Case: 1:21-cv-00135 Document #: 375 Filed: 07/07/22 Page 1 of 38 PageID #:7491
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`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
`EASTERN DIVISION
`
`
`
`
`
`In re Clearview AI, Inc., Consumer Privacy
`Litigation
`
`
`This Document Relates to:
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`1:21-cv-3372
`
`
`Civil Action File No.: 1:21-cv-00135
`
`Judge Sharon Johnson Coleman
`
`Magistrate Judge Maria Valdez
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`JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
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`
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`
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`FIRST AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
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`Plaintiff Andrea Vestrand (“Plaintiff”), individually and on behalf of all others similarly
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`situated (“Plaintiff Class Members”), brings this First Amended Class Action Complaint against
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`the following: (a) Clearview AI, Inc., formerly known as Smartcheckr Corp., Inc. (“Clearview”);
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`(b) Hoan Ton-That; (c) Richard Schwartz; (d) Rocky Mountain Data Analytics LLC (“Rocky
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`Mountain”); (e) Thomas Mulcaire; (f) Macy’s, Inc.; (g) Macy’s Retail Holdings, Inc., now known
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`as Macy’s Retail Holdings, LLC; (h) Macy’s Corporate Services, Inc., now known as Macy’s
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`Corporate Services, LLC; (i) AT&T Inc. (“AT&T”); (j) Kohl’s, Inc. (“Kohl’s”); (k) Best Buy
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`Stores, L.P. (“Best Buy”); (l) Albertsons Companies, LLC (“Albertsons”); (m) Walmart Inc.
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`(“Walmart”); and (n) The Home Depot, Inc. (“Home Depot”). Plaintiff brings this First Amended
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`Class Action Complaint against Defendants (f) through (n) (collectively, the “Client Defendants”),
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`individually and as representatives of a defendant class comprised of all other private, non-
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`governmental entities similarly situated to the Client Defendants (hereinafter, “Defendant Class
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`Members”). Plaintiff complains and alleges as follows based on personal knowledge as to herself,
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`the investigation of her counsel, and information and belief as to all other matters, and demands a
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`trial by jury.
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`NATURE OF THE ACTION
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`1.
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`Without providing any notice and without obtaining any consent, Defendants
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`Clearview, Ton-That and Schwartz (collectively, the “Clearview Defendants”) covertly scraped
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`three billion photographs of facial images from the internet – including facial images of millions
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`of American residents and then used artificial intelligence algorithms to scan the face geometry of
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`each individual depicted in the photographs in order to harvest the individuals’ unique biometric
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`identifiers1 and corresponding biometric information2 (collectively, “Biometrics”). Further, the
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`Clearview Defendants created a searchable biometric database (the “Biometric Database”) that
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`contained the above-described Biometrics and allowed users of the Biometric Database to identify
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`unknown individuals merely by uploading a photograph to the database.
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`2.
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`The Clearview Defendants did not develop their technology out of a desire for a
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`safer society. Rather, they developed their technology to invade the privacy of the American public
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`for their own profit.
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`3.
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`While the Clearview Defendants have touted their actions and the Biometric
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`Database as being helpful to law enforcement and other government agencies, the Clearview
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`Defendants have made their Biometric Database available to public and private entities and
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`persons, alike. What the Clearview Defendants’ technology really offers is a massive surveillance
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`state. Anyone utilizing the technology could determine the identities of people as they walk down
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`1 As used herein, “biometric identifier” is any personal feature that is unique to an individual, including
`fingerprints, iris scans, DNA and “face geometry,” among others.
`2 As used herein, “biometric information” is any information captured, converted, stored, or shared based
`on a person’s biometric identifier used to identify an individual.
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`2
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`the street, attend a political rally or enjoy time in public with their families. One of Clearview’s
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`financial backers has conceded that Clearview may be laying the groundwork for a “dystopian
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`future.”
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`4.
