Case: 1:21-cv-00135 Document #: 374 Filed: 07/07/22 Page 1 of 60 PageID #:7431
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`In re Clearview AI, Inc., Consumer Privacy
`Litigation
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`This document relates to:
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`All actions
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`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
`EASTERN DIVISION
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`
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`Civil Action File No.: 1:21-cv-00135
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`Judge Sharon Johnson Coleman
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`Magistrate Judge Maria Valdez
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`JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
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`SECOND AMENDED CONSOLIDATED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
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`Plaintiffs David Mutnick, Steven Vance, Mario Calderon, Anthony Hall, Isela Carmean,
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`Shelby Zelonis Roberson, Andrea Vestrand and Aaron Hurvitz (collectively, “Plaintiffs”),
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`individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated (“Plaintiff Class Members”), bring this
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`Second Amended Consolidated Class Action Complaint against the following: (a) Clearview AI,
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`Inc., formerly known as Smartcheckr Corp., Inc. (“Clearview”); (b) Hoan Ton-That; (c) Richard
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`Schwartz; (d) Rocky Mountain Data Analytics LLC (“Rocky Mountain”); (e) Thomas Mulcaire;
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`and (f) Macy’s, Inc. (“Macy’s”); (g) Macy’s Retail Holdings, Inc., now known as Macy’s Retail
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`Holdings, LLC; (h) Macy’s Corporate Services, Inc., now known as Macy’s Corporate Services,
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`LLC; (i) AT&T Inc. (“AT&T”); (j) Kohl’s, Inc. (“Kohl’s”); (k) Best Buy Stores, L.P. (“Best
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`Buy”); (l) Albertsons Companies, LLC (“Albertsons”); (m) Walmart Inc. (“Walmart”); and (n)
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`The Home Depot, Inc. (“Home Depot”). Plaintiffs bring this Second Amended Consolidated Class
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`Action Complaint against Defendants (f) through (n) (collectively, the “Client Defendants”),
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`individually and as representatives of a defendant class comprised of all other private, non-
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`governmental entities similarly situated to the Client Defendants (hereinafter, “Defendant Class
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`Members”). Plaintiffs complain and allege as follows based on personal knowledge as to
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`themselves, the investigation of their counsel, and information and belief as to all other matters,
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`and demand a trial by jury.
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`NATURE OF THE ACTION
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`Without providing any notice and without obtaining any consent, Defendants
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`1.
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`Clearview, Ton-That and Schwartz (collectively, the “Clearview Defendants”) covertly scraped
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`three billion photographs of facial images from the internet – including facial images of millions
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`of American residents and then used artificial intelligence algorithms to scan the face geometry of
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`each individual depicted in the photographs in order to harvest the individuals’ unique biometric
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`identifiers1 and corresponding biometric information2 (collectively, “Biometrics”). Further, the
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`Clearview Defendants created a searchable biometric database (the “Biometric Database”) that
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`contained the above-described Biometrics and allowed users of the Biometric Database to identify
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`unknown individuals merely by uploading a photograph to the database.
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`2.
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`The Clearview Defendants did not develop their technology out of a desire for a
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`safer society. Rather, they developed their technology to invade the privacy of the American public
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`for their own profit.
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`3.
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`While the Clearview Defendants have touted their actions and the Biometric
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`Database as being helpful to law enforcement and other government agencies, the Clearview
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`Defendants have made their Biometric Database available to public and private entities and
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`persons, alike. What the Clearview Defendants’ technology really offers is a massive surveillance
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`state. Anyone utilizing the technology could determine the identities of people as they walk down
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`the street, attend a political rally or enjoy time in public with their families. One of Clearview’s
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`1 As used herein, “biometric identifier” is any personal feature that is unique to an individual, including
`fingerprints, iris scans, DNA and “face geometry,” among others.
`2 As used herein, “biometric information” is any information captured, converted, stored, or shared based
`on a person’s biometric identifier used to identify an individual.
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`2
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`financial backers has conceded that Clearview may be laying the groundwork for a “dystopian
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`future.”
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`4.
