Avenue Associates, Inc., 926 F.3d 329, 335–36 (7th Cir. 2019). There, the
`plaintiff also did not plead that her receipt of a letter that failed to comply with the FDCPA “caused her any harm –
`indeed, had any effect whatsoever on her.” Id.
`
`6
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`Moreover, even if Plaintiffs had plausibly alleged that Macy’s uploaded their photographs
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`to the Clearview Database — and they did not — any injury that Plaintiffs could sustain under
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`BIPA resulted from Clearview’s alleged scraping of photographs, not Macy’s actions. Plaintiffs
`
`do not (and could not) allege that Macy’s created any face-recognition technology, nor do Plaintiffs
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`allege that Macy’s disseminated, purchased, received or collected any alleged biometric
`
`information from Clearview, or even that Macy’s has access to Clearview’s algorithmic functions
`
`or resulting “face scan” biometric data. In short, Plaintiffs have not alleged an injury-in-fact as to
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`Macy’s conduct.
`
`Macy’s recognizes that the Illinois General Assembly could “elevate to the status of legally
`
`cognizable injuries concrete, de facto injuries that were previously inadequate under state law.”
`
`Bryant, 984 F.3d at 621. Here, the General Assembly has spoken on the issue. It has expressly
`
`stated that (1) photographs are not biometric information (see 740 ILCS 14/10); and (2) only the
`
`“collector” of biometric information has the duty to obtain informed consent of an individual, not
`
`a party that merely asks the collector for the identity of someone in a photograph (see 740 ILCS
`
`14/15(b)). Thus, according to the General Assembly, Plaintiffs suffered no actual injury-in-fact as
`
`it relates to Macy’s, precisely because there is no prohibition against Macy’s or any other entity or
`
`individual asking a third party to identify a person in a photograph.
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`Plaintiffs’ main gripe is that Macy’s contracted with Clearview for the latter’s
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`identification services through the Clearview Database, and therefore must have “profited” from
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`the use of Plaintiffs’ biometric information, which Plaintiffs contend is prohibited under Section
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`15(c). As Macy’s will address infra, this argument fails to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). The
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`Article III standing deficiency additionally lies in the fact that, even if one were to assume that
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`Macy’s did “profit” from using Clearview’s products (a dubious claim since Plaintiffs recognize
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`that any alleged use was done for security purposes), the Seventh Circuit in Thornley held that a
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`Case: 1:21-cv-00135 Document #: 112-1 Filed: 06/28/21 Page 15 of 182 PageID #:1775
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`Section 15(c) BIPA claim lacks standing unless a plaintiff can tie such “profiting” to an actual
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`injury he or she suffered. As the court in Thornley held, “it is enough to say that [Section 15(c)]
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`is the same kind of general regulation as the duty to create and publish a retention and destruction
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`schedule found in Section 15(a), at least when the plaintiff asserts no particularized injury
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`resulting from the commercial transaction.” Thornley, 984 F.3d at 1247 (emphasis added).
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`The Thornley ruling makes sense from a practical perspective. Plaintiffs have alleged a
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`privacy-related injury, but Sections 15(a) (regarding retention standards), 15(b) (regarding
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`collection standards) and 15(d) (regarding dissemination standards) all exist to protect Plaintiffs’
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`privacy interests. When a party adheres to them, a plaintiff cannot show it has an injury in fact
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`from a Section 15(c) violation, because a company “profiting” from the use of biometric
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`information has no bearing on whether a plaintiff’s privacy interests have been safeguarded. BIPA
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`was intended to regulate the use of biometric technology — not prohibit it. See 740 ILCS 14/5(a),
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`(b), (g). To allow standing to exist for a Section 15(c) violation alone would be to read out the rest
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`of BIPA and prohibit the vast majority of uses of biometric information, something the legislature
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`did not intend. See Vance v. Amazon.com Inc., No. C20-1084JLR, 2021 WL 1401633, at *4 (W.D.
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`Wash. Apr. 14, 2021) (“Indeed, Plaintiffs’ reading of § 15(c) — prohibition of any use of biometric
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`data that brings a benefit — would lead to absurd results that contravene BIPA itself.”).
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`B.
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`The Complaint does not allege an injury that is fairly traceable to Macy’s, and
`which can be redressed through a decision against Macy’s.
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`Plaintiffs also fail to establish Article III standing because they cannot demonstrate that
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`their alleged injury is fairly traceable to Macy’s and is capable of being redressed through a
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`decision against Macy’s. See California v. Texas, No. 19-1019, 2021 WL 2459255, at *4 (U.S.
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`June 17, 2021); Bryant, 958 F.3d at 620–21. Macy’s does not need to belabor this straightforward
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`point. Plaintiffs have not alleged that they ever stepped into a Macy’s store, let alone which store
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`and when, and whether Macy’s ever took any photographs of them. Plaintiffs also have not alleged
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`Case: 1:21-cv-00135 Document #: 112-1 Filed: 06/28/21 Page 16 of 182 PageID #:1776
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`a single fact that would give rise to their belief that Macy’s actually submitted their photograph to
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`Clearview. Rather, the crux of Plaintiffs’ case — which they stated clearly in their Preliminary
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`Injunction Motion — is that the Plaintiffs have read online articles claiming that Macy’s may have
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`contracted with Clearview. Dkt. 31, p. 5. Article III standing depends on much more than mere
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`conjecture. A plaintiff has the burden to establish Article III standing in a federal action through
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`actual concrete facts, and not speculation. See Teesdale v. City of Chicago, 690 F.3d 829, 837
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`(7th Cir. 2012) (holding that the plaintiff’s claims lacked standing).
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`Similar issues arise in the nature of redress. The crux of Plaintiffs’ case is that their privacy
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`rights have been violated through Clearview’s scraping of biometric information from the internet
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`without informed consent. Thus, the relief Plaintiffs seek against Macy’s has no bearing on their
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`alleged need to protect their biometric information, precisely because Macy’s does not possess,
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`and has never possessed, this information. To underscore this point, Plaintiffs sought preliminary
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`injunctive relief against Clearview, not Macy’s, because Clearview allegedly maintains the
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`Clearview Database. Thus, any relief against Macy’s does nothing to protect Plaintiffs’ privacy
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`rights, and instead merely penalizes Macy’s for asking third parties to identify a person in a
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`photograph taken in public, something that is not, and has never been, prohibited under the
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`common law or statutes. Thus, Plaintiffs cannot establi