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`Accordingly, Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and similarly situated individuals,
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`brings this action for damages and other legal and equitable remedies resulting from the actions of
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`the Clearview Defendants, the Client Defendants and Defendant Class Members for their unlawful
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`creation and/or use of the Biometric Database consisting of the Biometrics of millions of American
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`residents, including residents of California. As alleged below, Defendants’ conduct violated, and
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`continues to violate, a number of state statutory and constitutional rights, as well as common law
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`rights, causing injury to Plaintiff and Plaintiff Class Members.
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`PARTIES
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`5.
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`Plaintiff Andrea Vestrand is, and at relevant times has been, a resident of California,
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`residing in the Central District of California.
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`6.
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`Defendant Clearview AI, Inc., formerly known as Smartcheckr Corp., Inc., is a
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`private, for-profit Delaware corporation, headquartered in New York, New York (Defendant and
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`its predecessors, hereinafter “Clearview”). Clearview markets its technology throughout the
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`United States, including in California. Moreover, Clearview obtains the images that underlie its
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`technology from millions of internet-based platforms and websites, including, on information and
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`belief, based on the magnitude of platforms and websites involved, platforms and websites of
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`California companies or companies that operate servers in California. Clearview’s business and
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`unlawful practices extend nationwide, and it has disclosed the Biometrics of unsuspecting
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`individuals to its clients around the country. Clearview continues to engage in this conduct to this
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`day.
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`3
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`7.
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`Defendant Hoan Ton-That is a founder and the Chief Executive Officer of
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`Clearview and an architect of its illegal scheme, as alleged herein. Ton-That’s responsibilities at
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`Clearview included, and continue to include, managing technology matters. At relevant times,
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`Ton-That knew of, participated in, consented to, approved, authorized and directed the wrongful
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`acts alleged in this First Amended Class Action Complaint.
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`8.
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`Defendant Richard Schwartz is a founder and the President of Clearview and an
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`architect of its illegal scheme. Schwartz’s responsibilities at Clearview included, and continue to
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`include, managing sales. Schwartz knew of, participated in, consented to, approved, authorized,
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`and directed the wrongful acts alleged in this First Amended Class Action Complaint.
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`9.
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`At relevant times, Defendant Thomas Mulcaire was an attorney licensed in
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`California, Clearview’s General Counsel and the Vice President of Defendant Rocky Mountain.
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`Mulcaire provided a Rocky Mountain customer with his personal information in order to be paid
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`directly for work performed by Rocky Mountain.
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`10.
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`Defendant Rocky Mountain Data Analytics LLC is a private, for-profit New
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`Mexico limited liability company with its principal place of business in New Mexico. As alleged
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`in more detail below, a unity of interest existed between Rocky Mountain, on the one hand, and
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`Ton-That, Schwartz and Mulcaire on the other that caused the separate personalities of Rocky
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`Mountain and Ton-That, Schwartz and Mulcaire to no longer exist. Further, as alleged in more
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`detail below, Clearview is legally responsible for the actions and conduct of Rocky Mountain.
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`11.
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`At relevant times, Defendant Macy’s, Inc. was a Delaware corporation, that held
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`itself out to as “one of the nation’s premier retailers” with approximately 680 department stores
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`and over 100,00 employees. Among the department stores, several were stores located in
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`California.
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`4
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`12.
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`At relevant times, Defendant Macy’s Retail Holdings, Inc., now known as Macy’s
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`Retail Holdings, LLC, was a New York corporation and wholly-owned subsidiary of Macy’s, Inc.
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`doing business in Illinois.
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`13.
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`At relevant times, Defendant Macy’s Corporate Services, Inc., now known as
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`Macy’s Corporate Services, LLC, was a New York Corporation and wholly-owned subsidiary of
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`Macy’s Retail Holdings, Inc. doing business in Illinois. Defendants Macy’s, Inc.; Macy’s Retail
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`Holdings, Inc., now known as Macy’s Retail Holdings, LLC; and Macy’s Corporate Services, Inc.,
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`now known as Macy’s Corporate Services, LLC, are hereinafter collectively referred to as
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`“Macy’s” or the “Macy’s Entities.”
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`14.
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`Defendant AT&T Inc. is a Delaware corporation, headquartered Dallas, Texas,
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`doing business in California.
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`15.