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`Accordingly, Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and similarly situated individuals,
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`bring this action for damages and other legal and equitable remedies resulting from the actions of
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`the Clearview Defendants, the Client Defendants and the Defendant Class Members for their
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`unlawful creation and/or use of the Biometric Database consisting of the Biometrics of millions of
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`American residents, including residents of Illinois, California, New York and Virginia. As alleged
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`below, Defendants’ conduct violated, and continues to violate, Illinois’ Biometric Information
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`Privacy Act (“BIPA”), 740 ILCS 14/1, et seq., as well as other state constitutional, statutory and
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`common laws, causing injury to Plaintiffs and Plaintiff Class Members
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`PARTIES
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`5.
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`Plaintiff David Mutnick is, and at relevant times has been, a resident of Illinois,
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`residing in the Northern District of Illinois.
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`6.
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`Plaintiff Steven Vance is, and at relevant times has been, a resident of Illinois,
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`residing in the Northern District of Illinois.
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`7.
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`Plaintiff Mario Calderon is, and at relevant times has been, a resident of Illinois,
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`residing in the Northern District of Illinois.
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`8.
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`Plaintiff Anthony Hall is, and at relevant times has been, a resident of Illinois,
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`residing in the Northern District of Illinois.
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`9.
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`Plaintiff Isela Carmean is, and at relevant times has been, a resident of Illinois
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`residing in the Northern District of Illinois.
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`10.
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`Plaintiff Shelby Zelonis Roberson is, and at relevant times has been, a resident of
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`Virginia.
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`11.
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`12.
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`13.
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`Plaintiff Andrea Vestrand is, and at relevant times has been, a resident of California.
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`Plaintiff Aaron Hurvitz is, and at relevant times has been, a resident of New York.
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`Defendant Clearview AI, Inc., formerly known as Smartcheckr Corp., Inc., is a
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`private, for-profit Delaware corporation, headquartered in New York, New York (Defendant and
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`its predecessors, hereinafter “Clearview”). Clearview markets its technology throughout the
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`United States, including in Illinois. Moreover, Clearview obtains the images that underlie its
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`technology from millions of internet-based platforms and websites, including, on information and
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`belief, based on the magnitude of platforms and websites involved, platforms and websites of
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`Illinois companies or companies who operate servers in Illinois. Clearview’s business and
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`unlawful practices extend nationwide, and it has disclosed the Biometrics of unsuspecting
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`individuals to its clients around the country. Clearview continues to engage in this conduct to this
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`day.
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`14.
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`Defendant Hoan Ton-That is a founder and the Chief Executive Officer of
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`Clearview and an architect of its illegal scheme, as alleged herein. Ton-That’s responsibilities at
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`Clearview included, and continue to include, managing technology matters. At relevant times,
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`Ton-That knew of, participated in, consented to, approved, authorized and directed the wrongful
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`acts alleged in this Second Amended Consolidated Class Action Complaint.
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`15.
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`Defendant Richard Schwartz is a founder and the President of Clearview and an
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`architect of its illegal scheme. Schwartz’s responsibilities at Clearview included, and continue to
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`include, managing sales. Schwartz knew of, participated in, consented to, approved, authorized,
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`and directed the wrongful acts alleged in this Second Amended Consolidated Class Action
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`Complaint.
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`4
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`16.
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`At relevant times, Defendant Thomas Mulcaire was an attorney licensed in
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`California, Clearview’s General Counsel and the Vice President of Defendant Rocky Mountain.
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`Mulcaire provided the Illinois Secretary of State, a Rocky Mountain customer, with his personal
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`information in order to be paid directly for work performed by Rocky Mountain.
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`17.
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`Defendant Rocky Mountain Data Analytics LLC is a private, for-profit New
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`Mexico limited liability company with its principal place of business in New Mexico. As alleged
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`in more detail below, a unity of interest existed between Rocky Mountain, on the one hand, and
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`Ton-That, Schwartz and Mulcaire on the other that caused the separate personalities of Rocky
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`Mountain and Ton-That, Schwartz and Mulcaire to no longer exist. Further, as alleged in more
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`detail below, Clearview is legally responsible for the actions and conduct of Rocky Mountain. At
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`relevant times, Rocky Mountain solicited business from potential Illinois customers and contracted
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`with the Illinois Secretary of State. Rocky Mountain provided the Illinois Secretary of State with
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`access to the Biometric Database and the Biometrics contained therein.