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`Defendant Kohl’s, Inc. is a Delaware corporation, headquartered in Menomonee
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`Falls, Wisconsin, doing business in California.
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`16.
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`Defendant Best Buy Stores, L.P. is a Minnesota corporation, headquartered in
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`Richfield, Minnesota, doing business in California.
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`17.
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`Defendant Albertsons Companies, LLC is a Delaware corporation, headquartered
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`in Boise, Idaho, doing business in California.
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`18.
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`Defendant Walmart Inc. is a Delaware corporation, headquartered in Bentonville,
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`Arkansas, doing business in California.
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`19.
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`Defendant The Home Depot, Inc. is a Delaware corporation, headquartered in
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`Atlanta, Georgia, doing business in California.
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`JURISDICTION AND VENUE
`This Court has original jurisdiction over this controversy pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
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`20.
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`1332(d) because there are more than 100 Plaintiff Class Members and the aggregate amount in
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`5
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`controversy exceeds $5,000,000.00, exclusive of interest, fees, and costs, and at least one member
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`of each of the Plaintiff Classes is a citizen of a state different from one of the Defendants.
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`21.
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`This Court has personal jurisdiction over the Clearview Defendants because their
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`contacts with California are directly related to the conduct alleged herein. Among other things, the
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`Clearview Defendants collected, obtained, distributed, and profited from the biometric data,
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`identities, likenesses, and photographs of Plaintiff and Plaintiff Class Members, who are California
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`residents, thereby invading their private domains within the State of California. The Clearview
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`Defendants engaged in their conduct without obtaining consent from Plaintiff and Plaintiff Class
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`Members, which they would have obtained in California had they sought it. As alleged in more
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`detail below, at relevant times, a unity of interest existed between Clearview and its principals,
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`Ton-That and Schwartz, that caused the separate personalities of Clearview and those principals
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`to no longer exist. Moreover, adherence to the fiction of a separate corporate existence would
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`promote injustice and inequitable consequences.
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`22.
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`This Court has personal jurisdiction over Rocky Mountain because, as alleged in
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`more detail below, a unity of interest existed between Rocky Mountain, on the one hand, and Ton-
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`That, Schwartz and Mulcaire on the other that caused the separate personalities of Rocky Mountain
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`and Ton-That, Schwartz and Mulcaire to no longer exist. As a result, Rocky Mountain had no
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`corporate existence separate from that of Clearview and, therefore, engaged in the same conduct
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`with respect to California as that alleged for the Clearview Defendants.
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`23.
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`This Court has personal jurisdiction over Mulcaire because he is a California-
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`licensed attorney who acted as Clearview’s General Counsel during the time Clearview engaged
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`in the unlawful conduct alleged herein. Moreover, Mulcaire was the Vice President of Rocky
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`6
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`Mountain, which as alleged in more detail below was a corporate shell of Clearview. Mulcaire’s
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`contacts with California were, thus, the same as those of the Clearview Defendants.
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`24.
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`The Court has personal jurisdiction over the Macy’s Entities because their contacts
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`with California are directly related to the conduct alleged herein.
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` On information and belief, Macy’s
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`obtained access to the Biometric Database and the Biometrics contained therein in order to identify
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`people whose images appeared in surveillance camera footage from Macy’s retail stores, including
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`its retail stores in California. Macy’s utilized the Biometric Database over 6,000 times, each time
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`uploading a probe image to the database to have the database search the Biometrics contained
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`therein, including the Biometrics of millions of California residents, for a biometric match. On
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`information and belief, based on the magnitude of the number of searches, Macy’s uploaded one
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`or more probe images from surveillance cameras located in California.
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`25.
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`The Court has personal jurisdiction over AT&T because its contacts with California
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`are directly related to the conduct alleged herein. At relevant times, AT&T operated numerous
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`retail stores in California. On information and belief, AT&T obtained access to the Biometric
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`Database and the Biometrics contained therein in order to identify people whose images appeared
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`in surveillance camera footage from AT&T retail stores, including its retail stores in California.
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`AT&T utilized the Biometric Database
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`, each time uploading a probe image to
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`the database to have the database search the Biometrics contained therein, including the Biometrics
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`of millions of California residents, for a biometric match. On information and belief, based on the
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`7
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`magnitude of the number of searches, AT&T uploaded one or more probe images from
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`surveillance cameras located in California.