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`18.
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`At relevant times, Defendant Macy’s, Inc. was a Delaware corporation, that held
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`itself out to as “one of the nation’s premier retailers” with approximately 680 department stores
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`and over 100,00 employees. Among the department stores, were stores located in Illinois.
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`19.
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`At relevant times, Defendant Macy’s Retail Holdings, Inc., now known as Macy’s
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`Retail Holdings, LLC, was a New York corporation and wholly-owned subsidiary of Macy’s, Inc.
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`doing business in Illinois.
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`20.
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`At relevant times, Defendant Macy’s Corporate Services, Inc., now known as
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`Macy’s Corporate Services, LLC, was a New York Corporation and wholly-owned subsidiary of
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`Macy’s Retail Holdings, Inc. doing business in Illinois. Defendants Macy’s, Inc.; Macy’s Retail
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`Holdings, Inc., now known as Macy’s Retail Holdings, LLC; and Macy’s Corporate Services, Inc.,
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`now known as Macy’s Corporate Services, LLC, are hereinafter collectively referred to as
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`“Macy’s” or the “Macy’s Entities.”
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`21.
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`Defendant AT&T Inc. is a Delaware corporation, headquartered Dallas, Texas,
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`doing business in Illinois.
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`22.
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`Defendant Kohl’s, Inc. is a Delaware corporation, headquartered in Menomonee
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`Falls, Wisconsin, doing business in Illinois.
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`23.
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`Defendant Best Buy Stores, L.P. is a Minnesota corporation, headquartered in
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`Richfield, Minnesota, doing business in Illinois.
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`24.
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`Defendant Albertsons Companies, LLC is a Delaware corporation, headquartered
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`in Boise, Idaho, doing business in Illinois.
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`25.
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`Defendant Walmart Inc. is a Delaware corporation, headquartered in Bentonville,
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`Arkansas, doing business in Illinois.
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`26.
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`Defendant The Home Depot, Inc. is a Delaware corporation, headquartered in
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`Atlanta, Georgia, doing business in Illinois.
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`JURISDICTION AND VENUE
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`This Court has original jurisdiction over this controversy pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
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`27.
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`§ 1332(d) because there are more than 100 Plaintiff Class Members and the aggregate amount in
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`controversy exceeds $5,000,000.00, exclusive of interest, fees, and costs, and at least one class
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`member is a citizen of a state different from one of the Defendants. The Court has supplemental
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`jurisdiction over all of the state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
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`28.
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`This Court has personal jurisdiction over the Clearview Defendants because their
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`contacts with Illinois are directly related to the conduct alleged herein. As set forth in the Court’s
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`order in Mutnick v. Clearview AI, Inc., No. 1:20-cv-512 (N.D. Ill) (Dkt. 86):
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`6
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`Ton-That and Schwartz founded Clearview in 2017. Ton-That and Schwartz have
`high-ranking positions in management and operations at Clearview. More
`specifically, Ton-That is Clearview’s CEO and is responsible for managing
`Clearview’s technological matters. Schwartz is Clearview’s president managing
`Clearview’s sales. Schwartz and Ton-That have contributed significant resources
`to Clearview’s operations. Schwartz, for example, has paid for the servers and other
`costs necessary to carry out Clearview’s scraping and scanning operations.
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`As Clearview’s principals, Schwartz and Ton-That have executed hundreds of
`agreements on behalf of Clearview with numerous Illinois law enforcement and
`other government agencies, as well as private entities in Illinois, to provide access
`to its facial recognition database. Through these agreements, defendants have sold,
`disclosed, obtained, and profited from the biometric identifiers of Illinois citizens.
`Some the entities to whom Clearview sold biometric information include the
`Chicago, Rockford, and Naperville police departments. Also, Clearview marketed
`its licenses (user accounts) for its facial recognition database to the Illinois
`Secretary of State and negotiated a contract with the Secretary of State via a series
`of emails, mail, and phone calls. As to Clearview’s price quote to the Secretary of
`State, set forth in a letter dated October 1, 2019, Clearview directed payments to be
`sent to Clearview AI/Attn: Richard Schwartz at Schwartz’s residence in New York
`City.
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`Plaintiffs further maintain that defendants purposely directed their “illegal
`harvesting” at the State of Illinois. To clarify, the images contained in the facial
`recognition databases sold to Illinois entities were uploaded and created using
`internet-based platforms and websites from companies in Illinois or companies who
`operate servers in Illinois. Simply put, defendants took biometric information from
`Illinois residents, created a surveillance database, and then marketed and sold
`licenses to use this database to entities in Illinois. As a result, plaintiffs’ privacy
`rights were violated.
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`29.
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`This Court has personal jurisdiction over Rocky Mountain and Mulcaire because
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`their contacts with Illinois are directly related to the conduct alleged herein. According to
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`Mulcaire’s May 23, 2020 sworn declaration: (a) Rocky Mountain “is a special purpose entity that
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`was used for the purpose of contracting with the Illinois Secretary of State”; (b) “[a]lthough [Rocky
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`Mountain] did submit a quote to the Chicago Police Department, other than the transaction with
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`the Illinois Secretary of State, [Rocky Mountain] has not engaged in any other transactions related
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`to Clearview’s [biometric] database since its formation, and is not currently engaged in efforts to
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`market or contract with parties for access to Clearview’s database”; and (c) Rocky Mountain “has
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`no employees, assets or products separate from those of Clearview . . . .” The Biometric Database
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`that Rocky Mountain offered and provided to the Illinois Secretary of State was the same Biometric
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`Database created by Clearview, with the same connection to Illinois as alleged in the preceding
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`paragraph. At relevant times, Mulcaire was Rocky Mountain’s Vice President and directly
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`corresponded with the Illinois Secretary of State in connection with Rocky Mountain’s efforts to
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`obtain the Illinois Secretary of State’s business. According to the Illinois Secretary of State’s
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`records, the “Vendor/Payee Name” for the entity providing the Biometric Database was “Thomas
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`Mulcaire” and the “Vendor Name2/DBA” was “Rocky Mtn Data Analytics LLC.” Further,
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`according to publicly-available information from the Illinois Comptroller’s Office, Thomas
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`Mulcaire was paid $5,000 in 2020, the amount invoiced by Rocky Mountain.
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`30.
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`The Court has personal jurisdiction over the Macy’s Entities because their contacts
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`with Illinois are directly related to the conduct alleged herein.
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`On information and belief, Macy’s
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`obtained access to the Biometric Database and the Biometrics contained therein in order to identify
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`people whose images appeared in surveillance camera footage from Macy’s retail stores, including
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`its retail stores in Illinois. Macy’s utilized the Biometric Database over 6,000 times, each time
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`uploading a probe image to the database to have the database search the Biometrics contained
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`therein, including the Biometrics of millions of Illinois residents, for a biometric match. On
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`information and belief, based on the magnitude of the number of searches, Macy’s uploaded one
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`or more probe images from surveillance cameras located in Illinois.
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`31.
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`The Court has personal jurisdiction over AT&T because its contacts with Illinois
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`are directly related to the conduct alleged herein. At relevant times, AT&T operated numerous
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`retail stores in Illinois. On information and belief, AT&T obtained access to the Biometric
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`Database and the Biometrics contained therein in order to identify people whose images appeared
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`in surveillance camera footage from AT&T retail stores, including its retail stores in Illinois.
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`AT&T utilized the Biometric Database
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`, each time uploading a probe image to
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`the database to have the database search the Biometrics contained therein, including the Biometrics
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`of millions of Illinois residents, for a biometric match. On information and belief, based on the
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`magnitude of the number of searches, AT&T uploaded one or more probe images from
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`surveillance cameras located in Illinois.
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`32.
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`The Court has personal jurisdiction over Kohl’s because its contacts with Illinois
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`are directly related to the conduct alleged herein. At relevant times, Kohl’s operated numerous
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`retail stores in Illinois. On information and belief, Kohl’s obtained access to the Biometric
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`Database and the Biometrics contained therein in order to identify people whose images appeared
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`in surveillance camera footage from Kohl’s retail stores, including its retail stores in Illinois.