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`26.
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`The Court has personal jurisdiction over Kohl’s because its contacts with California
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`are directly related to the conduct alleged herein. At relevant times, Kohl’s operated numerous
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`retail stores in California. On information and belief, Kohl’s obtained access to the Biometric
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`Database and the Biometrics contained therein in order to identify people whose images appeared
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`in surveillance camera footage from Kohl’s retail stores, including its retail stores in California.
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`Kohl’s utilized the Biometric Database
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`, each time uploading a probe image
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`to the database to have the database search the Biometrics contained therein, including the
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`Biometrics of millions of California residents, for a biometric match. On information and belief,
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`based on the magnitude of the number of searches, Kohl’s uploaded one or more probe images
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`from surveillance cameras located in California.
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`27.
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`The Court has personal jurisdiction over Best Buy because its contacts with
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`California are directly related to the conduct alleged herein. At relevant times, Best Buy operated
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`numerous retail stores in California. On information and belief, Best Buy obtained access to the
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`Biometric Database and the Biometrics contained therein in order to identify people whose images
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`appeared in surveillance camera footage from Best Buy retail stores, including its retail stores in
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`California. Best Buy utilized the Biometric Database
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`, each time uploading a
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`probe image to the database to have the database search the Biometrics contained therein, including
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`the Biometrics of millions of California residents, for a biometric match. On information and
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`belief, based on the magnitude of the number of searches, Best Buy uploaded one or more probe
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`images from surveillance cameras located in California.
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`8
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`28.
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`The Court has personal jurisdiction over Albertsons because its contacts with
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`California are directly related to the conduct alleged herein. At relevant times, Albertsons operated
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`numerous retail stores in California through its Safeway brand. On information and belief,
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`Albertsons obtained access to the Biometric Database and the Biometrics contained therein in
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`order to identify people whose images appeared in surveillance camera footage from Albertsons
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`retail stores, including its retail stores in California. Albertsons utilized the Biometric Database
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`, each time uploading a probe image to the database to have the database
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`search the Biometrics contained therein, including the Biometrics of millions of California
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`residents, for a biometric match. On information and belief, based on the magnitude of the number
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`of searches, Albertsons uploaded one or more probe images from surveillance cameras located in
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`California.
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`29.
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`The Court has personal jurisdiction over Walmart because its contacts with
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`California are directly related to the conduct alleged herein. At relevant times, Walmart operated
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`numerous retail stores in California. On information and belief, Walmart obtained access to the
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`Biometric Database and the Biometrics contained therein in order to identify people whose images
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`appeared in surveillance camera footage from Walmart retail stores, including its retail stores in
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`California. Walmart utilized the Biometric Database
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`, each time uploading a probe
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`image to the database to have the database search the Biometrics contained therein, including the
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`Biometrics of millions of California residents, for a biometric match. On information and belief,
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`based on the magnitude of the number of searches, Walmart uploaded one or more probe images
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`from surveillance cameras located in California.
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`30.
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`The Court has personal jurisdiction over Home Depot because its contacts with
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`California are directly related to the conduct alleged herein. At relevant times, Home Depot
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`9
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`operated numerous retail stores in California. On information and belief, Home Depot obtained
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`access to the Biometric Database and the Biometrics contained therein in order to identify people
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`whose images appeared in surveillance camera footage from Home Depot retail stores, including
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`its retail stores in California. Home Depot utilized the Biometric Database
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`,
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`each time uploading a probe image to the database to have the database search the Biometrics
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`contained therein, including the Biometrics of millions of California residents, for a biometric
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`match. On information and belief, based on the magnitude of the number of searches, Home Depot
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`uploaded one or more probe images from surveillance cameras located in California.
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`31.
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`Venue is proper in the Central District of California pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
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`1391(b)(2) because, as alleged above, a substantial part of the acts or omissions giving rise to
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`Plaintiff’s claims occurred in California. Alternatively, venue is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
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`1391(b)(3) because the Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendants. In addition, venue is
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`proper in the Northern District of Illinois pursuant to the Conditional Transfer Order of the United
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`States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation that transferred this matter to United States District
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`Court for the Northern District of Illinois to be included as part of the multidistrict litigation
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`captioned In re: Clearview AI, Inc., Consumer Privacy Litigation, No. 21-cv-00135 (the
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`“Multidistrict Litigation”).
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`Biometric Identifiers
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`FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
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`32.
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`Every individual has unique features by which he or she can be identified using a
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`set of standard quantitative measurements, commonly referred to as “biometric identifiers.”
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`10
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`33.
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`For example, the shape of and distance between tiny ridges on each person’s finger
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`are unique, so measures of those features can be used to identify a specific individual as the person
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`who made a fingerprint.
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`34.
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`Each person also has a unique facial geometry composed of, among other
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`measurements, distances between key facial landmarks and ratios between those distances.
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`35.
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`Once a picture of a person’s face is scanned and its biometric measurements are
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`captured, computers can store that information and use it to identify that individual any other time
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`that person’s face appears on the internet, in a scanned picture or in footage from any of the billions
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`of cameras that are constantly monitoring the public’s daily lives.
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`36.
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`Unlike fingerprints, facial biometrics are readily observable and, thus, present a
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`grave and immediate danger to privacy, individual autonomy, and liberty.
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`The Clearview Defendants’ Unlawful Biometric Database
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`37.
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`The Clearview Defendants have collected, captured and obtained Biometrics from
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`more than three billion images they covertly scraped from the internet – including, on information
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`and belief, the Biometrics of Plaintiff and Plaintiff Class Members – which they have amassed into
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`the searchable Biometric Database.
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`38.
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`Additionally, the Clearview Defendants have distributed, disseminated, sold,
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`traded, leased and otherwise profited from the Biometrics they unlawfully collected, captured and
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`obtained.
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`39.
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`To date, the Clearview Defendants have sold unfettered access to their vast
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`Biometric Database to more than 7,000 individuals from approximately 2,000 law enforcement
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`and government agencies, including the Chicago Police Department and the Illinois Secretary of
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`State.
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`40. Moreover, the Clearview Defendants have sold unfettered access to the Biometric
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`Database to more than 200 private companies, including the Client Defendants and Defendant
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`Class Members. Those private entities in turn frequently queried the Biometric Database for their
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`own business purposes, including to identify particular individuals appearing in photographs or
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`videos in their possession. Each time one of Clearview’s private clients queried the Biometric
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`Database, the Clearview Defendants’ algorithms compared the facial geometry of the subject
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`appearing in a chosen photograph or video against the facial geometry of each of the hundreds of
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`millions of subjects appearing in the database, including the facial geometry of Plaintiff and
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`Plaintiff Class Members. Thus, by obtaining access to and querying the Biometric Database, the
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`Client Defendants and Defendant Class Members necessarily obtained, accessed and used all of
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`the Biometrics in that database, including the Biometrics of Plaintiff and Plaintiff Class Members.
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`41.
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`At relevant times, the Clearview Defendants failed to store and protect from
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`disclosure the highly sensitive Biometrics in the Biometric Database: (a) using the reasonable
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`standard of care within Clearview’s industry; and (b) in a manner that was the same or more
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`protective than the manner in which the Clearview Defendants stored and protected other
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`confidential and sensitive information. Evidence of the Clearview Defendants’ lax security
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`practices includes the fact that Clearview’s electronic systems were hacked on at least two
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`occasions in 2020.
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`42.
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`According to public reports, in one instance, the hackers obtained Clearview’s
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`customer list. In the other instance, hackers obtained access to a “misconfigured server” that
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`exposed Clearview’s internal files, apps and source code to anyone on the internet. The
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`misconfigured server allowed anyone to run Clearview’s software application and access the
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`12
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`Biometric Database that contained the sensitive Biometrics of millions of United States residents,
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`including Plaintiff and Plaintiff Class Members.
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`The Corporate Fictions
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`43.