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`Kohl’s utilized the Biometric Database
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`, each time uploading a probe image
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`to the database to have the database search the Biometrics contained therein, including the
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`Biometrics of millions of Illinois residents, for a biometric match. On information and belief, based
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`on the magnitude of the number of searches, Kohl’s uploaded one or more probe images from
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`surveillance cameras located in Illinois.
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`33.
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`The Court has personal jurisdiction over Best Buy because its contacts with Illinois
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`are directly related to the conduct alleged herein. At relevant times, Best Buy operated numerous
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`retail stores in Illinois. On information and belief, Best Buy obtained access to the Biometric
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`Database and the Biometrics contained therein in order to identify people whose images appeared
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`in surveillance camera footage from Best Buy retail stores, including its retail stores in Illinois.
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`Best Buy utilized the Biometric Database
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`, each time uploading a probe image
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`to the database to have the database search the Biometrics contained therein, including the
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`Biometrics of millions of Illinois residents, for a biometric match. On information and belief, based
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`on the magnitude of the number of searches, Best Buy uploaded one or more probe images from
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`surveillance cameras located in Illinois.
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`34.
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`The Court has personal jurisdiction over Albertsons because its contacts with
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`Illinois are directly related to the conduct alleged herein. At relevant times, Albertsons operated
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`numerous retail stores in Illinois through its Jewel-Osco brand. On information and belief,
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`Albertsons obtained access to the Biometric Database and the Biometrics contained therein in
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`order to identify people whose images appeared in surveillance camera footage from Albertsons
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`retail stores, including its retail stores in Illinois. Albertsons utilized the Biometric Database
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`, each time uploading a probe image to the database to have the database search
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`the Biometrics contained therein, including the Biometrics of millions of Illinois residents, for a
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`biometric match. On information and belief, based on the magnitude of the number of searches,
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`Albertsons uploaded one or more probe images from surveillance cameras located in Illinois.
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`35.
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`The Court has personal jurisdiction over Walmart because its contacts with Illinois
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`are directly related to the conduct alleged herein. At relevant times, Walmart operated numerous
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`retail stores in Illinois. On information and belief, Walmart obtained access to the Biometric
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`Database and the Biometrics contained therein in order to identify people whose images appeared
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`in surveillance camera footage from Walmart retail stores, including its retail stores in Illinois.
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`Walmart utilized the Biometric Database
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`, each time uploading a probe image to
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`the database to have the database search the Biometrics contained therein, including the Biometrics
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`of millions of Illinois residents, for a biometric match. On information and belief, based on the
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`magnitude of the number of searches, Walmart uploaded one or more probe images from
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`surveillance cameras located in Illinois.
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`36.
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`The Court has personal jurisdiction over Home Depot because its contacts with
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`Illinois are directly related to the conduct alleged herein. At relevant times, Home Depot operated
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`numerous retail stores in Illinois. On information and belief, Home Depot obtained access to the
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`Biometric Database and the Biometrics contained therein in order to identify people whose images
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`appeared in surveillance camera footage from Home Depot retail stores, including its retail stores
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`in Illinois. Home Depot utilized the Biometric Database
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`, each time uploading
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`a probe image to the database to have the database search the Biometrics contained therein,
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`including the Biometrics of millions of Illinois residents, for a biometric match. On information
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`and belief, based on the magnitude of the number of searches, Home Depot uploaded one or more
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`probe images from surveillance cameras located in Illinois.
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`37.
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`Venue is proper in this District pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2) because, as
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`alleged above, a substantial part of the acts or omissions giving rise to Plaintiffs’ claims occurred
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`in Illinois. Alternatively, venue is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(3) because the Court has
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`personal jurisdiction over Defendants. Additionally, venue is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
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`1407(a) and the Order of the United States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation transferring
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`this multidistrict litigation to this Court.
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`38.
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`Venue is proper in this District pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2) because, as
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`alleged above, a substantial part of the acts or omissions giving rise to Plaintiffs’ claims occurred
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`in Illinois. Alternatively, venue is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(3) because the Court has
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`personal jurisdiction over Defendants. Additionally, venue is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
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`1407(a) and the Order of the United States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation transferring
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`this multidistrict litigation to this Court.