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`At relevant times, a unity of interest existed between Clearview and its principals,
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`Ton-That and Schwartz, that caused the separate personalities of Clearview and those principals
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`to no longer exist. Moreover, adherence to the fiction of a separate corporate existence would
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`promote injustice and inequitable consequences.
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`44.
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`From Clearview’s inception, Ton-That and Schwartz undercapitalized Clearview
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`so that Clearview could not fulfill its obligations – namely, its legal obligations. Ton-That’s and
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`Schwartz’s undercapitalization was especially egregious given that, as alleged herein, they built
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`Clearview around an inherently unlawful business model that exposed Clearview to substantial
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`legal liability at all times. Ton-That’s and Schwartz’s failure to adequately capitalize Clearview
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`rendered, and continues to render, Clearview a mere liability shield.
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`45.
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`Further, at relevant times, Clearview directed its customers to send payments to
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`Schwartz’s personal residence. Moreover, Schwartz paid for the servers and other costs necessary
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`to carry out Clearview’s unlawful scraping and biometric scanning operations.
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`46.
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`Additionally, Ton-That and Schwartz treated Clearview’s Biometric Database as
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`their own and transferred “ownership” of it as they saw fit. In or about September 2019, Rocky
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`Mountain was organized and, shortly thereafter, contracted with the Illinois Secretary of State to
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`provide the Secretary of State with access to the Biometric Database. Rocky Mountain represented
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`that the Biometric Database was “its proprietary technology” and that Rocky Mountain was the
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`“sole manufacturer and provider” of the Biometric Database. According to Rocky Mountain,
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`“there is no other company that offers this product [the Biometric Database] and set of
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`capabilities.” On information and belief, based on Ton-That’s and Schwartz’s leadership positions
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`within Clearview and the fact that they were responsible for the creation of the Biometric Database,
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`Ton-That and Schwartz authorized and were directly involved in the creation of Rocky Mountain
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`and responsible for allowing Rocky Mountain to sell access to the Biometric Database.
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`47.
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`Notably, at relevant times, a unity of interest existed between Rocky Mountain, on
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`the one hand, and Ton-That, Schwartz and Mulcaire on the other that caused the separate
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`personalities of Rocky Mountain and Ton-That, Schwartz and Mulcaire to no longer exist.
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`Moreover, adherence to the fiction of a separate corporate existence would promote injustice and
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`inequitable consequences.
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`48.
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`Rocky Mountain was, in essence, a corporate shell that Ton-That and Schwartz did
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`not capitalize at all.
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`49.
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`Further, Ton-That, Schwartz and Mulcaire did not follow corporate formalities with
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`respect to Rocky Mountain. For instance, Rocky Mountain’s salesperson, in actuality, was a
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`Clearview employee. On information and belief, Ton-That, Schwartz and Mulcaire authorized and
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`directed that Clearview salesperson to double as a Rocky Mountain salesperson, all the while
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`knowing that the salesperson would be paid for all of his work by Clearview. Further, on
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`information and belief, Ton-That and Schwartz authorized Mulcaire to provide his personal
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`information to the Illinois Secretary of State, knowing that by doing so the Illinois Secretary of
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`State would make direct payment to him, not Rocky Mountain. Mulcaire, an attorney, ultimately
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`provided his personal information to the Illinois Secretary of State, resulting in the Illinois
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`Secretary of State submitting a voucher to the Illinois Comptroller authorizing payment to
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`Mulcaire. The Illinois Comptroller ultimately issued a $5,000 payment to Mulcaire.
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`Case: 1:21-cv-00135 Document #: 375 Filed: 07/07/22 Page 15 of 38 PageID #:7505
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`50.
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`Based on the same facts alleged in the preceding paragraphs, Clearview, itself, is
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`also liable for the acts of Rocky Mountain because: (a) it was Rocky Mountain’s parent; and (b)
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`had control over and was involved in Rocky Mountain’s misconduct. As alleged, Rocky
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`Mountain’s misconduct can be traced to Clearview, its parent, through the conduct of Ton-That,
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`Schwartz and Mulcaire who were directly responsible for Rocky Mountain’s activities. Rocky
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`Mountain’s activities – which including collecting, obtaining, distributing, disseminating, selling,
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`leasing and profiting from the Biometrics of Plaintiff and Plaintiff Class Members – resulted in
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`Rocky Mountain violating the privacy rights of millions of American residents, including residents
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`of California. At all times, the injuries caused by Rocky Mountain’s conduct were foreseeable.