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`FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
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`Biometric Identifiers
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`39.
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`Every individual has unique features by which he or she can be identified using a
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`set of standard quantitative measurements, commonly referred to as “biometric identifiers.”
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`40.
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`For example, the shape of and distance between tiny ridges on each person’s finger
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`are unique, so measures of those features can be used to identify a specific individual as the person
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`who made a fingerprint.
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`41.
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`Each person also has a unique facial geometry composed of, among other
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`measurements, distances between key facial landmarks and ratios between those distances.
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`42.
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`Once a picture of a person’s face is scanned and its biometric measurements are
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`captured, computers can store that information and use it to identify that individual any other time
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`that person’s face appears on the internet, in a scanned picture or in footage from any of the billions
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`of cameras that are constantly monitoring the public’s daily lives.
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`43.
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`Unlike fingerprints, facial biometrics are readily observable and, thus, present a
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`grave and immediate danger to privacy, individual autonomy, and liberty.
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`The Clearview Defendants’ Unlawful Biometric Database
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`44.
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`The Clearview Defendants have collected, captured and obtained Biometrics from
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`more than three billion images they covertly scraped from the internet – including, on information
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`and belief, the Biometrics of Plaintiffs and Class Members – which they have amassed into the
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`searchable Biometric Database.
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`45.
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`Additionally, the Clearview Defendants have distributed, disseminated, sold,
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`traded, leased and otherwise profited from the Biometrics they unlawfully collected, captured and
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`obtained.
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`46.
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`To date, the Clearview Defendants have sold unfettered access to their vast
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`Biometric Database to more than 7,000 individuals from approximately 2,000 law enforcement
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`and government agencies, including the Chicago Police Department and the Illinois Secretary of
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`State.
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`47. Moreover, the Clearview Defendants have sold unfettered access to the Biometric
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`Database to more than 200 private companies, including Macy’s and Defendant Class Members.
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`Those private entities in turn frequently queried the Biometric Database for their own business
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`purposes, including to identify particular individuals appearing in photographs or videos in their
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`possession. Each time one of Clearview’s private clients queried the Biometric Database, the
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`Clearview Defendants’ algorithms compared the facial geometry of the subject appearing in a
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`chosen photograph or video against the facial geometry of each of the hundreds of millions of
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`subjects appearing in the database, including the facial geometry of each of the Plaintiffs and
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`Plaintiff Class Members. Thus, by obtaining access to and querying the Biometric Database,
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`Macy’s and Defendant Class Members necessarily obtained, accessed and used all of the
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`Biometrics in that database, including the Biometrics of Plaintiffs and Plaintiff Class Members.
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`48.
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`At relevant times, the Clearview Defendants failed to store and protect from
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`disclosure the highly sensitive Biometrics in the Biometric Database: (a) using the reasonable
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`standard of care within Clearview’s industry; and (b) in a manner that was the same or more
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`protective than the manner in which the Clearview Defendants stored and protected other
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`confidential and sensitive information. Evidence of the Clearview Defendants’ lax security
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`13
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`practices includes the fact that Clearview’s electronic systems were hacked on at least two
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`occasions in 2020.
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`49.
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`According to public reports, in one instance, the hackers obtained Clearview’s
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`customer list. In the other instance, hackers obtained access to a “misconfigured server” that
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`exposed Clearview’s internal files, apps and source code to anyone on the internet. The
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`misconfigured server allowed anyone to run Clearview’s software application and access the
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`Biometric Database that contained the sensitive Biometrics of millions of United States residents,
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`including Plaintiffs and Plaintiff Class Members.
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`The Corporate Fictions
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`50.
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`At relevant times, a unity of interest existed between Clearview and its principals,
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`Ton-That and Schwartz, that caused the separate personalities of Clearview and those principals
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`to no longer exist. Moreover, adherence to the fiction of a separate corporate existence would
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`promote injustice and inequitable consequences.
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`51.