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`Allegations Related to Plaintiff and Plaintiff Class Members
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`51.
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`At relevant times, Plaintiff uploaded from California to various websites on the
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`internet photographs taken in California and containing images of her face. In creating the
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`Biometric Database, Clearview searched millions of websites on the internet for image files.
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`Plaintiff’s Biometrics are contained in the Biometric Database.
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`52.
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`After scraping photographs from the internet, the Clearview Defendants, singularly
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`and/or in concert, performed facial geometric scans of the various faces in the scraped photographs,
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`including Plaintiff’s and Plaintiff Class Members’ faces, in order to collect, capture and obtain the
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`Biometrics from those faces.
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`53.
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`Additionally,
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`the Clearview Defendants distributed and disseminated
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`the
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`Biometrics of Plaintiff and Plaintiff Class Members to Rocky Mountain who, after obtaining the
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`Biometrics, then redistributed and disseminated them to the Illinois Secretary of State.
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`54.
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`The Clearview Defendants also distributed and disseminated the Biometrics of
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`Plaintiff and Plaintiff Class Members to the Client Defendants and Defendant Class Members who,
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`Case: 1:21-cv-00135 Document #: 375 Filed: 07/07/22 Page 16 of 38 PageID #:7506
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`as alleged above, purchased access to the Biometric Database and then repeatedly obtained the
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`Biometrics contained therein in connection with running biometric searches.
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`55.
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`Clearview, Rocky Mountain, Ton-That, Schwartz and Mulcaire profited from the
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`Biometrics in the Biometric Database, including the Biometrics of Plaintiff and Plaintiff Class
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`Members, by selling, leasing and trading them to thousands of governmental and private entities,
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`as alleged herein.
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`56.
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`The Client Defendants and Defendant Class Members also profited from the
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`Biometrics in the Biometric Database, including the Biometrics of Plaintiff and Plaintiff Class
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`Members, by using those Biometrics to prevent losses and/or improve the customer’s experience.
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`57.
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`Defendants: (a) never informed Plaintiff or Plaintiff Class Members in writing or
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`otherwise of the purpose for which they were collecting, capturing, obtaining, purchasing,
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`disclosing, redisclosing and disseminating the Biometrics of Plaintiff and Plaintiff Class Members;
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`and (b) never sought, nor received, a written release or other consent from Plaintiff or Plaintiff
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`Class Members or the respective authorized representatives of Plaintiff or Plaintiff Class Members
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`that allowed Defendants to collect, capture, obtain, purchase, disclose, redisclose and disseminate
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`the Biometrics of Plaintiff and Plaintiff Class Members.
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`58.
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`Further, Plaintiff and Plaintiff Class Members never consented, agreed or gave
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`permission – written or otherwise – to Defendants for the collection or storage of their unique
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`Biometrics. Indeed, prior to the Biometric Database being publicized, Plaintiff and Plaintiff Class
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`Members had no idea Defendants were ever in possession of their photographs.
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`59.
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`Likewise, Defendants never provided Plaintiff or Plaintiff Class Members with an
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`opportunity to prohibit or prevent the collection, storage, use or dissemination of their unique
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`Biometrics.
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`Case: 1:21-cv-00135 Document #: 375 Filed: 07/07/22 Page 17 of 38 PageID #:7507
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`The Injuries to and Damages of Plaintiff and Plaintiff Class Members
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`60.
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`As alleged herein, as a result of Defendants’ unlawful conduct, Plaintiff and
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`Plaintiff Class Members have already sustained injuries and face many more imminent and
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`certainly impending injuries, which injuries they will continue to suffer.
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`61.
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`Defendants’ unlawful conduct has resulted in, among other things: (a) Plaintiff’s
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`and Plaintiff Class Members’ unique Biometrics being collected, captured, obtained, purchased,
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`disclosed, redisclosed and otherwise disseminated wi