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`From Clearview’s inception, Ton-That and Schwartz undercapitalized Clearview
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`so that Clearview could not fulfill its obligations – namely, its legal obligations. Ton-That’s and
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`Schwartz’s undercapitalization was especially egregious given that, as alleged herein, they built
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`Clearview around an inherently unlawful business model that exposed Clearview to substantial
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`legal liability at all times. Ton-That’s and Schwartz’s failure to adequately capitalize Clearview
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`rendered, and continues to render, Clearview a mere liability shield.
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`52.
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`Further, at relevant times, Clearview directed its customers to send payments to
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`Schwartz’s personal residence. Moreover, Schwartz paid for the servers and other costs necessary
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`to carry out Clearview’s unlawful scraping and biometric scanning operations.
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`53.
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`Additionally, Ton-That and Schwartz treated Clearview’s Biometric Database as
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`their own and transferred “ownership” of it as they saw fit. In or about September 2019, Rocky
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`Mountain was organized and, shortly thereafter, contracted with the Illinois Secretary of State to
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`provide the Secretary of State with access to the Biometric Database. Rocky Mountain represented
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`that the Biometric Database was “its proprietary technology” and that Rocky Mountain was the
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`“sole manufacturer and provider” of the Biometric Database. According to Rocky Mountain,
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`“there is no other company that offers this product [the Biometric Database] and set of
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`capabilities.” On information and belief, based on Ton-That’s and Schwartz’s leadership positions
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`within Clearview and the fact that they were responsible for the creation of the Biometric Database,
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`Ton-That and Schwartz authorized and were directly involved in the creation of Rocky Mountain
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`and responsible for allowing Rocky Mountain to sell access to the Biometric Database.
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`54.
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`Notably, at relevant times, a unity of interest existed between Rocky Mountain, on
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`the one hand, and Ton-That, Schwartz and Mulcaire on the other that caused the separate
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`personalities of Rocky Mountain and Ton-That, Schwartz and Mulcaire to no longer exist.
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`Moreover, adherence to the fiction of a separate corporate existence would promote injustice and
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`inequitable consequences.
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`55.
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`Rocky Mountain was, in essence, a corporate shell that Ton-That and Schwartz did
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`not capitalize at all.
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`56.
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`Further, Ton-That, Schwartz and Mulcaire did not follow corporate formalities with
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`respect to Rocky Mountain. For instance, Rocky Mountain’s salesperson, in actuality, was a
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`Clearview employee. On information and belief, Ton-That, Schwartz and Mulcaire authorized and
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`directed that Clearview salesperson to double as a Rocky Mountain salesperson, all the while
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`knowing that the salesperson would be paid for all of his work by Clearview. Further, on
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`Case: 1:21-cv-00135 Document #: 374 Filed: 07/07/22 Page 16 of 60 PageID #:7446
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`information and belief, Ton-That and Schwartz authorized Mulcaire to provide his personal
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`information to the Illinois Secretary of State, knowing that by doing so the Illinois Secretary of
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`State would make direct payment to him, not Rocky Mountain. Mulcaire, an attorney, ultimately
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`provided his personal information to the Illinois Secretary of State, resulting in the Illinois
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`Secretary of State submitting a voucher to the Illinois Comptroller authorizing payment to
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`Mulcaire. The Illinois Comptroller ultimately issued a $5,000 payment to Mulcaire.
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`57.
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`Based on the same facts alleged in the preceding paragraphs, Clearview, itself, is
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`also liable for the acts of Rocky Mountain because: (a) it was Rocky Mountain’s parent; and (b)
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`had control over and was involved in Rocky Mountain’s misconduct. As alleged, Rocky
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`Mountain’s misconduct can be traced to Clearview, its parent, through the conduct of Ton-That,
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`Schwartz and Mulcaire who were directly responsible for Rocky Mountain’s activities. Rocky
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`Mountain’s activities – which including collecting, obtaining, distributing, disseminating, selling,
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`leasing and profiting from the Biometrics of Plaintiffs and Plaintiff Class Members – resulted in
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`Rocky Mountain violating the privacy rights of millions of American residents, including residents
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`of Illinois, California, New York and Virginia. At all times, the injuries caused by Rocky